Category: 2024

Categories
2024 European Convention on Human Rights Norway Private and family life Right to life

Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA v. Norway

Summary:
In a case before the EFTA Court concerning the EU’s emissions trading scheme, referred by the Oslo District Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, the EFTA Court acknowledged the link between human rights and climate change. The case concerned the obligation to surrender greenhouse gas emissions allowances granted under the scheme in the context of a corporate restructuring, with the EFTA Court finding that EU law precludes national legislation from providing that the obligation to surrender emissions allowances may be settled by dividend in a compulsory debt settlement in connection with the restructuring of an insolvent company.

In doing so, the Court held in para. 35 of its ruling (issued in 9 August 2024) that:

[I]t must be recalled that combating climate change is an objective of fundamental importance given its adverse effects and the severity of its consequences, including the grave risk of their irreversibility and its impact on fundamental rights (compare the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 April 2024, Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2024:0409JUD005360020).

Suggested citation:
EFTA Court, Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA v. Norway, Case E-12/23, Judgment of 9 August 2024.

Last updated:
2 June 2025

Categories
2024 Domestic court Germany Rights of nature

German Rights of Nature Case (8 O 1373/21)

Summary:

On 2 August 2024, in the context of a case about compensation for the purchase of a BMW-brand vehicle during the so-called “diesel scandal”/”Dieselgate”, a judge at the Erfurt Regional Court in Germany, Dr. Martin Borowsky, made an innovative finding: he found that rights of nature can already be derived from the law currently in force, namely the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, meaning that nature is not an object, but a subject with its own right to protection. The relevant parts of his extensive holding on this matter, based on his involvement during the drafting of the Charter and translated from the original German by this database, are replicated below in full.

Finding of the court (paras. 29-40 of the judgment):

[N]ature’s own rights, which arise from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, reinforce protection [in the context of the ‘diesel scandal’]. These rights of nature are – as in numerous other legal systems, such as in South America – to be taken into account ex officio and independently of any corresponding submission by the parties or an explicit reference to them.

As European Union law is relevant in the diesel cases, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is also applicable (Art. 51 (1)). The rights in the Charter, in particular Art. 2 and Art. 3 (1) in conjunction with Art. 37, establish inherent rights of nature, which also require consideration in the present case. These fundamental rights are by their nature applicable to nature or individual ecosystems — i.e. ecological persons. It can be left open whether in the present case nature as such or individual ecosystems (particularly) damaged by exhaust gases require protection. The Charter gives rise to the comprehensive right of ecological persons to have their existence, preservation and regeneration of their life cycles, structure, functions and development processes respected and protected.

The fact that the [EU’s] convention on fundamental rights [a “body composed of representatives of the Heads of State and Government and of the President of the Commission as well as of members of the European Parliament and national parliaments” formed to draft the EU’s fundamental rights charter], which met in 2000, had not yet taken these rights into account does not prevent such rights from being recognized. As is well known, originalism is not a decisive interpretative approach in Europe. Moreover, the convention on fundamental rights was certainly open to ecological issues and concerns.

In particular, the Charter – like the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights – is a living instrument that can be used to respond appropriately to new threats. The recognition of specific rights of ecological persons through the interpretation and application of existing Union law is necessary due to the importance and urgency of the ecological challenges – climate change, species extinction and global pollution – and in view of the threat of irreversible damage.

Granting legal subjectivity to ecological persons, as was recently done by the Spanish legislator for the Mar Menor saltwater lagoon, is in line with the Charter’s view of humanity. Its preamble emphasizes the responsibility and duties towards fellow human beings as well as towards the human community and future generations. According to Art. 37 of the Charter, a high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the Union’s policies and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. The recognition of nature’s own rights serves this essential objective of the Union.

The open term “person”, which is frequently used in the Charter, includes nature or ecosystems such as rivers and forests as additional legal subjects alongside humans. In the first title of the Charter, containing fundamental rights, the term “person” (“personne”) is used in the original German text, as in numerous other language versions, rather than the term “Mensch”. The English “everyone” can be equated with this. Since fundamental rights such as the right to life in Art. 2 of the Charter do not apply to legal persons, the overriding value, the added value of the term “person” lies in respecting and protecting ecological persons in addition to human beings.

Moreover, there is no apparent reason why legal persons – or in future artificial intelligence – should be comprehensively protected under fundamental rights, but not ecological persons. Ultimately, this only creates an “equality of arms”.

The guarantee of human dignity in Art. 1 of the Charter does not preclude the recognition of the rights of nature; on the contrary, it requires this step. The recognition of nature’s own rights helps to ensure that people can continue to lead a free and self-determined life in dignity in the future.

Furthermore, the fact that Art. 2 and other Charter rights are borrowed from the ECHR and that this Convention – to date – does not recognize any inherent rights of nature does not stand in the way of the above. Art. 52 para. 3 sentence 2 of the EU Charter expressly allows European Union law to grant more extensive protection than the ECHR.

