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2026 Blog Class action Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Private and family life The Netherlands

Bonaire Climate Case: Creative or Questionable Interpretation of International Climate Law?

Pranav Ganesan, PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich

The Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands(Bonaire) judgment of the Hague District Court has stolen the limelight as the new posterchild for strategic climate litigation. The plaintiff in this case, Greenpeace Netherlands, argued that the Dutch government failed in its duty to protect the residents of Bonaire, an island in the Caribbean which formally attained the status of a special municipality of the Netherlands in 2010. Although it is a special municipality (bijzondere gemeente), it is just as much a part of the Netherlands as any other province in the European Netherlands. The Dutch government owes obligations under international human rights law, including those arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), towards residents of the municipality. That international human rights law requires states to undertake climate mitigation measures and adaptation measures, as informed by international climate change law where relevant, has been affirmatively held in two advisory opinions from international courts and the European Court of Human Rights. And the proposition that the Dutch governmentโ€™s duty of care towards its population essentially includes obligations under the ECHR was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in material respects, the Hague District Courtโ€™s reasoning was so heavily based on international law.[1] In terms of the scope of state conduct implicated in this case, it outdoes the Urgenda case,which only concerned contributions to the mitigation of climate change. The Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiff that the Dutch government had violated Article 8 ECHR as well as the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR), the former due to inadequate mitigation measures, inadequate implementation of those measures, delays in adopting an adaptation plan for Bonaire and late provision of procedural safeguards to the residents of Bonaire. In this blog, I provide a quick analysis of the District Courtโ€™s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement in the section on mitigation measures. Readers interested in learning about the adaptation component and how the court addressed discrimination claim are welcome to read this blogpost by Wewerinke-Singh.

There are areas in the judgment where the District Courtโ€™s assessment of the compatibility of the Dutch Climate law framework with international climate law is questionable. The first glaring issue is that the court made a finding of non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement based on the absence of โ€˜absolute emissions reduction targetsโ€™ in the Dutch Climate Act of 2019 (para 11.13.1). The problem identified by the court was that the targets were expressed as goals that the government would โ€˜strive to achieve.โ€™ However, this does not mean that the targets are not absolute. The difference between absolute and relative emissions reductions targets being whether they are expressed as percentage reductions in comparison to the emissions during a fixed baseline year, as opposed to reductions from a business as usual scenario in case of relative targets (Winkler et al 2014, 636). The use of the expression โ€˜strive to achieveโ€™ means that the nature of the obligation to achieve the target is one of conduct rather than result, reflecting the nature of the obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures in pursuance of NDCs communicated under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement (ICJ Advisory Opinion, paras 251-253). Another connected example is the courtโ€™s declaration that โ€˜UN standardsโ€™ require emission reduction targets to be expressed as percentage reductions to be achieved by the target date, in comparison to 2019 levels as opposed to the 1990 baseline (para 11.13.2). Moreover, strictly speaking, Article 12(8) of the UNFCCC does not require the EU to provide information about each member stateโ€™s national carbon budget like the court suggests (para 11.15.3). The courtโ€™s interpretation of these treaty provisions might be technically imprecise, but it is undoubtedly bold, being based on the need for exemplary efforts from a developed country like the Netherlands, and reflecting the appropriate sense of urgency in light of the results of the First Global Stocktake (para 11.9.4). Through its interpretive moves, the court effectively hardened โ€˜softโ€™ obligations (i.e. normative expectations) sourced from the Paris Agreement and COP decisions (on hard and soft obligations in the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, 2016).

