Category: Right to life

Categories
Adaptation African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights Business responsibility / corporate cases Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Disability and health-related inequality Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation Environmental racism Evidence Extreme poverty Farming Gender / women-led Human dignity Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Minority rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Participation rights Private and family life Prohibition of torture Renewable energy Right to a healthy environment Right to assembly and association Right to development and work Right to education Right to freedom of expression Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to property Right to subsistence/food Rights of nature Sea-level rise Self-determination Standing/admissibility Victim status Vulnerability

African Court on Human and People’s Rights Climate Advisory Opinion

Summary:
On 2 May 2025, a request for an advisory opinion on climate change was submitted to the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The request was submitted by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), in collaboration with the African Climate Platform, and other African Civil society Organizations including the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, Natural Justice and resilient40, and seeks clarification of States’ obligations in the context of climate change.

Submitted under article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights and Rule 82(1) of the Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, the request submits that “[a]cross the continent, Africans are suffering the consequences of climate change, whether from rising temperatures, unrelenting droughts, catastrophic floods, vanishing biodiversity, or threats to livelihoods. Climate change in Africa has had prior, current and will have future consequences that impact the enjoyment of numerous rights.”

The request sets out impacts, disaggregating them region-by-region and in terms of the groups of people most affected by climate change (mentioning women and girls, children, the elderly, Indigenous peoples, and environmental human rights defenders in particular).

The request then goes on to discuss several issues of law, beginning with issues of admissibility and jurisdiction and then relying on a wide range of rights and instruments, namely:

  • a) the Constitutive Act of the African Union
  • b) the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), especially articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 60 and 61
  • c) African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)
  • d) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)
  • e) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
  • f) The Revised African Convention on Conservation of Nature
  • g) Any other Relevant Instrument.

In doing so, PALU invites the Court to consider international climate change law, including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as well as the UN Conventions on Combatting Desertification and on Biological Diversity.

Rights invoked in more detail:
PALU submits that “a rights-based climate approach is needed to address the challenges posed by climate change” and that the human rights framework “provides a robust legal framework upon which the Court may rely to define States’ responsibilities and duties in the context of climate change […] because the Charter clearly provides for collective rights and the explicit protection of the right to a healthy environment.” PALU accordingly invites the Court to consider the following provisions of the Banjul Charter:

  • Articles 2 and 3 (equality and non-discrimination)
  • Article 4 (right to life and inviolability of the human person)
  • Article 5 (right to respect for dignity and prohibition of all forms of exploitation and degradation, including slavery and torture)
  • Article 8 (freedom of conscience and religion)
  • Article 9 (freedom of information and opinion)
  • Article 10 (freedom of association)
  • Article 11 (freedom of assembly)
  • Article 12 (freedom of movement, residence and asylum; prohibition of mass expulsion)
  • Article 14 (right to property)
  • Article 16 (right to health)
  • Article 17 (right to education)
  • Article 18 (protection of the family, prohibition of age and gender discrimination)
  • Article 19 (equality of peoples, prohibition of domination)
  • Article 20 (right of peoples to existence and self-determination)
  • Article 21 (right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources)
  • Article 22 (right of peoples to their economic, social and cultural development)
  • Article 23 (right of peoples to national and international peace and security)
  • Article 24 (right of all peoples to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development)
  • The request also discusses the implied rights to food and shelter.

Issues for determination:
PALU submits the following issues for determination by the Court (paraphrased):

(a) Whether the Court can be seized with the question of obligations concerning climate change under the Banjul Charter and other relevant instruments?

(b) Whether the Court can interpret and lay down applicable custom and treaty law regarding States’ obligations and duties in the context of climate change?

If these questions are resolved in the affirmative, the Court is invited to further determine:

(a) What, if any, are States’ human and peoples’ rights obligations to protect and safeguard the rights of individuals and peoples of the past (ancestral rights), and present and future generations?

(b) Whether States have positive obligations to protect vulnerable populations including environmental human rights defenders, indigenous communities, women, children, youth, future generations, the current generation, past generations, the elderly and people with disabilities from the impact of climate change in line with the relevant treaties?