Finally, Art. 53 of the Charter requires comparative law to be taken into account in its interpretation. In numerous legal systems, particularly in the Global South, but also in the USA and New Zealand, the rights of nature are recognized and enforced under constitutional law, legislation or by judges. The European legal system is not immune to this increasing global trend.

Against this background, it seems justified from the point of view of legal doctrine to give nature’s own rights the force of law in Europe too. The example of Colombian or Peruvian courts can be followed here, which – even without relevant legislation – have derived such rights from an overall view of their legal systems.

Suggested citation:
Regional Court Erfurt, 8th Civil Chamber, judgment of 2 August 2024, file number 8 O 1373/21, ECLI:DE:LGERFUR:2024:0802.8O1373.21.00.

Last updated:
29 August 2024.

Categories
2024 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to life Right to property Right to pursue happiness Uncategorized

Min-A Park v. South Korea

Summary:
In July 2023, a fourth constitutional mitigation case was filed before the South Korean Constitutional Court. This case was consolidated with three previously-filed climate cases, representing a total of 255 plaintiffs, and the Constitutional Court issued its ruling in all four cases on 29 August 2024. This joint ruling was reported as a landmark judgment and as the first finding of its kind in Asia (i.e. the first time that a court in the region found that inadequate mitigation action violates constitutional rights).

In the present case, 51 individuals argued that their constitutional rights were being inadequately safeguarded by the failure to create an adequate implementation plana for South Korea’s 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement (NDC). This makes this case somewhat different from the other three, in the sense that it does not contest the country’s 40% reduction target (by 2030) itself, but argues that domestic measures will not be enough to meet that target. The plaintiffs estimated that current steps envisioned under South Korea’s Carbon Neutrality Plan would achieve only a 29.6% emissions reduction.

As per the complaint document (available, in the original Korean, on ClimateCaseChart), the plaintiffs invoked their rights to life, to pursue happiness, to general freedom, to property and to a healthy environment along with the State’s obligation to protect against disasters and protect fundamental rights.

Relevant developments:
On 12 June 2023, shortly before this case was filed, it was announced that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea had decided to submit an opinion to South Korea’s Constitutional Court to oppose the country’s Carbon Neutrality Act (2021), which it considered to be unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of future generations because it sets out a greenhouse gas emissions reductions target that was too low. The Act sets out a 40% emissions reductions target by 2030 as compared to 2018 levels. This, the Commission found, did not respect the constitutional principle of equality, because it passed the burden of greenhouse gas emissions on to future generations.

Consolidation with three other cases:
The South Korean Constitutional Court decided to consolidate its first four climate cases (Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea, Woodpecker et al. v. South Korea (Baby Climate Litigation), Climate Crisis Emergency Action v. South Korea (a.k.a. Byung-In Kim et al. v. South Korea) and Min-A Park v. South Korea (the present case). Public hearings in the cases were held on 23 April 2024 and 21 May 2024.

These cases all alleged that the government’s inadequate greenhouse gas reduction targets violated citizens’ fundamental rights, particularly those of future generations. Together, the four cases comprised over 250 plaintiffs, including civil society, youth and children. The Constitutional Court issued a joint ruling in these cases on 29 August 2024.

Judgment of the constitutional court:
On 29 August 2024, the South Korean Constitutional Court found a violation of constitutional rights in this case and three related cases. In an unanimous ruling, hailed as “the first decision of its kind in Asia“, the court found that the government’s response to the climate crisis was inadequate and threatened constitutional rights, noting that the country lacked legally binding long-term emissions reductions targets for the post-2031 period, which violated the constitutional rights of future generations by shifting an excessive reductions burden to the future. The Court gave government and legislature 18 months (until 28 February 2026) to introduce the relevant targets.

In particular, the Court ruled that Article 8(1) of the South Korean Carbon Neutrality Basic Act was unconstitutional. Previously, the government had pledged a 40% reduction of its GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 2018 levels, but had failed to set any targets since. The Constitutional Court held that this “does not have the minimum character necessary as a protective measure corresponding to the dangerous situation of the climate crisis”, citing the “principle of non-underprotection”, which means that the State must take appropriate measures to effectively protect the constitutional rights of its citizens.

Simultaneously, the Court held that the government’s target for 2030 did not infringe constitutional rights.

See also:
Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea.

Last updated:
29 August 2024.

Categories
2024 Emissions reductions/mitigation European Court of Human Rights France Private and family life Right to life Standing/admissibility Victim status

Carême v. France

Summary:
On 7 June 2022, the European Court of Human Rights announced the relinquishment of an application against France concerning the municipality of Grande-Synthe to the Court’s Grand Chamber. The applicant in this case, in his capacity as mayor of the municipality of Grande-Synthe, was originally involved in the Grande-Synthe case, but the Conseil d’État held on 19 November 2020 that, unlike the municipality itself, Mr Carême could not prove that he had an interest in bringing proceedings.