A final noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the rather detailed response to how the notion of โ€˜equityโ€™ in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Articles 2(1) and 4(1) of the Paris Agreement is to be applied in reviewing statesโ€™ mitigation commitments. Equity is an elusive concept, with debates on what an equitable distribution of the global emissions reduction burden entails having remained unsettled since the inception of international negotiations on the topic of climate mitigation (Oliver Herrera et al, 2025). The court provided the (un)acceptability of a โ€˜grandfathering approachโ€™ as an example of one such debate (para 11.13.5). But it did not go so far as to hold that the grandfathering approach is legally impermissible because it is inequitable per se, or that an equal per capita emissions approach is the minimum standard under international law. Rather, it assessed the Netherlandsโ€™ policy negatively on account of its failure to justify why its current policy, which is based on the controversial grandfathering principle and falls short of the ambition required by the equal per capita emissions approach, is equitable in accordance with Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(1). It thus did not use equity to dictate the outcome of what exactly the Dutch governmentโ€™s fair share of the global carbon emissions ought to be. At same time, it did not use the underlying controversy as a reason to entirely avoid reviewing the substance of the Dutch climate mitigation policy. This is underscored by its remedial findings, wherein the court declared that the Netherlandsโ€™ current mitigation commitments were inequitable, thereby leading to a breach of Article 8 (para 12.1), but dismissed Greenpeaceโ€™s request ordering the adoption of specific emissions reduction targets by the government, or at least a carbon budget reflecting the โ€˜equal per capita emissions approachโ€™ (paras 8.1 (IV)-(VI), 11.55 and 11.58).

Overall, the Bonaire judgment shows how climate litigation can lead to precarious precedents. On the one hand, the way the Court engaged with the concept of equity provided an assessment of Dutch mitigation ambition which was notably pragmatic and might serve as inspiration for other courts when asked to answer the fair share question. On the other hand, the judgment risks signaling to states that legal textsโ€”which negotiators toiled to craft in โ€˜constructively ambiguousโ€™ termsโ€”may be stretched by domestic courts to uncomfortable extents. Ultimately, the appellate courtโ€™s scrutiny of this case (should the Dutch government file an appeal) will reveal how this judgment will be remembered: whether it will be hailed for its boldness or criticized for its questionable interpretation of international treaties.


[1] Andrรฉ Nollkaemper commented: โ€˜Todayโ€™s judgment of the District Court of The Hague fully lives up to the reputation of Dutch courts as strongly international law-minded. [โ€ฆ] The conclusion is firmly anchored in international law. With 29 references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, 64 references to the European Courtโ€™s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, 64 to the UNFCCC, 62 to the Paris Agreement, and 12 to COP decisions, this surely ranks high on the list of climate change cases that are most shaped by international law.โ€™

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Austria Belgium Bulgaria Children and young people Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Emissions reductions/mitigation Estonia European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Extraterritorial obligations Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Non-discrimination Norway Paris Agreement Poland Portugal Private and family life Prohibition of torture Right to life Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia Spain Standing/admissibility Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands The United Kingdom Turkey Ukraine Victim status

Duarte Agostinho et al. v. Austria et al. (“Portuguese Children’s Case”)

Summary:
This case was brought by a group of six young people, acting together as the ‘Youth for Climate Justice’, against 33 Council of Europe Member States. Theirs was the first climate case to come before the ECtHR. In their application, the six applicants, aged between 8 and 21 at the time, argued that the 33 respondent States failed to comply with their positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, read in the light of the commitments made under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. They claimed that their right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) was being threatened by the effects of climate change in their home State of Portugal, including through the harms caused by forest fires. Moreover, they claimed that their right to respect for their private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR was being threatened by heatwaves that forced them to spend more time indoors. They also noted their anxiety about their uncertain future, and the fact that, as young people, they stand to experience the worst effects of climate change. They accordingly alleged a violation of Article 14 ECHR (non-discrimination), given the particular impacts of climate change on their generation. According to the applicants, the absence of adequate measures to limit global emissions constitutes, in itself, a breach of the obligations incumbent on States.

This was the first climate application brought before the European Court of Human Rights, and it was brought with the support of the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN). The issues raised here were novel in the Strasbourg context. In addition, in communicating the case, the Court also proprio motu raised an issue under Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case inadmissible on jurisdiction and non-exhaustion grounds.

