Category: Right to life

Categories
Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Evidence Fair trial Gender / women-led Imminent risk Keywords Margin of appreciation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Separation of powers Standing/admissibility Switzerland Victim status Vulnerability

Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland

Summary:
In 2016, the Senior Women for Climate Protection Switzerland (German: ‘Verein KlimaSeniorinnen’), a Swiss organisation, brought proceedings concerning the alleged omissions of the Swiss federal government to adopt an adequate climate protection policy. They submitted that current domestic climate targets and measures are not sufficient to limit global warming to a safe level. This failure to prevent climate-related disasters, they argued, represents a failure to protect the rights under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the rights to life and respect for private and family life, respectively) of the organization’s members. In particular, they submitted evidence that their specific demographic (older women) is particularly impacted by heatwaves, citing health impacts and excess mortality risks. The respondent State, they argued, has failed to comply with its positive obligations to protect their rights, read in light of the environmental law principles of precaution and intergenerational equity.

The applicants also invoked two procedural rights under the Convention, namely the rights in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR (right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, respectively). In this regard they argued that the domestic courts failed to take their case seriously and provide an effective remedy to contest the violation of their rights.

These claims were rejected by the domestic instances at three levels of jurisdiction. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in its ruling, considered that the case represented an actio popularis, concerned questions better suited to the political arena, and did not raise an arguable claim of a rights violation. As a result, the applicants took their case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

This case was only the second climate change-related case to come to Strasbourg. Like the Duarte Agostinho case, this application raised novel questions before the Court, including the issue of victim status in climate cases, the standing of (environmental) NGOs to bring cases to the Court, and the extent of the State margin of appreciation in regard to environmental protection measures related to climate change, and the extent of the positive obligation to protect individuals from the risks to their life and health posed by climate change.

On 9 April 2024, in a historic ruling, the ECtHR declared this case admissible in part (for the association) and found that there had been violations of Articles 6(1) and 8 ECHR. In doing so, this case became the Court’s leading climate judgment, and a model for further climate-related cases in this system.

Third-party interventions:
There were an unusually large (for the ECtHR) number of third party interventions in this case: 23 in total, including eight States. The KlimaSeniorinnen association provided copies of all of the third-party interventions; these are available here. Some of the third-party interveners were also granted leave to intervene orally during the hearing before the Grand Chamber.

Grand Chamber hearing:
This was the first climate case heard by the European Court of Human Rights, followed immediately by the Carême v. France case. The Court has adjourned its examination of six other climate cases until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the three climate change cases before it, meaning that leading judgments clarifying the Convention obligations around cliamte change can be expected in these cases.

During the hearing, submissions were heard from the applicants, the respondent State, and two of the 23 total third-party interveners (the Government of Ireland & the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). A live summary of the hearing is available here.

General findings of the Court in its judgment of 9 April 2024:
The Court’s judgment is prefaced by a number of general findings that reflect its intended nature as a leading case. Noting the need to ensure effective protection of Convention rights without undermining the prohibition of actio popularis cases under the Convention system, the Court acknowledged that it had a role to play here, finding that “the current situation (…) involves compelling present‑day conditions, confirmed by scientific knowledge, which the Court cannot ignore in its role as a judicial body tasked with the enforcement of human rights.” At the same time, noting “the necessarily primary responsibility of the legislative and executive branches and the inherently collective nature of both the consequences and the challenges arising from the adverse effects of climate change”, it held that the isuse of victim status here raised an issue of the separation of powers, requiring particular consideration. Noting the global and complex nature of climate change, it held that “the necessity of combating climate change involves various conflicts, the weighing‑up of which falls, as stated previously, within the democratic decision‑making processes, complemented by judicial oversight by the domestic courts and this Court.”

In light of this, and before assessing the case, the Court set out a number of general considerations relating to climate‑change cases. This includes questions of causation, including the finding that despite indirect causal links, “the essence of the relevant State duties in the context of climate change relates to the reduction of the risks of harm for individuals”, meaning that it could not apply”a strict conditio sine qua non requirement” to matters of causation. This section also includes issues of proof and evidence, and references the “evolution of scientific knowledge, social and political attitudes and legal standards concerning the necessity of protecting the environment”. Here the Court established that “there are sufficiently reliable indications that anthropogenic climate change exists, that it poses a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights guaranteed under the Convention, that States are aware of it and capable of taking measures to effectively address it, that the relevant risks are projected to be lower if the rise in temperature is limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and if action is taken urgently, and that current global mitigation efforts are not sufficient to meet the latter target” (para. 436). And, importantly, it discarded the “drop in the bucket” argument made by the respondent State, stating that “The relevant test does not require it to be shown that “but for” the failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred. Rather, what is important, and sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State, is that reasonable measures which the domestic authorities failed to take could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm” (para. 444). It also stressed that there is no right to a healthy environment in the ECHR, but that it can and has nonetheless dealt with other environmental cases, reiterating its past approach that “the crucial element which must be present in determining whether, in the circumstances of a given case, an environmental harm has adversely affected one of the rights safeguarded by the Convention is the existence of a harmful effect on a person and not simply the general deterioration of the environment” (para. 446). It also noted that it is conscious of its subsidiary role and the direct democratic legitimation of national authorities to make decisions on climate policy, but that where State policy affects Convention rights, it has competence to intervene and “the Court’s competence in the context of climate-change litigation cannot, as a matter of principle, be excluded” (paras. 449-451).

The Court also set out the relevant principles for interpreting the ECHR, including the living instrument approach and the fact that while the Court “does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention” — including the Paris Agreement — it has consistently noted that it will interpret the Convention in harmony with other international law.

Admissibility:
On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case admissible in part. Under Article 34 ECHR, it used this judgment as an opportunity to create new standards on victim status specific to climate-related cases. In doing so, it set out the general standards on victim status, noting that it did not admit actio popularis cases and that the ECHR “does not permit individuals or groups of individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention” (para. 460). It noted that the notion of victim status must be applied flexibly, and that it’s distinct from locus standi, i.e. representative actions.

The Court then issued general considerations on victim status and locus standi in climate cases, noting that “there is cogent scientific evidence demonstrating that climate change has already contributed to an increase in morbidity and mortality, especially among certain more vulnerable groups, that it actually creates such effects and that, in the absence of resolute action by States, it risks progressing to the point of being irreversible and disastrous” (para. 478).

