Author: ganesanpranav

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2026 Belgium Business responsibility / corporate cases Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Loss & damage

Falys et al. v. TotalEnergies (‘The Farmer Case’)

Summary:

In March 2024, Hugues Falys, a farmer located in Belgium, filed a legal action at the Commercial Court of Tournai (Belgium) against TotalEnergies. He was joined by Ligue des Droits Humains, Greenpeace Belgium and FIAN Belgium.

The objective of the legal action is to claim compensation for damages suffered by Falys as a result of climate breakdown, and to force TotalEnergies to move away from fossil fuels. The civil liability action is based on articles 1382 and 1383 of the former Belgian Civil Code. In their submissions to the court, the plaintiffs have put forward human rights arguments as one line of interpretation of the relevant provisions, inter alia referring the ECtHR’s judgment in Klimaseniorinnen multiple times.

Relevant developments:

On March 18, the Commercial Court of Tournai found the action to be admissible, thereby recognising that carbon majors can be held accountable in Belgium for causing climate change even if their headquarters is in another state. With regards to the merits of the case, the Court postponed its judgment to 9 September 2026 to await the decision in a similar case against TotalEnergies in France.

See also:

Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total.

Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland.

Links:

For the main conclusions of the plaintiffs (in French), see here.

For an unofficial translation of the main conclusions of the plaintiffs (in English), see here.

For the Court’s admissibility judgment of 18 March 2026 (in French), see here.

Last updated:

20 March 2026.

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2025 Deciding Body Emissions reductions/mitigation Hungary Right to a healthy environment

Constitutionality of Article 3(1) of the Climate Protection Act (Hungary), Decision No. II/3536/2021

Summary:

50 members of the parliament petitioned the Hungarian Constitutional Court to declare several provisions of the Climate Protection Act XLIV of 2020 as unconstitutional. They argued that the Act was not in conformity with the following provisions of the Fundamental Law of Hungary: Article P(1) containing the obligation of the state and everyone to protect, maintain land, and preserve for future generations, Hungary’s forests and the reserves of water; biodiversity; and cultural artefacts; Article Q(2) containing the obligation to ensure that Hungarian law is in conformity with international law; Article B(1) the obligation to conform to the requirements of rule of law, and the fundamental rights to life, physical health and well-being, legal protection for homes under Articles II, XX and XXI(1) respectively.  

In its plenary session on 13 May 2025, the Constitutional Court announced its decision on the case. It held that Section 3(1) of the Climate Protection Act, establishing a 40% emission reduction target to be achieved by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels), was unconstitutional and repealed with effect from 30 June 2026. In its reasoning, the Court invoked the principles of non-regression, precaution and prevention as bases for interpreting obligations under Articles P(1), XX(1) and XXI(1) of the Fundamental Law which required the state to continuously improve the level of protection in light of the latest developments in climate science and technology. It characterized the maintenance of the 40% target as a failure to update the state’s mitigation commitments in light of ‘events’ which had rendered it outdated. Further, it found that the Climate Protection Act only contained emissions reduction obligations, and did not address the creation of emissions sinks and adoption of adaptation measures, which are of equal importance in ensuring the effectiveness of the legal framework for protection against climate-related risks.

The Constitutional Court also found that the lack of mechanisms for ensuring accountability for the achievement of the target prescribed in Article 3(1) of the Climate Protection Act, to be a reason as to why the provision formally ran afoul of Article B(1) (rule of law) and in terms of content, led to a violation of Articles P(1), XX(1) and XXI(1) of the Fundamental Law.

The Court thus ordered the National Assembly to adopt a comprehensive regulation on Hungary’s climate mitigation commitment as well as adaptation measures tailored to Hungary’s circumstances by 30 June 2026.

Status:

The decision is final

Suggested Citation,

Constitutional Court of Hungary, Constitutionality of Article 3(1) of the Climate Protection Act (Hungary), Decision No. II/3536/2021, 13 May 2025.

Links:

Unofficial version of the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (in Hungarian) can be found here.

Last updated: 12 March 2026

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2026 Children and young people Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Non-discrimination Right to health Standing/admissibility Sweden Uncategorized

Aurora v. Sweden (Aurora Case II)

Summary

On 06 February 2026, the youth-led association Aurora launched a climate lawsuit before the Nacka District Court against the government of Sweden alleging a violation of their rights to life, health and well-being as well as the prohibition of discrimination (based on age). The case is a follow-up to Anton Folley and Others v. Sweden (Aurora Case). That case was a class action suit brought by over 600 young individuals (supported by Aurora), which the Supreme Court of Sweden dismissed as inadmissible on the ground that the plaintiffs did not meet the high threshold for individual victim status articulated by the European Court of Human Rights in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland judgment.

