Category: Right to life

Categories
2005 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Farming Fossil fuel extraction Human dignity Nigeria Right to life

Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. and Others

Summary:
The applicant brought the action on behalf of himself and the Iwherekan community in Delta State in the Niger Delta region. The community had for decades been subjected to continuous gas flaring by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The applicant argued that this practice caused severe health problems, degraded agricultural land and water sources, polluted the air, and contributed to broader adverse climate change effects. He contended that the continued flaring of gas violated constitutionally guaranteed rights to life and dignity (in terms of sections 33 and 34 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria) as well as protections under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The court held that the gas-flaring violated constitutionally guaranteed rights, including the right to a clean, poison-free, pollution-free, healthy environment. Having found this, the court declared the practice unconstitutional in the applicant’s community and ordered Shell and the NNPC to take immediate steps to stop flaring gas there. It also directed the Attorney General of the Federation to initiate amendments to the relevant legislation to align it with constitutional guarantees.

This case constitutionalised environmental protection, embedding it within Nigeria’s fundamental rights framework. Secondly, it recognised that environmental harm, including greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse effects of climate change, can amount to a violation of the rights to life and dignity. Thirdly, it demonstrated judicial willingness to confront powerful corporate and state actors where fundamental rights are implicated. The judgment ultimately situates climate change and environmental protection within the core of human rights law, affirming that the rights to life and dignity necessarily include the right to a healthy and sustainable environment.

Text of the decision:
The text of the decision can be consulted and downloaded below.

Gbemre v Shell (Decision)Download

Date of decision:
14 November 2005

Status:
Decided

Court:
Federal Court of Nigeria

Suggested citation:
Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company
Nigeria Limited and Others (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC 2005) (Federal High Court of Nigeria in the Benin Judicial Division, suit FHC/B/CS/53/05, 14 November 2005)

Last updated:
3 August 2026

Credits:
This database entry was contributed by Michaela O’Donoghue, LLD Candidate in the Urban Law and Sustainability Governance Chair, Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Categories
Adaptation Climate-induced displacement Disability and health-related inequality European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Imminent risk Loss & damage Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Participation rights Private and family life Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise The United Kingdom

Friends of the Earth and Others v. the United Kingdom

Summary:
In July 2025, an application concerning adaptation obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights was filed with the European Court of Human Rights against the United Kingdom. The application builds on domestic proceedings in the reportedly first-ever adaptation case in the United Kingdom, which was brought against the government before the UK’s High Court of Justice. The plaintiffs in this case included Kevin Jordan, a homeowner from Norfolk (UK), who alleged that his home was acutely threatened by coastal erosion, with the road leading up to it having already collapsed into the sea. On 30 November 2023, he was told to leave his home by the local authorities, and it was home was demolished seven days later. Mr Jordan brought his case together with the NGO ‘Friends of the Earth’ and disability rights activist Doug Paulley, a care home resident who alleged that his health conditions were being exacerbated by climate-aggravated heatwaves. Mr Paulley is a wheelchair user who has a number of long-term health conditions. Together, the plaintiffs challenged the UK’s National Adaptation Programme (NAP).

Domestic proceedings:
The UK’s domestic law requires the production of new NAP every five years, and the most recent version — NAP3 — was published in July 2023. The claimants argued that NAP3 is deficient for the following reasons:

  1. Failure to set sufficiently specific objectives;
  2. Failure to conduct and publish information on the assessment of the risks involved in implementing NAP3;
  3. Failure to consider the unequal impacts of NAP3 on protected groups (on the grounds of age, race and disability); and
  4. Violation of Articles 2, 8, 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the rights to life, respect for private and family life, non-discrimination and property, respectively), as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998.

In a judgment issued on 25 October 2024, the High Court of Justice for England and Wales rejected the applicants’ claims. Justice Chamberlain, in his judgment, found that there had been no error of law in this case. His ruling extensively considered the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, but found that “[u]nlike in the field of mitigation, and subject to the arguments about the effect of the ECHR as interpreted in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] (…), there is no internationally binding quantified standard governing how States must adapt to climate change. It would be very difficult to devise any such standard because the risks of climate change differ widely from state to state (and indeed within states). In some places, the main risk may be from flooding, in other places extreme heat or drought. Elsewhere, there may be a combination of risks, which all have to be addressed but some of which are more urgent than others. Moreover, the profile of risks, and the priorities attached to addressing them, may change over time” (para. 92 of the High Court ruling).

Assessing the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment overall, Judge Chamberlain found that while this judgment “represents a significant development of the case law in relation to climate change, not only as regards the standing of associations to bring claims before the Strasbourg Court, but also as regards the scope and extent of the positive obligations of the State and the margin of appreciation to be accorded when assessing whether those obligations have been discharged”, “the significance of the judgment for the UK’s climate change framework should not be overstated.” The Judge noted that KlimaSeniorinnen focused heavily on lacunae in domestic legislation and the targets set out in the Paris Agreement, whereas the law of the United Kingdom does not feature similar lacunae in mitigation target-setting.