It also held that (para. 479): the critical issues around climate change “arise from failures to act, or inadequate action”, meaning omissions in legislative or regulatory frameworks that require a special approach to victim status. Importantly, the Court also clarified that its findings on victim status in the context of complaints about omissions in climate policy “is without prejudice to the determination of victim status in circumstances where complaints by individuals concern alleged violations arising from a specific individual loss or damage already suffered by them” (para. 480), meaning that the specially approach spelled out for mitigation cases need not preclude other types of claims. However, it held, in the context of climate change, “a potentially a huge number of persons could claim victim status under the Convention”, which “would not sit well with the exclusion of actio popularis from the Convention mechanism and the effective functioning of the right of individual application” (para. 483). The Court clarified the difficult situation in which it found itself, between “disrupting national constitutional principles and the separation of powers” and depriving individuals affected in their rights from “any judicial recourse before the Court”, noting the “distinct representational disadvantage” of those most affected (para. 484). It then, in para 487 of the judgment, spelled out the criteria for individual victim status in climate cases. These are:

  • (a)  “a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change”, i.e. a significant level and severity of risk of adverse consequences; and
  • (b) “a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm.”

Given that there is no actio popularis under the Convention, the Court held, “the threshold for fulfilling these criteria is especially high”, and will depend on specific vulnerabilities and local circumstances as well as including considerations relating to: “the nature and scope of the applicant’s Convention complaint, the actuality/remoteness and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on the applicant’s life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicant’s vulnerability” (para. 488).

As to the standing of associations, the Court generally reiterated its previous Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others judgment, which had allowed representative standing for an organisation. It noted that recourse to collective bodies like associations can make defense of one’s interests more accessible in certain circumstances, including the context of climate change, noting that this general principle was also reflected in the Aarhus Convention, which it discussed extensively. The Court then set out some general principles on organizations’ victim status versus their standing as representatives of victims. In light of the former, it reiterated past case-law finding that “an association cannot rely on health considerations or nuisances and problems associated with climate change which can only be encountered by natural persons”. But it also recognized that understandings of the importance of litigation by associations had evolved, and that climate cases are complex and demanding and affect many individuals (para. 498). In addition, “the special feature of climate change as a common concern of humankind and the necessity of promoting intergenerational burden-sharing in this context (…), speak in favour of recognising the standing of associations before the Court in climate-change cases” (para. 499). However, this should not mean allowing an actio popularis: a test for associations’ standing is required. To design its test, the Court had regard to the Aarhus Convention while also noting key difference between its approach and that under Aarhus.

The test it devised for associations looks as follows: associations will have locus standi to bring climate cases about impacts on human lives and health where they:

  • (a) have been lawfully established in the relevant jurisdiction, or have standing to act there;
  • (b) pursue, under their statutory objectives, a dedicated purpose of defending the human rights of their members or other affected individuals in the jurisdiction concerned, and
  • (c) are genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of affected individuals in the jurisdiction who are subject to specific threats on their lives, health or well-being from climate change.

The Court also noted that it would consider additional factors, like the purpose for which the association was established, its non-profit character, the nature and extent of its activities, its membership and representativeness, its principles and transparency of governance and whether standing is in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

There was no need, however, to show that those on whose behalf the case has been brought would themselves have met the climate-specific victim-status requirements for individuals as set out earlier in the judgment.

Because the Court joined its actual analysis of the victim status requirement to the merits of the case, this is discussed in the following section.

Merits:
In setting out general principles on the applicability of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life), the Court noted past cases where the right was applicable to situations where there is a threat to life, but “where the person concerned did not die”. Although noting the evidence on vulnerable populations, the Court reiterated that the appropriate test here is one of whether there is a “real and imminent” risk to life, meaning that the risk must be serious, gennuine, sufficiently ascertainable and in physical proximity. It then tailored this last aspect to the nature of climate change, stating that it would suffice to show “an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant”. This means that, provided an applicant has victim status, “a serious risk of a significant decline in a person’s life expectancy owing to climate change ought also to trigger the applicability of Article 2.”

As for Article 8 ECHR, the Court stated generally that it was necessary to show an “actual interference” with the right, meaning that there needs to be “a direct and immediate link between the alleged environmental harm and the applicant’s private or family life or home”, and a

As for Article 8 ECHR, the Court stated generally that it was necessary to show an “actual interference” with the right, meaning that there needs to be “a direct and immediate link between the alleged environmental harm and the applicant’s private or family life or home”, and a certain level of severity. Drawing on its past environmental case-law, the Court went on to establish that “Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 519).

The Court then considered the applicability of Art. 8 ECHR to the case before it. As concerned the applicant association, it found that it met the criteria for standing by associations as set out earlier in the judgment, describing the KlimaSeniorinnen association as “a vehicle of collective recourse aimed at defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State”. The the complaints pursued by the association on behalf of its members, it held, fall within the scope of Article 8. The association accordingly had locus standi, and Article 8 was declared applicable to its complaint.

On applicants 2-5 (the individual applicants), the Court held that the threshold for meeting its two criteria (high-intensity exposure and a pressing need to ensure protection) was high. It was not enough to show that they were particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The crucial paragraph of the judgment here is para. 533: “while it may be accepted that heatwaves affected the applicants’ quality of life, it is not apparent from the available materials that they were exposed to the adverse effects of climate change, or were at risk of being exposed at any relevant point in the future, with a degree of intensity giving rise to a pressing need to ensure their individual protection (…). It cannot be said that the applicants suffered from any critical medical condition whose possible aggravation linked to heatwaves could not be alleviated by the adaptation measures available in Switzerland or by means of reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their complaint was accordingly declared inadmissible.

On the claims under Article 2, the Court held that it was not necessary to analyze this further, noting that its analysis would “have regard to the principles developed also under Article 2, which to a very large extent are similar to those under Article 8 (…) and which, when seen together, provide a useful basis for defining the overall approach to be applied in the climate-change context under both provisions.”

The Court then recapitulated more general principles now on the merits proper. It held that the Article 2 and 8 positive obligations are generally quite similar, requiring the State:

  • (a)  to put in place an adequate legislative and administrative framework and govern the licensing, setting-up, operation, security and supervision of the activity;
  • (b) to apply that framework effectively in practice;
  • (c) to remain within their margin of appreciation;
  • (d) to exercise due diligence and consider all competing interests;
  • (f) to provide access to essential information enabling individuals to assess risks to their health and lives;

Noting also that “the scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in the particular circumstances will depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation”.

In reviewing the domestic decision-making process, the Court has particular regard to the following considerations:

  • (a) Its subsidiary role;
  • (b) The need to consider all of the procedural aspects;
  • (c) The presence of appropriate investigations and studies;
  • (d) The public’s access to the conclusions of the relevant studies; and
  • (e) Whether or not the individuals concerned had an opportunity to protect their interests in the environmental decision-making process, i.e. participate effectively.

Turning to States’ positive obligations relation to climate, it first considered the State margin of appreciation. Having regard to the scientific evidence, the Court considered it justified to give climate protection considerable weight against competing considerations.

