Categories
Access to a remedy Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Emissions reductions/mitigation Fair trial Fossil fuel extraction Human dignity Imminent risk Non-discrimination Private and family life Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to health Right to property United States of America

Our Children’s Trust with 15 Juliana Plaintiffs v. The United States of America

Summary:
On 23 September 2025, the NGO Our Children’s Trust announced that it had filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging climate-related violations of human rights by the government of the United States of America on behalf of a group of youth. This petition follows the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on climate change, which was issued on 29 May 2025, as well as drawing on the climate advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The petitioners were formerly plaintiffs in the Juliana proceedings brought before US domestic courts on the basis of the public trust doctrine, among others.

Before the Inter-American Commission, the petitioners allege that the United States has known for decades that CO2 emissions cause climate change and that a transition away from fossil fuels is needed to protect human rights. They argue that, as the world’s largest emitter, the United States has played a leading role in causing climate change, and that its greenhouse gas emissions — and the resulting climate change — violate the human rights of children and youth, who are disproportionately impacted by its effects.

They claim before the Commission that the United States has failed to comply with its international obligations to guarantee the petitioners’ human rights, that it has a duty to prevent harm to the global climate system to guarantee those rights, that it brached its obligation to act with due diligence ot guarantee their rights and prevent harm to the climate system, that if violated its obligation to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions,a form of pollution, and that the United States’s deliberate emissions of greenhouse gasses violate the substantive rights of the petitioners as per the American Declaration, including the rights to life and health, the particular protections for children, equality and non-discrimination, the rights to home, property and private and family life, the right to culture, the right to dignity, and the right to a healthy climate.

They also invoke their procedural rights, namely the rights to access to justice and an effective remedy, alleging that the United States Department of Justice has deployed “extraordinary tactics” to silence the petitioners, and that the domestic courts failed to consider the merits of their claims.

In their request for relief, the petitioners inter alia request the Commission to:

  • order precautionary measures to prevent further irreparable harm;
  • join the admissibility and merits of the petition, in accordance with Article 37(4) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, given the serious and urgent nature of the case and the ongoing violations of Petitioners’ fundamental rights;
  • conduct an on-site country visit, including a visit with the Petitioners, and hold fact-finding hearings;
  • establish violations of Articles I (life), II (equality), V (private and family life), VI (family), VII (special protections for children), IX (inviolability of the home), XI (health), XIII (cultural life), XVIII (access to justice and effective remedies), XXIII (property), and XXIV (prompt and effective remedy) of the American Declaration and the rights to dignity (Preamble) and to a healthy climate; and
  • issue a country report with recommendations to the United States to remedy confirmed violations of international law, taking into account the clarifications of existing law set forth by the IACtHR and the ICJ in their in Advisory Opinions on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights and the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change.

Full text of the petition:

The full text of the petition can be found below.

Suggested citation:

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Our Children’s Trust with 15 Juliana Plaintiffs v. The United States of America, petition filed on 23 September 2025.

Categories
2022 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Indigenous peoples' rights Public trust doctrine Uncategorized United States of America

Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska I

Summary:
In 2017, sixteen children and young people — including some who were members of Alaskan Indigenous peoples — filed suit against the U.S. State of Alaska arguing by the state’s climate and energy policy violated their constitutional rights. Because the policy in question authorized and facilitated activities producing greenhouse gas emissions, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their due process rights to life, liberty, and property under the Alaskan Constitution, as well as their right to a stable climate system. The argued that the state government and relevant agencies had, “knowingly and with deliberate indifference”, created a dangerous situation for them, in violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs also made an equal protection claim and alleged a violation of Alaska’s public trust doctrine.

The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief. They sought a declaration that the state had a constitutional duty to protect their constitutional rights, as well as a duty under the public trust doctrine to protect Alaska’s waters, atmosphere, land, fish, wildlife, and other public trust resources. They sought a declaration that the state’s climate and energy policy had violated their rights and placed them “in a position of danger with deliberate indifference to their safety” and had “materially caused, contributed to, and/or exacerbated climate change and discriminated against Youth Plaintiffs as members of a protected class, and with respect to their fundamental rights”. They sought an order for the state to prepare a complete and accurate accounting of Alaska’s GHG emissions and an enforceable state climate recovery plan.

Alaska Superior Court Judgment:
On 30 October 2018, the Alaska Superior Court rejected the case, arguing that it was indistinguishable from previous climate cases based on the public trust doctrine and that it concerned political questions which were not justiciable. The plaintiffs appealed.

Alaska Supreme Court Judgment:
In 2022, on appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case (see full text of the judgment below). The Court found that the applicants’ claims concerned non-justiciable political questions and found that it could not make “the legislative policy judgments necessary to grant the requested injunctive relief.”

Judge Maassen, dissenting, argued that he was “no longer convinced that nothing can be gained by clarifying Alaskans’ constitutional rights and the State’s corresponding duties in the context of climate change”, and that the public trust doctrine under the Alaskan Constitution provided a right to a livable climate.

Additional developments:
A follow-up case, Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska II, was filed in 2022.

Suggested citation:
Supreme Court of Alaska, Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska I, 28 January 2022, No. 3AN-17-09910 CI.