Lawyers for the government in this case had sought to dismiss the findings of the ECtHR, as made in para. 552 of KlimaSeniorinnen, as an obiter dictum. This paragraph of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment reads as follows:

Furthermore, effective protection of the rights of individuals from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well-being and quality of life requires that the above-noted mitigation measures be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection. Such adaptation measures must be put in place and effectively applied in accordance with the best available evidence (…) and consistent with the general structure of the State’s positive obligations in this context (…).

Judge Chamberlain disagreed with the government as concerns the nature of this finding, noting the dangers of applying “common law concepts [the idea of obiter dicta] to the judgment of a court most of whose members come from different legal traditions.” Still, Judge Chamberlain noted that the Strasbourg Court’s findings were of a general nature (para. 101). He found that KlimaSeniorinnen “appears to indicate that the positive obligation imposed by Articles 2 and 8 [ECHR] extends to adopting and effectively implementing ‘adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection’”, stemming from the State’s underlying regulatory obligation. He notes that “[w]hat that means in the context of adaptation measures, however, is far from clear” (para. 103), given that adaptation measures were not central to the KlimaSeniorinnen case, and that the international legal framework in this regard is less well-developed than for mitigation measures. He went on to anticipate future rulings from the ECtHR, considering it

(…) likely that, if the Strasbourg Court had in a future case to apply the reasoning in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] to the adaptation context, it would say that:
(a) the narrow margin of appreciation in relation to the mitigation aims was justified by reference to the internationally agreed objective of carbon neutrality by 2050 and the impact of one State’s default on other States;
(b) neither of these features applies in the field of adaptation; and
(c) accordingly, in the field of adaptation, States are to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation in setting the relevant objectives and a wider margin still in setting out the proposals and policies for meeting them (by analogy with the margin accorded to the State in setting the means for achieving the mitigation objectives).

Accordingly, he found that the current adaptation framework in the United Kingdom appears to “fall comfortably within the UK’s margin of appreciation under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR” and is not “contrary to any clear and consistent line of authority from the Strasbourg Court”. On this basis, he found that there was neither an error of law nor an incompatibility with human rights law evident in this case.

Application to the European Court of Human Rights:
In July 2025, Friends of the Earth announced that the case had been filed as an application before the European Court of Human Rights. In their application, they alleged violations of their human rights by the UK’s failure to put in place the necessary adaptation measures to protect them (and, for Friends of the Earth, the people it represents) from the risks and impacts of climate change. Invoking their rights under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, as well as Article 1 of Protocol 1 (read with Article 14), they argue that their human rights are engaged by the effects of climate-change, including heatwaves (Mr Paulley) and coastal erosion (Mr Jordan). They draw on findings from the UK’s independent advisory body on climate change, the Climate Change
Committee (‘the CCC), which has stated that the UK is already experiencing a range of significant adverse impacts from climate change, including heatwaves and coastal erosion.

Under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR
Noting that coastal erosion has been accelerated by climate change, they noted that Mr Jordan had in the meantime lost his home to coastal erosion, and that afterwards he was offered little support, whether financial or otherwise. That, along with the lack of meaningful, long-term and effective planning to support coastal communities, left him particularly affected by coastal erosion and associated risks. Mr. Paulley, in the meantime, was room-bound during heatwaves, given the high temperatures that affect the common areas of his care home. This, they argued, severely impacted his physical and mental health.

The applicants drew on studies that document excess deaths during heat waves in the UK, including especially during the summer 2022 heat wave. They drew also on the adaptation-related obligations under the Paris Agreement, as well as case-law from other international adjudicators (Billy) and the ECtHR’s own case-law in cases concerning climate change and other environmental pollution.

They argued that the UK had failed to act with due diligence to protect the applicants. The government’s actions in this regard violated its positive obligations under the right to life in Article 2 (as well as Article 8 ECHR) ECHR given its failure to put in place and effectively apply in practice adaptation measures that are in accordance with the best available evidence and consistent with the general structure of the State’s positive obligations in this context. In particular, they argued that the UK lacked an effective legal framework for ECHR-compliant climate adaptation, and that the NAP3 itself does not effectively protect Convention rights, because it lacked transparency and procedural safeguards, was developed behind closed doors and did not adequately protect vulnerable individuals.

Under Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR
The applicants alleged that the UK had failed to put in place effective measures to protect Mr Jordan’s property rights. NAP3 failed to set out measures to either ensure that Mr Jordan’s property was not lost to the sea or that, once his home was demolished as a result of managed realignment, he was provided with proportionate compensation, access to reinsurance, or the like. There was no evidence that the government had even considered those things.