Regarding the margin of appreciation it distinguished between the scope of the margin as regards (i) the State’s commitment combating climate change and setting objectives in this respect, and (ii) the choice of means designed to achieve those objectives. The margin is more narrow with regard to the former. For the latter aspect, i.e. the choice of means, States have a wide margin of appreciation.

As to the content of States’ positive obligations under Article 8, this is primarily a regulatory obligation. This means that, in line with their international commitments, States need to put in place regulations and measures to prevent climate change. The global aims in the Paris Agreement are not enough; and “must inform the formulation of domestic policies, it is obvious that the said aims cannot of themselves suffice as a criterion for any assessment of Convention compliance of individual Contracting Parties to the Convention in this area. This is because “each individual State is called upon to define its own adequate pathway for reaching carbon neutrality, depending on the sources and levels of emissions and all other relevant factors within its jurisdiction.”

This means that Article 8 ECHR “requires that each Contracting State undertake measures for the substantial and progressive reduction of their respective GHG emission levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within, in principle, the next three decades” (ca. 2050). To avoid a disproportionate burden on future generations, this means immediate action needs to be taken and adequate intermediate reduction goals must be set for the interim period. The Court spelled out that this must be part of a binding regulatory framework at the national level, followed by adequate implementation, and that “the relevant targets and timelines must form an integral part of the domestic regulatory framework, as a basis for general and sectoral mitigation measures.”

In para. 550, the Court set out the criteria it would use to decide whether a State has remained within its margin of appreciation, namely whether the authorities had due regard to the need to:

  • “(a) adopt general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality and the overall remaining carbon budget for the same time frame, or another equivalent method of quantification of future GHG emissions, in line with the overarching goal for national and/or global climate-change mitigation commitments;
  • (b) set out intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways (by sector or other relevant methodologies) that are deemed capable, in principle, of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant time frames undertaken in national policies;
  • (c) provide evidence showing whether they have duly complied, or are in the process of complying, with the relevant GHG reduction targets (…);
  • (d) keep the relevant GHG reduction targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and
  • (e) act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures.”

These mitigation measures, it added, must be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account particular protection needs.

The Court also set out procedural safeguards, namely

  • (a) The publicity of relevant information; and
  • (b) The availability of procedures to take into account the views of the public, and in particular the interests of those affected.

Applying these principles to the case before it, the Court held that it could “take into account the overall situation in the respondent State”, including relevant information that came to light after the domestic proceedings, but that here, given an ongoing domestic legislative process, its assessment was limited to examining the domestic legislation as it stood on the date of the (internal) adoption of the judgment, which was 14 February 2024.

The Court noted that the currently existing 2011 CO2 Act (in force since 2013) required that emissions reductions of 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. However, as far back as August 2009, the Swiss Federal Council had found that the scientific evidence under a 2-2.4°C warming limit required a reduction in global emissions of at least 50-85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Industrialised countries (like Switzerland) had to reduce their emissions by 25-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. for the higher 1.5°C limit, emissions would have to decline continuously, and the pathway 20% by 2020 pathway was insufficient to achieve that objective.

As the Government acknowledged, domestic assessments found that even the reduction target for 2020 had been missed. Between 2013 and 2020, Switzerland reduced its emissions by around 11% compared with 1990 levels, indicating the insufficiency of the authorities’ past action to take the necessary measures to address climate change.

A proposed revision of the CO2 Act for 2020-2030 proposed an overall reduction of 50% of emissions, including a domestic reduction of 30% by 2030 and measures to be taken abroad (“external emissions”). This proposal was rejected in a popular referendum in June 2021. Here the Court held that, “irrespective of the way in which the legislative process is organised from the domestic constitutional point of view”, there was a legislative lacuna, pointing to a failure on the part of the respondent State to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 to devise a regulatory framework setting the requisite objectives and goals.

Reflecting the updated Swiss NDC, the Climate Act was enacted, and envisages the principle of a net‑zero emissions target by 2050, but several lacunae remain, and “the Court has difficulty accepting that the mere legislative commitment to adopt the concrete measures “in good time” (…) satisfies the State’s duty”, especially because “the introduction of that new legislation is not sufficient to remedy the shortcomings identified in the legal framework applicable so far.”

Currently, the Swiss goal used more emissions than even a globally equal “per capita emissions” approach would entitle it to use.

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that there was no established methodology to determine a country’s carbon budget, and noted that an NDC under the Paris Agreement was not an appropriate substitute. The Court approved of the reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Neubauer, where it rejected the argument that it was impossible to determine the national carbon budget by emphasizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

Thus, “while acknowledging that the measures and methods determining the details of the State’s climate policy fall within its wide margin of appreciation, in the absence of any domestic measure attempting to quantify the respondent State’s remaining carbon budget, the Court has difficulty accepting that the State could be regarded as complying effectively with its regulatory obligation under Article 8” (para. 572). This meant that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (by a majority of 16-1).

On the issue of Article 6 ECHR, concerning the right of access to a court, the Court held that the issue of victim status should again be joined to the merits, and the Court again dove in with general principles, finding that it did not per se need to tailor these principles to the nature of climate change cases.

Examining these principles in the case before it, the Court held that “it cannot be said that the individual applicants’ claim was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise lacking in foundation in terms of the relevant domestic law (…). The Court is unable to agree with the finding of the FSC that the individual applicants’ claim could not be considered arguable for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention” (para. 618). It went on to find that interests defended by the association meant that the “dispute” raised by it had a direct and sufficient link to its members’ rights. Finding that Article 6 (1) applied to the complaint of the applicant association, the Court also considered it to have victim status.

For the individual applicants, however, the Court found that the dispute they had brought concerning the failure to effectively implement mitigation measures was not directly decisive for their specific rights. They had not shown that there was a sufficiently imminent and certain effect on their individual rights, and this part of their complaint was inadmissible.

For the association, among other things, the Court rejected the domestic courts’ findings that there was still some time to prevent global warming from reaching the critical limit, and noted that they “did not engage seriously or at all with the action brought by the applicant association.” There had accordingly been a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR, with the Court emphasizing “the key role which domestic courts have played and will play in climate-change litigation”.

The applicants also complained that they had not had access to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. Here the Court noted that Article 6 is a lex specialis to Article 13, the latter being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6, so there was no separate issue in its regard.

Remedies:
The individual applicants had made requests for just satisfaction for damage under Article 41 ECHR, but the organisation did not, so no award was made. The Court did award costs and expenses to the amount of EUR 80,000.

The applicants had also made an Art. 46 claim for a general measures order. Here the Court noted that it is primarily for the State to choose, under the supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used domestically to discharge its obligation to comply with the Court’s judgment, as long as the means are compatible with the conclusions and spirit of that judgment. The Court went on to hold that, “having regard to the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, the Court is unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the present judgment.” It noted the State’s broad margin of appreciation choose the means to discharge its Convention obligations, and found that the State was thus better placed than the Court to decide which specific measures to take.