Last updated:
14 November 2024

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Minority rights New Zealand Paris Agreement Right to life Separation of powers

Smith v. Attorney General

Summary:
This case was filed in 2022 and concerns the same plaintiff as the Smith v. Fonterra corporate responsibility case. The plaintiff in these cases is a Māori landowner and spokesperson on climate change for his tribe (iwi). He argued that the climate policy of the New Zealand government had failed to adequately protect the citizens of New Zealand, and especially Māori, against the impacts of climate change. Before the High Court, he submitted that “the Government has taken no or inadequate climate change mitigation measures since it had become aware of the causes and effects of climate change down to the present.” In July 2022, the High Court struck out all of the applicant’s claims. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal on all counts in December 2024.

Claims made:
The plaintiff’s case is based on three main arguments (expanded from the original submissions, which concerned only the first argument of the three). First, the plaintiff argues that the government breached its common law duty of care to “take all necessary steps to reduce NZ emissions and to actively protect the plaintiff and his descendants from the adverse effects of climate change”, as derived from its authority over the territory of New Zealand, the government’s duty of care, and its responsibility to Māori. Secondly, he alleged a breach of the rights enshrined in sections 8 and 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), concerning deprivation of life and the denial of the right to practise culture. Here the plaintiff argued that the Crown had “failed to put in place an effective legislative and administrative framework properly designed to provide effective mitigation against the climate change risk in accordance with the best available science and New Zealand’s international and domestic legal obligations.” He invoked the protection of his own life, those of his tribe and clan, and those of future generations. Thirdly, he argued that the government had violated the Tiriti o Waitangi | the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document, and the consequent fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff and those he represents.

Finding of the High Court:
In July 2022, the High Court struck out all three claims. First, it found that the plaintiff’s arguments about the common law duty of care were not based on recognized legal obligations or case-law. It was also considered too far-reaching: “any relief, if it were available, would be an ineffective and piecemeal way to deal with climate change issues. Every person in New Zealand would be entitled to sue the Government under the novel duty.” It noted too that “the courts have neither the technical capacity nor the political mandate to co-ordinate in an integrated way to mitigate the effects of climate change”.

On the second argument, the Court found that the right to life claim was untenable because the plaintiff had not demonstrated a “‘real and identifiable’ risk to the life of a specified individual or even a class of individuals. It is a general threat that may eventuate as a result of the effects of climate change to all New Zealanders.” In addition, the Court was not convinced that it was possible to draw analogies to Dutch law, and specifically the Urgenda case invoked by the plaintiff, meaning that “[t]he decision in Urgenda must be treated with caution”.

Furthermore, on the minority rights claim, the Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged specific breaches of that right, which only entailed positive obligations under exceptional circumstances. It also held that the plaintiff’s case was “based on a claim that an existing legislative and policy framework is inadequate to protect Māori. There is no allegation of opposition or coercion targeting Māori that fits within that exceptional category here.” Accordingly, this part of the case was also declared inadmissible.

Finally, concerning the Tiriti o Waitangi, the Court found that this claim was so broad, and climate change was so complex, that “any fiduciary obligations arising from the Crown would be owed to the public in general. This alone makes the claim untenable”. To be contemplated, such a claim would depend on an underlying duty — here, the duty of care invoked by the applicant — which had already been rejected above, making this claim untenable. In addition, the Court held, “a claim that such a duty is owed to only a subsection of New Zealanders, Māori, as opposed to the public in general, is a further reason that it cannot be tenable”.

Judgment of the Court of Appeal:
On 19 December 2024, the Court of Appeal issued its ruling in this case, rejecting the applicant’s appeal on all counts.

On the claim concerning the right to life, the court considered six questions: 
           a)  whether that right includes a right to a life with dignity;
           b)  whether the widespread nature of (climate) effects preclude the applicability of the right to life;
           c)  whether the risks from climate change are sufficiently proximate;
           d)  whether the right to life can impose positive duties on the State;
           e)  whether it is tenable that New Zealand’s regulatory framework breached the right to life; and
           f)  whether reporting orders are tenably available.

On the first question, it found that it was not clearly untenable that the right to life includes a right to a minimum baseline as to the quality of life and is therefore applicable to the potential impacts of climate change.  This, it held, is consistent with international jurisprudence. Throughout, it extensively engaged with international jurisprudence (Billy, Teitiota) and soft-law materials (the HRC’s General comment No 36).

On the second question, the Court found that it was not clearly untenable on the grounds that the alleged risk to life potentially affects a large group or all of the population.   

On the third question, again referring to international climate jurisprudence on equivalent rights, and particularly engaging with the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, the Court found that this would be a matter of (scientific) evidence for trial, and that it could accordingly not strike this out at this stage. 

On the fourth question, the Court found – given the context of the climate emergency and the case-law from around the world responding to this challenge — it was not clearly untenable that NZBORA’s right to life requires the government to take protective measures against foreseeable threats to life. 

On the fifth question, on the challenge to the efficacy of the legislative framework responding to climate change, the Court found that it could not second-guess parliamentary policy choices, striking out this claim while referring to the possibility of judicial review of concrete actions taken under the legislative framework.

