Category: Vulnerability

Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland

Post author By Corina Heri
Post date 9 Apr 2024
3 Comments on Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland

Summary:
In 2016, the Senior Women for Climate Protection Switzerland (German: ‘Verein KlimaSeniorinnen’), a Swiss organisation, brought proceedings concerning the alleged omissions of the Swiss federal government to adopt an adequate climate protection policy. They submitted that current domestic climate targets and measures are not sufficient to limit global warming to a safe level. This failure to prevent climate-related disasters, they argued, represents a failure to protect the rights under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the rights to life and respect for private and family life, respectively) of the organization’s members. In particular, they submitted evidence that their specific demographic (older women) is particularly impacted by heatwaves, citing health impacts and excess mortality risks. The respondent State, they argued, has failed to comply with its positive obligations to protect their rights, read in light of the environmental law principles of precaution and intergenerational equity.

The applicants also invoked two procedural rights under the Convention, namely the rights in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR (right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, respectively). In this regard they argued that the domestic courts failed to take their case seriously and provide an effective remedy to contest the violation of their rights.

These claims were rejected by the domestic instances at three levels of jurisdiction. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in its ruling, considered that the case represented an actio popularis, concerned questions better suited to the political arena, and did not raise an arguable claim of a rights violation. As a result, the applicants took their case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

This case was only the second climate change-related case to come to Strasbourg. Like the Duarte Agostinho case, this application raised novel questions before the Court, including the issue of victim status in climate cases, the standing of (environmental) NGOs to bring cases to the Court, and the extent of the State margin of appreciation in regard to environmental protection measures related to climate change, and the extent of the positive obligation to protect individuals from the risks to their life and health posed by climate change.

On 9 April 2024, in a historic ruling, the ECtHR declared this case admissible in part (for the association) and found that there had been violations of Articles 6(1) and 8 ECHR. In doing so, this case became the Court’s leading climate judgment, and a model for further climate-related cases in this system.

Third-party interventions:
There were an unusually large (for the ECtHR) number of third party interventions in this case: 23 in total, including eight States. The KlimaSeniorinnen association provided copies of all of the third-party interventions; these are available here. Some of the third-party interveners were also granted leave to intervene orally during the hearing before the Grand Chamber.

Grand Chamber hearing:
This was the first climate case heard by the European Court of Human Rights, followed immediately by the Carême v. France case. The Court has adjourned its examination of six other climate cases until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the three climate change cases before it, meaning that leading judgments clarifying the Convention obligations around cliamte change can be expected in these cases.

During the hearing, submissions were heard from the applicants, the respondent State, and two of the 23 total third-party interveners (the Government of Ireland & the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). A live summary of the hearing is available here.

General findings of the Court in its judgment of 9 April 2024:
The Court’s judgment is prefaced by a number of general findings that reflect its intended nature as a leading case. Noting the need to ensure effective protection of Convention rights without undermining the prohibition of actio popularis cases under the Convention system, the Court acknowledged that it had a role to play here, finding that “the current situation (…) involves compelling present‑day conditions, confirmed by scientific knowledge, which the Court cannot ignore in its role as a judicial body tasked with the enforcement of human rights.” At the same time, noting “the necessarily primary responsibility of the legislative and executive branches and the inherently collective nature of both the consequences and the challenges arising from the adverse effects of climate change”, it held that the isuse of victim status here raised an issue of the separation of powers, requiring particular consideration. Noting the global and complex nature of climate change, it held that “the necessity of combating climate change involves various conflicts, the weighing‑up of which falls, as stated previously, within the democratic decision‑making processes, complemented by judicial oversight by the domestic courts and this Court.”

In light of this, and before assessing the case, the Court set out a number of general considerations relating to climate‑change cases. This includes questions of causation, including the finding that despite indirect causal links, “the essence of the relevant State duties in the context of climate change relates to the reduction of the risks of harm for individuals”, meaning that it could not apply”a strict conditio sine qua non requirement” to matters of causation. This section also includes issues of proof and evidence, and references the “evolution of scientific knowledge, social and political attitudes and legal standards concerning the necessity of protecting the environment”. Here the Court established that “there are sufficiently reliable indications that anthropogenic climate change exists, that it poses a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights guaranteed under the Convention, that States are aware of it and capable of taking measures to effectively address it, that the relevant risks are projected to be lower if the rise in temperature is limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and if action is taken urgently, and that current global mitigation efforts are not sufficient to meet the latter target” (para. 436). And, importantly, it discarded the “drop in the bucket” argument made by the respondent State, stating that “The relevant test does not require it to be shown that “but for” the failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred. Rather, what is important, and sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State, is that reasonable measures which the domestic authorities failed to take could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm” (para. 444). It also stressed that there is no right to a healthy environment in the ECHR, but that it can and has nonetheless dealt with other environmental cases, reiterating its past approach that “the crucial element which must be present in determining whether, in the circumstances of a given case, an environmental harm has adversely affected one of the rights safeguarded by the Convention is the existence of a harmful effect on a person and not simply the general deterioration of the environment” (para. 446). It also noted that it is conscious of its subsidiary role and the direct democratic legitimation of national authorities to make decisions on climate policy, but that where State policy affects Convention rights, it has competence to intervene and “the Court’s competence in the context of climate-change litigation cannot, as a matter of principle, be excluded” (paras. 449-451).