Relying upon the criteria for ‘victim status’ and the standing of associations to litigate climate cases laid down in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, Aurora argues that this fresh case is admissible and that the district court may proceed to examining the substantive claims.

Claims:

The substantive claims in Aurora II are largely the same as the claims which were made in the Aurora case, with the new petition drawing upon more recent climate jurisprudence, including the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change to support its case. In the petition, Aurora identifies a lack of measures or intermediate emission reduction targets envisaged for the period after 2030, and problematizes Sweden’s emissions debt (i.e. the exceedance of its national fair share of the global carbon budget) as failures to exercise due diligence in the discharge of positive obligation to protect individuals who Aurora represents from serious threats to the enjoyment of their rights. The petition also invokes the findings of the IPCC to argue that children and youth, who Aurora represents (majority born between 1998 and 2026), are at a particular risk from climate change, in order to demonstrate the disparate impact of Sweden’s failure to effectively contribute towards climate mitigation. The petition requests the court to handle the case with urgency, to declare violations of Articles 2, 8 and 14 and an order the government to pay legal costs incurred by the plaintiffs.

Links

  • For the petition (in Swedish) filed by Aurora, see here.
  • For the press release by Aurora announcing the case, see here.

Status

Pending

Suggested citation:

Nacka District Court, Aurora v. Sweden, filed on 6 February 2026 (pending).

Last updated:

11 February 2026

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2026 Blog Class action Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Private and family life The Netherlands

Bonaire Climate Case: Creative or Questionable Interpretation of International Climate Law?

Pranav Ganesan, PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich

The Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands(Bonaire) judgment of the Hague District Court has stolen the limelight as the new posterchild for strategic climate litigation. The plaintiff in this case, Greenpeace Netherlands, argued that the Dutch government failed in its duty to protect the residents of Bonaire, an island in the Caribbean which formally attained the status of a special municipality of the Netherlands in 2010. Although it is a special municipality (bijzondere gemeente), it is just as much a part of the Netherlands as any other province in the European Netherlands. The Dutch government owes obligations under international human rights law, including those arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), towards residents of the municipality. That international human rights law requires states to undertake climate mitigation measures and adaptation measures, as informed by international climate change law where relevant, has been affirmatively held in two advisory opinions from international courts and the European Court of Human Rights. And the proposition that the Dutch government’s duty of care towards its population essentially includes obligations under the ECHR was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in material respects, the Hague District Court’s reasoning was so heavily based on international law.[1] In terms of the scope of state conduct implicated in this case, it outdoes the Urgenda case,which only concerned contributions to the mitigation of climate change. The Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiff that the Dutch government had violated Article 8 ECHR as well as the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR), the former due to inadequate mitigation measures, inadequate implementation of those measures, delays in adopting an adaptation plan for Bonaire and late provision of procedural safeguards to the residents of Bonaire. In this blog, I provide a quick analysis of the District Court’s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement in the section on mitigation measures. Readers interested in learning about the adaptation component and how the court addressed discrimination claim are welcome to read this blogpost by Wewerinke-Singh.

There are areas in the judgment where the District Court’s assessment of the compatibility of the Dutch Climate law framework with international climate law is questionable. The first glaring issue is that the court made a finding of non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement based on the absence of ‘absolute emissions reduction targets’ in the Dutch Climate Act of 2019 (para 11.13.1). The problem identified by the court was that the targets were expressed as goals that the government would ‘strive to achieve.’ However, this does not mean that the targets are not absolute. The difference between absolute and relative emissions reductions targets being whether they are expressed as percentage reductions in comparison to the emissions during a fixed baseline year, as opposed to reductions from a business as usual scenario in case of relative targets (Winkler et al 2014, 636). The use of the expression ‘strive to achieve’ means that the nature of the obligation to achieve the target is one of conduct rather than result, reflecting the nature of the obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures in pursuance of NDCs communicated under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement (ICJ Advisory Opinion, paras 251-253). Another connected example is the court’s declaration that ‘UN standards’ require emission reduction targets to be expressed as percentage reductions to be achieved by the target date, in comparison to 2019 levels as opposed to the 1990 baseline (para 11.13.2). Moreover, strictly speaking, Article 12(8) of the UNFCCC does not require the EU to provide information about each member state’s national carbon budget like the court suggests (para 11.15.3). The court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions might be technically imprecise, but it is undoubtedly bold, being based on the need for exemplary efforts from a developed country like the Netherlands, and reflecting the appropriate sense of urgency in light of the results of the First Global Stocktake (para 11.9.4). Through its interpretive moves, the court effectively hardened ‘soft’ obligations (i.e. normative expectations) sourced from the Paris Agreement and COP decisions (on hard and soft obligations in the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, 2016).