On the sixth question, it found that the court’s institutional role did not encompass an ongoing monitoring role of the measures the Crown is implementing in response to climate change.

On the right to culture, the court found that it was not clearly untenable that climate change could give rise to a positive obligation to protect against a denial of the right to culture under s20 of NZBORA where a substantial interference amounting to a denial of the right occurs. However, here too the court found that the pleaded deficiencies of the domestic legal framework reflect policy choices that are for Parliament and that it could not review.

As concerns the claim of a breach of te Tiriti, the court found that this was clearly untenable because the domestic legislative framework gives effect to the Crown’s obligations under the Treaty and allows for decisions consistent with Treaty principles.

As concerns the claim that the Crown owes fiduciary duties to Mr Smith, his whānau, Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Kahu, the court found that the claimed fiduciary duty was not comparable to specific fiduciary duties arising between the government and certain Māori due to particular dealings between them.  As a result, the pleaded claim was inconsistent with the nature of fiduciary duties because the response to climate change required a balancing of interests and the government could not act purely in the interests of the pleaded beneficiaries. 

As concerned the claim that there was a novel common law duty in place, relying on the common law public trust doctrine, this doctrine stemmed from the context of access to seashores and navigable waters and was thus too far removed from the extensive duty pleaded in relation to climate change.  The court found that the boundaries of the public trust doctrine are imprecise and fluid, raising a host of conceptual problems in imposing fiduciary or trust-like obligations on the government, and that the doctrine could in any case be displaced by legislation; domestic law did not leave room for its application.

Status of the case:
Appeal to the Court of Appeal rejected 19 December 2024.

Further reading:
The text of the High Court ruling is available here.

The text of the Court of Appeal ruling is available here.

Suggested citation:
High Court of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2022] NZHC 1693.

Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2024] NZCA 692.

Categories
Austria Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Farming Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Right to life

Jasansky and Others v. Austria

Summary:
On 10 November 2023, it was reported that a climate-related application had been filed with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against Austria. The case is brought on behalf of four Austrian nationals — Monika Jasansky, Peter Fliegenschnee, Friedrich Pichler, and Klara Butz –along with the NGO Global 2000.

The application contests Austrian inaction in terms of mitigation measures, and argues that the individual applicants — who have been described, respectively, as an organic farmer, a retiree, a mayor, and a climate activist — have been adversely affected by extreme weather events aggravated by climate change, namely droughts, heatwaves and mudslides. The applicants allege a violation of the State’s positive obligation to protect the right to life in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Domestic proceedings:
The applicants contest a finding from the Austrian Constitutional Court, made in July 2023, which recognized the state’s duty to actively take effective measures to protect life and health as well as to protect private life and property, but accorded the government a wide margin of discretion and found that fundamental and human rights do not allow for claims to a specific measure (here the applicants petitioned the domestic courts to order legislators to set binding expiry dates for the permissibility of the sale of fossil fuels in 2040). Rather, the domestic court found that the legislature must be allowed to choose between the various available measures to meet the State’s protective obligations.

Suggested citation:
European Court of Human Rights, Jasansky and Others v. Austria, pending case, filed November 2023.

Categories
Adaptation Disability and health-related inequality Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to housing Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise The United Kingdom Vulnerability

R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs

Summary:
On 17 October 2023, the reportedly first-ever adaptation case in the United Kingdom was brought against the government before the UK’s High Court of Justice. The plaintiffs in this case included Kevin Jordan, a homeowner from Norfolk (UK), who alleged that his home was acutely threatened by coastal erosion, with the road leading up to it having already collapsed into the sea. Jordan brought his case together with the NGO ‘Friends of the Earth’ and disability rights activist Doug Paulley, a care home resident who alleged that his health conditions were being exacerbated by climate-aggravated heatwaves. Together, the plaintiffs challenged the UK’s National Adaptation Programme (NAP). Domestic law requires the production of new NAP every five years, and the most recent version — NAP3 — was published in July 2023. The claimants argued that NAP3 is deficient for the following reasons:

  1. Failure to set sufficiently specific objectives;
  2. Failure to conduct and publish information on the assessment of the risks involved in implementing NAP3;
  3. Failure to consider the unequal impacts of NAP3 on protected groups (on the grounds of age, race and disability); and
  4. Violation of Articles 2, 8, 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the rights to life, respect for private and family life, non-discrimination and property, respectively), as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998.

In regards to the alleged human rights violations, the plaintiffs invoked:

a. The well-established but urgent need for long-term policy and protected funding to enable care-homes (and similar healthcare settings) to adapt to excessive heat. This remains absent in NAP3 despite the increasing frequency and severity of annual heatwaves.
b. There being no new policy to manage overheating risks in existing health and social care buildings, such that they are properly refurbished as soon as reasonably practicable.
c. A lack of a commitment to provide adequate resources to support communities at imminent risk of being lost to erosion and flooding, including as to the established mental health and emotional wellbeing impacts for those affected.
d. Gaps, inconsistency and uncertainty in the potential allocation of funding provided for a range of areas, in particular for those communities that must (or are likely to have to) relocate and have their homes demolished.
e. There being no insurance or compensation schemes available for the worst affected by coastal erosion and who lose their homes.
f. No evidence of their being an express consideration, or reasoned analysis, of what a fair balance to strike would be between doing more to safeguard the human rights of vulnerable people and the interests of wider society.

