Category: Paris Agreement

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Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Minority rights New Zealand Paris Agreement Right to life Separation of powers

Smith v. Attorney General

Summary:
This case was filed in 2022 and concerns the same plaintiff as the Smith v. Fonterra corporate responsibility case. The plaintiff in these cases is a Māori landowner and spokesperson on climate change for his tribe (iwi). He argued that the climate policy of the New Zealand government had failed to adequately protect the citizens of New Zealand, and especially Māori, against the impacts of climate change. Before the High Court, he submitted that “the Government has taken no or inadequate climate change mitigation measures since it had become aware of the causes and effects of climate change down to the present.” In July 2022, the High Court struck out all of the applicant’s claims. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal on all counts in December 2024.

Claims made:
The plaintiff’s case is based on three main arguments (expanded from the original submissions, which concerned only the first argument of the three). First, the plaintiff argues that the government breached its common law duty of care to “take all necessary steps to reduce NZ emissions and to actively protect the plaintiff and his descendants from the adverse effects of climate change”, as derived from its authority over the territory of New Zealand, the government’s duty of care, and its responsibility to Māori. Secondly, he alleged a breach of the rights enshrined in sections 8 and 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), concerning deprivation of life and the denial of the right to practise culture. Here the plaintiff argued that the Crown had “failed to put in place an effective legislative and administrative framework properly designed to provide effective mitigation against the climate change risk in accordance with the best available science and New Zealand’s international and domestic legal obligations.” He invoked the protection of his own life, those of his tribe and clan, and those of future generations. Thirdly, he argued that the government had violated the Tiriti o Waitangi | the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document, and the consequent fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff and those he represents.

Finding of the High Court:
In July 2022, the High Court struck out all three claims. First, it found that the plaintiff’s arguments about the common law duty of care were not based on recognized legal obligations or case-law. It was also considered too far-reaching: “any relief, if it were available, would be an ineffective and piecemeal way to deal with climate change issues. Every person in New Zealand would be entitled to sue the Government under the novel duty.” It noted too that “the courts have neither the technical capacity nor the political mandate to co-ordinate in an integrated way to mitigate the effects of climate change”.

On the second argument, the Court found that the right to life claim was untenable because the plaintiff had not demonstrated a “‘real and identifiable’ risk to the life of a specified individual or even a class of individuals. It is a general threat that may eventuate as a result of the effects of climate change to all New Zealanders.” In addition, the Court was not convinced that it was possible to draw analogies to Dutch law, and specifically the Urgenda case invoked by the plaintiff, meaning that “[t]he decision in Urgenda must be treated with caution”.

Furthermore, on the minority rights claim, the Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged specific breaches of that right, which only entailed positive obligations under exceptional circumstances. It also held that the plaintiff’s case was “based on a claim that an existing legislative and policy framework is inadequate to protect Māori. There is no allegation of opposition or coercion targeting Māori that fits within that exceptional category here.” Accordingly, this part of the case was also declared inadmissible.

Finally, concerning the Tiriti o Waitangi, the Court found that this claim was so broad, and climate change was so complex, that “any fiduciary obligations arising from the Crown would be owed to the public in general. This alone makes the claim untenable”. To be contemplated, such a claim would depend on an underlying duty — here, the duty of care invoked by the applicant — which had already been rejected above, making this claim untenable. In addition, the Court held, “a claim that such a duty is owed to only a subsection of New Zealanders, Māori, as opposed to the public in general, is a further reason that it cannot be tenable”.

Judgment of the Court of Appeal:
On 19 December 2024, the Court of Appeal issued its ruling in this case, rejecting the applicant’s appeal on all counts.

On the claim concerning the right to life, the court considered six questions: 
           a)  whether that right includes a right to a life with dignity;
           b)  whether the widespread nature of (climate) effects preclude the applicability of the right to life;
           c)  whether the risks from climate change are sufficiently proximate;
           d)  whether the right to life can impose positive duties on the State;
           e)  whether it is tenable that New Zealand’s regulatory framework breached the right to life; and
           f)  whether reporting orders are tenably available.

On the first question, it found that it was not clearly untenable that the right to life includes a right to a minimum baseline as to the quality of life and is therefore applicable to the potential impacts of climate change.  This, it held, is consistent with international jurisprudence. Throughout, it extensively engaged with international jurisprudence (Billy, Teitiota) and soft-law materials (the HRC’s General comment No 36).

On the second question, the Court found that it was not clearly untenable on the grounds that the alleged risk to life potentially affects a large group or all of the population.   

On the third question, again referring to international climate jurisprudence on equivalent rights, and particularly engaging with the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, the Court found that this would be a matter of (scientific) evidence for trial, and that it could accordingly not strike this out at this stage. 

On the fourth question, the Court found – given the context of the climate emergency and the case-law from around the world responding to this challenge — it was not clearly untenable that NZBORA’s right to life requires the government to take protective measures against foreseeable threats to life. 

On the fifth question, on the challenge to the efficacy of the legislative framework responding to climate change, the Court found that it could not second-guess parliamentary policy choices, striking out this claim while referring to the possibility of judicial review of concrete actions taken under the legislative framework.

On the sixth question, it found that the court’s institutional role did not encompass an ongoing monitoring role of the measures the Crown is implementing in response to climate change.

On the right to culture, the court found that it was not clearly untenable that climate change could give rise to a positive obligation to protect against a denial of the right to culture under s20 of NZBORA where a substantial interference amounting to a denial of the right occurs. However, here too the court found that the pleaded deficiencies of the domestic legal framework reflect policy choices that are for Parliament and that it could not review.

As concerns the claim of a breach of te Tiriti, the court found that this was clearly untenable because the domestic legislative framework gives effect to the Crown’s obligations under the Treaty and allows for decisions consistent with Treaty principles.

As concerns the claim that the Crown owes fiduciary duties to Mr Smith, his whānau, Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Kahu, the court found that the claimed fiduciary duty was not comparable to specific fiduciary duties arising between the government and certain Māori due to particular dealings between them.  As a result, the pleaded claim was inconsistent with the nature of fiduciary duties because the response to climate change required a balancing of interests and the government could not act purely in the interests of the pleaded beneficiaries. 

As concerned the claim that there was a novel common law duty in place, relying on the common law public trust doctrine, this doctrine stemmed from the context of access to seashores and navigable waters and was thus too far removed from the extensive duty pleaded in relation to climate change.  The court found that the boundaries of the public trust doctrine are imprecise and fluid, raising a host of conceptual problems in imposing fiduciary or trust-like obligations on the government, and that the doctrine could in any case be displaced by legislation; domestic law did not leave room for its application.

Status of the case:
Appeal to the Court of Appeal rejected 19 December 2024.

Further reading:
The text of the High Court ruling is available here.

The text of the Court of Appeal ruling is available here.

Suggested citation:
High Court of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2022] NZHC 1693.

Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2024] NZCA 692.

Categories
2024 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to life Right to property Right to pursue happiness Uncategorized

Min-A Park v. South Korea

Summary:
In July 2023, a fourth constitutional mitigation case was filed before the South Korean Constitutional Court. This case was consolidated with three previously-filed climate cases, representing a total of 255 plaintiffs, and the Constitutional Court issued its ruling in all four cases on 29 August 2024. This joint ruling was reported as a landmark judgment and as the first finding of its kind in Asia (i.e. the first time that a court in the region found that inadequate mitigation action violates constitutional rights).

In the present case, 51 individuals argued that their constitutional rights were being inadequately safeguarded by the failure to create an adequate implementation plana for South Korea’s 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement (NDC). This makes this case somewhat different from the other three, in the sense that it does not contest the country’s 40% reduction target (by 2030) itself, but argues that domestic measures will not be enough to meet that target. The plaintiffs estimated that current steps envisioned under South Korea’s Carbon Neutrality Plan would achieve only a 29.6% emissions reduction.