Article 14 ECHR, read with Articles 2 and 8
Both individual applicants alleged that they are extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to their intersecting and compounding vulnerabilities: e.g., their specific conditions (residing in a care home, or a town subject to coastal erosion and resulting managed realignment, various health conditions, limited mobility and mental health issues.

Redacted application to the ECtHR:
The applicants’ (redacted) application to the ECtHR is available for download below.

2025-07-01 – ECtHR Submissions_Redacted_0Download

Suggested citation:
Friends of the Earth and Others v. the United Kingdom, application before the ECtHR of 1 July 2025 (pending).

Last updated:
27 July 2026.

Categories
2025 Adaptation Belgium Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Just transition litigation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Standing/admissibility Victim status

We Are Nature.Brussels and others v. Brussels-Capital Region

Summary:
In June 2023, an adaptation case was filed in Belgium against the Brussels-Capital Region (RBC) before the Francophone Court of First Instance of Brussels. The case was brought by 1330 individuals and by the NGO We Are Nature.Brussels, a Brussels-based organisation dedicated to protecting biodiversity, natural areas, undeveloped areas, abandoned sites, and living soils within the RBC. The plaintiffs emphasized the right to life in Article 2 ECHR and the right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 ECHR to argue that the region’s government had violated its duty of care to adapt to climate change by failing to adapt to the risks of flooding or urban heat islands. On 29 October 2025, Judge Sabine Malengreau for the Court of First Instance found that the RBC had indeed violated its legal obligations under domestic law, ordering the suspension of further urbanization and soil sealing projects on undeveloped sites larger than 0,5 hectares. Although the case is subject to appeal, it is provisionally enforceable.

The first instance court’s reasoning in more depth:
On the admissibility of the case, the court considered the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in KlimaSeniorinnen as concerns victim status and standing. The RBC’s government had invoked this judgment to argue that, like in the ECtHR proceedings, the individual applicants in the present case also lacked victim status because they had failed to demonstrate that they were personally and directly affected by the violations they alleged. The court rejected this argument. It held that this reasoning from the ECtHR was not relevant to the case before it given that the ECtHR determines victim status based on the autonomous conception of that term under Article 34 ECHR, whereas the conditions for liability under Belgian law “may validly differ from the conditions for the admissibility of an application filed within the framework of a system of remedies and procedures designed to ensure the ECtHR’s oversight of compliance with the ECHR.” It went on to declare the claims by the individual plaintiffs, all residents of Brussels, admissible.

In her reasoning, which noted the judgment in Belgium’s Klimaatzaak mitigation case, Judge Malengreau established a violation of the RBC’s duty of care because of its failure to act with the prudence and diligence required by Article 1382 of the former Belgian Civil Code. Previously, in the Klimaatzaak, two successive instances of the Belgian judiciary had already established that the RBC’s climate policy violated Articles 2 and 8 ECHR given that it had failed to take appropriate and reasonable measures to do its part in meeting the minimum requirements for reducing GHG emissions between 2013 and 2020.

Building on this reasoning, as well as obligations under the Paris Agreement and under EU law, the court noted (own translation from the original French):

  • RBC’s failure resulting from its inadequate goals and results in terms of mitigating GHG emissions;
  • the lack of an updated estimate of the capacity of natural sinks to absorb GHG emissions at the regional level;
  • the steady increase in urbanization and soil sealing;
  • the inadequacy of current regulatory tools;
  • and this, in a context where, for more than fifteen years, the RBC was aware of the certain risk of climate change that is dangerous to the region’s population and of the urgency of preventing the inevitable harmful effects of this climate change.

The court went on to find that:

Indeed, the aforementioned findings do not support the conclusion that RBC took the necessary measures to maintain and strengthen the capacity of natural sinks to absorb GHG emissions, even though it knew, as early as 2017, that, as things stood, the absorption capacity was largely insufficient relative to direct GHG emissions and that it was essential to strengthen natural sinks both to mitigate climate change and to adapt to its adverse effects.

In terms of establishing damage, the court held that:

None of the individual plaintiffs is immune to the negative effects (heat waves, droughts, floods, etc.) of climate change, which, in one way or another, is manifesting itself throughout the Brussels region.

It is also established that, regardless of efforts to mitigate the causes of global warming, its harmful effects will continue to multiply and worsen in the short and medium term.

To remedy this violation, the plaintiffs sought a moratorium on development and soil sealing on undeveloped sites larger than 0.5 ha.
The court noted that this would have the effect of regulating the use of land belonging to public and private actors, which would constitute an interference with property rights as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Belgian Constitution and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. It was accordingly not within the court’s authority to limit the exercise of the right to property by a broad and undefined range of public or private entities that were not parties to this case. Specific measures were accordingly left to the discretion of the RBC, which was ordered to take the necessary measures to suspend development and soil sealing of undeveloped sites and parcels of land larger than 0.5 ha within its jurisdiction, until the adoption of the PRAS amendment, or (as a back-up deadline) 31 December 2026.