Domestic proceedings:
None: this case was brought directly to the ECtHR. The applicants submitted that, given the complexity of the case and their limited financial means, as well as the limited prospects of success before domestic instances, requiring them to exhaust the domestic remedies in each of the 33 respondent States would impose an excessive and disproportionate burden on them.

Relinquishment:
On 29 June 2022, the 7-judge Chamber to which the case had originally been allocated relinquished jurisdiction over it in favour of the Court’s 17-judge Grand Chamber. Relinquishment is possible where a case either (a) raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or its Protocols, or (b) might lead to a result inconsistent with the Courtโ€™s case-law (Rule 72, paras 1-2 of the Rules of Court).

During the course of the proceedings, the complaint against Ukraine was withdrawn by the applicants. The Russian Federation ceased to be a Council of Europe Member State during the course of the proceedings, but this was not an obstacle to considering the application as concerns anything taking place before the end of its membership (on 16 September 2022).

In February 2023, the Court announced that it would hold a public Grand Chamber hearing in this case, along with two other climate cases pending before it (Carรชme v. France and KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v. Switzerland). It announced that it would adjourn the remaining climate cases pending before it in the meantime. The oral stage in these three cases was staggered: Carรชme and KlimaSeniorinnen were heard on 29 March 2023, while the hearing in Duarte Agostinho was heard by the same composition of the Grand Chamber on 27 September 2023.

Grand Chamber hearing:
A hearing in this case was held on 27 September 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here.

During the hearing, the respondent States pooled their submissions to a large extent, with additional arguments from the Netherlands, Portugal, and Turkiye. Third-party interveners also received leave to appear during the oral hearing, namely the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, the EU’s European Commission, and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). The substance of the hearing focused largely on admissibility issues, namely victim status, the (non-)exhaustion of domestic remedies and the extraterritoriality of Convention obligations. The judges also asked a number of questions to the parties before retiring to consider the admissibility and merits of the case.

Admissibility:
From the blog post on the case by Ayyoub (Hazhar) Jamali available on our blog

After months of anticipation, the ECtHR delivered its judgment on 9 April 2024. The Court found the case inadmissible on two key grounds. Firstly, it ruled out jurisdiction regarding non-territorial states, narrowing the scope of accountability in this complex legal landscape to applicantsโ€™ home states. Secondly, it dismissed the application against Portugal due to a lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The Court acknowledged its jurisdiction concerning Portugal but denied it concerning other non-territorial states. It recognized that under Article 1 of the Convention, jurisdiction primarily pertains to territorial boundaries, implying that individuals can only claim Convention violations against the territorial state where they reside. However, the Court reiterated that the Conventionโ€™s reach can extend beyond national borders in two main forms: when a state exercises effective control over an area (spatial concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdictionย ratione loci), and when there is state agent authority or control over individuals (personal concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdictionย ratione personae) (para 170). In the present case, as neither of these two criteria appeared applicable, the Court denied jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the applicantโ€™s argument that there are โ€˜exceptional circumstancesโ€™ and โ€˜special featuresโ€™ for establishing the respondent statesโ€™ extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants within the specific context of climate change. It emphasized that determining whether the ECHR applies extraterritorially requires examining whether โ€˜exceptional circumstancesโ€™ exist, indicating that the state concerned is exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants. This primarily involves exploring the nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent state.

The Court acknowledged that states have ultimate control over public and private activities within their territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions. It noted their international-law commitments, particularly those outlined in the Paris Agreement, which states have incorporated into their domestic laws and policy documents, as well as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement (para 192). Furthermore, the Court recognized the complex and multi-layered causal relationship between activities within a stateโ€™s territory that produce greenhouse gas emissions and their adverse impacts on the rights and well-being of individuals residing outside its borders (para 193). It emphasised that while climate change is a global phenomenon, each state bears responsibility for addressing it. However, the Court concluded that these considerations alone cannot justify creating a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation or expanding existing ones (para 195). It emphasised that the ECHR protection system is primarily based on principles of territorial jurisdiction and subsidiarity.