https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2023/20231101_21608_complaint.pdf (emphasis added)

High Court Judgment:
In a judgment issued on 25 October 2024, the High Court of Justice for England and Wales rejected the applicants’ claims. Justice Chamberlain, in his judgment, found that there had been no error of law in this case. His ruling extensively considered the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, but found that “[u]nlike in the field of mitigation, and subject to the arguments about the effect of the ECHR as interpreted in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] (…), there is no internationally binding quantified standard governing how States must adapt to climate change. It would be very difficult to devise any such standard because the risks of climate change differ widely from state to state (and indeed within states). In some places, the main risk may be from flooding, in other places extreme heat or drought. Elsewhere, there may be a combination of risks, which all have to be addressed but some of which are more urgent than others. Moreover, the profile of risks, and the priorities attached to addressing them, may change over time” (para. 92 of the High Court ruling).

Assessing the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment overall, Judge Chamberlain found that while this judgment “represents a significant development of the case law in relation to climate change, not only as regards the standing of associations to bring claims before the Strasbourg Court, but also as regards the scope and extent of the positive obligations of the State and the margin of appreciation to be accorded when assessing whether those obligations have been discharged”, “the significance of the judgment for the UK’s climate change framework should not be overstated.” The Judge noted that KlimaSeniorinnen focused heavily on lacunae in domestic legislation and the targets set out in the Paris Agreement, whereas the law of the United Kingdom does not feature similar lacunae in mitigation target-setting.

Lawyers for the government in this case had sought to dismiss the findings of the ECtHR, as made in para. 552 of KlimaSeniorinnen, as an obiter dictum. This paragraph of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment reads as follows:

Furthermore, effective protection of the rights of individuals from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well-being and quality of life requires that the above-noted mitigation measures be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection. Such adaptation measures must be put in place and effectively applied in accordance with the best available evidence (…) and consistent with the general structure of the State’s positive obligations in this context (…).

Judge Chamberlain disagreed with the government as concerns the nature of this finding, noting the dangers of applying “common law concepts [the idea of obiter dicta] to the judgment of a court most of whose members come from different legal traditions.” Still, Judge Chamberlain noted that the Strasbourg Court’s findings were of a general nature (para. 101). He found that KlimaSeniorinnen “appears to indicate that the positive obligation imposed by Articles 2 and 8 [ECHR] extends to adopting and effectively implementing ‘adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection'”, stemming from the State’s underlying regulatory obligation. He notes that “[w]hat that means in the context of adaptation measures, however, is far from clear” (para. 103), given that adaptation measures were not central to the KlimaSeniorinnen case, and that the international legal framework in this regard is less well-developed than for mitigation measures. He went on to anticipate future rulings from the ECtHR, considering it

(…) likely that, if the Strasbourg Court had in a future case to apply the reasoning in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] to the adaptation context, it would say that:
(a) the narrow margin of appreciation in relation to the mitigation aims was justified by reference to the internationally agreed objective of carbon neutrality by 2050 and the impact of one State’s default on other States;
(b) neither of these features applies in the field of adaptation; and
(c) accordingly, in the field of adaptation, States are to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation in setting the relevant objectives and a wider margin still in setting out the proposals and policies for meeting them (by analogy with the margin accorded to the State in setting the means for achieving the mitigation objectives).

Accordingly, he found that the current adaptation framework in the United Kingdom appears to “fall comfortably within the UK’s margin of appreciation under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR” and is not “contrary to any clear and consistent line of authority from the Strasbourg Court”. On this basis, he found that there was neither an error of law nor an incompatibility with human rights law evident in this case.

Application to the European Court of Human Rights:
In July 2025, Friends of the Earth announced that the case had been filed as an application before the European Court of Human Rights.

More information:
For reporting on the case, see coverage from the Guardian and the Independent.

Suggested citation:
High Court of Justice for England and Wales, R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs, [2024] EWHC 2707 (Admin), 25 October 2024.

Last updated:
13 November 2024

Categories
Adaptation Biodiversity Children and young people Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Imminent risk Indonesia Loss & damage Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to development and work Right to education Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to subsistence/food Right to water Sea-level rise Vulnerability

Indonesian Youths and others v. Indonesia (Rasya Assegaf and 12 others v. Indonesia)

Summary:
This case was brought by thirteen children, youth, and members of vulnerable groups from different parts of Indonesia, all of whom allege that they are affected by the Indonesian Government’s response to climate change. The seven youth plaintiffs, aged 7-29, together with six adults whose involvement in agrarian and farming activities renders them particularly vulnerable, invoke their constitutitional rights to life, to live in physical and spiritual prosperity in a good and healthy environment, to self-development through the fulfillment of basic needs, to food and water, to education, to work and earn a decent living, as well as the minor plaintiffs’ rights as children. They brought their complaint to Indonesia’s National Commission of Human Rights, the counrty’s independent national human rights authority, calling on it to exercise its monitoring and mediating function.