(c) What human rights obligations do States have to facilitate a just, transparent, equitable and accountable transition in the context of climate change in Africa?

(d) What are the obligations of African States in implementing adaptation, resilience and mitigation measures in response to climate change?

(e) What, if any, are applicable human rights obligations of States to compensate for loss, damage and reparations?

(f) What responsibilities, if any, do African States have in relation to third parties, including international monopolies, multinational corporations and non-state actors operating on the continent, to ensure that international and regional treaties and laws on climate change are respected, protected, promoted and implemented?

(g) What, if any, is the nature of the obligations on African States to cooperate with other states especially historical emitters to limit global warming to below the 1.5°C threshold, to avert an existential climate crisis for present and future generations on the continent?

Further reading:
For more information on the advisory opinion request, see this post by Yusra Suedi.

Suggested citation:
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Request for an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in addressing the climate crisis, filed 2 May 2025 (pending).

Last updated:
23 May 2025

Categories
Climate-induced displacement Colombia Domestic court Farming Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to subsistence/food Vulnerability

Mendoza Bohórquez and Librada Niño de Mendoza v. Colombia

Summary:
In 2021, this case was brought against several Colombian government agencies by two peasants from Saravena (Arauca), José Noé Mendoza Bohórquez and Ana Librada Niño de Mendoza. Previously, in 2015 and 2016, the plaintiffs had been displaced from their homes and crops by flooding of the Bojabá River. Several state entities denied the plaintiffs assistance as displaced persons because they were not listed in the Single Registry of Victims (RUV), which at the time included more than eight million people affected by violence in Colombia, because as environmentally displaced people they did not fall under the definition of victims of forced displacement in place at the time.

The plaintiffs filed a tutela action alleging the violation of their fundamental rights, including their rights to housing, food, life and personal safety. The court of first instance and the Superior Court of Bogotá found that the tutela action was inadmissible. However, in 2024, the Colombian Constitutional Court found that forced displacement due to a natural disaster should be considered to fall under the definition of internal forced displacement. It held that forced displacement in Colombia is not caused only by armed conflict, but also occurs due to environmental causes, such as flooding, volcanic eruptions or landslides. Having regard to the facts of the case — including the plaintiffs’ vulnerability, the fact that they were forced to abandon their home due to an environmental disaster, the devastation of their home and property, and the danger that it represented for their integrity and well-being (paras. 203-204) — the Court found that the plaintiffs’ rights were violated.

The Court found that the authorities had an obligation to apply a human rights-based approach and adopt structural measures in favor of persons affected by natural disasters. The Constitutional Court ordered Parliament to develop a regulatory framework to protect people displaced by environmental causes.

Notably, the ruling does not distinguish between displacement due to environmental causes and that due to climate change. Instead, it defines environment-induced displacement in para. 58 of its judgment as “forced internal displacement due to disasters, events associated with climate change and environmental degradation”.

Full text of the Constitutional Court ruling:

The full text of the ruling can be found here or downloaded below.

T-123-24Download

More information on the case:
For more information on the case, see this post by Zoé Briard in the blog of the UCLouvain’s Centre Charles De Visscher.

For reporting on the case (in Spanish), see El Pais.

Suggested citation:
Constitutional Court (Colombia), Mendoza Bohórquez and Librada Niño de Mendoza v. Colombia, 16 April 2024, Case T-123.

Last updated:
29 November 2024.

Categories
Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fossil fuel extraction Just transition litigation Norway Participation rights Private and family life Right to life

Greenpeace Nordic and Nature & Youth v. Energy Ministry (North Sea Fields Case)

Summary:
This case originated in a challenge to a series of administrative decisions by the Norwegian government granting corporations leave to operate new petroleum (oil and gas) fields in the North Sea (in Breidablikk, Yggdrasil, and Tyrving). The challenge was brought by two NGOs, Greenpeace Nordic and Natural og Ungdom (Nature & Youth). The case was heard in civil court, and challenged the petroleum fields

Claims made:
The three petroleum fields in question were subject to impact assessments by the corporate licensees. However, these impact assessments did not include combustion emissions from the oil and gas produced. The contested issue in the case concerned whether there was a legal requirement to include combustion emissions in this impact assessment (as per Norwegian and EU law). It was not argued that the impact assessments contained deficiencies with regard to other matters. The plaintiffs argued that combustion emissions should have been subject to an impact assessment. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy argued that it was sufficient that combustion emissions were assessed at a more general level by the Ministry, and that there is no requirement for this to be included in the specific impact assessments.

Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the administrative decisions breached the government’s positive obligations under Articles 2, 8 and 14 ECHR. They also also argued that the decisions were flawed because they did not have due regard for the best interests of the child, in breach of Section 104 of the Norwegian Constitution and Articles 3 and 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In addition, they argued that the decisions were based on an incorrect assessment of the facts.

The plaintiffs applied for a temporary injunction.

Ruling of the Oslo District Court:
On 18 January 2024, the Oslo District Court found the approvals of all three oil and gas fields had been invalid and issued an injunction forbidding the state from granting any new permits concerning these fields. the Court held that the contested decisions were unlawful because they had failed to include combustion emissions in the impact assessments conducted in advance, in violation of domestic and EU law, and highlighted procedural problems in the approvals process, especially the lack of adequate public participation. However, anticipating a ruling from the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in its then-pending climate cases — including three involving Norway, namely Duarte Agostinho, Greenpeace Nordic and the Norwegian Grandparents case –, the District Court refused to rule on the issue of compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court also concluded that there was no legal obligation for children to be heard or for the best interests of the child to be investigated and assessed in connection with decisions to approve plans for the development and operation of petroleum activities. The decisions were therefore not in conflict with Section 104 of the Norwegian Constitution and Articles 3 and 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The government was ordered to compensate the plaintiffs for their legal costs.

Proceedings at the Appeals Court in Oslo:
On 16 May 2024, the Oslo Appeals Court split the case into two parts. The State’s appeal against the Oslo District Court’s ruling in the injunction case of 18 January 2024 was to be heard during the appeal hearing regarding the main case. However, the right to enforce the District Court’s temporary injunction was suspended to await the Court of Appeal’s ruling.

Case documents (in Norwegian):
The case documents are available via ClimateCaseChart.com.

Suggested citation:
Oslo District Court, Greenpeace Nordic and Nature & Youth v. Energy Ministry (The North Sea Fields Case), case no. 23-099330TVI-TOSL/05, 18 January 2024.

Oslo Court of Appeals, Greenpeace Nordic and Nature & Youth v. Energy Ministry (The North Sea Fields Case), case no. LB-2024-36810-2, 16 May 2024.

Last updated:
29 November 2024.

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Ireland Private and family life Right to life Vulnerability

Community Law and Mediation Centre and others v. Ireland

Summary:
In September 2024, an Irish NGO — the Community Law and Mediation Centre (CLM) — and three individual plaintiffs were granted leave to proceed with a climate case against the Irish government. The plaintiffs argued that the government’s Climate Action Plan 2024 (CAP24) violated legislative targets as set out in the Climate and Low Carbon Development Act 2015, did not comply with the country’s carbon budget, and violated the fundamental rights of the three individual plaintiffs — who are, respectively, a grandfather, a youth climate activist, and a toddler — as well as of the vulnerable groups represented by CLM and of future generations. The plaintiffs invoked the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as concretized in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, alongside constitutional rights under the Irish Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It also builds on the 2020 judgment of the Irish Supreme Court, in the Friends of the Irish Environment case. There, the Court quashed the first Irish mitigation plan because of its inadequate level of detail.

The CLM stated that:

Ireland’s emissions are not decreasing rapidly enough to stay within the confines of the State’s own legally binding 2025 and 2030 carbon budgets and successive Climate Action Plans have fallen short on implementation. Low income and marginalised groups, the groups CLM has represented since its establishment almost 50 years ago, stand to be disproportionately impacted by climate change but have least opportunity to protect or vindicate their rights. In taking this case, CLM seeks to serve as a vehicle for collective recourse for these communities and future generations.