A final noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the rather detailed response to how the notion of ‘equity’ in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Articles 2(1) and 4(1) of the Paris Agreement is to be applied in reviewing states’ mitigation commitments. Equity is an elusive concept, with debates on what an equitable distribution of the global emissions reduction burden entails having remained unsettled since the inception of international negotiations on the topic of climate mitigation (Oliver Herrera et al, 2025). The court provided the (un)acceptability of a ‘grandfathering approach’ as an example of one such debate (para 11.13.5). But it did not go so far as to hold that the grandfathering approach is legally impermissible because it is inequitable per se, or that an equal per capita emissions approach is the minimum standard under international law. Rather, it assessed the Netherlands’ policy negatively on account of its failure to justify why its current policy, which is based on the controversial grandfathering principle and falls short of the ambition required by the equal per capita emissions approach, is equitable in accordance with Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(1). It thus did not use equity to dictate the outcome of what exactly the Dutch government’s fair share of the global carbon emissions ought to be. At same time, it did not use the underlying controversy as a reason to entirely avoid reviewing the substance of the Dutch climate mitigation policy. This is underscored by its remedial findings, wherein the court declared that the Netherlands’ current mitigation commitments were inequitable, thereby leading to a breach of Article 8 (para 12.1), but dismissed Greenpeace’s request ordering the adoption of specific emissions reduction targets by the government, or at least a carbon budget reflecting the ‘equal per capita emissions approach’ (paras 8.1 (IV)-(VI), 11.55 and 11.58).

Overall, the Bonaire judgment shows how climate litigation can lead to precarious precedents. On the one hand, the way the Court engaged with the concept of equity provided an assessment of Dutch mitigation ambition which was notably pragmatic and might serve as inspiration for other courts when asked to answer the fair share question. On the other hand, the judgment risks signaling to states that legal texts—which negotiators toiled to craft in ‘constructively ambiguous’ terms—may be stretched by domestic courts to uncomfortable extents. Ultimately, the appellate court’s scrutiny of this case (should the Dutch government file an appeal) will reveal how this judgment will be remembered: whether it will be hailed for its boldness or criticized for its questionable interpretation of international treaties.

[1] André Nollkaemper commented: ‘Today’s judgment of the District Court of The Hague fully lives up to the reputation of Dutch courts as strongly international law-minded. […] The conclusion is firmly anchored in international law. With 29 references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, 64 references to the European Court’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, 64 to the UNFCCC, 62 to the Paris Agreement, and 12 to COP decisions, this surely ranks high on the list of climate change cases that are most shaped by international law.’

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2025 Blog

The ICJ’s Interpretation of the Paris Agreement

Pranav Ganesan, PhD candidate at the University of Zurich

Introduction

The ICJ, in its advisory opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (AO), makes several notable findings which are worth unpacking and assessing. In this blogpost, I will comment upon some of the Court’s findings related to the interpretation of states’ obligations arising from the 2015 Paris Agreement (Part IV.B of the AO).

Much of the Court’s engagement with the provisions of the climate treaties, in the part of the judgment answering the first question concerning the international obligations of States to protect the climate system and other parts of the environment, was limited to identifying whether they contained procedural or substantive obligations, and obligations of conduct or obligations of result. The most interesting findings of the Court were:

  • That between the two temperature limits specified in the Paris Agreement (PA), viz. 2°C and 1.5°C (art. 2.1(a)), keeping the global average temperature increase below 1.5°C is the ‘primary temperature goal’ (para. 224); and
  • That Paris Agreement Parties’ discretion to determine the substantive content of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) is limited (para. 245).

In order to arrive at these conclusions, the Court resorted to the rules of interpretation as under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).

1.5°C as the Primary Goal

Regarding the 1.5°C temperature limit, the Court considered the Glasgow Pact, as a ‘subsequent agreement’ between the parties to the Paris Agreement regarding its interpretation. Subsequent agreements between all parties to a treaty regarding its interpretation or application must be ‘taken into account’ together with the treaty’s context for the purposes of interpretation (VCLT, Art. 31(3)(a)). In other words, they must be thrown into the ‘crucible’ of all things that inform a treaty provision’s interpretation (see Declaration of Judge Tladi, para. 13). Readers may recall that the Conference of Parties (COP) held at Glasgow in the year 2021 aimed to keep the 1.5°C goal alive. The Glasgow Pact reaffirms Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement, and then:

‘Recognizes that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C and resolves to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C’ (para. 21, emphasis in the original).

The ICJ also relied on the 2023 UAE Consensus which ‘encourages Parties to come forward in their next nationally determined contributions with ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, as informed by the latest science, in the light of different national circumstances’ (Decision 1/CMA.5, para. 39).