The complaint in depth:
The plaintiffs in this case emphasize that the Indonesian government has recognized the country’s extreme vulnerablility to the impacts of climate change, including to sea level rise, heat waves, storm surges, tidal flooding, shifts in the wet and dry seasons, changes to rain patterns, decreased food production, disturbances in the availability of water, the spread of pests, plant and human diseases, the sinking of small islands, and the loss of biodiversity. They also emphasize that Indonesia is already experiencing many of these serious climate change impacts, and that these will only continue to get worse.

In their submissions to the National Commission of Human Rights, the plaintiffs particularly emphasize the effects of heat stress combined with Indonesia’s humid climate; the loss of food security and livelihoods in fishing and tourism due to coral bleaching and a decrease in fish stocks; unpredictable precipitation patterns and resulting drought, water insecurity and flooding; and the impacts of heat and precipitation changes on agriculture, food and water security, and plant diseases and pests. They also emphasize the risks associated with tidal floods, high waves, saltwater intrusion and strong winds due to sea level rise, which endanger lives and will cause a loss of living space, shelter, food and water insecurity. In this regard, they note research by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank that shows that, in a high emissions scenario, and without adaptation, more than 4,2 million Indonesians will be affected by permanent tidal flooding by 2070–2100. This same research shows that 5.5-8 million Indonesian people will be affected by flooding from once-in-a-century storm surges by 2030. In addition, they note that climate change causes a higher incidence of vector-borne diseases affecting children and vulnerable populations, such as malaria, dengue fever, and cholera. Several of the plaintiffs have suffered from these diseases already. Other impacts on the health of children include air pollution, malnutrition and stunting, drowning during floods, coastal flodding, and mental health impacts such as climate anxiety. Citing a study from the American Psychological Association, they argue that experiencing extreme weather events leads to higher rates of depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, drug and alcohol use, domestic violence, and child abuse.

The plaintiffs emphasize that they have already experienced flooding, cyclones, extreme heat, vector-borne illness, climate anxiety, and impacts on their homes and agricultural or fishing livelihoods. They submit that the Government of Indonesia has a constitutional responsibility to protect them from the human rights impacts of the climate crisis, and allege that it has failed to do so by contributing to causing and exacerbating the climate crisis. Noting that Indonesia’s domestic law and its NDC under the Paris Agreement acknowledge the link between human rights and climate change, they submit that constitutional rights should be interpreted in harmony with international human rights law. This, they argue, means recognizing that Indonesia has obligations to mitigate and adapt to climate change, as well as cross-sectoral obligations to ensure that all climate adaptation and mitigation actions are inclusive, fair and participatory, and to prioritize the most affected and vulnerable populations.

The plaintiffs argue that the Indonesian government should prioritize mitigation through a moratorium on new coal-fired power plants and the licensing of palm oil plantation concesssions as well as by promoting sustainable polycultural and indigenous farming practices that will reduce its net GHG emissions and ensure crop resilience.

In terms of adaptation, the plaintiffs argue that Indonesia should ensure protection especially of those living in vulnerable areas, including small islands, riparian and lowland areas, coastal areas, and dry areas. This should take place through a community-oriented, inclusive and participative process, and should serve to upgrade infrastructure, provide social protection mechanisms, prioritize nature-based adaptation through ecosystem restoration, strengthen the resilience of food systems and ensure that adaptation does not take place at the expense of any vulnerable groups or future generations. In particular, they emphasize the rehabilitation of mangrove and coral ecosystems, given their function as natural flood and erosion protection; the promotion of sustainable agricultural practices, and procedural obligations to ensure consultation, information, inclusivity and equity.

The plaintiffs note Indonesia’s knowledge of climate change, its commitment to the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degree warming target under its Updated NDC, and its awareness of the risk of huge economic losses due to the dangers of climate change. Against this background, they argue that Indonesia has violated its human rights obligations by failing to mobilize the maximum available resources and take the highest possible level of ambition in mitigating its emissions, noting that it is one of the world’s largest emitters of land use change and energy emissions and the world’s seven largest emitter of cumulative emissions. They argue that, to align with the 1.5°C degree warming scenarios, Indonesia needs to limit its emissions from 660 to 687 million metric tons of CO2e by 2030. It is failing to do so, instead expanding its coal-fired power plant network and supporting ongoing deforestation.

The plaintiffs argue that these measures, i.e. the government’s failure to take adaptive steps, and its contribution to and exacerbation of climate change, have violated their right to a healthy environment, their right to health, their right to life and their rights to food and water. As concerns their right to development, the plaintiffs argue that “[t]he impact of climate change on the right to development has a ripple effect across all human rights”. They also link the government’s policies to impacts on their enjoyment on the right to education and the right to work and earn a decent living. Lastly, for the child applicants, they note risks for the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, access to education, proper food, proper housing, safe drinking water, and sanitation.