This was the second climate case to reach the Court’s Grand Chamber, after the Klimaseniorinnen application. The case was lodged on 28 January 2021, and the Grand Chamber held a public hearing in this case on 29 March 2023, making it the second climate case to be heard by the Court (after KlimaSeniorinnen).

Before the Court, the applicant argued that France’s insufficient climate change mitigation measures violated his rights to life (Article 2 ECHR) and to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). The Court summarized the applicant’s complaint as follows:

The applicant submits that the failure of the authorities to take all appropriate measures to enable France to comply with the maximum levels of greenhouse gas emissions that it has set itself constitutes a violation of the obligation to guarantee the right to life, enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention, and to guarantee the “right to a normal private and family life”, under Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, the applicant argues that Article 2 imposes an obligation on States to take the necessary measures to protect the lives of persons under their jurisdiction, including in relation to environmental hazards that might cause harm to life. Under Article 8 he argues that by dismissing his action on the grounds that he had no interest in bringing proceedings, the Conseil d’État disregarded his “right to a normal private and family life”. He submits that he is directly affected by the Government’s failure to take sufficient steps in the combat against climate change, since this failure increases the risk that his home might be affected in the years to come, and in any event by 2030, and that it is already affecting the conditions in which he occupies his property, in particular by not allowing him to plan his life peacefully there. He adds that the extent of the risks to his home will depend in particular on the results obtained by the French Government in the prevention of climate change.

The Court’s press release on this case can be found here.

Date of decision:
It was announced on 26 March 2024 that the Grand Chamber would issue its judgment in this case, along with the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber, in a hearing on 9 April 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The judgment and a summary were made available on the Court’s HUDOC database immediately after the hearing.

The Court’s findings on the admissibility:
From the summary prepared by Viktoriya Gurash on the day of the Grand Chamber decision in this case.

Today, on 9 April 2024, the European Court of Human Rights issued a Grand Chamber decision in this case, unanimously declaring the applicant’s complaints under Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights inadmissible ratione personae.

The Court, first, noted that its assessment of Mr Carême’s victim status as a physical person in the climate context will be based on the criteria set out in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland, decided on the same day, which includes that: the applicant must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change; and there must be a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm (para 487 of KlimaSeniorinnen). The Court emphasised that the threshold for fulfilling these criteria is especially high in view of the exclusion of actio popularis cases under the Convention (para 488 of KlimaSeniorinnen).

Using this framework, in Carême, the ECtHR first assessed the reasons adduced by the domestic courts, specifically the Conseil d’État, when rejecting Mr Carême’s standing. Before the national authorities, the applicant argued that the house in which he resided at the time was located close to the coastline and that according to some predictions it would be flooded by 2040, taking into account the effects of climate change. The Conseil d’État found that the area of the municipality of Grande-Synthe was at a very high level of exposure to high risks of flooding and severe drought with the effect not only of a reduction and degradation of water resources, but also significant damage to built-up areas, given the geological characteristics of the soil. However, the Conseil d’État ruled that Mr Carême did not have an interest in bringing proceedings on the basis of the mere fact that his current residence was located in an area likely to be subject to flooding by 2040. The ECtHR adhered to this argument, reasoning that the risk relating to climate change affecting the applicant is of hypothetical nature.

The crucial factor leading to the Court’s decision as regards the applicant’s victim status is that he no longer has any relevant links with Grande-Synthe because he no longer resides in France, nor does he own or rent any property in Grande-Synthe. The Court noted that in his initial application the applicant indicated an address in Grande-Synthe, although at that time he no longer resided in that municipality but in Brussels. In view of this, the Court found moot Mr Carême’s argument that his residence in Grande-Synthe was at a future risk of flooding and that the current situation prevented him from envisaging himself serenely in his home.

The Court held that the applicant had no right to lodge a complaint under Article 34 of the Convention on behalf of the municipality of Grande-Synthe because, in view of the ECtHR’s settled case law, decentralised authorities that exercise public functions are considered to be ‘governmental organisations’ that have no standing. In addition, the Court highlighted that the interests of the residents of Grande-Synthe have, in any event, been defended by their municipality before the Conseil d’État in accordance with national law.

Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s claim that he had developed allergic asthma making him particularly sensitive to air pollution caused by climate change, the Court found that since this issue was not raised in the initial application, it constitutes a new and distinct complaint and falls outside the scope of this case.

Further reading:

  • For a comment on this case, see Marta Torre-Schaub’s post on Verfassungsblog.
  • For the judgment, click here.
  • For the Court’s Q&A on the three climate cases, click here.

Webcast of the hearing:
To watch a webcast recording of the public hearing in this case, which was held before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 29 March 2023, click here (available in French and English).

Suggested citation:
ECtHR, Carême v. France, no. 7189/21, decision (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024

Last updated:
9 April 2024