Why is specifying the primacy of 1.5°C important? The mention of two different temperature limits in the Paris Agreement (a comprise formulation considering intractable disagreements between negotiating states) has been a source of some confusion. Mayer has argued that Article 2.1(a) can be explained as prescribing 2°C as the ‘real’ objective, with the States realizing that ‘achieving it is only possible if each of them implements the level of mitigation action that it sees as consistent with a 1.5°C target.’ Rajamani and Werksman have noted that: ‘[a]lthough there are differences in impacts between a 1.5°C temperature rise and a 2°C temperature rise, because the [PA’s] temperature goal is a single goal with two textually inseparable elements—the 1.5° C aspirational goal and the ‘well below 2°C’ goal—the implications of missing the goal are the same in relation to the implementation of the Agreement.’ The implications of missing the goal, according to the above authors, do not include state responsibility for individual Parties as Article 2.1 does not create legally binding obligations. However, there is no confusion as to the provision’s relevance for interpretation (which I shall get to in the next section).

Other international courts which have engaged with this provision have not been as clear about the primacy of the 1.5°C goal under the PA. In its KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, although the European Court of Human Rights noted as a general consideration that ‘the relevant risks are projected to be lower if the rise in temperature is limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’ (para. 436), it did not make normative statements suggesting 1.5°C as a quantitative temperature goal. In its findings as to the content of positive obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), it held that mitigation measures to be undertaken by ECHR parties must be aimed at preventing ‘a rise in global average temperature beyond levels capable of producing serious and irreversible adverse effects on human rights’ (para. 546). Admittedly, the Court’s factual finding regarding a +1.5°C warmer world could be taken together with this latter finding to imply that if the 1.5°C is crossed, the conclusion that human rights are seriously and irreversibly affected becomes obvious. Alternatively, the conspicuous absence of any mention of the 1.5°C threshold in the court’s conclusions as to ECHR parties’ positive obligations could be taken to imply that determination of what constitutes an unsafe level falls within each state party’s margin of appreciation as reduced by the consensus reflected in the PA and subsequent COP decisions (on the reduced margin of appreciation, see para 543). Under this line of reasoning, the Court could be seen as having shied away from putting forward its position on the issue of whether a consensus had arisen as to whether the lower of the two temperature goals is primary.

The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea took a different route its advisory opinion where it was tasked with interpreting obligations under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea related to addressing the deleterious effects of climate change on the marine environment. Regarding Article 194(1), the Tribunal interpreted the content of the duty to prevent, reduce and control marine environmental pollution via greenhouse gas emissions as requiring parties to undertake the necessary emission reduction measures while taking into account the 1.5°C goal in the PA (para. 243). It did so based on the ‘broad agreement within the scientific community that if global temperature increases exceed 1.5°C, severe consequences for the marine environment would ensue’ (para. 241). In other words, the ITLOS did not explicate that it regarded 1.5°C as the ‘primary goal’ under Article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement, although the advisory opinion could be understood as implying so. With the ICJ’s AO, this has now been made clear.

Just a few days before the ICJ gave its AO, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACtHR) gave its advisory opinion on the ‘obligations of States in responding to the climate emergency.’ The IACtHR not only identified an obligation to regulate climate mitigation under the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and 1988 San Salvador Protocol, but also went into detail as to what action states must take to comply with the same (para. 322 et seq). In this regard, it found there to be a ‘significant international consensus’ on keeping the global average temperature increase from exceeding beyond 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. However, it added that even achieving this goal ‘does not eliminate the risk hovering over millions of people in the region’ (para. 326). As I had argued in a previous blogpost, there is nothing special about 1.5°C and 2°C, since they were merely a product of political compromise. Thus, the fact that the PA mentions these numbers does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that human rights law should be apathetic to the devastating impacts suffered by individuals and groups in a +1.4°C or +1.3°C warmer world. The threshold of warming that puts populations and ecosystems at ‘serious’ risk may vary from region to region. And the Inter-American Court affirmed this view. Still, since it had to specify a standard or otherwise risk leaving scope for ambiguity, the Court held that states must determine a mitigation target, based inter alia, ‘on a temperature increase of no more than 1.5ºC’ (para. 326). Again, the Court did not interpret Article 2.1(a) of the PA itself but rather used the provision, the international consensus and specific findings of the IPCC as to the risks of global warming exceeding the 1.5°C mark to help arrive at ‘a minimum starting point’ for what should inform national mitigation targets (para. 326). What is more, the language used by the Inter-American Court suggests no tolerance even for a limited overshoot above 1.5°C, in contrast to what seems to be suggested by the text of the UAE Consensus (see Decision 1/CMA.5, para 27).

Ultimately, the ECtHR, ITLOS and IACtHR avoided wading into the thicket of constructive ambiguity created by the mention of two temperature goals in Article 2.1(a) of the PA. Of course, they were only tasked with interpreting the ECHR, UNCLOS and ACHR respectively, and referring to the PA as a relevant instrument for interpretive purposes (VCLT, art. 31(3)(c)). Answering an interpretive question pertaining to an external treaty provision could have invited criticisms about the courts overstepping their jurisdiction. Moreover, the three courts in question may have chosen the ‘better safe than sorry’ approach, avoiding getting the interpretation of the PA wrong (before the ICJ could give its AO). Going forward, other courts may rely upon the findings in the AO about Article 2.1(a) PA, as well as its approach of using COP decisions as interpretive tools.