The judgment:
The full text of the first-instance judgment (in the original French) is available below.

20251029-jugement-WAN-RBC-sans-annexesDownload

More information:
Additional information on the case, including press releases, are available here.

Suggested citation:
Francophone Court of First Instance of Brussels, We Are Nature.Brussels and others v. Brussels-Capital Region, case nr. 24/885/A, judgment of 29 October 2025.

Last updated:
23 July 2026.

Categories
Access to a remedy Climate activists and human rights defenders Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to health Right to life Russian Federation

Danilov et al. v. Russia (Russian Climate Case)

Summary:
In August 2023, a group of individuals and NGOs filed a climate application against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights. The applicants, made up of two NGOs (Ecodefense and Moscow Helsinki Group) and 18 individuals (including Indigenous persons and human‑rights defenders) challenges Russia’s climate policies and (in)actions for violating their human rights, citing Russia’s high per capita greenhouse gas emissions and particularly its high methane emissions. They argue that:

Russia is ranked as responsible for the third largest cumulative emissions since the beginning of the industrial era. Currently, it is the fourth largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world and the second biggest source of global energy-related methane emissions. As of 2021, it was the world’s largest exporter of fossil gas, the second largest exporter of oil, the third largest coal exporter and the largest gas flaring nation. It has the world’s second-largest coal reserves, and its 2020 Energy Strategy plans an increase in domestic coal production annually up to 2035. Russia has no quantifiable methane reduction plans and did not sign up to the COP26 global methane pledge. These factors materially affect global and Arctic climate risk.

As well as that:

Expert evidence shows Russia’s published policy from 2020 and 2021 allows emissions to continue rising to 2030 and only minimally decline thereafter — far above levels compatible with protecting human life and health or with Paris Agreement temperature targets. The Climate Action Tracker assesses Russia’s climate action as ‘critically insufficient’. The case argues that these policies breach constitutional and international human‑rights standards and Russia’s climate obligations. Most recently, Russia has issued a new emissions decree providing for a weaker 2035 emissions target. The new target is about 22% greater than Russia’s reported 2021 emissions.

After being rejected by the domestic courts, the applicants brought their case to the ECtHR, describing it as “the first and only climate challenge by Russian citizens to Russia’s policies at Strasbourg. Given Russia’s withdrawal/expulsion from the Council of Europe and the repressive context for human rights and environmental defenders, this is likely the last such case within a legally binding international forum during the critical climate mitigation window.” In Strasbourg, the applicants argue that the case remains in the Court’s temporal jurisdiction and invoke the rights to life, health, home and family life (Articles 2 and 8 ECHR), as well as the right to an effective remedy (Article 13 ECHR) and that prohibition of discrimination in relation to youth applicants and Indigenous applicants (Article 14 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 8 ECHR). They also argue that the Russian Government has sought to undermine the case, thereby interfering with their right to bring the case, in violation of Article 34 ECHR. Notably, it is reported that since the case began, both applicant NGO’s have been dissolved by the Russian courts, one applicant had his citizenship and that of family revoked and individual applicants and their lawyer have been designated ‘Foreign Agents’ under Russia’s Foreign Agent Law.

Further reading:
For a discussion of the case, see Joanna Evans, ‘The Russian Climate Case: A Crucial Test for the European Court of Human Rights’, Völkerrechtsblog, 15 December 2025, https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-russian-climate-case/.

More information on the case is provided by the applicants here.

Suggested citation:
ECtHR, Danilov et al. v. Russia, app. no. 9296/24, filed in August 2023.

Last updated:
24 June 2026.

Categories
2026 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Finland Private and family life Right to life

Greenpeace Finland & the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation v. Government of Finland

Summary:

Greenpeace Finland and Finnish Association for Nature Conservation have sought judicial review by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court of the government’s plans for implementation of climate targets under the 2022 Climate Act. These plans are detailed in the Government Report on the National Energy and Climate Strategy and Medium-Term Climate Plan, both of which were issued in December 2025. The plaintiffs argue that the measures envisaged by the government are insufficient to achieve the targets set out in the Climate Act, and alternative pathways towards the achievement of the targets have not been assessed, and thus the government is in breach of its statutory duty.    

The plaintiffs have approached the highest administrative court in Finland directly (rather than via the appellate route), arguing that the impugned government decisions implicate civil rights and obligations as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen & Others v. Switzerland judgment.

Last updated:

17 March 2026.

Links:

For the press release by the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, click here.