Measures requested:
The Plaintiffs request that the Commission:

  • State that climate change is a human rights crisis, and that each additional degree of heating will cause further impacts;
  • State that climate change has disrupted their rights to a healthy environment, life, health, and development through the fulfillment of basic needs, food, water, education, and employment; that the child plaintiffs are particularly vulnerable in this regard; and that the Government has violated its obligation to respect, protect, uphold and fulfill the plaintiffs’ human rights;
  • State that “the government has contributed to and continues to perpetuate the climate crisis by knowingly acting in disregard of the available scientific evidence on the necessary measures to mitigate climate change”, and that its actions — such as its approval of new coal-fired power plants, approval of large-scale deforestation and land clearing, and failure to implement basic adaptation measures — are an expression of this;
  • Recommmend immediate review of law and policy to reduce GHG emissions, mobilize resources, and minimize losses;
  • Recommend steps to reduce Indonesia’s national GHG emissions, including moratoria on new coal plants and on concessions for oil palm plantations, industrial forest plantations, and the clearing of peatlands; the promotion of sustainable and polycultural agricultural practices; and adaptation measures; and
  • Recommend an inclusive, fair, open, and effective approach to public participation in climate-related decision-making.

Developments in the case:
The case is still pending. However, in receiving the case during a hearing held on 14 July 2022, two of the Commissioners heard directly from the plaintiffs and welcomed the petition. Commissioner Choirul Anam stated that “climate change is an enormous problem, which influences various human rights. It is our job to push for better government actions in responding to climate change.”

Further information:
The text of the complaint in this case is available (in Bahasa and English) from ClimateCaseChart.com.

For a comment, see Margaretha Quina and Mae Manupipatpong, ‘Indonesian Human Rights Commission’s First Human Rights Complaint on the Impacts of Climate Change’, Climate Law Blog, 22 November 2022, available here.

Suggested citation:
National Commission of Human Rights of Indonesia, Indonesian Youths and others v. Indonesia, complaint filed on 14 July 2022.

Last updated:
8 August 2023.

Categories
Adaptation Domestic court Imminent risk Loss & damage Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Uganda

Tsama William & 47 Ors v. Uganda

Summary:

The case was initiated following multiple landslides that occurred in December 2019 in the Bududa district in Eastern Uganda, in an area that is prone to landslides, which the applicants allege were exacerbated by climate change. The applicants claim that the landslides resulted in their displacement from their homes, killed their relatives and destroyed their property and the environment.

The applicants brought the case against the Ugandan government, the environmental authority and the local government of Bududa before the High Court of Uganda seeking orders for protective measures and compensation.  

Claims:

The applicants claim that the respondents have violated their positive obligations under statutory law to protect the applicants from recurrent landslides. They argue that the respondents’ failures to put in place an effective machinery for dealing with landslides and promptly warn the applicants about known risks, violated their fundamental rights to life, a clean and healthy environment, property, and physical and mental health. Aside from declaratory relief, the applicants claim a sum of 6.8 billion Ugandan Shillings as compensation for loss of life, destruction of property, physical and mental harm, as well as the cost of resettlement to safer areas.  The applicants further allege that the risk of future landslides owing to extreme weather events caused by climate change requires the respondents to take measures to relocate and resettle the applicants.  

This case is about adaptation to environmental risks (i.e. it is broader than climate adaptation), since the applicants principally rely on evidence that the problem of recurring landslides in the Bududa district has been going on since the beginning of the 20th century. However, the applicants rely on climate change as one among the factors contributing to the landslide risks they had previously faced and are likely to face in the future, as well as their vulnerability.  

Links:

The case documents are accessible via Climate Case Chart. For petition submitted by the applicants to the High Court of Uganda see here.

For replies by the respondents, see here and here.

Status of the case: The case is pending before the High Court of Uganda.

Last updated: 03 August 2023.

Categories
2023 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Standing/admissibility Victim status

Citizens’ Committee on the Kobe Coal-Fired Power Plant v. Kobe Steel Ltd., et al.

Summary:
On 20 March 2023, a first-instance court in Japan heard a civil case concerning the construction and operation of new coal-fired power plants brought by the citizens of Kobe. Two weeks previously, on 9 March 2023, the Japanese Supreme Court refused to hear its first-ever administrative climate case concerning the same set of facts, giving no substantive reasons for doing so. In the civil case, which was filed in 2018, 40 citizens of Kobe brought suit against three corporations involved in the construction and operation of the plants. They argued that these plants would impact themtheir personal rights and right to a peaceful life both through air pollution and through their contribution to the climate change.

As Grace Nishikawa and Masako Ichihara have explained on the Sabin Center’s Climate Law Blog, ‘personal rights’ are established through case-law and frequently enter into play in environmental cases. They protect personal well-being, including the rights to life, bodily integrity, health, and a peaceful life (the last of which the authors compare to the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights). The plaintiffs in this case invoked these personal rights, arguing that the coal plants would aggravate climate change, leading to extreme heat and rainfall events that would directly affect them. In their submissions, they made arguments based on international and comparative law, mentioning carbon budgets, the Paris Agreement, the Dutch Urgenda case, and the Glasgow Climate Pact.

In its first-instance judgment, the Kobe District Court accepted that greenhouse emissions, including those from the plant, contribute to climate change and can violate personal rights. However, it found the risk of harm to the individual plaintiffs to be too uncertain, and rejected their claim, noting the difficulty of causally attributing responsibility for damage related to climate change.

Concerning the alleged violation of the right to a peaceful life, which the plaintiffs argued contains a right to a healthy and peaceful life, the Court likewise rejected this claim, for the same reasons, finding that fears about climate change were not concrete enough to constitute human rights violation. The Court also noted that there was no legally recognized right stable climate in Japan.