The Content of NDCs

The primacy of ‘national determination’ of mitigation contributions under the Paris Agreement (also called the ‘bottom-up approach’) has led to concerns about the toothlessness of the treaty. Indeed, while Article 4.2 creates a binding obligation on Parties to prepare and communicate NDCs, the committee tasked with reviewing compliance with this obligation cannot comment on their substantive (in)adequacy (Decision 20/CMA.1, Annex, para. 23). Moreover, the wording of Article 4.2 does not directly suggest that these NDCs must be highly ambitious or determined with concern for those most vulnerable to the effects of global warming. However, the ICJ held that ‘[t]he content of the NDCs is equally relevant’ to the formal preparation, communication and maintenance of successive NDCs ‘to determine compliance’ (para. 236).

The Court’s interpretation of Article 4.2 PA was based on other provisions of the Paris Agreement as well as COP Decisions. The following provisions were cited as providing support to the Court’s interpretation: Article 2 (setting out the Parties’ collective goals and manner of implementation of the PA), Article 3 (defining NDCs); Article 4.3 (setting out the normative expectation of progression and highest possible ambition); Article 14.3 (linking the outcomes of the global stocktake with NDCs) and Article 4.8 (linking information to be communicated through NDCs with COP decisions). Additionally, the Court relied on a requirement under the Paris Rulebook (adopted during the 2018 Katowice COP) that Parties must explain how they consider their contribution to be fair and ambitious, and how it contributes to the objectives of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement as set out in Article 2 of both treaties (Decision 4/CMA.1, Annex I, paras. 6-7). The Court’s reasoning on limited state discretion in determining the content of their NDCs is reminiscent of its reasoning in the Whaling judgment, relating to the question of whether the International Whaling Convention gives parties absolute discretion to determine whether their conduct falls within the ‘purposes of scientific research’ exception (see paras. 56-61). In both instances, the Court balanced the discretion-preserving intent suggested by the wording of the provisions against the treaties’ other-regarding object and purpose. And why is the ICJ’s finding that Parties’ discretion to self-regulate climate mitigation is not absolute important? As Judge Tladi noted in his declaration, this means that the ambitiousness (or sufficiency) of NDCs is ‘open to scrutiny, including judicial scrutiny’ (para. 17, emphasis added).

Concluding Remarks

This blogpost has highlighted two key findings of the ICJ regarding provisions of the PA. Parties must align the mitigation contributions they communicate with the 1.5°C goal as well as other standards under the PA such as progression, highest possible ambition, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Given that objectives specified in NDCs need to be implemented with due diligence through domestic measures (PA, art. 4.2 second sentence), these findings will embolden domestic courts in reviewing such measures.

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2022 Chile Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Gender / women-led Non-discrimination Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Separation of powers

Women from Huasco & Others v. Government of Chile & Ministries of Energy, Environment and Health

Summary:

On 25 November 2021, a group of women from the city of Huasco, alongside Doris Zamorano, a member of a civil society organization in Huasco, brought a constitutional action against Chile’s omission in coordinating the early closure of two coal-fired power plants. The Chilean government had signed closure agreements with owners of various thermoelectric power plants, but the two plants in question were absent from these agreements. They would be subject to the general clause requiring closure of all coal-fired power plants by the year 2040. The petitioners argued the emissions from the powerplants and the uncertainty as to their closure in advance of the year 2040 contributes to interferences with their exercise and enjoyment of fundamental rights. In particular, they point to the governmental authorities’ awareness about the persistent local air pollution and treatment of Huasco as a ‘sacrifice zone,’ as well as Chile’s climate mitigation commitments.  

On 2 May 2022, the Court of Appeals of Copiapo dismissed the petition on the ground that adjudication of the issues raised by the petitioners was beyond its competence. The petitioners have filed an appeal against this decision before the Supreme Court of Chile.

Claims:

The applicants argue that the State’s omissions consist in its failure to close two coal-fired power plants, failure to justify the exclusion of the two power plants from the list of plants due to be closed earlier than 2040 pursuant to its climate policy, and toleration of emissions from the two power plants despite no compensation being granted for the negative environmental impacts from their operation. The petition alleges that these omissions violate their constitutional rights to equality, to life, physical and psychological liberty, to an environment free from contamination, and to the protection of their health, as well as a breach of the State’s administrative duty not to act arbitrarily. In support of the latter contention, the petitioners relied on the administrative law principles of service of the human person, coordination between State organs and the environmental principles of prevention and precaution. Further, they argued that the normative content of the State’s duty were to be informed by Sustainable Development Goals, International Labour Organisation Guidelines on Just Transition, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement and Chile’s 2020 NDC Communication under the Paris Agreement. By way of evidence, the petitioners relied on reports of high levels of air pollution in the city of Huasco, and a comparative analysis of morbidity rates and incidences of respiratory illnesses in Huasco and Caldera, a similar city that was not in the vicinity of coal-fired power plants.

