Category: Margin of appreciation

Categories
2026 Blog Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Margin of appreciation Private and family life The Netherlands

Bonaire Climate Case: Creative or Questionable Interpretation of International Climate Law?

Pranav Ganesan, PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich

The Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands(Bonaire) judgment of the Hague District Court has stolen the limelight as the new posterchild for strategic climate litigation. The plaintiff in this case, Greenpeace Netherlands, argued that the Dutch government failed in its duty to protect the residents of Bonaire, an island in the Caribbean which formally attained the status of a special municipality of the Netherlands in 2010. Although it is a special municipality (bijzondere gemeente), it is just as much a part of the Netherlands as any other province in the European Netherlands. The Dutch government owes obligations under international human rights law, including those arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), towards residents of the municipality. That international human rights law requires states to undertake climate mitigation measures and adaptation measures, as informed by international climate change law where relevant, has been affirmatively held in two advisory opinions from international courts and the European Court of Human Rights. And the proposition that the Dutch government’s duty of care towards its population essentially includes obligations under the ECHR was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in material respects, the Hague District Court’s reasoning was so heavily based on international law.[1] In terms of the scope of state conduct implicated in this case, it outdoes the Urgenda case,which only concerned contributions to the mitigation of climate change. The Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiff that the Dutch government had violated Article 8 ECHR as well as the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR), the former due to inadequate mitigation measures, inadequate implementation of those measures, delays in adopting an adaptation plan for Bonaire and late provision of procedural safeguards to the residents of Bonaire. In this blog, I provide a quick analysis of the District Court’s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement in the section on mitigation measures. Readers interested in learning about the adaptation component and how the court addressed discrimination claim are welcome to read this blogpost by Wewerinke-Singh.

There are areas in the judgment where the District Court’s assessment of the compatibility of the Dutch Climate law framework with international climate law is questionable. The first glaring issue is that the court made a finding of non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement based on the absence of ‘absolute emissions reduction targets’ in the Dutch Climate Act of 2019 (para 11.13.1). The problem identified by the court was that the targets were expressed as goals that the government would ‘strive to achieve.’ However, this does not mean that the targets are not absolute. The difference between absolute and relative emissions reductions targets being whether they are expressed as percentage reductions in comparison to the emissions during a fixed baseline year, as opposed to reductions from a business as usual scenario in case of relative targets (Winkler et al 2014, 636). The use of the expression ‘strive to achieve’ means that the nature of the obligation to achieve the target is one of conduct rather than result, reflecting the nature of the obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures in pursuance of NDCs communicated under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement (ICJ Advisory Opinion, paras 251-253). Another connected example is the court’s declaration that ‘UN standards’ require emission reduction targets to be expressed as percentage reductions to be achieved by the target date, in comparison to 2019 levels as opposed to the 1990 baseline (para 11.13.2). Moreover, strictly speaking, Article 12(8) of the UNFCCC does not require the EU to provide information about each member state’s national carbon budget like the court suggests (para 11.15.3). The court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions might be technically imprecise, but it is undoubtedly bold, being based on the need for exemplary efforts from a developed country like the Netherlands, and reflecting the appropriate sense of urgency in light of the results of the First Global Stocktake (para 11.9.4). Through its interpretive moves, the court effectively hardened ‘soft’ obligations (i.e. normative expectations) sourced from the Paris Agreement and COP decisions (on hard and soft obligations in the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, 2016).

A final noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the rather detailed response to how the notion of ‘equity’ in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Articles 2(1) and 4(1) of the Paris Agreement is to be applied in reviewing states’ mitigation commitments. Equity is an elusive concept, with debates on what an equitable distribution of the global emissions reduction burden entails having remained unsettled since the inception of international negotiations on the topic of climate mitigation (Oliver Herrera et al, 2025). The court provided the (un)acceptability of a ‘grandfathering approach’ as an example of one such debate (para 11.13.5). But it did not go so far as to hold that the grandfathering approach is legally impermissible because it is inequitable per se, or that an equal per capita emissions approach is the minimum standard under international law. Rather, it assessed the Netherlands’ policy negatively on account of its failure to justify why its current policy, which is based on the controversial grandfathering principle and falls short of the ambition required by the equal per capita emissions approach, is equitable in accordance with Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(1). It thus did not use equity to dictate the outcome of what exactly the Dutch government’s fair share of the global carbon emissions ought to be. At same time, it did not use the underlying controversy as a reason to entirely avoid reviewing the substance of the Dutch climate mitigation policy. This is underscored by its remedial findings, wherein the court declared that the Netherlands’ current mitigation commitments were inequitable, thereby leading to a breach of Article 8 (para 12.1), but dismissed Greenpeace’s request ordering the adoption of specific emissions reduction targets by the government, or at least a carbon budget reflecting the ‘equal per capita emissions approach’ (paras 8.1 (IV)-(VI), 11.55 and 11.58).