Categories
Biodiversity Children and young people Deforestation Domestic court Non-discrimination Right to a healthy environment Right to life

Abe Lim et al. v. Malaysia

Summary:
On 28 February 2026, a case was filed at the Kuala Lumpur High Court that challenges Malaysia’s inaction on deforestation, linking it explicitly with the obligation to combat climate change. The applicants, all Malaysian youth, argue that their government’s inaction on deforestation breaches the constitutional rights enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution (MC), namely the right to life (Art. 5(1) MC), which the Malaysian courts have previously recognized as encompassing the right to a healthy environment, and the right to equality (Art. 8(1) MC), given that deforestation disproportionately burdens youths and future generations. They argue that the government breached the expectations of maintaining forest cover that it had consistently created since 1992, and that it was bound to protect forests under the public trust doctrine. They seek a mandatory order requiring the government to take all necessary steps to prevent deforestation by avoiding dips below 50% forest cover, and to report on its progress in this regard. To make this claim, the applicants draw on expert reports, including a report on “50% Forest Cover: Assessing Malaysia’s Compliance with Forest-Climate Commitments” that notes the global and local cooling effect of forests, as well as their capacity for carbon sequestration. The expert report notes that:

Studies from the Amazon suggest that ecosystem degradation above 25% of a total forest area could result in a “tipping point” and cause the entire ecosystem to systematically die out; this not only results in a loss of biodiversity but causes a forest complex to become a net-emitter of CO2 (Gatti et al., 2021). The risk of deforestation causing a Malaysian rainforest to reach this “tipping point”, whether in isolated forest patches or in larger complexes, have not been sufficiently studied and so remains a major threat to Malaysia’s progress in achieving its net-zero target.

Hearing:
On 21 July 2026, a hearing was held in this case before the Kuala Lumpur High Court.

Application document and attached expert report:

1.-Application-for-Judicial-Review–002Download
5.-Applicants–Expert-Affidavit–002Download

Suggested citation:
Kuala Lumpur High Court, Abe Lim et al. v. Malaysia, WA-25-96-02/2026, filed 28 February 2026, pending case.

Last updated:
24 June 2026.

Categories
Australia Disability and health-related inequality Emissions reductions/mitigation Evidence Fossil fuel extraction Human Rights Committee Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to culture Right to life

Poelina et al. v. Australia

Summary:
On 20 June 2026, a communication against Australia was filed with the UN Human Rights Committee. The authors of the communication, who live in five Australian states, argue that Australia’s continued licensing of fossil fuel projects violates their rights under several provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), namely the right to life (Article 6 ICCPR), the right to privacy, family, and home life (Article 17), and the right to culture (Article 27). Drawing on the International Court of Justice’s 2025 climate advisory opinion, as well as the ECtHR’s 2024 KlimaSeniorinnen judgment and the IACtHR’s 2025 climate advisory opinion, they submit that they have experienced several rights-impacting events, all of which were “made substantially more likely and severe by anthropogenic climate change, to which Australia materially contributes through its production of fossil fuels for export.” This includes extreme heat, bushfires or wildfires, flooding, and toxic algal blooms. The authors build their claims on past extreme events that impacted several authors’ Aboriginal culture and lands, which have been flooded and face toxic algal blooms destroying traditional food sources and ways of life. Two authors also risked their lives fighting the 2019-2020 bushfires, with one losing his home to the flames and another volunteering as a firefighter. Other authors live with disabilities or health conditions that place them particularly at risk from heat waves or floods.

Relying on scientific reports and expert evidence (especially the Anderson and Calverley report), the authors submit that current levels of GHG emissions mean that “there are less than two years remaining to ensure warming is limited to 1.5°C”. They also argue against models that tolerate overshooting 1.5°C, arguing that States cannot rely on unproven carbon removal technologies to return below that level of warming and that technologies to remove or sequester carbon, notably carbon, capture, and storage (CCS) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR), remain unproven and ineffective.

The core of the communication is the argument that Australia has failed the “stringent due diligence” standard, which the ICJ has interpreted as requiring states to “use all means at their disposal” to prevent significant harm to the climate system by aligning their actions with a global pathway that limits warming to 1.5°C. In an illustrative list of internationally wrongful acts, the ICJ listed “fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies” (para 427). Based on this finding, the communication argues that Australia’s ongoing conduct relating to fossil fuel exploration, production and subsidies violates the authors’ ICCPR rights.

The authors note that Australia is “one of the world’s leading historical and current producers of fossil fuels for export” (as of 2024, the second largest global exporter of coal, and the third largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, with ca. 80% of Australia’s total fossil fuel CO2 footprint coming from fossil fuel exports as of 2022). Despite its international obligations to act on climate change, the authors submit, the Australian government’s policy “remains to maximise fossil fuel exports, and Australia continues to subsidise and approve fossil fuel projects that will export fossil fuels for decades to come, in some cases into the 2070s.”