The Court further denied the applicantsโ€™ claim that bringing a case against Portugal alone would be ineffective and that they had no other means of holding the respondent states accountable for the impact of climate change on their Convention rights. It distinguished between jurisdiction and responsibility, which constitutes a separate matter to be examined in relation to the merit of the complaint (para 202).

The Court further rejected the applicantsโ€™ claim concerning the reach of the Convention outside of national boundaries by their reliance on a test of โ€˜control over the applicantsโ€™ Convention interestsโ€™. It reasoned that, according to its established case-law, extraterritorial jurisdiction as conceived under Article 1 ECHR requires control over the person him- or herself rather than the personโ€™s interests as such (para 204-206). It highlighted that, except for specific cases under Article 2 concerning intentional deprivation of life by state agents, there is no precedent for a criterion like โ€˜control over Convention interestsโ€™ as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction (paragraph 205). Consequently, the Court argued that adopting such an extension would represent a significant departure from established principles under Article 1.

The Court stated that otherwise, and given the multilateral dimension of climate change, almost anyone adversely affected by climate change anywhere in the world could be brought within the jurisdiction of any Contracting Party for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR in relation to that Partyโ€™s actions or omissions to tackle climate change. It also rejected the suggestion that such an extension of jurisdiction could be limited to the Conventionโ€™s legal space. It reasoned that, given the nature of climate change, including its causes and effects, an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction by reference to that criterion would be artificial and difficult to justify (para 206).

Moreover, the Court acknowledged the significance of developments in international law, particularly with regards to the interpretations provided by bodies such as the Inter-American Court and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It recognised the relevance of these interpretations in shaping the understanding of jurisdiction within the context of human rights treaties. However, the Court noted that these bodies had adopted distinct notions of jurisdiction, which had not been recognised in its own case-law. While the Court considered the insights provided by these international instruments and bodies, it concluded that they did not provide sufficient grounds for extending the extraterritorial jurisdiction of respondent states under the Convention, particularly as proposed by the applicants (para 209-210). Therefore, while remaining attentive to legal developments and global responses to issues such as climate change, the Court found no basis within the Convention for expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction as advocated by the applicants.

In conclusion, the Court found no grounds in the Convention for extending the respondent statesโ€™ extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation.

Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
Regarding Portugal, the applicantsโ€™ home state, there was no extraterritoriality issue. Here the Court examined whether effective remedies existed within the Portuguese legal system that the applicants were required to use under the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule. Despite the applicantsโ€™ argument that broad constitutional provisions alone could not provide effective and certain remedies, the Court disagreed, highlighting various remedies available in Portugal. These included, for example, constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment,ย actio popularisย claims for environmental protection, etc (para 217-223). The Court emphasised the importance of affording domestic courts the opportunity to address issues before having recourse to international remedies. Consequently, the complaint against Portugal was found inadmissible. The Court also rejected the suggestion that it should rule on the issue of climate change before domestic courts had the opportunity to do so, reaffirming the principle of subsidiarity and the role of domestic jurisdictions in adjudicating such matters (para 228).

Victim Status
The Court found it challenging to determine whether the applicants met the criteria for victim status as set out on the same day in theย KlimaSeniorinnenย judgmentย against Switzerland. The lack of clarity is attributed, in part, to the applicantsโ€™ failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court found that, in any event, the application was inadmissible for the reasons previously outlined. Therefore, the Court declined to examine further whether the applicants could claim victim status (para 229-230).