Overall, the Bonaire judgment shows how climate litigation can lead to precarious precedents. On the one hand, the way the Court engaged with the concept of equity provided an assessment of Dutch mitigation ambition which was notably pragmatic and might serve as inspiration for other courts when asked to answer the fair share question. On the other hand, the judgment risks signaling to states that legal texts—which negotiators toiled to craft in ‘constructively ambiguous’ terms—may be stretched by domestic courts to uncomfortable extents. Ultimately, the appellate court’s scrutiny of this case (should the Dutch government file an appeal) will reveal how this judgment will be remembered: whether it will be hailed for its boldness or criticized for its questionable interpretation of international treaties.

[1] André Nollkaemper commented: ‘Today’s judgment of the District Court of The Hague fully lives up to the reputation of Dutch courts as strongly international law-minded. […] The conclusion is firmly anchored in international law. With 29 references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, 64 references to the European Court’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, 64 to the UNFCCC, 62 to the Paris Agreement, and 12 to COP decisions, this surely ranks high on the list of climate change cases that are most shaped by international law.’

Categories
Austria Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Farming Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Right to life

Jasansky and Others v. Austria

Summary:
On 10 November 2023, it was reported that a climate-related application had been filed with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against Austria. The case is brought on behalf of four Austrian nationals — Monika Jasansky, Peter Fliegenschnee, Friedrich Pichler, and Klara Butz –along with the NGO Global 2000.

The application contests Austrian inaction in terms of mitigation measures, and argues that the individual applicants — who have been described, respectively, as an organic farmer, a retiree, a mayor, and a climate activist — have been adversely affected by extreme weather events aggravated by climate change, namely droughts, heatwaves and mudslides. The applicants allege a violation of the State’s positive obligation to protect the right to life in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Domestic proceedings:
The applicants contest a finding from the Austrian Constitutional Court, made in July 2023, which recognized the state’s duty to actively take effective measures to protect life and health as well as to protect private life and property, but accorded the government a wide margin of discretion and found that fundamental and human rights do not allow for claims to a specific measure (here the applicants petitioned the domestic courts to order legislators to set binding expiry dates for the permissibility of the sale of fossil fuels in 2040). Rather, the domestic court found that the legislature must be allowed to choose between the various available measures to meet the State’s protective obligations.

Suggested citation:
European Court of Human Rights, Jasansky and Others v. Austria, pending case, filed November 2023.

Categories
Adaptation Disability and health-related inequality Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to housing Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise The United Kingdom Vulnerability

R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs

Summary:
On 17 October 2023, the reportedly first-ever adaptation case in the United Kingdom was brought against the government before the UK’s High Court of Justice. The plaintiffs in this case included Kevin Jordan, a homeowner from Norfolk (UK), who alleged that his home was acutely threatened by coastal erosion, with the road leading up to it having already collapsed into the sea. Jordan brought his case together with the NGO ‘Friends of the Earth’ and disability rights activist Doug Paulley, a care home resident who alleged that his health conditions were being exacerbated by climate-aggravated heatwaves. Together, the plaintiffs challenged the UK’s National Adaptation Programme (NAP). Domestic law requires the production of new NAP every five years, and the most recent version — NAP3 — was published in July 2023. The claimants argued that NAP3 is deficient for the following reasons:

  1. Failure to set sufficiently specific objectives;
  2. Failure to conduct and publish information on the assessment of the risks involved in implementing NAP3;
  3. Failure to consider the unequal impacts of NAP3 on protected groups (on the grounds of age, race and disability); and
  4. Violation of Articles 2, 8, 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the rights to life, respect for private and family life, non-discrimination and property, respectively), as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998.

In regards to the alleged human rights violations, the plaintiffs invoked:

a. The well-established but urgent need for long-term policy and protected funding to enable care-homes (and similar healthcare settings) to adapt to excessive heat. This remains absent in NAP3 despite the increasing frequency and severity of annual heatwaves.
b. There being no new policy to manage overheating risks in existing health and social care buildings, such that they are properly refurbished as soon as reasonably practicable.
c. A lack of a commitment to provide adequate resources to support communities at imminent risk of being lost to erosion and flooding, including as to the established mental health and emotional wellbeing impacts for those affected.
d. Gaps, inconsistency and uncertainty in the potential allocation of funding provided for a range of areas, in particular for those communities that must (or are likely to have to) relocate and have their homes demolished.
e. There being no insurance or compensation schemes available for the worst affected by coastal erosion and who lose their homes.
f. No evidence of their being an express consideration, or reasoned analysis, of what a fair balance to strike would be between doing more to safeguard the human rights of vulnerable people and the interests of wider society.