As per the complaint document (available, in the original Korean, on ClimateCaseChart), the plaintiffs invoked their rights to life, to pursue happiness, to general freedom, to property and to a healthy environment along with the State’s obligation to protect against disasters and protect fundamental rights.

Relevant developments:
On 12 June 2023, shortly before this case was filed, it was announced that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea had decided to submit an opinion to South Korea’s Constitutional Court to oppose the country’s Carbon Neutrality Act (2021), which it considered to be unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of future generations because it sets out a greenhouse gas emissions reductions target that was too low. The Act sets out a 40% emissions reductions target by 2030 as compared to 2018 levels. This, the Commission found, did not respect the constitutional principle of equality, because it passed the burden of greenhouse gas emissions on to future generations.

Consolidation with three other cases:
The South Korean Constitutional Court decided to consolidate its first four climate cases (Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea, Woodpecker et al. v. South Korea (Baby Climate Litigation), Climate Crisis Emergency Action v. South Korea (a.k.a. Byung-In Kim et al. v. South Korea) and Min-A Park v. South Korea (the present case). Public hearings in the cases were held on 23 April 2024 and 21 May 2024.

These cases all alleged that the government’s inadequate greenhouse gas reduction targets violated citizens’ fundamental rights, particularly those of future generations. Together, the four cases comprised over 250 plaintiffs, including civil society, youth and children. The Constitutional Court issued a joint ruling in these cases on 29 August 2024.

Judgment of the constitutional court:
On 29 August 2024, the South Korean Constitutional Court found a violation of constitutional rights in this case and three related cases. In an unanimous ruling, hailed as “the first decision of its kind in Asia“, the court found that the government’s response to the climate crisis was inadequate and threatened constitutional rights, noting that the country lacked legally binding long-term emissions reductions targets for the post-2031 period, which violated the constitutional rights of future generations by shifting an excessive reductions burden to the future. The Court gave government and legislature 18 months (until 28 February 2026) to introduce the relevant targets.

In particular, the Court ruled that Article 8(1) of the South Korean Carbon Neutrality Basic Act was unconstitutional. Previously, the government had pledged a 40% reduction of its GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 2018 levels, but had failed to set any targets since. The Constitutional Court held that this “does not have the minimum character necessary as a protective measure corresponding to the dangerous situation of the climate crisis”, citing the “principle of non-underprotection”, which means that the State must take appropriate measures to effectively protect the constitutional rights of its citizens.

Simultaneously, the Court held that the government’s target for 2030 did not infringe constitutional rights.

See also:
Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea.

Last updated:
29 August 2024.

Categories
Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Extreme poverty Germany Just transition litigation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to health Right to life

“Zukunftsklage” (Greenpeace and ors. v. Germany) – Neubauer II / Steinmetz III

Summary:
On 26 June 2024, it was announced that five German environmental organisations, together with a large number of individual plaintiffs, would be preparing a total of three new constitutional complaints against the Federal Government’s inadequate climate policy and the gutting of the Climate Protection Act (KSG) for the event that Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier were to sign pending amendments of the Act into law.

The five organisations — Germanwatch, Greenpeace, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH), Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) and Solarenergie-Förderverein Deutschland (SFV) — will each lead a complaint together with plaintiffs affected by climate change in different areas of their lives. Some of these plaintiffs were parties to the groundbreaking Neubauer case before the Federal Constitutional Court, including Luisa Neubauer, Sophie Backsen, Hannes Backsen, and Lüke Recktenwald.

The applicants argue that, even though the Neubauer case elevated climate action to the level of constitutional protection, insufficient action has taken place since then. Drawing on the intertemporal constitutional freedoms recognized in Neubauer, the interests of intergenerational justice, impacts on life and health, and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in KlimaSeniorinnen, wherein it found a violation of the right to respect for private and family life in Art. 8 ECHR, the plaintiffs argue that the requisite climate action is being delayed further into the future, increasingly endangering the future enjoyment of rights. This particularly affects the transport sector, where “extreme cuts and measures” will be required to meet reductions targets.

The plaintiffs note that the German Council of Climate Experts has made it clear that Germany is unlikely to achieve its climate targets for 2030, and that according to data from the Federal Environment Agency, the target of net zero by 2045 will also be missed by a considerable margin given current plans. This is in part due to abolition of funding programs as a result of the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Climate and Transformation Fund in November 2023.

Focusing particularly on an amendment to the German Climate Protection Act (KSG), passed by the German Bundestag on 26 April 2024, the plaintiffs note that this move (i) abolishes binding sector targets; (ii) eliminates the requirement for corrective action to catch up on missed targets; and means that (iii) post-2030 compliance with emission targets will only be considered in detail from 2029 and only planned and implemented from 2030. Overall, these legislative changes show that the legislator has not understood the constitutional limits to the overall concept of climate protection.

Since the 2021 Neubauer judgment, the plaintiffs argue, the German CO2 budget has been unnecessarily used up, while feasible and proportionate measures have not been taken. For example, the introduction of a speed limit on German freeways and in cities would have saved considerable amounts of CO2 and thus protected opportunities for freedom. The plaintiffs also cite failure to plan for green mobility options in rural areas. While immediate action in the transport sector would make it possible to transition gradually, the current plans require an “emergency stop” that will severely limit the freedoms of especially poorer segments of the population.

This cannot be countered by the fact that regulations exist at EU level. The applicants argue that EU climate protection law as a whole, and for the transport sector in particular, does not guarantee the necessary protection of fundamental rights because it does not contain any binding interim targets after 2030 and does not specify a comprehensible budget up to 2050. And, the plaintiffs note, German legislators are currently not even complying with the requirements of EU law, as established by the German Council of Climate Experts, among others.

Relief sought:
In their announcement, the plaintiffs set out three motions for relief.

  1. The German Climate Protection Act (KSG) still allows too many emissions given that the German emissions budget is empty if measured by the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement and the European Court of Human Rights, and almost empty if measured against the 1.75°C threshold set by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2021. The law is not ambitious enough, the permitted quantity targets jeopardize human rights instead of securing them. This must be changed to comply with the state’s existing duty to protect.
  2. The recent amendment to the KSG is unconstitutional. By weakening the required measures to reach Germany’s goals, the amendment violates the intertemporal freedoms recognized in Neubauer. The amendment must be repealed and the old law must apply unchanged.
  3. The failure to take climate protection measures in the transport sector already violates intertemporal civil liberties, making disproportionate measures unavoidable later in time. People in rural areas are particularly affected by such restrictions on freedom, putting socially disadvantaged groups at a disadvantage.

Cases under the “Zukunftsklage” umbrella:

A first case under this umbrella was filed in July 2024. Known as “Steinmetz, et al. v. Germany III“, this case was brought by an NGO, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, and 11 individual plaintiffs aged between 14 and 27. They allege that current reforms are insufficient and that they violate the principle of intergenerational freedom developed in the Neubauer ruling. Drawing extensively on the European Court of Human Rights’ KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, they also argue that current mitigation plans in Germany infringe their rights to life and physical integrity, drawing on Article 8 ECHR.

Complaint form in the Steinmetz III caseDownload

Last updated:
29 November 2024

Categories
Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Evidence Fair trial Gender / women-led Imminent risk Keywords Margin of appreciation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Separation of powers Standing/admissibility Switzerland Victim status Vulnerability

Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland

Summary:
In 2016, the Senior Women for Climate Protection Switzerland (German: ‘Verein KlimaSeniorinnen’), a Swiss organisation, brought proceedings concerning the alleged omissions of the Swiss federal government to adopt an adequate climate protection policy. They submitted that current domestic climate targets and measures are not sufficient to limit global warming to a safe level. This failure to prevent climate-related disasters, they argued, represents a failure to protect the rights under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the rights to life and respect for private and family life, respectively) of the organization’s members. In particular, they submitted evidence that their specific demographic (older women) is particularly impacted by heatwaves, citing health impacts and excess mortality risks. The respondent State, they argued, has failed to comply with its positive obligations to protect their rights, read in light of the environmental law principles of precaution and intergenerational equity.