Date:
9 April 2024

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
Communicated by the Court on 30 November 2020. Relinquished to the Grand Chamber on 29 June 2022. Grand Chamber hearing held on 27 September 2023. Decision announced at a Grand Chamber hearing held on 9 April 2024, along with rulings in the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other Member States, no. 39371/20, decision (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:
For more information on this case, see the following links.

  • For more background on the case and profiles on the applicants, click here: https://youth4climatejustice.org/.ย 
  • For all of the case documents, including the submissions from the respondent States and the third-party interveners, see here.
  • For analyses of the Grand Chamber hearing, see this post on our own blog by Viktoriya Gurash, or this post on Verfassungsblog by Corina Heri.
  • For the judgment, click here.
  • For the Court’s Q&A on the three climate cases, click here.

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Categories
2023 Adaptation Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Private and family life Right to life Sea-level rise The Netherlands

Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (Bonaire)

Summary:
On 28 January 2026, the Commerce team of the Hague District Court issued a judgment in a case brought by Greenpeace and seven residents of the Caribbean island of Bonaire against the Dutch government. In examining the case, which concerned both alleged mitigation and adaptation failures, the Court found several violations of the human rights guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In particular, and extensively discussing the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) KlimaSeniorinnen judgment of 9 April 2024, the Court found that the Dutch State had failed to fulfil its positive obligations towards the inhabitants of Bonaire under Article 8 ECHR, because the authoritiesโ€™ mitigation and adaptation measures taken as a whole in relation to them did not meet the Netherlandsโ€™ obligations under the international climate regime (the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, discussing also the Kyoto Protocol). Additionally, given that the Dutch State took mitigation and adaptation measures for the inhabitants of Bonaire much later and less systematically than for the inhabitants of the European Netherlands, it found violations of the ECHR’s non-discrimination norms.

Background to the case:
On 11 May 2023, Greenpeace and seven residents of the Caribbean island of Bonaire sent a pre-litigation letter (Dutch: sommatie) to the office of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands. The letter claimed that the Netherlands does not sufficiently protect the authors from climate change and thereby violates their human rights. Since 2010, Bonaire has been a special municipality of the Netherlands and part of the Caribbean Netherlands. In the pre-litigation letter, the plaintiffs claim that the duties of care arising from Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to life and the right to family life, have been breached. The inaction of the Netherlands in sufficiently addressing climate change, they argue, violates these human rights. Therefore, they made the following demands:

  1. The Netherlands must implement the necessary measures to protect Bonaire from the consequences of climate change.
  2. The State shall develop and implement a policy which guarantees a 100% reduction of Dutch emission of all greenhouse gases in 2030 when compared to 1990 levels.
  3. Lastly, as part of and to realize the demands above, the State must implement all necessary measures to ensure that, in January 2040 at the latest, the joint volume of the national emission of all greenhouse gases will have been reduced by 100% when compared to 1990 emissions levels.

With the pre-litigation letter to the Prime Minister, the plaintiffs asked for negotiations to find a mutually agreeable decision on their demands. Given the lack of successful negotiations, the plaintiffs initiated proceedings under the Dutch Act on Redress of Mass Damages in Collective Action (WAMCA, alternatively translated as the Settling of Large-scale Losses or Damage (Class Actions) Act), which restructured the Dutch legal system’s approach to mass litigation and collective redress since coming into force in 2020.

Admissibility:
On 25 September 2024, Greenpeace announced that a court in the Hague had ruled that its action on behalf of the public interest of the people of Bonaire was admissible. A hearing was set to follow in 2025.

Judgment of 28 January 2026:
The District Court of Hague (Court) found that individuals residing in Bonaire were owed positive obligations arising from the application of Article 8 of the ECHR in the context of climate-related risks as identified in the judgment inย Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland. It further found that the non-discrimination norms found in Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the ECHR were applicable to the case in light of the difference in treatment of the residents of Bonaire arising out of the lack of a climate adaptation applicable to Bonaire, when in contrast, a coherent and integrated climate adaptation policy was being implemented for the European Netherlands since 2016.