Status of case:
Pending

More information:

Last updated:
29 November 2024

Categories
Adaptation Disability and health-related inequality Domestic court Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation Human dignity Paris Agreement Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to subsistence/food South Korea Vulnerability

Senior Citizens v. Korea

Summary:
In June 2024, a group of 123 older South Korean citizens brought suit against their government before South Korea’s National Human Rights Commission, arguing that the government’s greenhouse gas mitigation plans had violated their human dignity and their right to life. Their case concerns both mitigation and adaptation action. In terms of mitigation, they sought enhancement of the country’s 2030 national greenhouse gas reduction targets and an ambitious next nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. In terms of adaptation, they sought a risk assessment of impacts on human rights, including the rights to life, food, health, and housing, and emphasized the State’s fundamental obligation to protect these rights. This assessment should entail, they argued, “a factual survey and epidemiological investigation into the risks the climate crisis poses to the human rights of vulnerable social groups, including older persons”, and lead to more ambitious adaptation measures.

Petition:
The full text of the petition as filed can be found below.

Senior_Citizens_v_Korea_petitionDownload

Status of case:
Pending before South Korea’s National Human Rights Commission

Last updated:
29 November 2024

Categories
Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Private and family life Public trust doctrine Right to culture Right to health Right to life Sea-level rise United States of America Vulnerability

Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska II

Summary:
On 22 May 2024, a group of young people supported by the NGO ‘Our Children’s Trust’ filed suit against the U.S. State of Alaska arguing that statutory requirements to develop and advance the Alaska Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project violate their public trust rights as well as their rights to substantive due process, life, liberty and property, and the right to protected natural resources for “current and future generations” under the Alaskan Constitution. They argue that this project will cause “existential harms to the lives, health, safety, and cultural traditions and identities of Alaska’s youth, and substantially limit their access to the vital natural resources upon which they depend.”

The case follows on an earlier case against Alaska, Sagoonick et al. v. Alaska I, which was rejected in 2022 by a divided Alaskan Supreme Court.

Claims made:
The case challenges legislation creating the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation, a state agency created to pursue building a new LNG pipeline. 

According to the plaintiffs, Alaska is “already in a state of climate disruption” and the contested project “would ensure continuing and substantially elevated levels of climate pollution for decades, locking in increasing and worsening harms to Youth Plaintiffs”. They argue that the youth plaintiffs are “uniquely vulnerable to climate change injuries and face disproportionate harms”. Arguing that climate pollution is already causing dangerous climate disruption in Alaska, injuring the plaintiffs in this case, they cite the following climate-related impacts:

  • temperature increase, heatwaves, and other heat-related changes;
  • thawing permafrost;
  • changing precipitation patterns, extreme weather events and droughts;
  • loss of sea, river, and lake ice;
  • ocean acidification;
  • melting glaciers and sea level rise; and
  • increasingly frequent and severe wildfires and smoke.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the contested provisions of State law violate their public trust rights to equal access to public trust resources and to sustained yield of public trust resources free from substantial impairment. They argued that the state of Alaska has a duty under the public trust doctrine to ensure “the continuing availability of public trust resources for present and future generations”.

In addition, they sought a declaration that they have a fundamental right to a climate system that sustains human life, liberty, and dignity under the Alaskan Constitution, which is being violated by the contested statutory provisions.

The youth plaintiffs also petitioned the court to enjoin the defendants from taking further actions to advance or develop the Alaska LNG Project. They sought costs and expenses as well as “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.”

Recent developments:
In October 2024, it was reported that the state of Alaska had asked the Court to dismiss the case.

2024.05.22.AK+LNG+ComplaintDownload

Last updated:
14 November 2024

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Paris Agreement Right to culture Right to development and work Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to property

Environmental Rights Foundation and others v. Taiwan  

Summary:
On 30 January 2024, Taiwanese environmental groups, along with children and other individual plaintiffs, petitioned the Taiwanese Constitutional Court to demand intergenerational climate justice from the government. Their case challenges the 2023 Climate Change Response Act (氣候變遷因應法) because it does not include short and medium-term national periodic regulatory goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In doing so, the plaintiffs contest the government’s plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 23-25% compared to 2005 levels, which they considered insufficiently ambitious.