The applicants also invoked two procedural rights under the Convention, namely the rights in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR (right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, respectively). In this regard they argued that the domestic courts failed to take their case seriously and provide an effective remedy to contest the violation of their rights.

These claims were rejected by the domestic instances at three levels of jurisdiction. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in its ruling, considered that the case represented an actio popularis, concerned questions better suited to the political arena, and did not raise an arguable claim of a rights violation. As a result, the applicants took their case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

This case was only the second climate change-related case to come to Strasbourg. Like the Duarte Agostinho case, this application raised novel questions before the Court, including the issue of victim status in climate cases, the standing of (environmental) NGOs to bring cases to the Court, and the extent of the State margin of appreciation in regard to environmental protection measures related to climate change, and the extent of the positive obligation to protect individuals from the risks to their life and health posed by climate change.

On 9 April 2024, in a historic ruling, the ECtHR declared this case admissible in part (for the association) and found that there had been violations of Articles 6(1) and 8 ECHR. In doing so, this case became the Court’s leading climate judgment, and a model for further climate-related cases in this system.

Third-party interventions:
There were an unusually large (for the ECtHR) number of third party interventions in this case: 23 in total, including eight States. The KlimaSeniorinnen association provided copies of all of the third-party interventions; these are available here. Some of the third-party interveners were also granted leave to intervene orally during the hearing before the Grand Chamber.

Grand Chamber hearing:
This was the first climate case heard by the European Court of Human Rights, followed immediately by the Carême v. France case. The Court has adjourned its examination of six other climate cases until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the three climate change cases before it, meaning that leading judgments clarifying the Convention obligations around cliamte change can be expected in these cases.

During the hearing, submissions were heard from the applicants, the respondent State, and two of the 23 total third-party interveners (the Government of Ireland & the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). A live summary of the hearing is available here.

General findings of the Court in its judgment of 9 April 2024:
The Court’s judgment is prefaced by a number of general findings that reflect its intended nature as a leading case. Noting the need to ensure effective protection of Convention rights without undermining the prohibition of actio popularis cases under the Convention system, the Court acknowledged that it had a role to play here, finding that “the current situation (…) involves compelling present‑day conditions, confirmed by scientific knowledge, which the Court cannot ignore in its role as a judicial body tasked with the enforcement of human rights.” At the same time, noting “the necessarily primary responsibility of the legislative and executive branches and the inherently collective nature of both the consequences and the challenges arising from the adverse effects of climate change”, it held that the issue of victim status here raised an issue of the separation of powers, requiring particular consideration. Noting the global and complex nature of climate change, it held that “the necessity of combating climate change involves various conflicts, the weighing‑up of which falls, as stated previously, within the democratic decision‑making processes, complemented by judicial oversight by the domestic courts and this Court.”

In light of this, and before assessing the case, the Court set out a number of general considerations relating to climate‑change cases. This includes questions of causation, including the finding that despite indirect causal links, “the essence of the relevant State duties in the context of climate change relates to the reduction of the risks of harm for individuals”, meaning that it could not apply “a strict conditio sine qua non requirement” to matters of causation. This section also includes issues of proof and evidence, and references the “evolution of scientific knowledge, social and political attitudes and legal standards concerning the necessity of protecting the environment”. Here the Court established that “there are sufficiently reliable indications that anthropogenic climate change exists, that it poses a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights guaranteed under the Convention, that States are aware of it and capable of taking measures to effectively address it, that the relevant risks are projected to be lower if the rise in temperature is limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and if action is taken urgently, and that current global mitigation efforts are not sufficient to meet the latter target” (para. 436). And, importantly, it discarded the “drop in the bucket” argument made by the respondent State, stating that “The relevant test does not require it to be shown that “but for” the failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred. Rather, what is important, and sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State, is that reasonable measures which the domestic authorities failed to take could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm” (para. 444). It also stressed that there is no right to a healthy environment in the ECHR, but that it can and has nonetheless dealt with other environmental cases, reiterating its past approach that “the crucial element which must be present in determining whether, in the circumstances of a given case, an environmental harm has adversely affected one of the rights safeguarded by the Convention is the existence of a harmful effect on a person and not simply the general deterioration of the environment” (para. 446). It also noted that it is conscious of its subsidiary role and the direct democratic legitimation of national authorities to make decisions on climate policy, but that where State policy affects Convention rights, it has competence to intervene and “the Court’s competence in the context of climate-change litigation cannot, as a matter of principle, be excluded” (paras. 449-451).

The Court also set out the relevant principles for interpreting the ECHR, including the living instrument approach and the fact that while the Court “does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention” — including the Paris Agreement — it has consistently noted that it will interpret the Convention in harmony with other international law.

Admissibility:
On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case admissible in part. Under Article 34 ECHR, it used this judgment as an opportunity to create new standards on victim status specific to climate-related cases. In doing so, it set out the general standards on victim status, noting that it did not admit actio popularis cases and that the ECHR “does not permit individuals or groups of individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention” (para. 460). It noted that the notion of victim status must be applied flexibly, and that it’s distinct from locus standi, i.e. representative actions.

The Court then issued general considerations on victim status and locus standi in climate cases, noting that “there is cogent scientific evidence demonstrating that climate change has already contributed to an increase in morbidity and mortality, especially among certain more vulnerable groups, that it actually creates such effects and that, in the absence of resolute action by States, it risks progressing to the point of being irreversible and disastrous” (para. 478).

It also held that (para. 479): the critical issues around climate change “arise from failures to act, or inadequate action”, meaning omissions in legislative or regulatory frameworks that require a special approach to victim status. Importantly, the Court also clarified that its findings on victim status in the context of complaints about omissions in climate policy “is without prejudice to the determination of victim status in circumstances where complaints by individuals concern alleged violations arising from a specific individual loss or damage already suffered by them” (para. 480), meaning that the special approach spelled out for mitigation cases need not preclude other types of claims. However, it held, in the context of climate change, “a potentially a huge number of persons could claim victim status under the Convention”, which “would not sit well with the exclusion of actio popularis from the Convention mechanism and the effective functioning of the right of individual application” (para. 483). The Court clarified the difficult situation in which it found itself, between “disrupting national constitutional principles and the separation of powers” and depriving individuals affected in their rights from “any judicial recourse before the Court”, noting the “distinct representational disadvantage” of those most affected (para. 484). It then, in para 487 of the judgment, spelled out the criteria for individual victim status in climate cases. These are:

  • (a)  “a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change”, i.e. a significant level and severity of risk of adverse consequences; and
  • (b) “a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm.”

Given that there is no actio popularis under the Convention, the Court held, “the threshold for fulfilling these criteria is especially high”, and will depend on specific vulnerabilities and local circumstances as well as including considerations relating to: “the nature and scope of the applicant’s Convention complaint, the actuality/remoteness and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on the applicant’s life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicant’s vulnerability” (para. 488).

As to the standing of associations, the Court generally reiterated its previous Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others judgment, which had allowed representative standing for an organisation. It noted that recourse to collective bodies like associations can make defense of one’s interests more accessible in certain circumstances, including the context of climate change, noting that this general principle was also reflected in the Aarhus Convention. The Court then set out some general principles on organizations’ victim status versus their standing as representatives of victims. In light of the former, it reiterated past case-law finding that “an association cannot rely on health considerations or nuisances and problems associated with climate change which can only be encountered by natural persons”. But it also recognized that understandings of the importance of litigation by associations had evolved, and that climate cases are complex and demanding and affect many individuals (para. 498). In addition, “the special feature of climate change as a common concern of humankind and the necessity of promoting intergenerational burden-sharing in this context (…), speak in favour of recognising the standing of associations before the Court in climate-change cases” (para. 499). However, this should not mean allowing an actio popularis: a test for associations’ standing is required. To design its test, the Court had regard to the Aarhus Convention while also noting key difference between its approach and that under Aarhus.