In its reasoning, it assessed the Netherlandsโ€™ and the EUโ€™s climate mitigation laws as falling short of the minimum requirements of ambition and stringency, which it derived from decisions of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC read with provisions of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. It negatively appraised the Netherlandsโ€™ reliance on a โ€˜grandfatheringโ€™ approach, which it found to be โ€˜controversialโ€™ although not prohibited. These shortcomings informed its negative โ€˜overall assessmentโ€™ of the Netherlandsโ€™ climate mitigation framework for compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment. Next, regarding the positive obligation to effectively implement climate mitigation measures, it held that the Stateโ€™s admission that the 2030 emissions reduction was โ€˜highly unlikelyโ€™ to be met as a decisive factor in determining a breach of that obligation.

Regarding adaptation measures, the Court found that although initial steps have been taken (for instance, the setting up of a local project for the development of an adaptation plan) the fact that no concrete timeline for the implementation of adaptation measures exists despite the known climate risks (especially that of partial submergence significant parts of land territory by 2050), and that the State has carried out insufficient scientific research and committed no financial resources for certain adaptation-related policies in Bonaire were assessed negatively. On this basis the Court concluded that the State had breached its positive obligation to sufficiently and in a timely manner, take appropriate adaptation measures in Bonaire. Finally, it found that the State did not fulfil its obligations to provide relevant environmental information to the residents of Bonaire and allow for their participation in climate-related decision making at least until 2023.

The Court found that the State did not provide an adequate justification of the unequal treatment of Bonaire as it related to its inclusion within the Netherlandโ€™s overall climate adaptation policy and the commitment of resources for the implementation of adaptation measures. It thus found that the State had breached its obligation of non-discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the ECHR.

Order:
Based on the above, the Court partially allowed the plaintiffsโ€™ claim for specific performance against the state and ordered the State to ensure incorporate โ€˜absoluteโ€™ emissions reduction targets compatible with the minimum requirements arising out of COP decisions and the Paris Agreement into its national climate legislation and provide insight into Netherlandsโ€™ โ€˜remaining emission allowanceโ€™; to draft and implement an appropriate national adaptation plan that also includes Bonaire; and pay legal costs to the plaintiffs. It rejected the plaintiffsโ€™ requests that the Court order the State to adopt specific emissions reduction targets, and a binding national carbon budget determined in accordance with its fair share of the global carbon budget for 1.5หšC.

In doing so, it held that the State has considerable policy-making discretion in choosing its measures to comply with its international obligations under the UN climate treaties, meaning that the Court ordered the State to take effective measures to fulfil its UN obligations in a timely manner, without issuing any concrete orders as to the measures to be taken, deferring to the other branches of government and the separation of powers in this regard (trias politica).

Further reading:

English translation of the judgment of 28 January 2025:

Judgment of 28 January 2025 (Dutch):

Pre-litigation letter of 11 May 2023:

Suggested citation:
The Hague District Court, Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (Bonaire), Judgment of 28 January 2026, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1347.

Date last updated:
29 January 2026.

Categories
2022 Austria Belgium Cyprus Denmark European Court of Human Rights France Germany Greece Luxembourg Private and family life Right to life Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands The United Kingdom

Soubeste and 4 other applications v. Austria and 11 other States

Summary:
On 21 June 2022, it was reported that an application had been filed at the European Court of Human Rights concerning membership in the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994 (ECT), which entered into force in 1998. The case was brought by five young people, aged between 17 and 31, who allege that the 12 respondent Statesโ€™ membership of the ECT stymies climate action, thereby violating their rights under Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life) ECHR.

It was further reported that the 12 respondent States in this case are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Britain. In these States, corporate actors in the fossil fuel sector can bring legal action against the respective governments for losses of profits due to energy-related measures, thereby raising the costs of the green energy transition or making it illusory. The applicants argue that their Convention rights have been violated as a result.