To make this argument, the authors submit that due diligence to prevent significant environmental harm must be informed by the precautionary principle; that due diligence requires Australia to regulate third parties within its jurisdiction and control; that due diligence requires assessment of the cumulative effects of activities within Australia’s jurisdiction or control; that due diligence requires adopting mitigation measures that reflect best available science; that due diligence requires adopting mitigation measures that reflect best available science; that a State’s failure to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in ways consistent with due diligence is conduct attributable to that State that may violate human rights; that a State’s failure to regulate its export of fossil fuels, consistent with due diligence, is also attributable conduct that may violate human rights obligations; that there is a sufficient causal nexus between Australia’s non-compliance with human rights and the specific harms experienced by the authors; that legal standards of causation for individual harm in the context of climate harms are flexible, as demonstrated by various courts; that there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus to satisfy the ICJ’s approach to causation when assessing injury; that Australia’s fossil fuel exports are a material contribution to climate change and have caused, and will foreseeably cause, harm to the authors; that continued fossil fuel production means that Australia is not taking the necessary measures to prevent harm to the climate system; and that these acts and omissions are violating ICCPR rights.

Attribution science (the Thiery, Watkins, Cook and Crisp reports):
The Communication extensively details the concrete impacts faced by the applicants, and is accompanied by several expert reports that attribute the harms experienced to the impacts of climate change. The “Thiery report” concerns overall climate attribution, including heatwaves, bushfires, ocean warming, severe storms, drought, algal blooms, and sea-level rise; the “Watkins Report” concerns flooding; and the “Cook Report” concerns toxic algal blooms. The authors also submitted two reports by Dr George Crisp on climate-related health impacts for two of the authors.

Export emissions (the Anderson and Claverly report):
The Communication challenges Australia’s plans to produce fossil fuel for export on the basis a report by Anderson and Claverly. The report evaluates whether the estimated carbon budgets compatible with ‘achieving around a 50% chance of not exceeding 1.5°C and around 83% chance of not exceeding 2°C’ of global warming can accommodate emissions from Australia’s projected coal and LNG exports. The authors of the report conclude that ‘under assumptions favourable to Australia,’ the evidence is unequivocal that Australia’s planned export pathways are not compatible with the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals.

Admissibility (the Peel Report):
On the admissibility of the communication, concerning the absence of proceedings on the domestic level, the authors argue that they have satisfied the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule because Australian law does not offer redress for the harms at stake and the rights violations invoked.

To support this argument, they submit a report authored by Prof. Jacqueline Peel, who together with two co-author shows that there are no effective remedies available to the Authors to redress their alleged harms to the standards set out previously by the Committee, as there are no effective judicial or administrative avenues to compel Australia to align its production of fossil fuels for export with pathways for 1.5°C of warming. This is due to the fact, in particular, that Australian courts cannot compel the government to align fossil fuel exports with a 1.5°C pathway; that there is no constitutional or national-level statutory bill of rights in Australia; that existing statutory frameworks do not provide an effective remedy; and that there is no common law duty of care owed to the Authors in this context. In doing so, the report reflects the Committee’s own reasoning in Daniel Billy and Others v. Australia (2022), where the Committee found that the communication was admissible because no effective remedy was available to the Authors.

Relief sought:
The authors seek for their ICCPR rights to be upheld and note that the violation of these rights cannot be addressed only through mitigation of emissions released in Australia or through adaptation measures. Instead, they argue, exported (“Scope 3”) emissions from Australia’s fossil fuel exports materially contribute to climate harms. They seek for the Committee to:

  • Declare that the Australian government’s acts and omissions related to fossil fuel production for export, and its failure to adequately regulate the public and private operators involved, violate its human rights obligations to prevent a global average temperature increase of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels.
  • Establish violations of the authors’ rights to life; privacy, family, and home life; and culture under the Covenant.
  • Recommend the creation of a domestic process to review the compatibility of Australia’s fossil fuel exports with pathways to limit warming to 1.5°C.
  • Recommend an urgent phaseout of production of fossil fuels for export, including ceasing relevant public subsidies.
  • Recommend that Australia pause approvals for fossil fuel production projects for export.

Case documents:
The communication in this case can be downloaded below.

unhrc-poelina-et-al-v-australia-20-06-2026_redactedDownload

Suggested citation:
UN Human Rights Committee, Anne Poelina, Barry Traill, Brendon Donohue, Catherine, Jack Egan, Latishamarie Francis, Pamelarose Francis, Melissa Fisher, Sama Youhana and Rikki Dank v. Australia, Communication of 20 June 2026.