The petitioners requested the Court of Appeals of Copiapo to order the concerned state organs to (i) establish and implement a plan to effect the early closure of the two power plants, and (ii) establish a compensation plan for historical and current emissions of the power plants to redress the environmental and health-related impacts.

In his reply, the Minister of Energy challenged the appropriateness of a judicial review of complex public policies which were the result of a democratic and representative participative process. The Minister also elaborated on the procedural history and content of the government’s policy on decarbonisation, and the limits of the legal competences of the various Ministries vis-à-vis regulation of private actors in the energy sector, to rebut the petitioners’ arguments about the State’s breach of administrative duties. The reply submitted by the Minister of Environment argued that there is no omission attributable to the Ministry of the Environment since regulation of power plants falls within the authority of the Ministry of Energy, and that environmental management instruments were enacted to improve the air quality in Huasco. The Minister of Health submitted a similar reply. The Undersecretary General of the Presidency argued that State authorities lack the power to order the early closure of the said power plants, and that all of the authorities named in the petition had taken relevant measures in relation to the factual situation described by the petitioners.

Decision:

On 2 May 2022, the Court of Appeals of Copiapo rendered its decision wherein it rejected the petition. The Court noted that petitioners’ action for constitutional review of the State’s omission suggests that they disagree with its actions which form part of the public policy on decarbonisation of the country. However, this policy was developed and implemented with the participation of various state organs (with the Ministry of Energy being at the head of them) and it is not for the Court to substitute itself for them and order a replacement or modification of such policy. The Court also noted the involvement of non-State stakeholders, including both actors from the industry and civil society, in the establishment of the decarbonisation policy.

Additionally, with respect to closure of power plants, the Court noted that State organs do not have the authority to demand closures and that such an outcome can only be achieved through agreements between the State and the concerned owners of the power plants. The Court concluded that the fact that the agreement concluded between the State and the owner of the two power plants in question does not envisage a concrete plan for their closure, as it does for some other power plants, does not evince arbitrariness.

Links:

The case documents are accessible via Climate Case Chart (click here).

Status of the case:

The case is pending in appeal before the Supreme Court of Chile.

Last updated:

08 August 2023.

Categories
Adaptation Domestic court Imminent risk Loss & damage Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Uganda

Tsama William & 47 Ors v. Uganda

Summary:

The case was initiated following multiple landslides that occurred in December 2019 in the Bududa district in Eastern Uganda, in an area that is prone to landslides, which the applicants allege were exacerbated by climate change. The applicants claim that the landslides resulted in their displacement from their homes, killed their relatives and destroyed their property and the environment.

The applicants brought the case against the Ugandan government, the environmental authority and the local government of Bududa before the High Court of Uganda seeking orders for protective measures and compensation.  

Claims:

The applicants claim that the respondents have violated their positive obligations under statutory law to protect the applicants from recurrent landslides. They argue that the respondents’ failures to put in place an effective machinery for dealing with landslides and promptly warn the applicants about known risks, violated their fundamental rights to life, a clean and healthy environment, property, and physical and mental health. Aside from declaratory relief, the applicants claim a sum of 6.8 billion Ugandan Shillings as compensation for loss of life, destruction of property, physical and mental harm, as well as the cost of resettlement to safer areas.  The applicants further allege that the risk of future landslides owing to extreme weather events caused by climate change requires the respondents to take measures to relocate and resettle the applicants.  

This case is about adaptation to environmental risks (i.e. it is broader than climate adaptation), since the applicants principally rely on evidence that the problem of recurring landslides in the Bududa district has been going on since the beginning of the 20th century. However, the applicants rely on climate change as one among the factors contributing to the landslide risks they had previously faced and are likely to face in the future, as well as their vulnerability.  

Links:

The case documents are accessible via Climate Case Chart. For petition submitted by the applicants to the High Court of Uganda see here.

For replies by the respondents, see here and here.

Status of the case: The case is pending before the High Court of Uganda.

Last updated: 03 August 2023.

Categories
Australia Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Non-discrimination Private and family life Right to life Right to property

Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v. Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors

Summary:

The case concerns the applications by Waratah Coal Pty Ltd. (WC) for a ‘mining license’ and an ‘environmental authority’ under the Australian mining regulation and environmental protection legislation. These would allow it to mine coal in areas of the Galilee Basin, including parts of a protected area under the nature conservation law.  

