Category: Class action

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Business responsibility / corporate cases Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life The Netherlands

Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell Plc (No. 2)

Summary:
On 21 April 2026, the Dutch NGO Milieudefensie delivered summons to oil and gas giant Shell Plc, in its second collective legal action against the company following the first Milieudefensie case (decided on appeal in 2024). This second case, under Section 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), is brought on behalf of current and future generations of Dutch citizens after the corporate actor moved its seat from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom. Milieudefensie summoned Shell to appear at a hearing to be held at the District Court of Amsterdam on 29 July 2026.

In its 273-page summons, Milieudefensie covers issues of jurisdiction, the requirements for a collective suit under Section 3:305a DCC, the scientific evidence underpinning its case, the risk of reaching climate tipping points for Europe and for the Netherlands, international climate policy and the global 1.5-degree temperature target, the important role played by non-state actors and their corporate responsibilities to respect human rights, the inhibiting influence of the oil and gas industry, including Shell, on infrastructural carbon lock-ins, including through its historical undermining of climate science and strategies to delay climate action, as well as its lobbying against the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD or CS3D) of 13 June 2024.

Milieudefensie sets out the framework for assessing Shell’s responsibility under Sections 3:296 and 6:162 DCC, fleshing this out by invoking the societal duty of care under domestic law, as well as the doctrine of hazardous negligence, human rights law (particularly Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, the rights to life and respect for private and family life), international customary law, international soft law, and legal principles including the precautionary principle, the climate law principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), and the principle of intergenerational justice. In particular, the summons argues that

“[s]ince the Urgenda judgment, it has been widely recognised in court judgments that dangerous climate change leads to human rights violations. Not only the ECHR, but also the IACtHR and the ICJ have recently found this. Numerous (supreme) national courts have independently reached the same conclusion. Within Europe, for example, reference can be made to the case law of the [German] Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Court of Appeal in Brussels. Outside Europe, the situation is no different. For example, the Lahore High Court in Pakistan, the Supreme Court of Colombia, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, the District Court of Montana (United States) and the Supreme Court of India have all ruled that human rights can be relied on in order to be protected against the effects of climate change. In view of the above, there can be no misunderstanding that human rights (indirectly) have a horizontal effect when the unwritten duty-of-care standard is fleshed out. Nor can there be any debate about the fact that dangerous climate change leads to human rights violations and that human rights can be relied on for protection against dangerous climate change. The only question that remains is what assessment framework needs to be applied here. “

Milieudefensie argues that Shell bears a share of the responsibility to prevent dangerous climate change, discussing its level of knowledge and the foreseeability of harm by arguing that Shell has long known about the fact that fossil fuels cause climate change, with serious consequences for people and the environment, has known that it is making a substantial contribution to climate change and that it needs to take (precautionary) measures. It sets out Shell’s two-pillared obligations: first, a reduction obligation for Scope 1, 2 and 3 CO2 emissions, and second, an obligation not to develop new oil and gas fields.

Concerning the first pillar of obligations, Milieudefensie argues that “Shell must make an equitable contribution (a “fair share”) to preventing dangerous climate change and limiting global warming to 1.5°C by reducing its emissions.” In doing so, it invokes UN reports to argue that:

  • companies must demonstrate maximum ambition to achieve (net) zero CO2 emissions as quickly as possible, but by 2050 at the latest;
  • companies must set ambitious and credible interim targets for the short and medium term on the road to the above-mentioned goal of net zero CO2 emissions that represent a fair share of the global reduction target; and
  • the (interim) targets should cover all Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions and should aim for absolute CO2 emission reductions.  

    It also submits that “Shell can be considered to be an influential Western company in several respects; it has both substantial emissions and large transition capabilities and a large historical responsibility. These are all relevant circumstances under the above-mentioned climate protocols (as evidenced by e.g. the reference to the CBDR principle and the need to take on a fair share of the global target) for asking Shell to take on an above-average responsibility and requiring it to reduce its emissions faster than the global average.”

    As concerns the second pillar of obligations, Milieudefensie argues that Shell’s obligation not to pursue new fossil fuel projects is “based on the doctrine of hazardous negligence, human rights law, the legal principles discussed, soft law and other objective points of reference, is that Shell must cease the development and production of new oil and gas fields. After all, the carbon budget with a 50% probability of 1.5°C is already exceeded with the operation of the existing fossil-fuel infrastructure alone, and new oil and gas fields are therefore incompatible with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C by the end of this century. “

    Milieudefensie concludes that Shell is breaching its societal duty of care under domestic law, and seeks the following provisionally enforceable remedies:

    • Emissions reductions, covering annual Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, as per the table below;
    • A prohibition of achieving these reductions through divestment, i.e. through transfer of shares or assets;
    • To prohibit Shell from making use of carbon credits for the purpose of achieving the emission reductions described;
    • To order Shell to achieve that the Shell Group ceases, continues to cease and does not start the production of new oil and gas from fields.