Concerning the additional air pollution complaint, the Court found that this was not serious enough to constitute a concrete danger to the plaintiffs’ rights. It also did not engage with the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction halting the operation of the coal plants.

Appeal:
Climate Case Chart reports that an appeal in this case was filed on 4 January 2023.

Further reading:
The above draws on the following two key sources:

The original case documents (in Japanese) are available via Climate Case Chart.

Suggested citation:
Kobe District Court, Citizens’ Committee on the Kobe Coal-Fired Power Plant v. Kobe Steel Ltd., et al., Judgment of 20 March 2023.

Last updated:
20 July 2023

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to life South Korea

Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea

Summary:
On 13 March 2020, nineteen teenagers from across South Korea initiated proceedings against their government (the National Assembly of Korea and the President of Korea), arguing that insufficient emissions reductions efforts were violating their constitutional rights. They alleged that Korean climate legislation (originally Article 42(1)1 of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, and later also Article 8(1) of the domestic Carbon Neutrality Act (the “Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth Act” of 2021) was not compatible with their constitutional rights, bringing their case against the National Assembly for enacting the law and the government for implementing an administrative plan based on that law. Their constitutional complaint was combined with three other mitigation cases and decided by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea on 29 August 2024.

The applicants in this case are part of the Korean Youth 4 Climate Action Group, which has led the Korean ‘School Strike for Climate’ movement. They argued that, by not taking action to prevent the threats posed by climate change, the government had violated the right of younger generations to life and the pursuit of happiness (Article 10 of the Constitution), which they argue also enshrines the right to resist against human extinction, along with the right to live in a healthy and pleasant environment (Article 35(1) of the Constitution). They also contested inter-generational inequalities under the constitutional prohibition of discrimination (Article 11 of the Constitution) and invoked the duty of the State to prevent environmental disasters (Article 34(e) of the Constitution). In doing so, the applicants invoked the fatal risk posed by climate change and the irrevocable damage to be suffered by younger generations. As a major emitter of greenhouse gas emissions, they argued, Korea has an obligation to protect its citizens from the effects of climate change by taking stronger emissions reductions action.

Relevant interim developments:
On 30 December 2022, the Korean National Human Rights Commission issued an official statement to the President of Korea regarding climate change and human rights. Citing IPCC reports, UN findings, other instances of climate litigation (such as Urgenda and Neubauer) and the existence of different vulnerabilities, it found that “[a]s the climate crisis has far-reaching impacts on multiple human rights, including the rights to life, food, health and housing, the government should regard protecting and promoting the rights of everyone in the midst of climate crisis as its fundamental obligation and reform related laws and systems to address the climate crisis from a human rights perspective.”

On 12 June 2023, it was announced that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea had decided to submit an opinion to South Korea’s Constitutional Court to oppose the country’s Carbon Neutrality Act (2021), which it considered to be unconstitutional and in violation of the constitutional rights of future generations because it sets out a greenhouse gas emissions reductions target that was too low. The Act sets out a 40% emissions reductions target by 2030 as compared to 2018 levels. This, the Commission found, did not respect the constitutional principle of equality, because it passed the burden of greenhouse gas emissions on to future generations.

Timeline of the case (by Youth 4 Climate Action Korea):

  • 13 March 2020: Youth 4 Climate Action files a constitutional petition
  • 25 March 2020: Notice of referral from the Constitutional Court
  • 28 September 2020: Submission of supplementary opinion on constitutional petition (1)
  • 29 October 2020: Defendants submit presidential opinion
  • 26 January 2021: Submission of supplementary opinion (2)
  • 15 April 2021: Submission of supplementary opinion (3)
  • 23 July 2021: Submission of supplementary opinion (4)
  • 23 September 2021: Submission of supplementary opinion (5) on constitutional petition
  • 13 March 2022: Additional constitutional petition filed against the Carbon Neutrality Basic Act
  • 8 June 2022: Additional constitutional petition filed against the Enforcement Decree of the Carbon Neutrality Basic Act
  • 31 May 2023: Submission of supplementary opinion (6)
  • 22 August 2023: National Human Rights Commission submits opinion to Constitutional Court on ‘Unconstitutionality of Carbon Neutrality Basic Act’
  • 28 December 2023: Defendant submits presidential opinion to Constitutional Court
  • 15 March 15, 2024: Brief submission
  • 29 March 2024: Defendant submits a witness statement (Ahn Young-hwan) to the Constitutional Court
  • 29 March 2024: Defendant submits a witness statement (Yoo Yeon-cheol) to the Constitutional Court
  • 1 April 2024: Submission of the reference opinion (Jo Cheon-ho)
  • 1 April 2024: Submission of the reference opinion (Park Deok-young)
  • 23 April 2024: First public hearing
  • 13 May 2024: Submission of supplementary brief
  • 14 May 2024: Ministry of Environment, Office for Government Policy Coordination submit opinion paper
  • 21 May 2024: Second public hearing, final statement by the plaintiff
  • 29 August 2024: Judgment of Constitutional Court

Consolidation with three other cases:
The South Korean Constitutional Court decided to consolidate its first four climate cases (Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea (the present case), Woodpecker et al. v. South Korea (Baby Climate Litigation), Climate Crisis Emergency Action v. South Korea (a.k.a. Byung-In Kim et al. v. South Korea) and Min-A Park v. South Korea. Public hearings in the cases were held on 23 April 2024 and 21 May 2024.