The test it devised for associations looks as follows (§ 502): associations will have locus standi to bring climate cases about impacts on human lives and health where they:

  • (a) have been lawfully established in the relevant jurisdiction, or have standing to act there;
  • (b) pursue, under their statutory objectives, a dedicated purpose of defending the human rights of their members or other affected individuals in the jurisdiction concerned, and
  • (c) are genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of affected individuals in the jurisdiction who are subject to specific threats on their lives, health or well-being from climate change.

The Court also noted that it would consider additional factors, like the purpose for which the association was established, its non-profit character, the nature and extent of its activities, its membership and representativeness, its principles and transparency of governance and whether standing is in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

There was no need, however, to show that those on whose behalf the case has been brought would themselves have met the climate-specific victim-status requirements for individuals as set out earlier in the judgment.

Because the Court joined its actual analysis of the victim status requirement to the merits of the case, this is discussed in the following section.

Merits:
In setting out general principles on the applicability of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life), the Court noted past cases where the right was applicable to situations where there is a threat to life, but “where the person concerned did not die”. Although noting the evidence on vulnerable populations, the Court reiterated that the appropriate test here is one of whether there is a “real and imminent” risk to life, meaning that the risk must be serious, genuine, sufficiently ascertainable and in physical proximity. It then tailored this last aspect to the nature of climate change, stating that it would suffice to show “an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant”. This means that, provided an applicant has victim status, “a serious risk of a significant decline in a person’s life expectancy owing to climate change ought also to trigger the applicability of Article 2.”

As for Article 8 ECHR, the Court stated generally that it was necessary to show an “actual interference” with the right, meaning that there needs to be “a direct and immediate link between the alleged environmental harm and the applicant’s private or family life or home”, and a certain level of severity. Drawing on its past environmental case-law, the Court went on to establish that “Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 519).

The Court then considered the applicability of Art. 8 ECHR to the case before it. As concerned the applicant association, it found that it met the criteria for standing by associations as set out earlier in the judgment, describing the KlimaSeniorinnen association as “a vehicle of collective recourse aimed at defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State”. The complaints pursued by the association on behalf of its members, it held, fall within the scope of Article 8. The association accordingly had locus standi, and Article 8 was declared applicable to its complaint.

On applicants 2-5 (the individual applicants), the Court held that the threshold for meeting its two criteria (high-intensity exposure and a pressing need to ensure protection) was high. It was not enough to show that they were particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The crucial paragraph of the judgment here is para. 533: “while it may be accepted that heatwaves affected the applicants’ quality of life, it is not apparent from the available materials that they were exposed to the adverse effects of climate change, or were at risk of being exposed at any relevant point in the future, with a degree of intensity giving rise to a pressing need to ensure their individual protection (…). It cannot be said that the applicants suffered from any critical medical condition whose possible aggravation linked to heatwaves could not be alleviated by the adaptation measures available in Switzerland or by means of reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their complaint was accordingly declared inadmissible.

On the claims under Article 2, the Court held that it was not necessary to analyze this further, noting that its analysis would “have regard to the principles developed also under Article 2, which to a very large extent are similar to those under Article 8 (…) and which, when seen together, provide a useful basis for defining the overall approach to be applied in the climate-change context under both provisions.”

The Court then recapitulated more general principles now on the merits proper. It held that the Article 2 and 8 positive obligations are generally quite similar, requiring the State:

  • (a)  to put in place an adequate legislative and administrative framework and govern the licensing, setting-up, operation, security and supervision of the activity;
  • (b) to apply that framework effectively in practice;
  • (c) to remain within their margin of appreciation;
  • (d) to exercise due diligence and consider all competing interests;
  • (f) to provide access to essential information enabling individuals to assess risks to their health and lives;

Noting also that “the scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in the particular circumstances will depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation”.

In reviewing the domestic decision-making process, the Court has particular regard to the following considerations:

  • (a) Its subsidiary role;
  • (b) The need to consider all of the procedural aspects;
  • (c) The presence of appropriate investigations and studies;
  • (d) The public’s access to the conclusions of the relevant studies; and
  • (e) Whether or not the individuals concerned had an opportunity to protect their interests in the environmental decision-making process, i.e. participate effectively.

Turning to States’ positive obligations relation to climate, it first considered the State margin of appreciation. Having regard to the scientific evidence, the Court considered it justified to give climate protection considerable weight against competing considerations.

Regarding the margin of appreciation it distinguished between the scope of the margin as regards (i) the State’s commitment combating climate change and setting objectives in this respect, and (ii) the choice of means designed to achieve those objectives. The margin is more narrow with regard to the former. For the latter aspect, i.e. the choice of means, States have a wide margin of appreciation.

As to the content of States’ positive obligations under Article 8, this is primarily a regulatory obligation. This means that, in line with their international commitments, States need to put in place regulations and measures to prevent climate change. The global aims in the Paris Agreement are not enough; and “must inform the formulation of domestic policies, it is obvious that the said aims cannot of themselves suffice as a criterion for any assessment of Convention compliance of individual Contracting Parties to the Convention in this area. This is because “each individual State is called upon to define its own adequate pathway for reaching carbon neutrality, depending on the sources and levels of emissions and all other relevant factors within its jurisdiction.”

This means that Article 8 ECHR “requires that each Contracting State undertake measures for the substantial and progressive reduction of their respective GHG emission levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within, in principle, the next three decades” (ca. 2050). To avoid a disproportionate burden on future generations, this means immediate action needs to be taken and adequate intermediate reduction goals must be set for the interim period. The Court spelled out that this must be part of a binding regulatory framework at the national level, followed by adequate implementation, and that “the relevant targets and timelines must form an integral part of the domestic regulatory framework, as a basis for general and sectoral mitigation measures.”

In para. 550, the Court set out the criteria it would use to decide whether a State has remained within its margin of appreciation, namely whether the authorities had due regard to the need to:

  • “(a) adopt general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality and the overall remaining carbon budget for the same time frame, or another equivalent method of quantification of future GHG emissions, in line with the overarching goal for national and/or global climate-change mitigation commitments;
  • (b) set out intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways (by sector or other relevant methodologies) that are deemed capable, in principle, of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant time frames undertaken in national policies;
  • (c) provide evidence showing whether they have duly complied, or are in the process of complying, with the relevant GHG reduction targets (…);
  • (d) keep the relevant GHG reduction targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and
  • (e) act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures.”

These mitigation measures, it added, must be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account particular protection needs.

The Court also set out procedural safeguards, namely

  • (a) The publicity of relevant information; and
  • (b) The availability of procedures to take into account the views of the public, and in particular the interests of those affected.

Applying these principles to the case before it, the Court held that it could “take into account the overall situation in the respondent State”, including relevant information that came to light after the domestic proceedings, but that here, given an ongoing domestic legislative process, its assessment was limited to examining the domestic legislation as it stood on the date of the (internal) adoption of the judgment, which was 14 February 2024.

The Court noted that the currently existing 2011 CO2 Act (in force since 2013) required that emissions reductions of 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. However, as far back as August 2009, the Swiss Federal Council had found that the scientific evidence under a 2-2.4°C warming limit required a reduction in global emissions of at least 50-85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Industrialised countries (like Switzerland) had to reduce their emissions by 25-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. for the higher 1.5°C limit, emissions would have to decline continuously, and the pathway 20% by 2020 pathway was insufficient to achieve that objective.

As the Government acknowledged, domestic assessments found that even the reduction target for 2020 had been missed. Between 2013 and 2020, Switzerland reduced its emissions by around 11% compared with 1990 levels, indicating the insufficiency of the authorities’ past action to take the necessary measures to address climate change.

A proposed revision of the CO2 Act for 2020-2030 proposed an overall reduction of 50% of emissions, including a domestic reduction of 30% by 2030 and measures to be taken abroad (“external emissions”). This proposal was rejected in a popular referendum in June 2021. Here the Court held that, “irrespective of the way in which the legislative process is organised from the domestic constitutional point of view”, there was a legislative lacuna, pointing to a failure on the part of the respondent State to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 to devise a regulatory framework setting the requisite objectives and goals.