    More information:
    The full text of the summons (translated into English by Milieudefensie) is available below. For more information on the case, see here.

    Summons Milieudefensie v. Shell (No. 2)Download

    Suggested citation:
    District Court of Amsterdam, Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell Plc (No. 2), summons issued 21 April 2026.

    Categories
    2026 Blog Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Margin of appreciation Private and family life The Netherlands

    Bonaire Climate Case: Creative or Questionable Interpretation of International Climate Law?

    Pranav Ganesan, PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich

    The Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands(Bonaire) judgment of the Hague District Court has stolen the limelight as the new posterchild for strategic climate litigation. The plaintiff in this case, Greenpeace Netherlands, argued that the Dutch government failed in its duty to protect the residents of Bonaire, an island in the Caribbean which formally attained the status of a special municipality of the Netherlands in 2010. Although it is a special municipality (bijzondere gemeente), it is just as much a part of the Netherlands as any other province in the European Netherlands. The Dutch government owes obligations under international human rights law, including those arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), towards residents of the municipality. That international human rights law requires states to undertake climate mitigation measures and adaptation measures, as informed by international climate change law where relevant, has been affirmatively held in two advisory opinions from international courts and the European Court of Human Rights. And the proposition that the Dutch government’s duty of care towards its population essentially includes obligations under the ECHR was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in material respects, the Hague District Court’s reasoning was so heavily based on international law.[1] In terms of the scope of state conduct implicated in this case, it outdoes the Urgenda case,which only concerned contributions to the mitigation of climate change. The Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiff that the Dutch government had violated Article 8 ECHR as well as the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR), the former due to inadequate mitigation measures, inadequate implementation of those measures, delays in adopting an adaptation plan for Bonaire and late provision of procedural safeguards to the residents of Bonaire. In this blog, I provide a quick analysis of the District Court’s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement in the section on mitigation measures. Readers interested in learning about the adaptation component and how the court addressed discrimination claim are welcome to read this blogpost by Wewerinke-Singh.

    There are areas in the judgment where the District Court’s assessment of the compatibility of the Dutch Climate law framework with international climate law is questionable. The first glaring issue is that the court made a finding of non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement based on the absence of ‘absolute emissions reduction targets’ in the Dutch Climate Act of 2019 (para 11.13.1). The problem identified by the court was that the targets were expressed as goals that the government would ‘strive to achieve.’ However, this does not mean that the targets are not absolute. The difference between absolute and relative emissions reductions targets being whether they are expressed as percentage reductions in comparison to the emissions during a fixed baseline year, as opposed to reductions from a business as usual scenario in case of relative targets (Winkler et al 2014, 636). The use of the expression ‘strive to achieve’ means that the nature of the obligation to achieve the target is one of conduct rather than result, reflecting the nature of the obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures in pursuance of NDCs communicated under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement (ICJ Advisory Opinion, paras 251-253). Another connected example is the court’s declaration that ‘UN standards’ require emission reduction targets to be expressed as percentage reductions to be achieved by the target date, in comparison to 2019 levels as opposed to the 1990 baseline (para 11.13.2). Moreover, strictly speaking, Article 12(8) of the UNFCCC does not require the EU to provide information about each member state’s national carbon budget like the court suggests (para 11.15.3). The court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions might be technically imprecise, but it is undoubtedly bold, being based on the need for exemplary efforts from a developed country like the Netherlands, and reflecting the appropriate sense of urgency in light of the results of the First Global Stocktake (para 11.9.4). Through its interpretive moves, the court effectively hardened ‘soft’ obligations (i.e. normative expectations) sourced from the Paris Agreement and COP decisions (on hard and soft obligations in the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, 2016).