The case was brought by an NGO, the Environmental Rights Foundation, along with individuals who allege that they are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (including because of their livelihoods related to farming and fishing, by virtue of their Indigenous heritage and culture, or because they are children).  

The plaintiffs argue that the current regulation does not adequately safeguard their right to life, right to bodily integrity and health, right to survival, right to housing, right to work, property rights and cultural rights. They argue that the legislature has forsaken its obligation to ensure an adequate regulatory framework including a cross-generational allocation of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The 23-25% reductions target does not allow Taiwan to reach net zero by 2050 and is insufficiently protective of fundamental rights. The plaintiffs argue that, under current measures, Taiwan will exhaust its remaining carbon budget for a 1.5°C and 1.7°C world by 2030. In addition, the current measures do not set sufficient interim yearly goals because it lacks goals for the period from 2026 to 2030.

Last updated:
4 October 2024

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Minority rights New Zealand Paris Agreement Right to life Separation of powers

Smith v. Attorney General

Summary:
This case was filed in 2022 and concerns the same plaintiff as the Smith v. Fonterra corporate responsibility case. The plaintiff in these cases is a Māori landowner and spokesperson on climate change for his tribe (iwi). He argued that the climate policy of the New Zealand government had failed to adequately protect the citizens of New Zealand, and especially Māori, against the impacts of climate change. Before the High Court, he submitted that “the Government has taken no or inadequate climate change mitigation measures since it had become aware of the causes and effects of climate change down to the present.” In July 2022, the High Court struck out all of the applicant’s claims. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal on all counts in December 2024.

Claims made:
The plaintiff’s case is based on three main arguments (expanded from the original submissions, which concerned only the first argument of the three). First, the plaintiff argues that the government breached its common law duty of care to “take all necessary steps to reduce NZ emissions and to actively protect the plaintiff and his descendants from the adverse effects of climate change”, as derived from its authority over the territory of New Zealand, the government’s duty of care, and its responsibility to Māori. Secondly, he alleged a breach of the rights enshrined in sections 8 and 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), concerning deprivation of life and the denial of the right to practise culture. Here the plaintiff argued that the Crown had “failed to put in place an effective legislative and administrative framework properly designed to provide effective mitigation against the climate change risk in accordance with the best available science and New Zealand’s international and domestic legal obligations.” He invoked the protection of his own life, those of his tribe and clan, and those of future generations. Thirdly, he argued that the government had violated the Tiriti o Waitangi | the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document, and the consequent fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff and those he represents.

Finding of the High Court:
In July 2022, the High Court struck out all three claims. First, it found that the plaintiff’s arguments about the common law duty of care were not based on recognized legal obligations or case-law. It was also considered too far-reaching: “any relief, if it were available, would be an ineffective and piecemeal way to deal with climate change issues. Every person in New Zealand would be entitled to sue the Government under the novel duty.” It noted too that “the courts have neither the technical capacity nor the political mandate to co-ordinate in an integrated way to mitigate the effects of climate change”.

On the second argument, the Court found that the right to life claim was untenable because the plaintiff had not demonstrated a “‘real and identifiable’ risk to the life of a specified individual or even a class of individuals. It is a general threat that may eventuate as a result of the effects of climate change to all New Zealanders.” In addition, the Court was not convinced that it was possible to draw analogies to Dutch law, and specifically the Urgenda case invoked by the plaintiff, meaning that “[t]he decision in Urgenda must be treated with caution”.

Furthermore, on the minority rights claim, the Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged specific breaches of that right, which only entailed positive obligations under exceptional circumstances. It also held that the plaintiff’s case was “based on a claim that an existing legislative and policy framework is inadequate to protect Māori. There is no allegation of opposition or coercion targeting Māori that fits within that exceptional category here.” Accordingly, this part of the case was also declared inadmissible.