Separate opinions:
A separate opinion by Judge Eicke is annexed to this judgment. He disagreed with the majority in several points, especially victim status and the merits of Art. 8. He presented his view as a disagreement of a “fundamental nature” that “goes to the very heart of the role of the Court within the Convention system and, more generally, the role of a court in the context of the unique and unprecedented challenges posed to humanity” because the majority had exceeded “the permissible limits of evolutive interpretation”.

According to Judge Eicke, the majority judgment creates a new right to “effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well‑being and quality of life arising from the harmful effects and risks caused by climate change”. While acknowledging the seriousness of the threat of climate change, and noting “(a) the absolute need for urgent action and (b) the sheer complexity of the challenges climate change (and the other aspects of the “triple planetary crisis”) pose (geo-)politically, practically, logistically as well as legal,” he argues that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances (Article 2(2) Paris Agreement) is “difficult to reconcile (if not wholly inconsistent) with the Court’s primary role of ensuring observance of a common minimum standard of protection applicable equally to all Contracting Parties”.

On victim status, Eicke argues that “there was, in fact, no dispute and no uncertainty about the “victim” status of the individual applicants in relation to the Article 6 § 1 complaint in this case; and therefore no need to join that question to the merits”. He sets out and adheres to the previously established case-law on victim status, refusing to join the majority in creating a new approach tailored to climate cases and arguing that exceptions should only be possible where individual applications document victim status are not “ever” likely to be possible. He argues that the judgment creates an actio popularis.

Under Articles 2 and 8, Eicke argues that while it would have been possible to find a procedural violation of Articles 2 or 8, “the substantive violation of Article 8 which the majority seeks to construct from this starting premise has no basis either in the text of the Convention nor in any of the Court’s case-law.” He considers that “the Court would already have achieved much if it had focussed on a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and, at a push, a procedural violation of Article 8 relating in particular to (…) the right of access to court and of access to information”. He accuses the majority of trying “to run before it could walk”, and “giving (false) hope that litigation and the courts can provide “the answer” without there being, in effect, any prospect of litigation (especially before this Court) accelerating the taking of the necessary measures towards the fight against anthropogenic climate change”, and mentions the risk that this judgment will distract from other efforts to tackle climate change.

Implementation measures taken:

N/A

Date of decision:
It was announced on 26 March 2024 that the Grand Chamber would issue its judgment in this case, along with the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber, in a hearing to be held on 9 April 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The judgment and a summary were made available on the Court’s HUDOC database immediately after the hearing.

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
This case was communicated to the respondent State, Switzerland, on 17 March 2021. On 26 April 2022, a Chamber of the Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, held a public hearing in this case on 29 March 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here. On 9 April 2024, the Court issued its judgment in the case.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, no. 53600/20, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:

Webcast of the hearing:
To watch a webcast recording of the public hearing in this case, which was held before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 29 March 2023, click here (available in French and English).

Last updated:
9 April 2024

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Duarte Agostinho et al. v. Austria et al. (“Portuguese Children’s Case”)

Summary:
This case was brought by a group of six young people, acting together as the ‘Youth for Climate Justice’, against 33 Council of Europe Member States. Theirs was the first climate case to come before the ECtHR. In their application, the six applicants, aged between 8 and 21 at the time, argued that the 33 respondent States failed to comply with their positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, read in the light of the commitments made under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. They claimed that their right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) was being threatened by the effects of climate change in their home State of Portugal, including through the harms caused by forest fires. Moreover, they claimed that their right to respect for their private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR was being threatened by heatwaves that forced them to spend more time indoors. They also noted their anxiety about their uncertain future, and the fact that, as young people, they stand to experience the worst effects of climate change. They accordingly alleged a violation of Article 14 ECHR (non-discrimination), given the particular impacts of climate change on their generation. According to the applicants, the absence of adequate measures to limit global emissions constitutes, in itself, a breach of the obligations incumbent on States.

This was the first climate application brought before the European Court of Human Rights, and it was brought with the support of the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN). The issues raised here were novel in the Strasbourg context. In addition, in communicating the case, the Court also proprio motu raised an issue under Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case inadmissible on jurisdiction and non-exhaustion grounds.

Domestic proceedings:
None: this case was brought directly to the ECtHR. The applicants submitted that, given the complexity of the case and their limited financial means, as well as the limited prospects of success before domestic instances, requiring them to exhaust the domestic remedies in each of the 33 respondent States would impose an excessive and disproportionate burden on them.

Relinquishment:
On 29 June 2022, the 7-judge Chamber to which the case had originally been allocated relinquished jurisdiction over it in favour of the Court’s 17-judge Grand Chamber. Relinquishment is possible where a case either (a) raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or its Protocols, or (b) might lead to a result inconsistent with the Court’s case-law (Rule 72, paras 1-2 of the Rules of Court).

During the course of the proceedings, the complaint against Ukraine was withdrawn by the applicants. The Russian Federation ceased to be a Council of Europe Member State during the course of the proceedings, but this was not an obstacle to considering the application as concerns anything taking place before the end of its membership (on 16 September 2022).

In February 2023, the Court announced that it would hold a public Grand Chamber hearing in this case, along with two other climate cases pending before it (Carême v. France and KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v. Switzerland). It announced that it would adjourn the remaining climate cases pending before it in the meantime. The oral stage in these three cases was staggered: Carême and KlimaSeniorinnen were heard on 29 March 2023, while the hearing in Duarte Agostinho was heard by the same composition of the Grand Chamber on 27 September 2023.

Grand Chamber hearing:
A hearing in this case was held on 27 September 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here.

During the hearing, the respondent States pooled their submissions to a large extent, with additional arguments from the Netherlands, Portugal, and Turkiye. Third-party interveners also received leave to appear during the oral hearing, namely the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, the EU’s European Commission, and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). The substance of the hearing focused largely on admissibility issues, namely victim status, the (non-)exhaustion of domestic remedies and the extraterritoriality of Convention obligations. The judges also asked a number of questions to the parties before retiring to consider the admissibility and merits of the case.

Admissibility:
From the blog post on the case by Ayyoub (Hazhar) Jamali available on our blog

After months of anticipation, the ECtHR delivered its judgment on 9 April 2024. The Court found the case inadmissible on two key grounds. Firstly, it ruled out jurisdiction regarding non-territorial states, narrowing the scope of accountability in this complex legal landscape to applicants’ home states. Secondly, it dismissed the application against Portugal due to a lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The Court acknowledged its jurisdiction concerning Portugal but denied it concerning other non-territorial states. It recognized that under Article 1 of the Convention, jurisdiction primarily pertains to territorial boundaries, implying that individuals can only claim Convention violations against the territorial state where they reside. However, the Court reiterated that the Convention’s reach can extend beyond national borders in two main forms: when a state exercises effective control over an area (spatial concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdiction ratione loci), and when there is state agent authority or control over individuals (personal concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdiction ratione personae) (para 170). In the present case, as neither of these two criteria appeared applicable, the Court denied jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘special features’ for establishing the respondent states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants within the specific context of climate change. It emphasized that determining whether the ECHR applies extraterritorially requires examining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, indicating that the state concerned is exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants. This primarily involves exploring the nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent state.