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life The Netherlands

Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell Plc (No. 2)

Summary:
On 21 April 2026, the Dutch NGO Milieudefensie delivered summons to oil and gas giant Shell Plc, in its second collective legal action against the company following the first Milieudefensie case (decided on appeal in 2024). This second case, under Section 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), is brought on behalf of current and future generations of Dutch citizens after the corporate actor moved its seat from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom. Milieudefensie summoned Shell to appear at a hearing to be held at the District Court of Amsterdam on 29 July 2026.

In its 273-page summons, Milieudefensie covers issues of jurisdiction, the requirements for a collective suit under Section 3:305a DCC, the scientific evidence underpinning its case, the risk of reaching climate tipping points for Europe and for the Netherlands, international climate policy and the global 1.5-degree temperature target, the important role played by non-state actors and their corporate responsibilities to respect human rights, the inhibiting influence of the oil and gas industry, including Shell, on infrastructural carbon lock-ins, including through its historical undermining of climate science and strategies to delay climate action, as well as its lobbying against the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD or CS3D) of 13 June 2024.

Milieudefensie sets out the framework for assessing Shell’s responsibility under Sections 3:296 and 6:162 DCC, fleshing this out by invoking the societal duty of care under domestic law, as well as the doctrine of hazardous negligence, human rights law (particularly Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, the rights to life and respect for private and family life), international customary law, international soft law, and legal principles including the precautionary principle, the climate law principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), and the principle of intergenerational justice. In particular, the summons argues that

“[s]ince the Urgenda judgment, it has been widely recognised in court judgments that dangerous climate change leads to human rights violations. Not only the ECHR, but also the IACtHR and the ICJ have recently found this. Numerous (supreme) national courts have independently reached the same conclusion. Within Europe, for example, reference can be made to the case law of the [German] Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Court of Appeal in Brussels. Outside Europe, the situation is no different. For example, the Lahore High Court in Pakistan, the Supreme Court of Colombia, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, the District Court of Montana (United States) and the Supreme Court of India have all ruled that human rights can be relied on in order to be protected against the effects of climate change. In view of the above, there can be no misunderstanding that human rights (indirectly) have a horizontal effect when the unwritten duty-of-care standard is fleshed out. Nor can there be any debate about the fact that dangerous climate change leads to human rights violations and that human rights can be relied on for protection against dangerous climate change. The only question that remains is what assessment framework needs to be applied here. “

Milieudefensie argues that Shell bears a share of the responsibility to prevent dangerous climate change, discussing its level of knowledge and the foreseeability of harm by arguing that Shell has long known about the fact that fossil fuels cause climate change, with serious consequences for people and the environment, has known that it is making a substantial contribution to climate change and that it needs to take (precautionary) measures. It sets out Shell’s two-pillared obligations: first, a reduction obligation for Scope 1, 2 and 3 CO2 emissions, and second, an obligation not to develop new oil and gas fields.

Concerning the first pillar of obligations, Milieudefensie argues that “Shell must make an equitable contribution (a “fair share”) to preventing dangerous climate change and limiting global warming to 1.5°C by reducing its emissions.” In doing so, it invokes UN reports to argue that:

  • companies must demonstrate maximum ambition to achieve (net) zero CO2 emissions as quickly as possible, but by 2050 at the latest;
  • companies must set ambitious and credible interim targets for the short and medium term on the road to the above-mentioned goal of net zero CO2 emissions that represent a fair share of the global reduction target; and
  • the (interim) targets should cover all Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions and should aim for absolute CO2 emission reductions.  

It also submits that “Shell can be considered to be an influential Western company in several respects; it has both substantial emissions and large transition capabilities and a large historical responsibility. These are all relevant circumstances under the above-mentioned climate protocols (as evidenced by e.g. the reference to the CBDR principle and the need to take on a fair share of the global target) for asking Shell to take on an above-average responsibility and requiring it to reduce its emissions faster than the global average.”

As concerns the second pillar of obligations, Milieudefensie argues that Shell’s obligation not to pursue new fossil fuel projects is “based on the doctrine of hazardous negligence, human rights law, the legal principles discussed, soft law and other objective points of reference, is that Shell must cease the development and production of new oil and gas fields. After all, the carbon budget with a 50% probability of 1.5°C is already exceeded with the operation of the existing fossil-fuel infrastructure alone, and new oil and gas fields are therefore incompatible with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C by the end of this century. “

Milieudefensie concludes that Shell is breaching its societal duty of care under domestic law, and seeks the following provisionally enforceable remedies:

  • Emissions reductions, covering annual Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, as per the table below;
  • A prohibition of achieving these reductions through divestment, i.e. through transfer of shares or assets;
  • To prohibit Shell from making use of carbon credits for the purpose of achieving the emission reductions described;
  • To order Shell to achieve that the Shell Group ceases, continues to cease and does not start the production of new oil and gas from fields.

More information:
The full text of the summons (translated into English by Milieudefensie) is available below. For more information on the case, see here.