In this regard, the IPCC pointed out in Chapter 14 of Working Group III report in the Sixth Assessment Cycle in 2022 (available here) that “bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, include provisions for using a system of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) designed to protect the interests of investors in energy projects from national policies that could lead their assets to be stranded. Numerous scholars have pointed to ISDS being able to be used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed at phasing out the use of their assets”. It also noted that “international investment agreements may lead to โ€˜regulatory chillโ€™, which may lead to countries refraining from or delaying the adoption of mitigation policies, such as phasing out fossil fuels”.

Status of case:

The case was initially adjourned until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the climate change cases pending before it (see the ECtHRโ€™s press releaseย here).

On 24 July 2024, it was reported that the applicants had withdrawn their application after the European Unionย agreedย to leave the ECT and the governments of France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom initiated the procedures to terminate their membership in the treaty.

Suggested case citation:

European Court of Human Rights, Soubeste and 4 other applications v. Austria and 11 other States (nos. 31925/22, 31932/22, 31938/22, 31943/22, and 31947/22), application filed on 21 June 2022 (not yet communicated).

Last updated:

15 March 2023

Categories
2021 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation The Netherlands

Milieudefensie and others v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC

Summary:

This case was brought as a class action tort suit by a group of NGOs, as well as more than 17,000 individuals represented by Milieudefensie. The applicants claimed that Royal Dutch Shell had an obligation to reduce its carbon emissions relative to 2019 levels by 2030 across its entire energy portfolio. It represents a groundbreaking advance in the context of business responsibility for human rights impacts. A Dutch district court issued a historic decision, ordering Shell to sharply reduce its CO2 emissions, aligning with the Paris Agreementโ€™s goal of limiting global warming to well below 2ยฐC above pre-industrial levels. Shell appealed the judgment. The appeals court has ruled in favour of Shell, overturning the previous order requiring the company to slash its carbon emissions by 45% by 2030.

Date:

15 November 2024

Facts:

The court extensively discussed the science on climate change and its impacts, reductions targets, and the existing international instruments at length. It reiterated the reduction goals set out in the Paris Agreement.

Admissibility:

The court described the case as a public interest action. These are allowed under Dutch law, and the court noted that the common interest of preventing dangerous climate change by reducing CO2 emissions can be protected in a class action. It discussed at length whether the cases shared a โ€˜similar interestโ€™, which is a requirement under the Dutch Civil Code. This requirement entails that the interests in question must be suitable for bundling into a class action so as to safeguard an the legal protection of the stakeholders.

In determining whether the individual applicants had locus standi, the court held that they had no separate interest beyond that represented by Milieudefensie before the court, and wrote off the individual claims.

Merits:

Relying on domestic law, human rights law, and soft law instruments, the domestic court interpreted the unwritten standard of care contained in Dutch domestic tort law.

Book 6, Section 162 of the Dutch Civil Code proscribes acts that conflict with what is generally accepted according to unwritten law. The court held that this standard of care also applies to Royal Dutch Shell. Applying this standard, the court held that Shell was obliged to reduce its CO2 emissions by net 45% at end 2030, relative to 2019. This reduction obligation relates to Shell’s entire energy portfolio and all of its aggregate emissions. This is an obligation of result for the activities of the Shell group itself, and a best-efforts obligation with respect to its business relations and end-users. Because Shell has the ability to influence these relations, it is expected to use its influence to bring about emissions reductions.

The Court of Appealโ€™s Decision:

The appeals court acknowledged that while Shell has โ€˜an obligation toward citizens to limits its CO2 emissions,โ€™ it was not legally required to reduce emissions by a specific percentage such as the 45% set in the original ruling. The court cited an absence of an agreed-upon standard within climate science about the exact amount of emission reduction required for individual companies. Moreover, the court emphasised that ensuring human rights protection, including protection from climate change, is primarily up to the government. The court noted that Shell was already working to curb emissions in its production processes and argued that even if Shell halted its fuel sales, other companies might simply fill the gap to meet ongoing demand for fossil fuels, effectively resulting in no reduction in overall emissions.