Finally, concerning the Tiriti o Waitangi, the Court found that this claim was so broad, and climate change was so complex, that “any fiduciary obligations arising from the Crown would be owed to the public in general. This alone makes the claim untenable”. To be contemplated, such a claim would depend on an underlying duty — here, the duty of care invoked by the applicant — which had already been rejected above, making this claim untenable. In addition, the Court held, “a claim that such a duty is owed to only a subsection of New Zealanders, Māori, as opposed to the public in general, is a further reason that it cannot be tenable”.

Judgment of the Court of Appeal:
On 19 December 2024, the Court of Appeal issued its ruling in this case, rejecting the applicant’s appeal on all counts.

On the claim concerning the right to life, the court considered six questions: 
           a)  whether that right includes a right to a life with dignity;
           b)  whether the widespread nature of (climate) effects preclude the applicability of the right to life;
           c)  whether the risks from climate change are sufficiently proximate;
           d)  whether the right to life can impose positive duties on the State;
           e)  whether it is tenable that New Zealand’s regulatory framework breached the right to life; and
           f)  whether reporting orders are tenably available.

On the first question, it found that it was not clearly untenable that the right to life includes a right to a minimum baseline as to the quality of life and is therefore applicable to the potential impacts of climate change.  This, it held, is consistent with international jurisprudence. Throughout, it extensively engaged with international jurisprudence (Billy, Teitiota) and soft-law materials (the HRC’s General comment No 36).

On the second question, the Court found that it was not clearly untenable on the grounds that the alleged risk to life potentially affects a large group or all of the population.   

On the third question, again referring to international climate jurisprudence on equivalent rights, and particularly engaging with the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, the Court found that this would be a matter of (scientific) evidence for trial, and that it could accordingly not strike this out at this stage. 

On the fourth question, the Court found – given the context of the climate emergency and the case-law from around the world responding to this challenge — it was not clearly untenable that NZBORA’s right to life requires the government to take protective measures against foreseeable threats to life. 

On the fifth question, on the challenge to the efficacy of the legislative framework responding to climate change, the Court found that it could not second-guess parliamentary policy choices, striking out this claim while referring to the possibility of judicial review of concrete actions taken under the legislative framework.

On the sixth question, it found that the court’s institutional role did not encompass an ongoing monitoring role of the measures the Crown is implementing in response to climate change.

On the right to culture, the court found that it was not clearly untenable that climate change could give rise to a positive obligation to protect against a denial of the right to culture under s20 of NZBORA where a substantial interference amounting to a denial of the right occurs. However, here too the court found that the pleaded deficiencies of the domestic legal framework reflect policy choices that are for Parliament and that it could not review.

As concerns the claim of a breach of te Tiriti, the court found that this was clearly untenable because the domestic legislative framework gives effect to the Crown’s obligations under the Treaty and allows for decisions consistent with Treaty principles.

As concerns the claim that the Crown owes fiduciary duties to Mr Smith, his whānau, Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Kahu, the court found that the claimed fiduciary duty was not comparable to specific fiduciary duties arising between the government and certain Māori due to particular dealings between them.  As a result, the pleaded claim was inconsistent with the nature of fiduciary duties because the response to climate change required a balancing of interests and the government could not act purely in the interests of the pleaded beneficiaries. 

As concerned the claim that there was a novel common law duty in place, relying on the common law public trust doctrine, this doctrine stemmed from the context of access to seashores and navigable waters and was thus too far removed from the extensive duty pleaded in relation to climate change.  The court found that the boundaries of the public trust doctrine are imprecise and fluid, raising a host of conceptual problems in imposing fiduciary or trust-like obligations on the government, and that the doctrine could in any case be displaced by legislation; domestic law did not leave room for its application.

Status of the case:
Appeal to the Court of Appeal rejected 19 December 2024.

Further reading:
The text of the High Court ruling is available here.

The text of the Court of Appeal ruling is available here.

Suggested citation:
High Court of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2022] NZHC 1693.

Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2024] NZCA 692.