Reflecting the updated Swiss NDC, the Climate Act was enacted, and envisages the principle of a net‑zero emissions target by 2050, but several lacunae remain, and “the Court has difficulty accepting that the mere legislative commitment to adopt the concrete measures “in good time” (…) satisfies the State’s duty”, especially because “the introduction of that new legislation is not sufficient to remedy the shortcomings identified in the legal framework applicable so far.”

Currently, the Swiss goal used more emissions than even a globally equal “per capita emissions” approach would entitle it to use.

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that there was no established methodology to determine a country’s carbon budget, and noted that an NDC under the Paris Agreement was not an appropriate substitute. The Court approved of the reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Neubauer, where it rejected the argument that it was impossible to determine the national carbon budget by emphasizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

Thus, “while acknowledging that the measures and methods determining the details of the State’s climate policy fall within its wide margin of appreciation, in the absence of any domestic measure attempting to quantify the respondent State’s remaining carbon budget, the Court has difficulty accepting that the State could be regarded as complying effectively with its regulatory obligation under Article 8” (para. 572). This meant that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (by a majority of 16-1).

On the issue of Article 6 ECHR, concerning the right of access to a court, the Court held that the issue of victim status should again be joined to the merits, and the Court again dove in with general principles, finding that it did not per se need to tailor these principles to the nature of climate change cases.

Examining these principles in the case before it, the Court held that “it cannot be said that the individual applicants’ claim was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise lacking in foundation in terms of the relevant domestic law (…). The Court is unable to agree with the finding of the FSC that the individual applicants’ claim could not be considered arguable for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention” (para. 618). It went on to find that interests defended by the association meant that the “dispute” raised by it had a direct and sufficient link to its members’ rights. Finding that Article 6 (1) applied to the complaint of the applicant association, the Court also considered it to have victim status.

For the individual applicants, however, the Court found that the dispute they had brought concerning the failure to effectively implement mitigation measures was not directly decisive for their specific rights. They had not shown that there was a sufficiently imminent and certain effect on their individual rights, and this part of their complaint was inadmissible.

For the association, among other things, the Court rejected the domestic courts’ findings that there was still some time to prevent global warming from reaching the critical limit, and noted that they “did not engage seriously or at all with the action brought by the applicant association.” There had accordingly been a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR, with the Court emphasizing “the key role which domestic courts have played and will play in climate-change litigation”.

The applicants also complained that they had not had access to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. Here the Court noted that Article 6 is a lex specialis to Article 13, the latter being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6, so there was no separate issue in its regard.

Remedies:
The individual applicants had made requests for just satisfaction for damage under Article 41 ECHR, but the organisation did not, so no award was made. The Court did award costs and expenses to the amount of EUR 80,000.

The applicants had also made an Art. 46 claim for a general measures order. Here the Court noted that it is primarily for the State to choose, under the supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used domestically to discharge its obligation to comply with the Court’s judgment, as long as the means are compatible with the conclusions and spirit of that judgment. The Court went on to hold that, “having regard to the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, the Court is unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the present judgment.” It noted the State’s broad margin of appreciation choose the means to discharge its Convention obligations, and found that the State was thus better placed than the Court to decide which specific measures to take.

Separate opinions:
A separate opinion by Judge Eicke is annexed to this judgment. He disagreed with the majority in several points, especially victim status and the merits of Art. 8. He presented his view as a disagreement of a “fundamental nature” that “goes to the very heart of the role of the Court within the Convention system and, more generally, the role of a court in the context of the unique and unprecedented challenges posed to humanity” because the majority had exceeded “the permissible limits of evolutive interpretation”.

According to Judge Eicke, the majority judgment creates a new right to “effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well‑being and quality of life arising from the harmful effects and risks caused by climate change”. While acknowledging the seriousness of the threat of climate change, and noting “(a) the absolute need for urgent action and (b) the sheer complexity of the challenges climate change (and the other aspects of the “triple planetary crisis”) pose (geo-)politically, practically, logistically as well as legal,” he argues that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances (Article 2(2) Paris Agreement) is “difficult to reconcile (if not wholly inconsistent) with the Court’s primary role of ensuring observance of a common minimum standard of protection applicable equally to all Contracting Parties”.

On victim status, Eicke argues that “there was, in fact, no dispute and no uncertainty about the “victim” status of the individual applicants in relation to the Article 6 § 1 complaint in this case; and therefore no need to join that question to the merits”. He sets out and adheres to the previously established case-law on victim status, refusing to join the majority in creating a new approach tailored to climate cases and arguing that exceptions should only be possible where individual applications document victim status are not “ever” likely to be possible. He argues that the judgment creates an actio popularis.

Under Articles 2 and 8, Eicke argues that while it would have been possible to find a procedural violation of Articles 2 or 8, “the substantive violation of Article 8 which the majority seeks to construct from this starting premise has no basis either in the text of the Convention nor in any of the Court’s case-law.” He considers that “the Court would already have achieved much if it had focussed on a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and, at a push, a procedural violation of Article 8 relating in particular to (…) the right of access to court and of access to information”. He accuses the majority of trying “to run before it could walk”, and “giving (false) hope that litigation and the courts can provide “the answer” without there being, in effect, any prospect of litigation (especially before this Court) accelerating the taking of the necessary measures towards the fight against anthropogenic climate change”, and mentions the risk that this judgment will distract from other efforts to tackle climate change.

Implementation measures taken:

N/A

Date of decision:
It was announced on 26 March 2024 that the Grand Chamber would issue its judgment in this case, along with the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber, in a hearing to be held on 9 April 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The judgment and a summary were made available on the Court’s HUDOC database immediately after the hearing.

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
This case was communicated to the respondent State, Switzerland, on 17 March 2021. On 26 April 2022, a Chamber of the Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, held a public hearing in this case on 29 March 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here. On 9 April 2024, the Court issued its judgment in the case.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, no. 53600/20, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:

Webcast of the hearing:
To watch a webcast recording of the public hearing in this case, which was held before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 29 March 2023, click here (available in French and English).

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Categories
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Children and young people Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Emissions reductions/mitigation Estonia European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Extraterritorial obligations Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Non-discrimination Norway Paris Agreement Poland Portugal Private and family life Prohibition of torture Right to life Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia Spain Standing/admissibility Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands The United Kingdom Turkey Ukraine Victim status

Duarte Agostinho et al. v. Austria et al. (“Portuguese Children’s Case”)

Summary:
This case was brought by a group of six young people, acting together as the ‘Youth for Climate Justice’, against 33 Council of Europe Member States. Theirs was the first climate case to come before the ECtHR. In their application, the six applicants, aged between 8 and 21 at the time, argued that the 33 respondent States failed to comply with their positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, read in the light of the commitments made under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. They claimed that their right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) was being threatened by the effects of climate change in their home State of Portugal, including through the harms caused by forest fires. Moreover, they claimed that their right to respect for their private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR was being threatened by heatwaves that forced them to spend more time indoors. They also noted their anxiety about their uncertain future, and the fact that, as young people, they stand to experience the worst effects of climate change. They accordingly alleged a violation of Article 14 ECHR (non-discrimination), given the particular impacts of climate change on their generation. According to the applicants, the absence of adequate measures to limit global emissions constitutes, in itself, a breach of the obligations incumbent on States.

This was the first climate application brought before the European Court of Human Rights, and it was brought with the support of the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN). The issues raised here were novel in the Strasbourg context. In addition, in communicating the case, the Court also proprio motu raised an issue under Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case inadmissible on jurisdiction and non-exhaustion grounds.

Domestic proceedings:
None: this case was brought directly to the ECtHR. The applicants submitted that, given the complexity of the case and their limited financial means, as well as the limited prospects of success before domestic instances, requiring them to exhaust the domestic remedies in each of the 33 respondent States would impose an excessive and disproportionate burden on them.