https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2023/20231101_21608_complaint.pdf (emphasis added)

High Court Judgment:
In a judgment issued on 25 October 2024, the High Court of Justice for England and Wales rejected the applicants’ claims. Justice Chamberlain, in his judgment, found that there had been no error of law in this case. His ruling extensively considered the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, but found that “[u]nlike in the field of mitigation, and subject to the arguments about the effect of the ECHR as interpreted in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] (…), there is no internationally binding quantified standard governing how States must adapt to climate change. It would be very difficult to devise any such standard because the risks of climate change differ widely from state to state (and indeed within states). In some places, the main risk may be from flooding, in other places extreme heat or drought. Elsewhere, there may be a combination of risks, which all have to be addressed but some of which are more urgent than others. Moreover, the profile of risks, and the priorities attached to addressing them, may change over time” (para. 92 of the High Court ruling).

Assessing the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment overall, Judge Chamberlain found that while this judgment “represents a significant development of the case law in relation to climate change, not only as regards the standing of associations to bring claims before the Strasbourg Court, but also as regards the scope and extent of the positive obligations of the State and the margin of appreciation to be accorded when assessing whether those obligations have been discharged”, “the significance of the judgment for the UK’s climate change framework should not be overstated.” The Judge noted that KlimaSeniorinnen focused heavily on lacunae in domestic legislation and the targets set out in the Paris Agreement, whereas the law of the United Kingdom does not feature similar lacunae in mitigation target-setting.

Lawyers for the government in this case had sought to dismiss the findings of the ECtHR, as made in para. 552 of KlimaSeniorinnen, as an obiter dictum. This paragraph of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment reads as follows:

Furthermore, effective protection of the rights of individuals from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well-being and quality of life requires that the above-noted mitigation measures be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection. Such adaptation measures must be put in place and effectively applied in accordance with the best available evidence (…) and consistent with the general structure of the State’s positive obligations in this context (…).

Judge Chamberlain disagreed with the government as concerns the nature of this finding, noting the dangers of applying “common law concepts [the idea of obiter dicta] to the judgment of a court most of whose members come from different legal traditions.” Still, Judge Chamberlain noted that the Strasbourg Court’s findings were of a general nature (para. 101). He found that KlimaSeniorinnen “appears to indicate that the positive obligation imposed by Articles 2 and 8 [ECHR] extends to adopting and effectively implementing ‘adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection'”, stemming from the State’s underlying regulatory obligation. He notes that “[w]hat that means in the context of adaptation measures, however, is far from clear” (para. 103), given that adaptation measures were not central to the KlimaSeniorinnen case, and that the international legal framework in this regard is less well-developed than for mitigation measures. He went on to anticipate future rulings from the ECtHR, considering it

(…) likely that, if the Strasbourg Court had in a future case to apply the reasoning in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] to the adaptation context, it would say that:
(a) the narrow margin of appreciation in relation to the mitigation aims was justified by reference to the internationally agreed objective of carbon neutrality by 2050 and the impact of one State’s default on other States;
(b) neither of these features applies in the field of adaptation; and
(c) accordingly, in the field of adaptation, States are to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation in setting the relevant objectives and a wider margin still in setting out the proposals and policies for meeting them (by analogy with the margin accorded to the State in setting the means for achieving the mitigation objectives).

Accordingly, he found that the current adaptation framework in the United Kingdom appears to “fall comfortably within the UK’s margin of appreciation under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR” and is not “contrary to any clear and consistent line of authority from the Strasbourg Court”. On this basis, he found that there was neither an error of law nor an incompatibility with human rights law evident in this case.

Friends-of-the-Earth-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Environment-Food-and-Rural-AffairsDownload

Application to the European Court of Human Rights:
In July 2025, Friends of the Earth announced that the case had been filed as an application before the European Court of Human Rights.

More information:
For reporting on the case, see coverage from the Guardian and the Independent.

Suggested citation:
High Court of Justice for England and Wales, R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs, [2024] EWHC 2707 (Admin), 25 October 2024.