Summons Milieudefensie v. Shell (No. 2)Download

Suggested citation:
District Court of Amsterdam, Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell Plc (No. 2), summons issued 21 April 2026.

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Japan Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Right to pursue happiness

Call4 et al. v. Japan

Summary:
On 18 December 2025 and 4 April 2026, two lawsuits were filed in Japan against the Japanese government’s inaction on climate change. The first suit was filed with the Tokyo District Court on behalf of 452 plaintiffs from all over Japan, including victims of heatstroke, individuals who work in primary industries such as agriculture and fisheries, and children. The second suit, again with the Tokyo District Court, was filed on behalf of 454 additional plaintiffs.

The (in total) 906 plaintiffs in these twin cases summarize their claims as follows:

First, they challenge the legality of the government’s emissions reductions targets, given their inconsistency with the 1.5-degree warming target set out by the Paris Agreement. They challenge the reduction targets set out in the most recent Japanese NDC and the country’s 7th Global Warming Countermeasures Plan, both dated February 2025. Under these instruments, the government’s current targets aim for a 39% emissions reduction by 2030, a 52% reduction by 2035, and a 67% reduction by 2040 compared to 2019 levels, which the plaintiffs argue is incompatible with IPCC science, the 1.5-degree target, and Japan’s obligations as a highly developed nation.

Second, the plaintiffs argue that the government’s failure to enact effective legislation to achieve the 1.5-degree target is unconstitutional. They submit that “currently in Japan, there are no laws that set greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2030 or 2035, nor are there any legally binding emission standards.” They argue that “[t]he right to live peacefully in a stable climate without fear of harm to one’s life, health, or property is a human right that should be guaranteed by the Constitution”, as well as invoking the constitutionally guaranteed right to live peacefully.

In doing so, the plaintiffs draw on IPCC reports and explicitly refer to climate litigation in domestic and international jurisdictions, including the ICJ’s climate advisory opinion.

More information:
More information on the case, as well as case documents, are available here.

The applicants’ submissions in both cases (in Japanese) are available for download below.

Filing in the first caseDownload
Filing in the second caseDownload

Suggested citation:
Tokyo District Court, Call4 et al. v. Japan, filings of 18 December 2025 and 4 April 2026 (pending).

Categories
2026 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to life Separation of powers United States of America

Kaarina Dunn et al. v. Public Service Comission of Wisconsin, et al.

Summary:
On 23 April 2026, a court in the US state of Wisconsin ruled in a youth climate case against the Wisconsin Public Service Commission and the Wisconsin State legislature. The case was filed by fifteen young people ranging in age from 8-17. The youth plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of statues governing the approval of fossil fuel-fired power plants because those statutes limit the ability of the first respondent, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, to consider air quality impacts of when issuing permits for such plants. In doing so, they had invoked their rights, under the Wisconsin state constitution, to liberty and to life, as well as the rights to a stable climate system and to access, enjoy and use navigable waters (both of which they considered inherent within the constitution). They also alleged a violation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.

According to the Plaintiffs, climate change has rendered them unable to enjoy Wisconsin’s natural resources, like its rivers and lakes, as well as prevented them from engaging in recreational activities, like swimming and skiing. Some are deprived of their Indigenous cultural traditions, while others have experienced asthma and contracted Lyme disease.

The judge tasked with resolving this case, Judge Julie Genovese, ruled that “[w]hile the court is sympathetic to the youths and admires their willingness to access the courts in their quest to protect the planet, I conclude that the case must be dismissed because environmental policy is a nonjusticiable political question”. The judge discussed Wisconsin’s political question doctrine, which “dictates that courts will not decide questions that require the court to determine what the best or wisest public policy would be”, and “also embodies a practical component, recognizing that matters of economic and social policy are not reasonably “susceptible to judicial management or resolution.””

The judge concluded that:

“by substituting this court’s judgment for the legislature, the court
would be showing a lack of respect for the legislative and executive branches. Plaintiffs do not like these policy decisions. (…) Because Plaintiffs think it is technologically and economically feasible for Wisconsin to be carbon free by 2050, they conclude that by invalidating the statutes and thus their limitations, the PSC will decide to stop approving fossil fuel-fired plants, and Plaintiffs’ carbon free goal will be achieved. While the court may agree with Plaintiffs’ policy preferences, it would show a blatant lack of respect for our elected officials and the agency defendants to substitute my judgment for theirs, and strike the limitations imposed by the legislature and executed by the PSC. Accordingly, because the court concludes that the legislature’s policy decisions represent a nonjusticiable political question, this case must be dismissed.”

Full text of the judgment:
The full text of the judgment is available for download below.

Decision Wisconsin 2026Download

Submission on behalf of the state:
The submission made on behalf of the state government can be downloaded below.

Filing Legislature’s attorney Ryan WalshDownload