The Court also set out the relevant principles for interpreting the ECHR, including the living instrument approach and the fact that while the Court “does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention” — including the Paris Agreement — it has consistently noted that it will interpret the Convention in harmony with other international law.

Admissibility:
On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case admissible in part. Under Article 34 ECHR, it used this judgment as an opportunity to create new standards on victim status specific to climate-related cases. In doing so, it set out the general standards on victim status, noting that it did not admit actio popularis cases and that the ECHR “does not permit individuals or groups of individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention” (para. 460). It noted that the notion of victim status must be applied flexibly, and that it’s distinct from locus standi, i.e. representative actions.

The Court then issued general considerations on victim status and locus standi in climate cases, noting that “there is cogent scientific evidence demonstrating that climate change has already contributed to an increase in morbidity and mortality, especially among certain more vulnerable groups, that it actually creates such effects and that, in the absence of resolute action by States, it risks progressing to the point of being irreversible and disastrous” (para. 478).

It also held that (para. 479): the critical issues around climate change “arise from failures to act, or inadequate action”, meaning omissions in legislative or regulatory frameworks that require a special approach to victim status. Importantly, the Court also clarified that its findings on victim status in the context of complaints about omissions in climate policy “is without prejudice to the determination of victim status in circumstances where complaints by individuals concern alleged violations arising from a specific individual loss or damage already suffered by them” (para. 480), meaning that the specially approach spelled out for mitigation cases need not preclude other types of claims. However, it held, in the context of climate change, “a potentially a huge number of persons could claim victim status under the Convention”, which “would not sit well with the exclusion of actio popularis from the Convention mechanism and the effective functioning of the right of individual application” (para. 483). The Court clarified the difficult situation in which it found itself, between “disrupting national constitutional principles and the separation of powers” and depriving individuals affected in their rights from “any judicial recourse before the Court”, noting the “distinct representational disadvantage” of those most affected (para. 484). It then, in para 487 of the judgment, spelled out the criteria for individual victim status in climate cases. These are:

(a) “a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change”, i.e. a significant level and severity of risk of adverse consequences; and
(b) “a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm.”

Given that there is no actio popularis under the Convention, the Court held, “the threshold for fulfilling these criteria is especially high”, and will depend on specific vulnerabilities and local circumstances as well as including considerations relating to: “the nature and scope of the applicant’s Convention complaint, the actuality/remoteness and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on the applicant’s life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicant’s vulnerability” (para. 488).

As to the standing of associations, the Court generally reiterated its previous Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others judgment, which had allowed representative standing for an organisation. It noted that recourse to collective bodies like associations can make defense of one’s interests more accessible in certain circumstances, including the context of climate change, noting that this general principle was also reflected in the Aarhus Convention, which it discussed extensively. The Court then set out some general principles on organizations’ victim status versus their standing as representatives of victims. In light of the former, it reiterated past case-law finding that “an association cannot rely on health considerations or nuisances and problems associated with climate change which can only be encountered by natural persons”. But it also recognized that understandings of the importance of litigation by associations had evolved, and that climate cases are complex and demanding and affect many individuals (para. 498). In addition, “the special feature of climate change as a common concern of humankind and the necessity of promoting intergenerational burden-sharing in this context (…), speak in favour of recognising the standing of associations before the Court in climate-change cases” (para. 499). However, this should not mean allowing an actio popularis: a test for associations’ standing is required. To design its test, the Court had regard to the Aarhus Convention while also noting key difference between its approach and that under Aarhus.