Last updated:
13 November 2024

Categories
2023 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Margin of appreciation Paris Agreement Separation of powers Spain Standing/admissibility Victim status

Greenpeace Spain et al. v. Spain

Summary:
In 2020, three environmental NGOs (Greenpeace, Ecologistas en Acción and Oxfam Intermón) challenged the level of ambition of the Spanish government’s domestic greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets in what has been described as the first-ever Spanish climate case. At the material time, the Spanish ambition was to reduce emissions by 23% by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels); the three NGOs argued that this target should have been more ambitious, at 55%. In the absence of any response to the challenge by the Government, in September 2020, the three NGOs filed an administrative appeal to the Spanish Supreme Court. In 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, with the plaintiffs announcing their intention to seize the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Claims made:
These proceedings challenged delays in the adoption of the National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (‘Plan Nacional Integrado de Energía y Clima’ or PNIEC), as required under European Union law (by 31 December 2019, see EU Regulation 2018/1999), as well as its low level of amibition. The Spanish government missed this deadline, only transmitting its PNIEC to the European Commission on 31 March 2020. In their pleadings, the applicants argued that the Spanish state must take more ambitious measures in order to guarantee respect for human and environmental rights for present and future generations.

Ruling:
On 24 July 2023, the case was decided by the Spanish Supreme Court, which rejected the appeal in full. The Court noted the formal nature of the complaints about delays in the adoption of the plan, and emphasized the short time frame for the adoption of the PNIEC imposed by EU law, as well as the complexity of decision-making within multi-level governance frameworks, which meant that the plan could not be considered void as a whole.

As concerns the level of amibition of the plan, the Supreme Court noted the need to decide this case under Spanish law, and not the case-law from other jurisdictions that had been cited by the applicants; it also noted the need to respect the concrete legal obligations that Spain had assumed under the Paris Agreement, as well as the need to balance climate action with the interests of a sustainable economy.

The Court held that the State had a wide margin of discretion in this context, and that the case was asking it to exceed its role by not only declareing an acceptable emissions target, but accordingly by imposing far-reaching changes to Spain’s economic policy. It noted that while the targets under the Paris Agreement were minimum targets (“at least”), as were those under EU law, the Spanish legislator had chosen to adhere to these minima, and not to exceed them.

On the fundamental rights claim, the Court referred to EU law on locus standi, especially the Armando Carvalho case. It emphasized the need to prevent voiding the criterion of direct and individual concern. Accordingly, it found that the alleged infringement of human rights by the PNIEC was not sufficient in itself to render these claims admissible. The decision to adhere to the minima set out under EU law could not be considered arbitrary, but instead constituted a legitimate exercise of the Spanish government’s constitutional powers.

Further proceedings:
After the ruling was issued, Lorena Ruiz-Huerta, counsel for the plaintiff organizations, announced their intention to take this case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in order to “force the State to protect the human rights that are seriously threatened by climate change”.

Suggested citation:
Spanish Supreme Court, Greenpeace Spain et al. v. Spain, no. 1079/2023, 24 July 2023, ECLI:ES:TS:2023:3556.

Further information:
For the Supreme Court’s ruling (in Spanish), see here.

The applicants’ pleadings (in Spanish) are available via ClimateCaseChart.com.

Last updated:
4 August 2023

Categories
2018 Biodiversity Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Nepal Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to subsistence/food

Padam Bahadur Shrestha v. Office of Prime Minister and Others

Summary:
The petitioner, Padam Bahadur Shrestha, had applied to the concerned authorities in Nepal to enact a separate law on climate change in August 2018, but did not receive a response. He thus filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Nepal alleging that the situation in Nepal is marked by absence of a special climate change legislation, inadequacies in existing environmental legislation in addressing climate change, and poor implementation of the State’s climate change policy. He argued that this suffices to establish a violation of the right to life, right to live in a healthy and clean environment, right to health care and right to food found in Articles 16, 30, 35, and 36 of the Nepali Constitution.

Date of decision:

25 December 2018

Court’s decision:

The Supreme Court of Nepal found that an amendment to the existing laws and introduction of a new consolidated law that addresses climate change was necessary and issued detailed directions on what features the new law must contain. It based this order on the reasons that such would facilitate Nepal’s compliance with its obligations under international law, including the Paris Agreement and that climate mitigation and adaptation directly concern fundamental rights including the right to life, right to have nutritious food and the right to a clean environment. It further held that although the Environmental Protection Act of 1997 addressed environmental protection along the dimension of climate change, its provisions were inadequate regarding climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Status of the case:

Decided.

Suggested case citation:

The Supreme Court of Nepal, Padam Bahadur Shreshta v Office of the Prime Minister and Others, NKP, Part 61, Vol. 3, judgment of 25 December 2018.

Case documents:

For the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nepal (in Nepali), click here.

For an unofficial English translation of the judgment (authored by Hardik Subedi), click here.