The Court acknowledged that states have ultimate control over public and private activities within their territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions. It noted their international-law commitments, particularly those outlined in the Paris Agreement, which states have incorporated into their domestic laws and policy documents, as well as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement (para 192). Furthermore, the Court recognized the complex and multi-layered causal relationship between activities within a state’s territory that produce greenhouse gas emissions and their adverse impacts on the rights and well-being of individuals residing outside its borders (para 193). It emphasised that while climate change is a global phenomenon, each state bears responsibility for addressing it. However, the Court concluded that these considerations alone cannot justify creating a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation or expanding existing ones (para 195). It emphasised that the ECHR protection system is primarily based on principles of territorial jurisdiction and subsidiarity.

The Court further denied the applicants’ claim that bringing a case against Portugal alone would be ineffective and that they had no other means of holding the respondent states accountable for the impact of climate change on their Convention rights. It distinguished between jurisdiction and responsibility, which constitutes a separate matter to be examined in relation to the merit of the complaint (para 202).

The Court further rejected the applicants’ claim concerning the reach of the Convention outside of national boundaries by their reliance on a test of ‘control over the applicants’ Convention interests’. It reasoned that, according to its established case-law, extraterritorial jurisdiction as conceived under Article 1 ECHR requires control over the person him- or herself rather than the person’s interests as such (para 204-206). It highlighted that, except for specific cases under Article 2 concerning intentional deprivation of life by state agents, there is no precedent for a criterion like ‘control over Convention interests’ as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction (paragraph 205). Consequently, the Court argued that adopting such an extension would represent a significant departure from established principles under Article 1.

The Court stated that otherwise, and given the multilateral dimension of climate change, almost anyone adversely affected by climate change anywhere in the world could be brought within the jurisdiction of any Contracting Party for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR in relation to that Party’s actions or omissions to tackle climate change. It also rejected the suggestion that such an extension of jurisdiction could be limited to the Convention’s legal space. It reasoned that, given the nature of climate change, including its causes and effects, an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction by reference to that criterion would be artificial and difficult to justify (para 206).

Moreover, the Court acknowledged the significance of developments in international law, particularly with regards to the interpretations provided by bodies such as the Inter-American Court and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It recognised the relevance of these interpretations in shaping the understanding of jurisdiction within the context of human rights treaties. However, the Court noted that these bodies had adopted distinct notions of jurisdiction, which had not been recognised in its own case-law. While the Court considered the insights provided by these international instruments and bodies, it concluded that they did not provide sufficient grounds for extending the extraterritorial jurisdiction of respondent states under the Convention, particularly as proposed by the applicants (para 209-210). Therefore, while remaining attentive to legal developments and global responses to issues such as climate change, the Court found no basis within the Convention for expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction as advocated by the applicants.

In conclusion, the Court found no grounds in the Convention for extending the respondent states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation.

Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
Regarding Portugal, the applicants’ home state, there was no extraterritoriality issue. Here the Court examined whether effective remedies existed within the Portuguese legal system that the applicants were required to use under the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule. Despite the applicants’ argument that broad constitutional provisions alone could not provide effective and certain remedies, the Court disagreed, highlighting various remedies available in Portugal. These included, for example, constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment, actio popularis claims for environmental protection, etc (para 217-223). The Court emphasised the importance of affording domestic courts the opportunity to address issues before having recourse to international remedies. Consequently, the complaint against Portugal was found inadmissible. The Court also rejected the suggestion that it should rule on the issue of climate change before domestic courts had the opportunity to do so, reaffirming the principle of subsidiarity and the role of domestic jurisdictions in adjudicating such matters (para 228).

Victim Status
The Court found it challenging to determine whether the applicants met the criteria for victim status as set out on the same day in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment against Switzerland. The lack of clarity is attributed, in part, to the applicants’ failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court found that, in any event, the application was inadmissible for the reasons previously outlined. Therefore, the Court declined to examine further whether the applicants could claim victim status (para 229-230).

Date:
9 April 2024

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
Communicated by the Court on 30 November 2020. Relinquished to the Grand Chamber on 29 June 2022. Grand Chamber hearing held on 27 September 2023. Decision announced at a Grand Chamber hearing held on 9 April 2024, along with rulings in the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other Member States, no. 39371/20, decision (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:
For more information on this case, see the following links.

  • For more background on the case and profiles on the applicants, click here: https://youth4climatejustice.org/. 
  • For all of the case documents, including the submissions from the respondent States and the third-party interveners, see here.
  • For analyses of the Grand Chamber hearing, see this post on our own blog by Viktoriya Gurash, or this post on Verfassungsblog by Corina Heri.
  • For the judgment, click here.
  • For the Court’s Q&A on the three climate cases, click here.

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Categories
2024 Emissions reductions/mitigation European Court of Human Rights France Private and family life Right to life Standing/admissibility Victim status

Carême v. France

Summary:
On 7 June 2022, the European Court of Human Rights announced the relinquishment of an application against France concerning the municipality of Grande-Synthe to the Court’s Grand Chamber. The applicant in this case, in his capacity as mayor of the municipality of Grande-Synthe, was originally involved in the Grande-Synthe case, but the Conseil d’État held on 19 November 2020 that, unlike the municipality itself, Mr Carême could not prove that he had an interest in bringing proceedings.

This was the second climate case to reach the Court’s Grand Chamber, after the Klimaseniorinnen application. The case was lodged on 28 January 2021, and the Grand Chamber held a public hearing in this case on 29 March 2023, making it the second climate case to be heard by the Court (after KlimaSeniorinnen).

Before the Court, the applicant argued that France’s insufficient climate change mitigation measures violated his rights to life (Article 2 ECHR) and to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). The Court summarized the applicant’s complaint as follows:

The applicant submits that the failure of the authorities to take all appropriate measures to enable France to comply with the maximum levels of greenhouse gas emissions that it has set itself constitutes a violation of the obligation to guarantee the right to life, enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention, and to guarantee the “right to a normal private and family life”, under Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, the applicant argues that Article 2 imposes an obligation on States to take the necessary measures to protect the lives of persons under their jurisdiction, including in relation to environmental hazards that might cause harm to life. Under Article 8 he argues that by dismissing his action on the grounds that he had no interest in bringing proceedings, the Conseil d’État disregarded his “right to a normal private and family life”. He submits that he is directly affected by the Government’s failure to take sufficient steps in the combat against climate change, since this failure increases the risk that his home might be affected in the years to come, and in any event by 2030, and that it is already affecting the conditions in which he occupies his property, in particular by not allowing him to plan his life peacefully there. He adds that the extent of the risks to his home will depend in particular on the results obtained by the French Government in the prevention of climate change.