Categories
2024 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to life Right to property Right to pursue happiness Uncategorized

Min-A Park v. South Korea

Summary:
In July 2023, a fourth constitutional mitigation case was filed before the South Korean Constitutional Court. This case was consolidated with three previously-filed climate cases, representing a total of 255 plaintiffs, and the Constitutional Court issued its ruling in all four cases on 29 August 2024. This joint ruling was reported as a landmark judgment and as the first finding of its kind in Asia (i.e. the first time that a court in the region found that inadequate mitigation action violates constitutional rights).

In the present case, 51 individuals argued that their constitutional rights were being inadequately safeguarded by the failure to create an adequate implementation plana for South Korea’s 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement (NDC). This makes this case somewhat different from the other three, in the sense that it does not contest the country’s 40% reduction target (by 2030) itself, but argues that domestic measures will not be enough to meet that target. The plaintiffs estimated that current steps envisioned under South Korea’s Carbon Neutrality Plan would achieve only a 29.6% emissions reduction.

As per the complaint document (available, in the original Korean, on ClimateCaseChart), the plaintiffs invoked their rights to life, to pursue happiness, to general freedom, to property and to a healthy environment along with the State’s obligation to protect against disasters and protect fundamental rights.

Relevant developments:
On 12 June 2023, shortly before this case was filed, it was announced that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea had decided to submit an opinion to South Korea’s Constitutional Court to oppose the country’s Carbon Neutrality Act (2021), which it considered to be unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of future generations because it sets out a greenhouse gas emissions reductions target that was too low. The Act sets out a 40% emissions reductions target by 2030 as compared to 2018 levels. This, the Commission found, did not respect the constitutional principle of equality, because it passed the burden of greenhouse gas emissions on to future generations.

Consolidation with three other cases:
The South Korean Constitutional Court decided to consolidate its first four climate cases (Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea, Woodpecker et al. v. South Korea (Baby Climate Litigation), Climate Crisis Emergency Action v. South Korea (a.k.a. Byung-In Kim et al. v. South Korea) and Min-A Park v. South Korea (the present case). Public hearings in the cases were held on 23 April 2024 and 21 May 2024.

These cases all alleged that the government’s inadequate greenhouse gas reduction targets violated citizens’ fundamental rights, particularly those of future generations. Together, the four cases comprised over 250 plaintiffs, including civil society, youth and children. The Constitutional Court issued a joint ruling in these cases on 29 August 2024.

Judgment of the constitutional court:
On 29 August 2024, the South Korean Constitutional Court found a violation of constitutional rights in this case and three related cases. In an unanimous ruling, hailed as “the first decision of its kind in Asia“, the court found that the government’s response to the climate crisis was inadequate and threatened constitutional rights, noting that the country lacked legally binding long-term emissions reductions targets for the post-2031 period, which violated the constitutional rights of future generations by shifting an excessive reductions burden to the future. The Court gave government and legislature 18 months (until 28 February 2026) to introduce the relevant targets.

In particular, the Court ruled that Article 8(1) of the South Korean Carbon Neutrality Basic Act was unconstitutional. Previously, the government had pledged a 40% reduction of its GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 2018 levels, but had failed to set any targets since. The Constitutional Court held that this “does not have the minimum character necessary as a protective measure corresponding to the dangerous situation of the climate crisis”, citing the “principle of non-underprotection”, which means that the State must take appropriate measures to effectively protect the constitutional rights of its citizens.

Simultaneously, the Court held that the government’s target for 2030 did not infringe constitutional rights.

See also:
Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea.

Last updated:
29 August 2024.

Categories
Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Extreme poverty Germany Just transition litigation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to health Right to life

“Zukunftsklage” (Greenpeace and ors. v. Germany) – Neubauer II / Steinmetz III

Summary:
On 26 June 2024, it was announced that five German environmental organisations, together with a large number of individual plaintiffs, would be preparing a total of three new constitutional complaints against the Federal Government’s inadequate climate policy and the gutting of the Climate Protection Act (KSG) for the event that Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier were to sign pending amendments of the Act into law.