The case reached the Land Court of Queensland on account of objections by environmental groups to WC’s applications. The Land Court of Queensland’s role was to provide a recommendation to the governmental authorities responsible for deciding on the applications after reviewing their merits (considering the compatibility of the proposed project with the environmental laws in Australia). However, the Court also found that the human rights implications of the coal mining project were relevant. The justification for this was that the court was directly bound by the Human Rights Act 2019 to not make a decision that is incompatible with human rights.

In its lengthy judgment, Court concluded on the basis of the evidence available to it and the interests at stake that it could not recommend the approval of WC’s applications.

Claims:

The objectors to WC’s applications raised several contentions in regards to the local and global environmental impacts of allowing coal mining in the Galilee Basin (including its contribution to climate change), as well as interference with private property rights. WC refuted these contentions and found that several issues raised by the objectors were irrelevant to the decision of their applications.  

In regards to climate change, WC disagreed that the emissions produced by foreign consumers of the mined coal are a relevant consideration. It argued that approving the mining of coal does not entail approving its combustion, and that the responsibility for the emissions from the latter falls on importing countries which decide to do so.  WC also argued that the mine will make no difference to total emissions because it would displace lower quality coal with higher greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  

Decision:

The Court framed its recommendation as pertaining to the specific coal mining project in question rather than coal mining in general. It was not convinced by the evidence put forth by WC with respect to the adequacy of its plans of offsetting the environmental impacts which would follow from the coal mining project.

In relation to climate change, the Court found that the mitigation of climate change was amongst the public interests which needed to be considered in the balance against the public interest considerations in support of the project (such as economic development). While the Court acknowledged that the project itself would not necessarily put Australia over its greenhouse gas emissions budget or lead to an exceedence of the temperature limits set by the Paris Agreement, Australia’s limited carbon budget and the risks of exceeding the 1.5° and 2°degree C temperature limits, and Queensland’s intention to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, were strong factors which supported the refusal of the project. 

The Court rejected WC’s contentions in regards to foreign emissions from the combustion of the coal mined by WC, finding that not considering them would be inconsistent with the public interest criterion in the environmental protection legislation.

The Court found that the human rights to life, protection of children, culture of First Nations People, privacy and home, property, and the enjoyment by certain groups of rights without discrimination were engaged by the coal mining project. In its assessment, the project constituted a ‘limit’ to these rights owing to its causal link with climate change which, in turn, affects the enjoyment of these rights. The Court concluded that the economic and other public interest benefits of the project were not sufficient to justify the limitation of human rights which would result from the project.

Links:

For full judgment of 25 November 2022, see here.

Suggested case citation:

Land Court of Queensland, Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors (No 6) [2022] QLC 21, 25 November 2022, President Fleur Kingham.

Last updated:

03 August 2023.

Categories
Brazil Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Right to a healthy environment Right to culture

PSB et. al. v. Brazil (Amazon deforestation)

Summary:

On 11 November 2020, seven political parties with representation in Brazil’s National Congress brought an action against the Brazilian government before the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil. The petition sought the effective implementation of the public policy to combat deforestation in Brazilian Amazon, viz. the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of the Legal Amazon Deforestation (PPCDAm). The petition is in the nature of an Allegation of Disobedience of Fundamental Precept (ADPF). The ADPF claimed that the government’s actions and omissions in relation to the protection of forests in the Amazon, including within Indigenous Lands and Federal Conservation Units violates constitutional rights and prevents Brazil from fulfilling its climate targets assumed under the Paris Agreement and transposed into national laws.  

The Federal Supreme Court decided in favour of the petitioners and ordered the Federal government to resume the PPCDAm, and strengthen the governmental organs linked to the socio-environmental agenda. The effect of this order was stopped on account of another judge of the Federal Supreme Court seeking a review of the decision.  

Facts of the case:

The petitioners earmarked 2019-2020 as the relevant period for the purposes of the ADPF, since this period is allegedly marked by unprecedented attacks on Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution which guarantees the right to an ecologically balanced environment. The petitioners alleged that the government abandoned and stopped enforcing the PPCDAm. They further alleged that the government has explicitly refused to cooperate with monitoring agencies and authorities for inspection and control of the use of forests (including the Brazilian Environmental Protection Agency); frozen the financing for the public policy for combating deforestation; and increased environmental deregulation. By way of evidence, the petitioners relied on statistics demonstrating an increase in deforestation notwithstanding a drastic reduction in notices of violations and cease-and-desist orders relating to forest conservation laws. They also relied on budget data of the main agencies which are entrusted with the execution of the public policy on combatting deforestation, and evidence pointing to the non-cooperation of the military in enforcement action.  