The Court’s press release on this case can be found here.

Date of decision:
It was announced on 26 March 2024 that the Grand Chamber would issue its judgment in this case, along with the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber, in a hearing on 9 April 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The judgment and a summary were made available on the Court’s HUDOC database immediately after the hearing.

The Court’s findings on the admissibility:
From the summary prepared by Viktoriya Gurash on the day of the Grand Chamber decision in this case.

Today, on 9 April 2024, the European Court of Human Rights issued a Grand Chamber decision in this case, unanimously declaring the applicant’s complaints under Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights inadmissible ratione personae.

The Court, first, noted that its assessment of Mr Carême’s victim status as a physical person in the climate context will be based on the criteria set out in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland, decided on the same day, which includes that: the applicant must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change; and there must be a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm (para 487 of KlimaSeniorinnen). The Court emphasised that the threshold for fulfilling these criteria is especially high in view of the exclusion of actio popularis cases under the Convention (para 488 of KlimaSeniorinnen).

Using this framework, in Carême, the ECtHR first assessed the reasons adduced by the domestic courts, specifically the Conseil d’État, when rejecting Mr Carême’s standing. Before the national authorities, the applicant argued that the house in which he resided at the time was located close to the coastline and that according to some predictions it would be flooded by 2040, taking into account the effects of climate change. The Conseil d’État found that the area of the municipality of Grande-Synthe was at a very high level of exposure to high risks of flooding and severe drought with the effect not only of a reduction and degradation of water resources, but also significant damage to built-up areas, given the geological characteristics of the soil. However, the Conseil d’État ruled that Mr Carême did not have an interest in bringing proceedings on the basis of the mere fact that his current residence was located in an area likely to be subject to flooding by 2040. The ECtHR adhered to this argument, reasoning that the risk relating to climate change affecting the applicant is of hypothetical nature.

The crucial factor leading to the Court’s decision as regards the applicant’s victim status is that he no longer has any relevant links with Grande-Synthe because he no longer resides in France, nor does he own or rent any property in Grande-Synthe. The Court noted that in his initial application the applicant indicated an address in Grande-Synthe, although at that time he no longer resided in that municipality but in Brussels. In view of this, the Court found moot Mr Carême’s argument that his residence in Grande-Synthe was at a future risk of flooding and that the current situation prevented him from envisaging himself serenely in his home.

The Court held that the applicant had no right to lodge a complaint under Article 34 of the Convention on behalf of the municipality of Grande-Synthe because, in view of the ECtHR’s settled case law, decentralised authorities that exercise public functions are considered to be ‘governmental organisations’ that have no standing. In addition, the Court highlighted that the interests of the residents of Grande-Synthe have, in any event, been defended by their municipality before the Conseil d’État in accordance with national law.

Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s claim that he had developed allergic asthma making him particularly sensitive to air pollution caused by climate change, the Court found that since this issue was not raised in the initial application, it constitutes a new and distinct complaint and falls outside the scope of this case.

Further reading:

  • For a comment on this case, see Marta Torre-Schaub’s post on Verfassungsblog.
  • For the judgment, click here.
  • For the Court’s Q&A on the three climate cases, click here.

Webcast of the hearing:
To watch a webcast recording of the public hearing in this case, which was held before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 29 March 2023, click here (available in French and English).

Suggested citation:
ECtHR, Carême v. France, no. 7189/21, decision (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Categories
2023 Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Human dignity Inter-American Human Rights System Peru Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life

Inhabitants of La Oroya v Peru

Summary:

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) ruled on 27 November 2023 that Peru is accountable for violating various rights of residents living near the La Oroya Metallurgical Complex (CMLO), established in 1992 in La Oroya. The CMLO, dedicated to smelting and refining metals such as lead, copper, zinc, and arsenic, caused severe environmental pollution, contaminating air, water, and soil, and adversely affecting residents’ health and well-being. Consequently, the Court mandated Peru to conduct an environmental contamination analysis, provide free medical care to affected individuals, and adjust pollutant standards, marking a significant victory for the plaintiffs after enduring years of pollution and inadequate governmental response.

Claim:

The residents of La Oroya brought claims against Peru, asserting that the government’s failure to regulate and address the environmental contamination from the smelting complex violated their fundamental human rights, including the right to a healthy environment, health, and life. They presented evidence of the adverse health effects experienced due to exposure to toxic pollutants emitted by the complex.

Decision:

The IACtHR has declared the international responsibility of the State of Peru for multiple human rights violations affecting the inhabitants of La Oroya. These violations are rooted in the contamination of the air, water, and soil caused by mining-metallurgical activities in the CMLO. The State’s failure to regulate and supervise these activities exacerbated the situation, leading to violations of the rights to a healthy environment, health, life, and personal integrity of the victims. Furthermore, the Court found that the State failed to fulfil its obligation of progressive development concerning the right to a healthy environment by regressing air quality standards.

The Court also determined that the State neglected children’s rights by not implementing adequate protection measures, considering the disproportionate impact of contamination on the children of La Oroya. It emphasized the critical connection between safeguarding children and addressing the climate crisis, noting that mining and industrial activities, particularly those involving fossil fuels, are significant contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, posing risks to public health and exacerbating climate change. It further acknowledged the vulnerability of children to the impacts of climate change and the long-term consequences they face, as underscored by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in the Sacchi case. Consequently, the Court asserts that states have a duty to protect children and must take decisive action to mitigate health risks from pollutant emissions that exacerbate climate change crisis.

Moreover, the Court concluded that the State violated the right to public participation and adequate information provision to the victims regarding measures affecting their rights. Additionally, it found the State in violation of the right to judicial protection by failing to comply with a decision of the Constitutional Court for the protection of La Oroya’s inhabitants, which was delivered in 2006.

Finally, the Court held the State accountable for not investigating reported acts of harassment, threats, and reprisals against some victims. Based on these findings, the Court determined that the State of Peru violated several articles of the American Convention on Human Rights, specifically articles 26, 5, 4.1, 8.1, 13, 19, 23, and 25, in relation to articles 1.1 and 2 of the same instrument

Peru is ordered to conduct a comprehensive study assessing contamination in air, water, and soil in La Oroya and to develop an environmental remediation plan accordingly. Furthermore, Peru must provide free medical care to victims and compensate them individually with amounts ranging between $15,000 and $30,000. This decision emphasizes states’ obligation to safeguard the right to a healthy environment and hold them accountable for environmental harm threatening their citizens’ well-being.