    A final noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the rather detailed response to how the notion of ‘equity’ in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Articles 2(1) and 4(1) of the Paris Agreement is to be applied in reviewing states’ mitigation commitments. Equity is an elusive concept, with debates on what an equitable distribution of the global emissions reduction burden entails having remained unsettled since the inception of international negotiations on the topic of climate mitigation (Oliver Herrera et al, 2025). The court provided the (un)acceptability of a ‘grandfathering approach’ as an example of one such debate (para 11.13.5). But it did not go so far as to hold that the grandfathering approach is legally impermissible because it is inequitable per se, or that an equal per capita emissions approach is the minimum standard under international law. Rather, it assessed the Netherlands’ policy negatively on account of its failure to justify why its current policy, which is based on the controversial grandfathering principle and falls short of the ambition required by the equal per capita emissions approach, is equitable in accordance with Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(1). It thus did not use equity to dictate the outcome of what exactly the Dutch government’s fair share of the global carbon emissions ought to be. At same time, it did not use the underlying controversy as a reason to entirely avoid reviewing the substance of the Dutch climate mitigation policy. This is underscored by its remedial findings, wherein the court declared that the Netherlands’ current mitigation commitments were inequitable, thereby leading to a breach of Article 8 (para 12.1), but dismissed Greenpeace’s request ordering the adoption of specific emissions reduction targets by the government, or at least a carbon budget reflecting the ‘equal per capita emissions approach’ (paras 8.1 (IV)-(VI), 11.55 and 11.58).

    Overall, the Bonaire judgment shows how climate litigation can lead to precarious precedents. On the one hand, the way the Court engaged with the concept of equity provided an assessment of Dutch mitigation ambition which was notably pragmatic and might serve as inspiration for other courts when asked to answer the fair share question. On the other hand, the judgment risks signaling to states that legal texts—which negotiators toiled to craft in ‘constructively ambiguous’ terms—may be stretched by domestic courts to uncomfortable extents. Ultimately, the appellate court’s scrutiny of this case (should the Dutch government file an appeal) will reveal how this judgment will be remembered: whether it will be hailed for its boldness or criticized for its questionable interpretation of international treaties.

    [1] André Nollkaemper commented: ‘Today’s judgment of the District Court of The Hague fully lives up to the reputation of Dutch courts as strongly international law-minded. […] The conclusion is firmly anchored in international law. With 29 references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, 64 references to the European Court’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, 64 to the UNFCCC, 62 to the Paris Agreement, and 12 to COP decisions, this surely ranks high on the list of climate change cases that are most shaped by international law.’

    Categories
    Brazil Class action Deforestation Domestic court Environmental racism Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Just transition litigation Minority rights Non-discrimination Rights of nature

    São Paulo State Public Defender’s Office v. São Paulo State Land Institute Foundation (ITESP) et al.

    Summary:
    On 31 March 2014, the São Paulo State Public Defender’s Office brought a “Public Civil Action” against the São Paulo State Land Institute Foundation (ITESP), the São Paulo State Foundation for Forest Conservation and Production (Fundação Florestal), and the State of São Paulo. The case sought annulment of the decision to protect biodiversity by creating a new State Park, the Alto Ribeira Tourist State Park (PETAR), despite the fact that the area in question overlapped with a traditional Quilombola territory, or a territory settled by Afro-Brazilian descendants of escaped slaves. The ruling highlights environmental racism as causing the marginalization of this community. The plaintiffs argued that the Quilombola are protectors of nature and have a relationship of mutual dependence with it and requested territorial recognition.

    Ruling of 29 December 2023:
    On 29 December 2023, a ruling was issued upholding the claim of the Quilombola community of Bombas and invalidating the decision to create the State Park to the extent that it overlapped with the Quilombola territory. The court established that it could review the conformity of domestic law against international human rights norms, finding also that ILO Convention 169 was hierarchically superior to domestic constitutional law. It also highlighted the difficulty of balancing the interests of the Quilombola community and PETAR, noting that both concerned internationally recognised human rights – the Quilombola community given its traditional customs, connection to nature and unique culture, and PETAR as a World Heritage Site at the heart of the Atlantic Rainforest that was home to a number of rare species of flora and fauna.

    Exploring the issue of environmental racism, the court found that:

    The Socio-Environmental Institute (ISA) recently produced a series of reports recognising that the Bombas community is subject to environmental racism. The issue is linked in the sense that despite the abstraction and supposed generality of the law, when it is applied to a specific case in environmental terms, because it disregards original realities (the way of life of the traditional community from the way of life of the urbanised community), it imposes burdens that make survival almost unbearable, because it creates prohibitions that affect the subsistence of groups that feed themselves, sustain themselves, produce minimal income and extract essential elements for their maintenance from the environment. Not that this isn’t also the case in urbanised society, after all, there’s no denying that all consumer goods originate from materials that are exploited on a large scale in world production and that originate from nature, such as oil.