Claims:

The petition alleged violations of constitutional rights, viz. the right of present and future generations to an ecologically balanced environment (Article 225), which they argue includes a derivative ‘fundamental the integrity of the climate system or a fundamental right to a stable and secure climate’; rights of indigenous peoples to their traditional lands (Article 231); and cultural rights (Articles 215 and 216). The petitioners also argued that the government’s lack of transparency about implementation of the PPCDAm, its campaign to discredit agencies and institutions which provide data and information on the environment, including Federal agencies, and its denial of deforestation and climate change constitute violations of the right to information.  

The Attorney General argued against the admissibility of the action on multiple grounds, viz. (i) that the action does not concern a constitutional issue and is rather a matter of administrative law, since the reliefs (administrative measures) requested by the petitioners do not directly follow from the text of the Brazilian Constitution; (ii) that admitting the case would run counter to the subsidiarity principle enshrined in the procedural law of the Federal Supreme Court, which requires that it should avoid admitting actions in the nature of an ADPF when there are other effective means of remedying the damage; and (iii) that the procedure for control of constitutionality is not suitable for allowing broad examination of evidence. The Attorney General further refuted the statistical evidence raised by the petitioners arguing that the reduction in number of notices of violations and cease-and-desist orders was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic. On the merits, the Attorney General contended that the Federal Government had the prerogative to modulate its administrative strategies in line with the legal framework.  

Decision:

On 6 April 2022, Minister Cármen Lúcia of the Federal Supreme Court issued a decision in favour of the petitioners. She rejected the contentions of the Attorney General, deciding that there is no doubt as to the constitutional nature of the issues raised in the action; that a review of the Federal government’s actions in relation to the problem of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, which has negative repercussions for the climate, falls within the Federal Supreme Court’s jurisdiction; and the examination of evidence is not practically difficult (owing to the sufficiency of the information provided by governmental agencies and amici curae). The decision notes that non-compliance by Brazilian state organs with commitments under international environmental treaties amounts to a violation of the environmental duties emanating from the Constitution. Reading the principle of non-retrogression into Article 225 of the Constitution, the decision identifies acts of the Federal Government which were contrary to such principle.  

Relief:

The Court declared that the situation regarding the illegal deforestation of the Amazon rainforest and the omissions of the Brazilian State in relation to its protective functions was unconstitutional. It ordered the Federal Government to present a detailed plan for the implementation of the PPCDAs and effective protection measures relating to the Amazon forest and the rights of indigenous peoples and other inhabitants in protected areas, within 30 days from the decision. The decision also lists concrete benchmarks and targets that the Federal Government’s plan ought to be based on and seek to achieve.  

Status:

Immediately following Minister Cármen Lúcia’s decision, Minister André Mendonça of the Federal Supreme Court requested a review of that decision, which effectively blocked the decision. As a result, the effect of the decision requiring the Federal Government to take certain actions within a set date stands suspended. The case is still pending before the Federal Supreme Court.  

Links:

Petition (accessible via Climate Case Chart: Portuguese, Unofficial English translation).

Decision (in Portuguese).

For further procedural information, visit Supremo Tribunal Federal.  

Suggested citation:

Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, PSB et al. v. Brazil, case ADPF 760, decision of 6 April 2022.

 Last updated:

03 August 2023.

Categories
Access to a remedy Children and young people Extreme poverty Haiti Human dignity Inter-American Human Rights System Right to life Vulnerability

Petition of Children of Cité Soleil and SAKALA

Summary:

On 4 February 2021, six children of Cité Soleil, Haiti and a community center established to provide safe harbor for children in Cité Soleil (SAKALA Community Center for Peaceful Alternatives) communicated a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging human rights violations arising from the adverse environmental conditions that they are subject to.  

Facts of the case:

The petitioners’ concern relates to the local waste management system in Cité Soleil, which is woefully inadequate and exposes residents to risks arising from toxic waste and fumes. They complain that waste from other cities is brought into Cité Soleil but not contained in sanitary landfills or subjected to waste treatment. Piles of trash are burnt in the open, worsening the air quality, and floods carry the trash into residential areas, and lead to the contamination of water sources. They argue that climate-related adverse events magnify the adverse environmental conditions that children in Cité Soleil are faced with, aggravating their vulnerability.  

Claims:

The petitioners allege that Haiti is engaged in violations of the rights of the child, the right to dignity, the right to life, and the right to judicial protection of children in Cité Soleil. They request the Commission to recommend Haiti to undertake concrete measures addressing the environmental pollution problem and providing specialized and adequate medical care to the children. Aside from requesting an investigation on the matter and granting the reliefs sought, the petitioners have requested the Commission to grant precautionary measures of protection in the interim- requiring Haiti to take urgent measures and protect the children in Cité Soleil from harm.  

Status of the case:

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is yet to decide on the admissibility of the petition.  

Links:

For the petition (in English), click here.

Last updated:

2 August 2023.