Next step:

It is expected that the applicants will appeal the case to the Dutch Supreme Court.

Separate opinions:

None

Measures taken as a result of the judgment:

Pending

Status of case:

Decided

Suggested case citation:

The Hague Court of Appeal, Milieudefensie and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Others, case number 200.302.332/01, Judgment of 12 November 2024.

Links:

For full judgments by the District Court and Appeals Court (in English), see here and here.

Categories
2020 Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Extraterritorial obligations Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life The Netherlands

Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (KLM)

Summary:

During the Covid-19 pandemic, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines struggled with serious financial difficulties. To support the airline during the crisis, the Dutch government granted KLM a bailout package totalling 3.4 billion Euros. Along with the support package, a number of conditions were imposed on KLM. These included a set of sustainability requirements and a requirement to reduce CO2 emissions. As a result, Greenpeace Netherlands sued the Dutch government before the District Court of the Hague on 7 October 2020. Greenpeace claimed that the conditions imposed were not sufficient to achieve the climate goals of the Paris Agreement and that the state should either have imposed a cap on CO2 emissions on the airline or should not have granted the bailout package at all. In Greenpeace’s view, the state has thus breached its duty of care to prevent dangerous climate change, following the ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court in the Urgenda Foundation case, thereby allegedly violating of Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

In its ruling of 9 December 2020, the court ruled against Greenpeace, reasoning that neither the Paris Agreement nor other international climate agreements oblige the Dutch government to reduce CO2 emissions from international aviation. According to the court, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 stipulates that cooperation with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is required for CO2 reduction in international aviation. The Paris Agreement therefore only contains the obligation to reduce domestic emissions, but not emissions from international air traffic. Furthermore, the court found that the conditions requested by Greenpeace go beyond the ICAO’s resolution on CO2 emissions and that the conditions imposed by the Dutch government are in accordance with all international obligations in this regard. The court concluded that there was no obligation of the State of the Netherlands which was violated by granting KLM the bailout package with its conditions.

Date of decision:

9 December 2020

Suggested case citation:

District Court of The Hague, Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands, Judgment of 9 December 2020, C/09/600364 / KG ZA 20-933, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:12440.

Case ducuments:

Date last updated:

11 January 2023

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life The Netherlands

Urgenda Foundation v. the Netherlands

Summary:
This case, brought in 2013 by the Urgenda foundation and hundreds of Dutch citizens against the Netherlands, has become the leading climate and human rights judgment, and served as inspiration for similar litigation around the world. The final judgment in this case was issued in 2019, and in this case the domestic courts not only found that the Dutch climate policy had violated Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the rights to life and respect for private and family life, respectively), but also issued an injunction requiring greenhouse gas emissions reductions.

Remedies ordered:
District Court of The Hague had previously ruled that the government was obligated to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020 in comparison to 1990 levels. The District Court’s decision was appealed by the State. The Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision on 9 October 2018. After the State’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme court ruled in favour of Urgenda and held that the government has a legal duty to prevent dangerous climate change.

Date of final domestic judgment:
20 December 2019

More on this case:
For the final judgment in Dutch, click here.

For the summary provided by the Supreme Court (English), click here.

Recommended reading:
Ingrid Leijten, ‘Human Rights v. Insufficient Climate Action: The Urgenda Case’ 37(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2019)

Benoit Mayer, ‘The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation: Ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (9 October 2018)’ 8(1) Transnational Environmental Law (2019), 167-192.

Maiko Meguro, ‘State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation’ 114(4) American Journal of International Law (2020), 729-735.

Suggested citation:
Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), Urgenda Foundation v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 20 December 2019, No. 19/00135, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2006.