Relinquishment:
On 29 June 2022, the 7-judge Chamber to which the case had originally been allocated relinquished jurisdiction over it in favour of the Court’s 17-judge Grand Chamber. Relinquishment is possible where a case either (a) raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or its Protocols, or (b) might lead to a result inconsistent with the Court’s case-law (Rule 72, paras 1-2 of the Rules of Court).

During the course of the proceedings, the complaint against Ukraine was withdrawn by the applicants. The Russian Federation ceased to be a Council of Europe Member State during the course of the proceedings, but this was not an obstacle to considering the application as concerns anything taking place before the end of its membership (on 16 September 2022).

In February 2023, the Court announced that it would hold a public Grand Chamber hearing in this case, along with two other climate cases pending before it (Carême v. France and KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v. Switzerland). It announced that it would adjourn the remaining climate cases pending before it in the meantime. The oral stage in these three cases was staggered: Carême and KlimaSeniorinnen were heard on 29 March 2023, while the hearing in Duarte Agostinho was heard by the same composition of the Grand Chamber on 27 September 2023.

Grand Chamber hearing:
A hearing in this case was held on 27 September 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here.

During the hearing, the respondent States pooled their submissions to a large extent, with additional arguments from the Netherlands, Portugal, and Turkiye. Third-party interveners also received leave to appear during the oral hearing, namely the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, the EU’s European Commission, and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). The substance of the hearing focused largely on admissibility issues, namely victim status, the (non-)exhaustion of domestic remedies and the extraterritoriality of Convention obligations. The judges also asked a number of questions to the parties before retiring to consider the admissibility and merits of the case.

Admissibility:
From the blog post on the case by Ayyoub (Hazhar) Jamali available on our blog

After months of anticipation, the ECtHR delivered its judgment on 9 April 2024. The Court found the case inadmissible on two key grounds. Firstly, it ruled out jurisdiction regarding non-territorial states, narrowing the scope of accountability in this complex legal landscape to applicants’ home states. Secondly, it dismissed the application against Portugal due to a lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The Court acknowledged its jurisdiction concerning Portugal but denied it concerning other non-territorial states. It recognized that under Article 1 of the Convention, jurisdiction primarily pertains to territorial boundaries, implying that individuals can only claim Convention violations against the territorial state where they reside. However, the Court reiterated that the Convention’s reach can extend beyond national borders in two main forms: when a state exercises effective control over an area (spatial concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdiction ratione loci), and when there is state agent authority or control over individuals (personal concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdiction ratione personae) (para 170). In the present case, as neither of these two criteria appeared applicable, the Court denied jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘special features’ for establishing the respondent states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants within the specific context of climate change. It emphasized that determining whether the ECHR applies extraterritorially requires examining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, indicating that the state concerned is exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants. This primarily involves exploring the nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent state.

The Court acknowledged that states have ultimate control over public and private activities within their territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions. It noted their international-law commitments, particularly those outlined in the Paris Agreement, which states have incorporated into their domestic laws and policy documents, as well as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement (para 192). Furthermore, the Court recognized the complex and multi-layered causal relationship between activities within a state’s territory that produce greenhouse gas emissions and their adverse impacts on the rights and well-being of individuals residing outside its borders (para 193). It emphasised that while climate change is a global phenomenon, each state bears responsibility for addressing it. However, the Court concluded that these considerations alone cannot justify creating a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation or expanding existing ones (para 195). It emphasised that the ECHR protection system is primarily based on principles of territorial jurisdiction and subsidiarity.

The Court further denied the applicants’ claim that bringing a case against Portugal alone would be ineffective and that they had no other means of holding the respondent states accountable for the impact of climate change on their Convention rights. It distinguished between jurisdiction and responsibility, which constitutes a separate matter to be examined in relation to the merit of the complaint (para 202).

The Court further rejected the applicants’ claim concerning the reach of the Convention outside of national boundaries by their reliance on a test of ‘control over the applicants’ Convention interests’. It reasoned that, according to its established case-law, extraterritorial jurisdiction as conceived under Article 1 ECHR requires control over the person him- or herself rather than the person’s interests as such (para 204-206). It highlighted that, except for specific cases under Article 2 concerning intentional deprivation of life by state agents, there is no precedent for a criterion like ‘control over Convention interests’ as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction (paragraph 205). Consequently, the Court argued that adopting such an extension would represent a significant departure from established principles under Article 1.

The Court stated that otherwise, and given the multilateral dimension of climate change, almost anyone adversely affected by climate change anywhere in the world could be brought within the jurisdiction of any Contracting Party for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR in relation to that Party’s actions or omissions to tackle climate change. It also rejected the suggestion that such an extension of jurisdiction could be limited to the Convention’s legal space. It reasoned that, given the nature of climate change, including its causes and effects, an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction by reference to that criterion would be artificial and difficult to justify (para 206).

Moreover, the Court acknowledged the significance of developments in international law, particularly with regards to the interpretations provided by bodies such as the Inter-American Court and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It recognised the relevance of these interpretations in shaping the understanding of jurisdiction within the context of human rights treaties. However, the Court noted that these bodies had adopted distinct notions of jurisdiction, which had not been recognised in its own case-law. While the Court considered the insights provided by these international instruments and bodies, it concluded that they did not provide sufficient grounds for extending the extraterritorial jurisdiction of respondent states under the Convention, particularly as proposed by the applicants (para 209-210). Therefore, while remaining attentive to legal developments and global responses to issues such as climate change, the Court found no basis within the Convention for expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction as advocated by the applicants.

In conclusion, the Court found no grounds in the Convention for extending the respondent states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation.

Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
Regarding Portugal, the applicants’ home state, there was no extraterritoriality issue. Here the Court examined whether effective remedies existed within the Portuguese legal system that the applicants were required to use under the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule. Despite the applicants’ argument that broad constitutional provisions alone could not provide effective and certain remedies, the Court disagreed, highlighting various remedies available in Portugal. These included, for example, constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment, actio popularis claims for environmental protection, etc (para 217-223). The Court emphasised the importance of affording domestic courts the opportunity to address issues before having recourse to international remedies. Consequently, the complaint against Portugal was found inadmissible. The Court also rejected the suggestion that it should rule on the issue of climate change before domestic courts had the opportunity to do so, reaffirming the principle of subsidiarity and the role of domestic jurisdictions in adjudicating such matters (para 228).

Victim Status
The Court found it challenging to determine whether the applicants met the criteria for victim status as set out on the same day in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment against Switzerland. The lack of clarity is attributed, in part, to the applicants’ failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court found that, in any event, the application was inadmissible for the reasons previously outlined. Therefore, the Court declined to examine further whether the applicants could claim victim status (para 229-230).

Date:
9 April 2024

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
Communicated by the Court on 30 November 2020. Relinquished to the Grand Chamber on 29 June 2022. Grand Chamber hearing held on 27 September 2023. Decision announced at a Grand Chamber hearing held on 9 April 2024, along with rulings in the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other Member States, no. 39371/20, decision (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:
For more information on this case, see the following links.

  • For more background on the case and profiles on the applicants, click here: https://youth4climatejustice.org/. 
  • For all of the case documents, including the submissions from the respondent States and the third-party interveners, see here.
  • For analyses of the Grand Chamber hearing, see this post on our own blog by Viktoriya Gurash, or this post on Verfassungsblog by Corina Heri.
  • For the judgment, click here.
  • For the Court’s Q&A on the three climate cases, click here.