These cases all alleged that the government’s inadequate greenhouse gas reduction targets violated citizens’ fundamental rights, particularly those of future generations. Together, the four cases comprised over 250 plaintiffs, including civil society, youth and children. The Constitutional Court issued a joint ruling in these cases on 29 August 2024.

Judgment of the constitutional court:
On 29 August 2024, the South Korean constitutional court ruled. It found a violation of constitutional rights in this case and three related cases. In an unanimous ruling, hailed as “the first decision of its kind in Asia“, the court found that the government’s response to the climate crisis was inadequate and threatened constitutional rights, noting that the country lacked legally binding long-term emissions reductions targets for the post-2031 period, which violated the constitutional rights of future generations by shifting an excessive reductions burden to the future. The court gave government and legislature 18 months (until 28 February 2026) to introduce the relevant targets.

In particular, the Court ruled that Article 8(1) of the South Korean Carbon Neutrality Basic Act was unconstitutional. Previously, the government had pledged a 40% reduction of its GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 2018 levels, but had failed to set any targets since. The Constitutional Court held that this “does not have the minimum character necessary as a protective measure corresponding to the dangerous situation of the climate crisis”, citing the “principle of non-underprotection”, which means that the State must take appropriate measures to effectively protect the constitutional rights of its citizens.

Simultaneously, the Court held that the government’s target for 2030 did not infringe constitutional rights.

Status of the case:
Decided. On 29 August 2024, the South Korean constitutional court found a violation of the constitutional rights of future generations in this case.

More information on the case:
For a press report on the case, see here.

On the National Human Rights Commission of Korea’s intervention, see this article in the Korea Herald.

The submissions in the case, including an unofficial English translation of the complaint prepared by the applicants’ counsel, are available via ClimateCaseChart.

For a summary of the constitutional court’s ruling, see here.

Full text of the judgment (Korean):

Suggested citation:

Constitutional Court of South Korea, Do-Hyun Kim and 18 others v. South Korea, judgment of 29 August 2024.

Last updated:
29 August 2024.

Categories
Access to a remedy Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Gender / women-led Imminent risk Non-discrimination Private and family life Right to life Standing/admissibility The United Kingdom Victim status

Plan B. Earth and Others v. the United Kingdom

Summary:

On 11 July 2022, an application against the United Kingdom was filed before the European Court of Human Rights by the NGO Plan B. Earth and four individual applicants. The applicants argued that the United Kingdom’s government violated their rights under Articles 2, 8 and 14 of the ECHR by failing to take practical and effective measures to tackle the threat of anthropogenic climate change. They also submitted that they had suffered violations of their procedural rights under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR because they had been denied a full hearing of their case.

Citing the UK Government’s acknowledgment of the fact that climate change is a serious threat to humanity, the applicant NGO submitted that its membership included those “who are exposed to disproportionate and discriminatory impacts and risks, whether by virtue of age, gender, mental health or membership of racially marginalised communities, or because their family life is inextricably linked to communities on the frontline of the crisis.” The applicants also cited the State’s positive obligation to safeguard the right to life, and argued that the Paris Agreement, and its temperature goal of 1,5 degrees Celsius, are relevant in determining the scope of these positive obligations. They argued that practical and effective measures are required to ensure climate mitigation, adaptation, finance flows and loss and damage, and that the respondent State has failed in all four regards.

Victim status:

As concerns the applicants’ victim status, they argued that they were “victims” of the alleged Convention violations. They referred to domestic rules that increase the cost risk by £5,000 for each additional claimant in environmental cases; this rule serves to deter class actions, and therefore prevents applicants from sharing the cost and other risks involved in litigation. They noted that the first applicants’ members include individuals exposed to disproportionate and discriminatory impacts and risks as concerns their age, gender, membership of racially marginalised communities, family life inextricably linked with communities in the Global South, and mental health, and those who are at the intersection of such increased risks. They also noted that, given the high risk of overwhelming and irreversible interference with the applicants’ rights, denying them victim status would render their Convention rights theoretical and illusory.

Status of case:

The ECtHR declared the application inadmissible, holding that the applicants were not sufficiently affected by the alleged breach of the Convention or its Protocols to claim to be victims of a violation within the meaning of Art. 34 of the Convention. This decision was taken by a Committee judicial formation, as the result of a written procedure without a public decision.

According to Plan B Earth’s press release following the decision, the panel was composed of three judges, among which the UK Judge Tim Eicke.

Date of decision:

13 December 2022 (according to the ECtHR’s press release).

More information:

  • For the full text of the application form, click here.
  • For a press release from Plan B Earth on the filing, click here.
  • For the full claim before the High Court of Justice, click here.
  • For the Court of Appeals’ judgment, click here.

Suggested citation:
European Court of Human Rights, Plan B. Earth and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 35057/22, Decision of 13 December 2022.

Last updated:
15 March 2023.