The five organisations — Germanwatch, Greenpeace, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH), Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) and Solarenergie-Förderverein Deutschland (SFV) — will each lead a complaint together with plaintiffs affected by climate change in different areas of their lives. Some of these plaintiffs were parties to the groundbreaking Neubauer case before the Federal Constitutional Court, including Luisa Neubauer, Sophie Backsen, Hannes Backsen, and Lüke Recktenwald.

The applicants argue that, even though the Neubauer case elevated climate action to the level of constitutional protection, insufficient action has taken place since then. Drawing on the intertemporal constitutional freedoms recognized in Neubauer, the interests of intergenerational justice, impacts on life and health, and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in KlimaSeniorinnen, wherein it found a violation of the right to respect for private and family life in Art. 8 ECHR, the plaintiffs argue that the requisite climate action is being delayed further into the future, increasingly endangering the future enjoyment of rights. This particularly affects the transport sector, where “extreme cuts and measures” will be required to meet reductions targets.

The plaintiffs note that the German Council of Climate Experts has made it clear that Germany is unlikely to achieve its climate targets for 2030, and that according to data from the Federal Environment Agency, the target of net zero by 2045 will also be missed by a considerable margin given current plans. This is in part due to abolition of funding programs as a result of the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Climate and Transformation Fund in November 2023.

Focusing particularly on an amendment to the German Climate Protection Act (KSG), passed by the German Bundestag on 26 April 2024, the plaintiffs note that this move (i) abolishes binding sector targets; (ii) eliminates the requirement for corrective action to catch up on missed targets; and means that (iii) post-2030 compliance with emission targets will only be considered in detail from 2029 and only planned and implemented from 2030. Overall, these legislative changes show that the legislator has not understood the constitutional limits to the overall concept of climate protection.

Since the 2021 Neubauer judgment, the plaintiffs argue, the German CO2 budget has been unnecessarily used up, while feasible and proportionate measures have not been taken. For example, the introduction of a speed limit on German freeways and in cities would have saved considerable amounts of CO2 and thus protected opportunities for freedom. The plaintiffs also cite failure to plan for green mobility options in rural areas. While immediate action in the transport sector would make it possible to transition gradually, the current plans require an “emergency stop” that will severely limit the freedoms of especially poorer segments of the population.

This cannot be countered by the fact that regulations exist at EU level. The applicants argue that EU climate protection law as a whole, and for the transport sector in particular, does not guarantee the necessary protection of fundamental rights because it does not contain any binding interim targets after 2030 and does not specify a comprehensible budget up to 2050. And, the plaintiffs note, German legislators are currently not even complying with the requirements of EU law, as established by the German Council of Climate Experts, among others.

Relief sought:
In their announcement, the plaintiffs set out three motions for relief.

  1. The German Climate Protection Act (KSG) still allows too many emissions given that the German emissions budget is empty if measured by the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement and the European Court of Human Rights, and almost empty if measured against the 1.75°C threshold set by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2021. The law is not ambitious enough, the permitted quantity targets jeopardize human rights instead of securing them. This must be changed to comply with the state’s existing duty to protect.
  2. The recent amendment to the KSG is unconstitutional. By weakening the required measures to reach Germany’s goals, the amendment violates the intertemporal freedoms recognized in Neubauer. The amendment must be repealed and the old law must apply unchanged.
  3. The failure to take climate protection measures in the transport sector already violates intertemporal civil liberties, making disproportionate measures unavoidable later in time. People in rural areas are particularly affected by such restrictions on freedom, putting socially disadvantaged groups at a disadvantage.

Cases under the “Zukunftsklage” umbrella:

A first case under this umbrella was filed in July 2024. Known as “Steinmetz, et al. v. Germany III“, this case was brought by an NGO, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, and 11 individual plaintiffs aged between 14 and 27. They allege that current reforms are insufficient and that they violate the principle of intergenerational freedom developed in the Neubauer ruling. Drawing extensively on the European Court of Human Rights’ KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, they also argue that current mitigation plans in Germany infringe their rights to life and physical integrity, drawing on Article 8 ECHR.

Complaint form in the Steinmetz III caseDownload

Last updated:
29 November 2024