    To say that there is a precise separation between humans and the environment, as well as that there is real protection, is in itself a huge contradiction. After all, we are all on a planet and making use of its resources (…).

    Ultimately, the court found the decision establishing the Park to be incompatible with Article 68 of the Transitional Constitutional Provisions Act (ADCT) and ILO Convention 169. Although the decision noted the problem of environmental racism, it found that the marginalization at stake stemmed from combined social, environmental, historical, and legal factors. It affirmed the relationship between traditional communities and the environment and the need to halt human impacts on natural ecosystems.

    As noted by Climatecasechart, the original claim did not reference climate change; this connection was introduced judicially in the ruling of 2023.

    On 5 March 2024, the São Paulo State Attorney General’s Office appealed. In doing so, it highlighted the threat of climate change and the importance of carbon sinks, such as the State Park in question.

    Further information:
    To read the full judgment in the case (in Portuguese), click here.

    Last updated:
    12 February 2025.

    Categories
    Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Extreme poverty Germany Just transition litigation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to health Right to life

    “Zukunftsklage” (Greenpeace and ors. v. Germany) – Neubauer II / Steinmetz III

    Summary:
    On 26 June 2024, it was announced that five German environmental organisations, together with a large number of individual plaintiffs, would be preparing a total of three new constitutional complaints against the Federal Government’s inadequate climate policy and the gutting of the Climate Protection Act (KSG) for the event that Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier were to sign pending amendments of the Act into law.

    The five organisations — Germanwatch, Greenpeace, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH), Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) and Solarenergie-Förderverein Deutschland (SFV) — will each lead a complaint together with plaintiffs affected by climate change in different areas of their lives. Some of these plaintiffs were parties to the groundbreaking Neubauer case before the Federal Constitutional Court, including Luisa Neubauer, Sophie Backsen, Hannes Backsen, and Lüke Recktenwald.

    The applicants argue that, even though the Neubauer case elevated climate action to the level of constitutional protection, insufficient action has taken place since then. Drawing on the intertemporal constitutional freedoms recognized in Neubauer, the interests of intergenerational justice, impacts on life and health, and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in KlimaSeniorinnen, wherein it found a violation of the right to respect for private and family life in Art. 8 ECHR, the plaintiffs argue that the requisite climate action is being delayed further into the future, increasingly endangering the future enjoyment of rights. This particularly affects the transport sector, where “extreme cuts and measures” will be required to meet reductions targets.

    The plaintiffs note that the German Council of Climate Experts has made it clear that Germany is unlikely to achieve its climate targets for 2030, and that according to data from the Federal Environment Agency, the target of net zero by 2045 will also be missed by a considerable margin given current plans. This is in part due to abolition of funding programs as a result of the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Climate and Transformation Fund in November 2023.

    Focusing particularly on an amendment to the German Climate Protection Act (KSG), passed by the German Bundestag on 26 April 2024, the plaintiffs note that this move (i) abolishes binding sector targets; (ii) eliminates the requirement for corrective action to catch up on missed targets; and means that (iii) post-2030 compliance with emission targets will only be considered in detail from 2029 and only planned and implemented from 2030. Overall, these legislative changes show that the legislator has not understood the constitutional limits to the overall concept of climate protection.

    Since the 2021 Neubauer judgment, the plaintiffs argue, the German CO2 budget has been unnecessarily used up, while feasible and proportionate measures have not been taken. For example, the introduction of a speed limit on German freeways and in cities would have saved considerable amounts of CO2 and thus protected opportunities for freedom. The plaintiffs also cite failure to plan for green mobility options in rural areas. While immediate action in the transport sector would make it possible to transition gradually, the current plans require an “emergency stop” that will severely limit the freedoms of especially poorer segments of the population.

    This cannot be countered by the fact that regulations exist at EU level. The applicants argue that EU climate protection law as a whole, and for the transport sector in particular, does not guarantee the necessary protection of fundamental rights because it does not contain any binding interim targets after 2030 and does not specify a comprehensible budget up to 2050. And, the plaintiffs note, German legislators are currently not even complying with the requirements of EU law, as established by the German Council of Climate Experts, among others.

    Relief sought:
    In their announcement, the plaintiffs set out three motions for relief.