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Categories
China Emissions reductions/mitigation Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Fossil fuel extraction Paris Agreement Participation rights Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to water Rights at stake

Violations of Human Rights by Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and China due to Coal Fired plants in BiH

Summary:

On 17 March 2021, two UN Special Rapporteurs, Marcos A. Orellana (Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes) and David R. Boyd (Special Rapporteur on the issues of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment), issued communications to Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) and China regarding alleged human rights violations stemming from the operation of coal power plants in BiH, supported by Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and financed by the China Development Bank. Civil society complaints raised concerns about water and air pollution, negative impacts on climate change, and adverse health effects, including respiratory issues and cardiac arrest. The communication highlighted violations of international human rights obligations related to a healthy environment, life, health, bodily integrity, safe drinking water, and sanitation. It also emphasised the exacerbation of climate change conditions through increased greenhouse gas emissions. Procedural environmental human rights were allegedly affected due to failures in providing information, access to justice, and effective remedies for health impacts caused by the plants. The communication sought measures from both BiH and China, including ensuring plant compliance with national and international laws, harmonising environmental permitting procedures, monitoring health impacts, and preventing negative human rights and environmental outcomes. China was also asked to provide information on the global impacts of pollution caused by Chinese-supported plants and measures to ensure Belt and Road Initiative projects align with the Paris Agreement’s climate objectives.

China responded to the communication on 27 May 2021, rejecting the allegations as false and emphasising its commitment to international responsibility for climate change. China stated that the Tuzla plant, one of the plants in question, is intended to replace outdated units, complying with EU carbon emissions standards and contributing to local development and reliable energy supply. BiH had not responded yet.

Claim:

The case revolves around the alleged violations of human rights related to pollution, waste, and climate change resulting from the operation of Chinese-supported coal-fired plants in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The claim is that both Bosnia Herzegovina and China have failed to meet international human rights obligations for human and environmental rights, including the right to a healthy environment, life, health, bodily integrity, safe drinking water, and sanitation. The construction and operation of these plants are accused of exacerbating climate change conditions by increasing greenhouse gas emissions. The communication seeks measures to address these concerns, emphasising the responsibility of states under international human rights law to prevent, investigate, punish, and redress such abuses.

Links:

The case documents can be found here. The documents are also available for download below:

DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile-CHNDownload
DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile-BIHDownload
DownLoadFile-response0CHNDownload

Status of the case:
The case is currently pending before the UN Special Rapporteurs.

Suggested citation:
Violations of Human Rights by Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) and China due to Coal Fired plants in BiH, AL BIH 2/2021 and AL CHN 2/2021 (17 March 2021).

Last updated:
15 January 2024.

Categories
2021 Domestic court Ecuador Gender / women-led Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to subsistence/food Right to water Rights of nature

Herrera Carrion et al. v Ministry of the Environment et al. (“Caso Mecheros”)

Summary:

The Caso Mecheros ruling, issued by the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbíos in 2021, revolved around nine girls from the provinces of Sucumbíos and Orellana who lodged a constitutional injunction against the Ecuadorian government. In their lawsuit, the applicants asserted that the practice of gas flaring violated their rights to water, health, food sovereignty, and a healthy, ecologically balanced environment. The flares are open-air pipes that burn and expel natural gas at an average temperature of 400 degrees Celsius. The pollution resulting from gas flaring was alleged to have severe impacts on the environment, human health, biodiversity, and climate change. The plaintiffs sought the annulment of gas flaring authorizations, immediate removal of flaring towers, and a prohibition on new oil-related flares in the Amazon region.

Claim:

The plaintiffs argued that the common practice of gas flaring by the Ecuadorian state violated their rights to water, health, food sovereignty, and a healthy, ecologically balanced environment. They asserted that the state’s actions contributed to environmental damage, health issues, biodiversity loss, and climate change. Their specific requests included the annulment of gas flaring authorisations, immediate removal of existing flaring towers, and a prohibition on new oil-related flares in the Amazon region.

Decision:

Initially, on 7 May 2020, the request was denied by the court of first instance. According to Judge María Custodia Toapanta Guanoquiza, there were no studies confirming the impact of gas flaring on the health of people in the area. However, on 29 July 2021, the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbíos ruled in favour of the plaintiffs’ appeal, asserting that the Ecuadorian State failed to uphold the girls’ rights to reside in a healthy environment. The ruling highlights the disregard for various international environmental commitments made by Ecuador, notably its Nationally Determined Contributions presented during the COP 21 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. As part of its decision, the Court has mandated an updated plan for the gradual elimination of gas flares, with a priority on removing those in close proximity to populated areas within 18 months. Additionally, it stipulated the complete removal of all gas flares by December 2030. The decision also permits new authorisations for clean technologies, provided they are situated away from populated centres.

This landmark decision not only establishes a legal precedent but is also hailed as a historic triumph. It draws a crucial connection between the repercussions of gas flaring and the violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution. The ruling underscores the adverse health effects associated with gas flaring and has the potential to influence public policies in other nations grappling with similar environmental challenges.

Links:

The case documents are accessible for download below (in the original Spanish).

rulingDownload
Decision-court-of-first-instanceDownload

Status of the case:

Decided.

Suggested citation:

Herrera Carrion et al. v. Ministry of the Environment et al. (Caso Mecheros), Provincial Court of Justice, Juicio No: 21201202000170 (Jul. 29, 2021) (Ecuador).

Last updated:

12 January 2024.

Categories
Adaptation Disability and health-related inequality Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to housing Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise The United Kingdom Vulnerability

R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs

Summary:
On 17 October 2023, the reportedly first-ever adaptation case in the United Kingdom was brought against the government before the UK’s High Court of Justice. The plaintiffs in this case included Kevin Jordan, a homeowner from Norfolk (UK), who alleged that his home was acutely threatened by coastal erosion, with the road leading up to it having already collapsed into the sea. Jordan brought his case together with the NGO ‘Friends of the Earth’ and disability rights activist Doug Paulley, a care home resident who alleged that his health conditions were being exacerbated by climate-aggravated heatwaves. Together, the plaintiffs challenged the UK’s National Adaptation Programme (NAP). Domestic law requires the production of new NAP every five years, and the most recent version — NAP3 — was published in July 2023. The claimants argued that NAP3 is deficient for the following reasons:

  1. Failure to set sufficiently specific objectives;
  2. Failure to conduct and publish information on the assessment of the risks involved in implementing NAP3;
  3. Failure to consider the unequal impacts of NAP3 on protected groups (on the grounds of age, race and disability); and
  4. Violation of Articles 2, 8, 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the rights to life, respect for private and family life, non-discrimination and property, respectively), as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998.

In regards to the alleged human rights violations, the plaintiffs invoked:

a. The well-established but urgent need for long-term policy and protected funding to enable care-homes (and similar healthcare settings) to adapt to excessive heat. This remains absent in NAP3 despite the increasing frequency and severity of annual heatwaves.
b. There being no new policy to manage overheating risks in existing health and social care buildings, such that they are properly refurbished as soon as reasonably practicable.
c. A lack of a commitment to provide adequate resources to support communities at imminent risk of being lost to erosion and flooding, including as to the established mental health and emotional wellbeing impacts for those affected.
d. Gaps, inconsistency and uncertainty in the potential allocation of funding provided for a range of areas, in particular for those communities that must (or are likely to have to) relocate and have their homes demolished.
e. There being no insurance or compensation schemes available for the worst affected by coastal erosion and who lose their homes.
f. No evidence of their being an express consideration, or reasoned analysis, of what a fair balance to strike would be between doing more to safeguard the human rights of vulnerable people and the interests of wider society.

https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2023/20231101_21608_complaint.pdf (emphasis added)

High Court Judgment:
In a judgment issued on 25 October 2024, the High Court of Justice for England and Wales rejected the applicants’ claims. Justice Chamberlain, in his judgment, found that there had been no error of law in this case. His ruling extensively considered the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, but found that “[u]nlike in the field of mitigation, and subject to the arguments about the effect of the ECHR as interpreted in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] (…), there is no internationally binding quantified standard governing how States must adapt to climate change. It would be very difficult to devise any such standard because the risks of climate change differ widely from state to state (and indeed within states). In some places, the main risk may be from flooding, in other places extreme heat or drought. Elsewhere, there may be a combination of risks, which all have to be addressed but some of which are more urgent than others. Moreover, the profile of risks, and the priorities attached to addressing them, may change over time” (para. 92 of the High Court ruling).