Links:

The case documents are accessible below for download:

Court-statement-about-the-rulingDownload
Full-text-of-the-rulingDownload
Official-summary-of-the-rulingDownload

Status of the case:

Decided.

Suggested citation:

Inhabitants of La Oroya v Peru (Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Judgment of November 27, 2023, Inter-Am Ct HR, Series C No 511.

Last updated:

25 March 2024.

Categories
China Emissions reductions/mitigation Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Fossil fuel extraction Paris Agreement Participation rights Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to water Rights at stake

Violations of Human Rights by Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and China due to Coal Fired plants in BiH

Summary:

On 17 March 2021, two UN Special Rapporteurs, Marcos A. Orellana (Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes) and David R. Boyd (Special Rapporteur on the issues of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment), issued communications to Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) and China regarding alleged human rights violations stemming from the operation of coal power plants in BiH, supported by Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and financed by the China Development Bank. Civil society complaints raised concerns about water and air pollution, negative impacts on climate change, and adverse health effects, including respiratory issues and cardiac arrest. The communication highlighted violations of international human rights obligations related to a healthy environment, life, health, bodily integrity, safe drinking water, and sanitation. It also emphasised the exacerbation of climate change conditions through increased greenhouse gas emissions. Procedural environmental human rights were allegedly affected due to failures in providing information, access to justice, and effective remedies for health impacts caused by the plants. The communication sought measures from both BiH and China, including ensuring plant compliance with national and international laws, harmonising environmental permitting procedures, monitoring health impacts, and preventing negative human rights and environmental outcomes. China was also asked to provide information on the global impacts of pollution caused by Chinese-supported plants and measures to ensure Belt and Road Initiative projects align with the Paris Agreement’s climate objectives.

China responded to the communication on 27 May 2021, rejecting the allegations as false and emphasising its commitment to international responsibility for climate change. China stated that the Tuzla plant, one of the plants in question, is intended to replace outdated units, complying with EU carbon emissions standards and contributing to local development and reliable energy supply. BiH had not responded yet.

Claim:

The case revolves around the alleged violations of human rights related to pollution, waste, and climate change resulting from the operation of Chinese-supported coal-fired plants in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The claim is that both Bosnia Herzegovina and China have failed to meet international human rights obligations for human and environmental rights, including the right to a healthy environment, life, health, bodily integrity, safe drinking water, and sanitation. The construction and operation of these plants are accused of exacerbating climate change conditions by increasing greenhouse gas emissions. The communication seeks measures to address these concerns, emphasising the responsibility of states under international human rights law to prevent, investigate, punish, and redress such abuses.

Links:

The case documents can be found here. The documents are also available for download below:

DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile-CHNDownload
DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile-BIHDownload
DownLoadFile-response0CHNDownload

Status of the case:
The case is currently pending before the UN Special Rapporteurs.

Suggested citation:
Violations of Human Rights by Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) and China due to Coal Fired plants in BiH, AL BIH 2/2021 and AL CHN 2/2021 (17 March 2021).

Last updated:
15 January 2024.

Categories
Brazil Class action Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Human dignity Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to subsistence/food

Institute of Amazonian Studies (IEA) v Brazil

Summary:

The IEA v. Brazil case centres on the severe deforestation crisis in the Brazilian Amazon, a major global climate concern. The Institute of Amazonian Studies (IEA), an NGO, initiated a public civil action, not only demanding the Brazilian government’s compliance with national climate laws but also advocating for the recognition of a new fundamental right to a stable climate for both current and future generations. IEA contends that the government has failed to meet emissions targets outlined in the National Policy on Climate Change, specifically the Plan to Prevent and Combat Deforestation in the Legal Amazon. The NGO seeks court orders to enforce compliance with these plans and, in case of non-compliance, calls for reforestation and resource allocation. Importantly, IEA asserts the existence of a fundamental right to climate stability implicit in the Brazilian Constitution, crucial for human life and ecological balance. This right encompasses various aspects such as an ecologically balanced environment, dignified life, inviolability of life, freedom, equality, security, property, health, food, and housing. The case also challenges the burden of proof, with IEA requesting a reversal, arguing that the government, holding evidence, should prove compliance with climate policies and lack of influence on deforestation rates.

Claim:

The IEA’s main contentions involve compelling the Brazilian government to adhere to climate policies, implement deforestation reduction plans, and acknowledge a fundamental right to climate stability. Additionally, the NGO seeks a reversal of the burden of proof, placing the responsibility on the government to demonstrate compliance with climate regulations and its non-influence on deforestation rates.

Legal developments:

In July 2021, the Federal District Court of Curitiba initially declined jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Court of Amazonas. However, this decision was subsequently suspended on 20 August 2021 by the Federal Appellate Court, following a ruling from the reporting judge. The Appellate Court reversed the lower court’s decision, returning the case to the Federal District Court.

During this process, the question of whether the case should be consolidated with another one, Federal Prosecutor’s Office v. IBAMA, concerning the operationalisation of monitoring bases in critical areas within the Amazon, was also considered. The Court determined that the two cases were distinct in terms of typology, structure, objective, cause of actions, and demands. Specifically, it highlighted the differences between IEA v. Brazil, aimed at ensuring the federal government takes steps to implement climate policies, and Federal Prosecutor’s Office v. IBAMA, which addresses environmental law matters.

On 7 December 2021, the Third Chamber of the Appellate Court affirmed the decision to return the case to the Federal District Court. The Court emphasised that, although both lawsuits dealt with illegal deforestation, they had different focuses. IEA v. Brazil concentrated on reducing Brazilian emissions through deforestation reduction, while Federal Prosecutor’s Office v. IBAMA addressed an environmental law case focused on combating deforestation in ten “ecological hotspots” within a specific timeframe, namely the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court underscored the distinction between climate litigation and environmental litigation in making its determination.

Links:

The case documents are accessible here and here.

Status of the case:

The case is currently pending before the Federal Court of Curitiba.

Suggested citation:

Institute of Amazonian Studies v. Brazil, Federal Regional Court, Fourth Region, ACP No. 5048951-39.2020.4.04.7000, 29 March 2022 (Brazil).

Last updated:

12 January 2024

Categories
Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Non-discrimination Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property United States of America

Genesis B. v United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Summary:
On 10 December 2023, 18 children from California, aged 8 to 17, initiated a constitutional climate lawsuit titled Genesis B. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The lawsuit targets not only the EPA but also its administrator, Michael Regan, and the U.S. federal government. The central claim put forth by the young plaintiffs is that the EPA, responsible for regulating greenhouse gas emissions, is deliberately allowing life-threatening climate pollution to be emitted by fossil fuel sources under its jurisdiction. According to the plaintiffs, this negligence is causing substantial harm to the health and welfare of children. Furthermore, the children argue that the EPA is engaging in discrimination against them as a distinct group of individuals by discounting the economic value of their lives and their future when making decisions about the permissible levels of climate pollution. The plaintiffs assert that such actions violate their constitutional rights, specifically the right to equal protection of the law and the right to life.