    1. The German Climate Protection Act (KSG) still allows too many emissions given that the German emissions budget is empty if measured by the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement and the European Court of Human Rights, and almost empty if measured against the 1.75°C threshold set by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2021. The law is not ambitious enough, the permitted quantity targets jeopardize human rights instead of securing them. This must be changed to comply with the state’s existing duty to protect.
    2. The recent amendment to the KSG is unconstitutional. By weakening the required measures to reach Germany’s goals, the amendment violates the intertemporal freedoms recognized in Neubauer. The amendment must be repealed and the old law must apply unchanged.
    3. The failure to take climate protection measures in the transport sector already violates intertemporal civil liberties, making disproportionate measures unavoidable later in time. People in rural areas are particularly affected by such restrictions on freedom, putting socially disadvantaged groups at a disadvantage.

    Cases under the “Zukunftsklage” umbrella:

    A first case under this umbrella was filed in July 2024. Known as “Steinmetz, et al. v. Germany III“, this case was brought by an NGO, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, and 11 individual plaintiffs aged between 14 and 27. They allege that current reforms are insufficient and that they violate the principle of intergenerational freedom developed in the Neubauer ruling. Drawing extensively on the European Court of Human Rights’ KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, they also argue that current mitigation plans in Germany infringe their rights to life and physical integrity, drawing on Article 8 ECHR.

    Complaint form in the Steinmetz III caseDownload

    Last updated:
    29 November 2024

    Categories
    Brazil Class action Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Human dignity Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to subsistence/food

    Institute of Amazonian Studies (IEA) v Brazil

    Summary:

    The IEA v. Brazil case centres on the severe deforestation crisis in the Brazilian Amazon, a major global climate concern. The Institute of Amazonian Studies (IEA), an NGO, initiated a public civil action, not only demanding the Brazilian government’s compliance with national climate laws but also advocating for the recognition of a new fundamental right to a stable climate for both current and future generations. IEA contends that the government has failed to meet emissions targets outlined in the National Policy on Climate Change, specifically the Plan to Prevent and Combat Deforestation in the Legal Amazon. The NGO seeks court orders to enforce compliance with these plans and, in case of non-compliance, calls for reforestation and resource allocation. Importantly, IEA asserts the existence of a fundamental right to climate stability implicit in the Brazilian Constitution, crucial for human life and ecological balance. This right encompasses various aspects such as an ecologically balanced environment, dignified life, inviolability of life, freedom, equality, security, property, health, food, and housing. The case also challenges the burden of proof, with IEA requesting a reversal, arguing that the government, holding evidence, should prove compliance with climate policies and lack of influence on deforestation rates.

    Claim:

    The IEA’s main contentions involve compelling the Brazilian government to adhere to climate policies, implement deforestation reduction plans, and acknowledge a fundamental right to climate stability. Additionally, the NGO seeks a reversal of the burden of proof, placing the responsibility on the government to demonstrate compliance with climate regulations and its non-influence on deforestation rates.

    Legal developments:

    In July 2021, the Federal District Court of Curitiba initially declined jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Court of Amazonas. However, this decision was subsequently suspended on 20 August 2021 by the Federal Appellate Court, following a ruling from the reporting judge. The Appellate Court reversed the lower court’s decision, returning the case to the Federal District Court.

    During this process, the question of whether the case should be consolidated with another one, Federal Prosecutor’s Office v. IBAMA, concerning the operationalisation of monitoring bases in critical areas within the Amazon, was also considered. The Court determined that the two cases were distinct in terms of typology, structure, objective, cause of actions, and demands. Specifically, it highlighted the differences between IEA v. Brazil, aimed at ensuring the federal government takes steps to implement climate policies, and Federal Prosecutor’s Office v. IBAMA, which addresses environmental law matters.

    On 7 December 2021, the Third Chamber of the Appellate Court affirmed the decision to return the case to the Federal District Court. The Court emphasised that, although both lawsuits dealt with illegal deforestation, they had different focuses. IEA v. Brazil concentrated on reducing Brazilian emissions through deforestation reduction, while Federal Prosecutor’s Office v. IBAMA addressed an environmental law case focused on combating deforestation in ten “ecological hotspots” within a specific timeframe, namely the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court underscored the distinction between climate litigation and environmental litigation in making its determination.

    Links:

    The case documents are accessible here and here.

    Status of the case:

    The case is currently pending before the Federal Court of Curitiba.

    Suggested citation:

    Institute of Amazonian Studies v. Brazil, Federal Regional Court, Fourth Region, ACP No. 5048951-39.2020.4.04.7000, 29 March 2022 (Brazil).