Assessing the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment overall, Judge Chamberlain found that while this judgment “represents a significant development of the case law in relation to climate change, not only as regards the standing of associations to bring claims before the Strasbourg Court, but also as regards the scope and extent of the positive obligations of the State and the margin of appreciation to be accorded when assessing whether those obligations have been discharged”, “the significance of the judgment for the UK’s climate change framework should not be overstated.” The Judge noted that KlimaSeniorinnen focused heavily on lacunae in domestic legislation and the targets set out in the Paris Agreement, whereas the law of the United Kingdom does not feature similar lacunae in mitigation target-setting.

Lawyers for the government in this case had sought to dismiss the findings of the ECtHR, as made in para. 552 of KlimaSeniorinnen, as an obiter dictum. This paragraph of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment reads as follows:

Furthermore, effective protection of the rights of individuals from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well-being and quality of life requires that the above-noted mitigation measures be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection. Such adaptation measures must be put in place and effectively applied in accordance with the best available evidence (…) and consistent with the general structure of the State’s positive obligations in this context (…).

Judge Chamberlain disagreed with the government as concerns the nature of this finding, noting the dangers of applying “common law concepts [the idea of obiter dicta] to the judgment of a court most of whose members come from different legal traditions.” Still, Judge Chamberlain noted that the Strasbourg Court’s findings were of a general nature (para. 101). He found that KlimaSeniorinnen “appears to indicate that the positive obligation imposed by Articles 2 and 8 [ECHR] extends to adopting and effectively implementing ‘adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection'”, stemming from the State’s underlying regulatory obligation. He notes that “[w]hat that means in the context of adaptation measures, however, is far from clear” (para. 103), given that adaptation measures were not central to the KlimaSeniorinnen case, and that the international legal framework in this regard is less well-developed than for mitigation measures. He went on to anticipate future rulings from the ECtHR, considering it

(…) likely that, if the Strasbourg Court had in a future case to apply the reasoning in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] to the adaptation context, it would say that:
(a) the narrow margin of appreciation in relation to the mitigation aims was justified by reference to the internationally agreed objective of carbon neutrality by 2050 and the impact of one State’s default on other States;
(b) neither of these features applies in the field of adaptation; and
(c) accordingly, in the field of adaptation, States are to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation in setting the relevant objectives and a wider margin still in setting out the proposals and policies for meeting them (by analogy with the margin accorded to the State in setting the means for achieving the mitigation objectives).

Accordingly, he found that the current adaptation framework in the United Kingdom appears to “fall comfortably within the UK’s margin of appreciation under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR” and is not “contrary to any clear and consistent line of authority from the Strasbourg Court”. On this basis, he found that there was neither an error of law nor an incompatibility with human rights law evident in this case.

Friends-of-the-Earth-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Environment-Food-and-Rural-AffairsDownload

Application to the European Court of Human Rights:
In July 2025, Friends of the Earth announced that the case had been filed as an application before the European Court of Human Rights.

More information:
For reporting on the case, see coverage from the Guardian and the Independent.

Suggested citation:
High Court of Justice for England and Wales, R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs, [2024] EWHC 2707 (Admin), 25 October 2024.

Last updated:
13 November 2024

Categories
Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to education Right to health Right to life Right to subsistence/food Right to water Self-determination Turkey Uncategorized

A.S. & S.A. & E.N.B v. Presidency of Türkiye & The Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change

Summary:

On 13 April 2023, Türkiye submitted its updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The NDC states that Türkiye aims to reduce its CO2 emissions by 41% by 2030 compared to the business-as-usual scenario with 2012 as its base year, and plans on peaking emissions by 2038 at the latest. This would increase CO2 emissions by 30% until 2030. Due to this further increase in CO2 emissions, climate activists Atlas Sarrafoğlu, Ela Naz Birdal and Seren Anaçoğlu filed a lawsuit against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change before the Council of State (the highest administrative court in Türkiye) on 8 May 2023.

The plaintiffs claimed that Türkiye’s NDC is inadequate under the Paris Agreement and that the resulting increase in CO2 emissions violates their human rights under the country’s constitution, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the European Convention on Human Rights. The rights they claimed had been violated included: the right to life, the right to intergenerational equality, the right to the protection of one’s private life, the right to health, cultural rights, the right to develop one’s material and spiritual existence, the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment, the right to education, the right to work, and the right to healthy food and water. Because of the alleged inadequacy of the NDC under the Paris Agreement, they demanded its annulment and the creation of a more ambitious commitment.

Status of Case:

On 22 December 2023, The Wave reported that the Council of State had dismissed this case without examining it, arguing that the NDC did not constitute an administrative act and was accordingly not open to judicial annulment.

Further reading:

News Article by PAMACC: https://www.pamacc.org/index.php/k2-listing/item/1440-president-recep-erdogan-of-turkey-sued-for-slow-implementiion-of-the-paris-agreement

News Article by the Turkish human rights press agency “Bianet”: https://bianet.org/haber/young-climate-activists-file-lawsuit-against-erdogan-over-inadequate-emission-goals-278474

Date last updated:

22 December 2023.

Categories
Argentina Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Uncategorized

Hahn et al. v APR Energy S.R.L.

Summary:

The legal action centred on the construction and operation of Matheu II and Matheu III, thermoelectric power plants in Pilar, Argentina. The plaintiffs, comprising a coalition of individuals and non-governmental organizations, argued that these projects lacked the necessary environmental assessments and contended that relying on fossil fuels for power generation ran contrary to international agreements such as the American Convention on Human Rights, the Paris Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, among others. Initially, the Federal Court of Campana granted precautionary measures to halt construction, citing environmental and procedural concerns, safeguarding collective interests, and mitigating potential harm. However, in December 2022, they allowed limited operation of Matheu III, considering global energy challenges. In June 2023, the court denied an extension for Matheu III, citing noise pollution concerns raised by the Municipality of Pilar and emphasizing the need to balance energy production with local environmental well-being.

Claim:

The legal action was undertaken with the primary objective of preventing the construction and operation of the thermoelectric power stations Matheu II and Matheu III. The plaintiffs asserted that these plants had initiated construction without fulfilling the proper environmental assessment. Furthermore, they argued that the use of fossil fuels in power generation was in violation of international human rights treaties, climate agreements, and domestic regulations. They asserted that the operation of these power plants posed a significant threat to the environment, public health, and the fundamental human right to enjoy a healthy and balanced environment.

Decision:

Initially, the Federal Court of Campana ruled in favor of the plaintiffs by issuing precautionary measures that temporarily halted the construction and operation of the power plants. These measures were based on environmental and procedural considerations, as well as protecting collective interests and preventing potential harm, as stipulated in domestic law. However, the court’s decisions did not explicitly address the issue of climate impact.

Subsequently, Araucaria, one of the plant operators, secured a partial adjustment to the precautionary measures in December 2022. This modification permitted the temporary and limited operation of Matheu III, partially due to concerns stemming from the global energy crisis and the resultant surge in energy prices, driven in part by geopolitical events like the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

However, in June 2023, the Federal Court of Campana chose not to extend the authorization for the partial operation of Matheu III. The decision was prompted by concerns raised by the Municipality of Pilar regarding noise pollution. This ruling reflects the court’s consideration of local environmental and public health concerns, highlighting the importance of balancing energy production with environmental and societal well-being.

Links:

The case documents are accessible via Climate Case Chart: Click here.

Status of the case:

The case is currently pending before the Federal Court of Campana.

Suggested citation:

Hahn et al. v. APR Energy S.R.L (Juvevir Asociación Civil v. APR Energy and Araucaria Energy) (Federal Court of Campagna, Argentina), Case No: FSM 116712/2017

Last updated:

03 November 2023.