This legal action represents the most recent development in a sequence of constitutional climate cases initiated by the nonprofit legal organisation Our Children’s Trust and led by youth activists. Notably, Our Children’s Trust achieved a significant milestone in August 2023 with the Held and Others v. Montana case. In this instance, a judge sided with plaintiffs who contended that the state’s policies favouring fossil fuels encroached upon their constitutional entitlement to a clean and healthful environment

Claim:
The youth involved in Genesis B. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency assert that the EPA’s actions violate their fundamental constitutional rights, specifically the right to equal protection of the law and the right to life and liberty. They seek a declaratory judgment from the federal court and are urging the court to establish a unique standard of judicial review that recognises and protects the equal protection rights of children. Ultimately, the plaintiffs aim to compel the EPA to cease permitting life-threatening levels of fossil fuel climate pollution and, in alignment with scientific recommendations, phase out fossil fuel pollution by 2050.

Link:
The case document is available for download below:

Doc1Complaint2023.12.10Download

Status of the case:
The case is currently pending before the U.S. District Court in the Central District of California.

Suggested citation:
Genesis B. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Case No. 2:23-cv-10345 (Filed 12/10/23)

Last updated:
31 December 2023.

Categories
2022 Austria Disability and health-related inequality Domestic court Non-discrimination Private and family life Right to health Right to life Rights at stake

In Re Tax Benefits for Aviation

Summary:
The applicant, a consumer utilising both rail and air services, applied for relief, citing a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis and health issues exacerbated by the climate crisis. She argued that existing Austrian tax laws favouring aviation over rail travel contributed to environmental problems and violated her constitutional rights, including the right to equality before the law, the right to life, and the right to private and family life. Specifically, the applicant contended that tax benefits for aviation companies created an unjustified disparity in treatment between equivalent means of transport, negatively impacting consumers who choose rail travel.

Claim:
The applicant claimed that the tax advantages granted to aviation companies, in contrast to railway companies, violated her fundamental rights. These rights included the right to equality before the law, with the applicant asserting that the tax benefits led to unequal treatment of equivalent means of transport in direct competition. Additionally, she argued a violation of her right to life, contending that climate change, exacerbated by tax benefits to aviation, posed a threat to human life, and that the state failed in its positive obligation to adopt measures to prevent such threats. The applicant also alleged a violation of her right to private and family life, asserting that the state’s encouragement of climate-damaging behavior through tax benefits violated its positive obligations to protect health, well-being, and bodily integrity from environmental hazards.

Decision:
On 27 June 2023, the Constitutional Court of Austria dismissed the application as inadmissible. The court cited the amendment to the Value-Added Tax Act as of 1 January 2023, which extended value-added tax (VAT) exemptions from aviation and maritime shipping to cross-border rail transport. The court determined that the contested provision was no longer in force, leading to a lack of standing for the applicants. Additionally, the court held that the obligation to pay VAT was directed at businesses, excluding consumers from challenging relevant provisions. The same rationale applied to the mineral oil tax, as it was not payable by consumers, and they were deemed not affected in their legal sphere, thus lacking the entitlement to challenge tax provisions.

Link:
The case document is accessible below.

20230627_19868_decisionDownload

Status of the case:
Decided.

Suggested citation:
In Re Tax Benefits for Aviation [2022] G 106-107/2022-10, V 140/2022-10 (Constitutional Court of Austria).

Last updated:
12 December 2023.

Categories
2023 Adaptation Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Private and family life Right to life Sea-level rise The Netherlands

Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (Bonaire)

Summary:
On 11 May 2023, Greenpeace and seven residents of the Caribbean island of Bonaire sent a pre-litigation letter (Dutch: sommatie) to the office of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte. The letter claims that the Netherlands does not sufficiently protect the authors from climate change and thereby violates their human rights. Since 2010, Bonaire has been a special municipality of the Netherlands and part of the Caribbean Netherlands. In the pre-litigation letter, the plaintiffs claim that the duties of care arising from Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to life and the right to family life, have been breached. The inaction of the Netherlands in sufficiently addressing climate change, they argue, violates these human rights. Therefore, they have made the following demands:

  1. The Netherlands must implement the necessary measures to protect Bonaire from the consequences of climate change.
  2. The State shall develop and implement a policy which guarantees a 100% reduction of Dutch emission of all greenhouse gases in 2030 when compared to 1990 levels.
  3. Lastly, as part of and to realize the demands above, the State must implement all necessary measures to ensure that, in January 2040 at the latest, the joint volume of the national emission of all greenhouse gases will have been reduced by 100% when compared to 1990 emissions levels.

With the pre-litigation letter to the Prime Minister, the plaintiffs asked for negotiations to find a mutually agreeable decision on their demands. If no such negotiation is held, or if it is unsuccessful, the plaintiffs will submit the matter to the competent court.

Status of Case:

Pending

Further reading:

Greenpeace Press Release: https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/59658/dutch-citizens-launch-legal-action-against-the-netherlands-over-climate-impacts-on-caribbean-island-bonaire/

pre-litigation-letter-BonaireDownload

Date last updated:

24 November 2023

Categories
Austria Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Farming Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Right to life

Jasansky and Others v. Austria

Summary:
On 10 November 2023, it was reported that a climate-related application had been filed with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against Austria. The case is brought on behalf of four Austrian nationals — Monika Jasansky, Peter Fliegenschnee, Friedrich Pichler, and Klara Butz –along with the NGO Global 2000.

The application contests Austrian inaction in terms of mitigation measures, and argues that the individual applicants — who have been described, respectively, as an organic farmer, a retiree, a mayor, and a climate activist — have been adversely affected by extreme weather events aggravated by climate change, namely droughts, heatwaves and mudslides. The applicants allege a violation of the State’s positive obligation to protect the right to life in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Domestic proceedings:
The applicants contest a finding from the Austrian Constitutional Court, made in July 2023, which recognized the state’s duty to actively take effective measures to protect life and health as well as to protect private life and property, but accorded the government a wide margin of discretion and found that fundamental and human rights do not allow for claims to a specific measure (here the applicants petitioned the domestic courts to order legislators to set binding expiry dates for the permissibility of the sale of fossil fuels in 2040). Rather, the domestic court found that the legislature must be allowed to choose between the various available measures to meet the State’s protective obligations.

Suggested citation:
European Court of Human Rights, Jasansky and Others v. Austria, pending case, filed November 2023.