    Last updated:

    12 January 2024

    Categories
    2022 Class action Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples rights New Zealand Right to life Self-determination

    Smith v. Attorney-General

    Summary:

    In March 2022, a prominent Māori landowner and advocate for tribal climate concerns took a significant step by bringing a case before the High Court of New Zealand. The central argument of the case was that the government had violated fundamental human rights, particularly the right to life and minority rights, due to its inadequate response to climate change. The plaintiff’s core contention was that successive governments had consistently failed to address the severe consequences of climate change, with a particular emphasis on its disproportionate impact on the Māori community.

    Initially, the case centred on a single cause of action, which involved the government’s breach of duty to take all necessary steps to reduce New Zealand emissions and actively protect the plaintiff and his descendants from the adverse effects of climate change. Later, following a court order issued by Justice Johnston in May 2020, the plaintiff expanded the case to include two additional distinct causes of action. These additional claims were based on alleged violations of the rights to life and the rights of minorities as outlined in sections 8 and 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the government’s failure to act in accordance with its obligations as stipulated in the Treaty of Waitangi (one of New Zealand’s founding documents, agreed in 1840 between the British Crown and Māori leaders). The Court eventually dismissed all three claims.

    Claim:

    The plaintiff’s claim was multi-faceted, asserting that the government’s actions, or lack thereof, constituted violations of human rights, particularly the right to life and minority rights, with a focus on the Māori population. The claim included allegations concerning the breach of duty, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the Treaty of Waitangi.

    Decision:

    On July 15, 2022, the Court rendered a decision in favour of the government, dismissing all three claims presented by the plaintiff. The Court found the plaintiff’s common law duty of care claim untenable, reasoning that it failed to define specific legal obligations and exceeded the boundaries of incremental development of new duties. Moreover, the Court asserted that the creation of an effective remedy, such as court-monitored monitoring, would necessitate an institutional expertise, democratic participation, and accountability beyond the capabilities of the court process alone.

    The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s assertion regarding the right to life, deeming it untenable due to the absence of substantial evidence indicating a ‘real and identifiable’ threat to individuals or groups. Instead, the Court viewed climate change as a general threat impacting all New Zealanders due to its broad-reaching consequences. The Court further noted that the plaintiff’s argument concerning the breach of minority rights lacked merit since the relevant regulations primarily prohibited the Crown from infringing upon minority rights rather than imposing positive duties.

    Additionally, the Court clarified that claims based on the Treaty and fiduciary obligations were not valid, as they hinged on the same general duty initially put forth in the first cause of action, which the Court had already rejected as unsound. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s contention that this duty was owed exclusively to the Māori population, rather than the wider public, further undermined its validity.

    Links:

    The case documents are accessible via Climate Case Chart: Click here.

    Status of the case:

    Judgment

    Suggested citation:

    Michael John Smith v. The Attorney-General, [2022] NZHC 1693 (15 July 2022), The High Court of New Zealand.

    Last updated:

    20 October 2023.

    Categories
    2021 Canada Children and young people Class action Domestic court Non-discrimination Right to a healthy environment Right to life

    ENVironnement JEUnesse v. Canada

    Summary:
    In 2018, the environmental NGO ENvironnement JEUnesse applied for leave to bring a class action case against the Canadian government on behalf of citizens of Québec aged 35 and under. The NGO sought a declaration from that the Canadian government had violated its obligation to protect these citizens’ fundamental rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Québec Charter of Rights and Freedoms by setting insufficent greenhouse gas reduction targets and by failing to create an adequate plan to reach these targets. Specifically, they invoked their rights to life, to a healthy environment, and to equality. On 11 July 2019, the Superior Court of Quebec dismissed the motion to authorize the institution of a class action, finding that the proposed class, with its 35-year age limit, had been created arbitrarily. An appeal by ENVironnement JEUnesse was denied on 13 December 2021.

    Remedies sought:
    As well as a declaratory judgment, the NGO sought punitive damages and an order to cease interference with the plaintiffs’ rights.

    Judgment:
    In their judgment of 13 December 2021, the three judges of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and denied the certification of the proposed class. They referred to the role of the legislature in making the complex social and economic choices required here. They also considered that the remedies sought by the applicants were not specific enough to be implemented by a court. Lastly, the judges upeld the previous instance’s finding concerning the arbitary constitution of the class, with its 35-year age limit.

    Further procedural steps:
    The applicants announced that they would launch an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

    Further reading:
    The judgment of the Court of Appeal (in French) can be found below.

    The Judgment (in French)Download

    The declaration of appeal can be found here.