The test it devised for associations looks as follows: associations will have locus standi to bring climate cases about impacts on human lives and health where they:

(a) have been lawfully established in the relevant jurisdiction, or have standing to act there;
(b) pursue, under their statutory objectives, a dedicated purpose of defending the human rights of their members or other affected individuals in the jurisdiction concerned, and
(c) are genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of affected individuals in the jurisdiction who are subject to specific threats on their lives, health or well-being from climate change.

The Court also noted that it would consider additional factors, like the purpose for which the association was established, its non-profit character, the nature and extent of its activities, its membership and representativeness, its principles and transparency of governance and whether standing is in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

There was no need, however, to show that those on whose behalf the case has been brought would themselves have met the climate-specific victim-status requirements for individuals as set out earlier in the judgment.

Because the Court joined its actual analysis of the victim status requirement to the merits of the case, this is discussed in the following section.

Merits:
In setting out general principles on the applicability of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life), the Court noted past cases where the right was applicable to situations where there is a threat to life, but “where the person concerned did not die”. Although noting the evidence on vulnerable populations, the Court reiterated that the appropriate test here is one of whether there is a “real and imminent” risk to life, meaning that the risk must be serious, gennuine, sufficiently ascertainable and in physical proximity. It then tailored this last aspect to the nature of climate change, stating that it would suffice to show “an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant”. This means that, provided an applicant has victim status, “a serious risk of a significant decline in a person’s life expectancy owing to climate change ought also to trigger the applicability of Article 2.”

As for Article 8 ECHR, the Court stated generally that it was necessary to show an “actual interference” with the right, meaning that there needs to be “a direct and immediate link between the alleged environmental harm and the applicant’s private or family life or home”, and a certain level of severity. Drawing on its past environmental case-law, the Court went on to establish that “Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 519).

The Court then considered the applicability of Art. 8 ECHR to the case before it. As concerned the applicant association, it found that it met the criteria for standing by associations as set out earlier in the judgment, describing the KlimaSeniorinnen association as “a vehicle of collective recourse aimed at defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State”. The the complaints pursued by the association on behalf of its members, it held, fall within the scope of Article 8. The association accordingly had locus standi, and Article 8 was declared applicable to its complaint.

On applicants 2-5 (the individual applicants), the Court held that the threshold for meeting its two criteria (high-intensity exposure and a pressing need to ensure protection) was high. It was not enough to show that they were particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The crucial paragraph of the judgment here is para. 533: “while it may be accepted that heatwaves affected the applicants’ quality of life, it is not apparent from the available materials that they were exposed to the adverse effects of climate change, or were at risk of being exposed at any relevant point in the future, with a degree of intensity giving rise to a pressing need to ensure their individual protection (…). It cannot be said that the applicants suffered from any critical medical condition whose possible aggravation linked to heatwaves could not be alleviated by the adaptation measures available in Switzerland or by means of reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their complaint was accordingly declared inadmissible.

On the claims under Article 2, the Court held that it was not necessary to analyze this further, noting that its analysis would “have regard to the principles developed also under Article 2, which to a very large extent are similar to those under Article 8 (…) and which, when seen together, provide a useful basis for defining the overall approach to be applied in the climate-change context under both provisions.”

The Court then recapitulated more general principles now on the merits proper. It held that the Article 2 and 8 positive obligations are generally quite similar, requiring the State:

(a) to put in place an adequate legislative and administrative framework and govern the licensing, setting-up, operation, security and supervision of the activity;
(b) to apply that framework effectively in practice;
(c) to remain within their margin of appreciation;
(d) to exercise due diligence and consider all competing interests;
(f) to provide access to essential information enabling individuals to assess risks to their health and lives;

Noting also that “the scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in the particular circumstances will depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation”.

In reviewing the domestic decision-making process, the Court has particular regard to the following considerations:

(a) Its subsidiary role;
(b) The need to consider all of the procedural aspects;
(c) The presence of appropriate investigations and studies;
(d) The public’s access to the conclusions of the relevant studies; and
(e) Whether or not the individuals concerned had an opportunity to protect their interests in the environmental decision-making process, i.e. participate effectively.

Turning to States’ positive obligations relation to climate, it first considered the State margin of appreciation. Having regard to the scientific evidence, the Court considered it justified to give climate protection considerable weight against competing considerations.

Regarding the margin of appreciation it distinguished between the scope of the margin as regards (i) the State’s commitment combating climate change and setting objectives in this respect, and (ii) the choice of means designed to achieve those objectives. The margin is more narrow with regard to the former. For the latter aspect, i.e. the choice of means, States have a wide margin of appreciation.

As to the content of States’ positive obligations under Article 8, this is primarily a regulatory obligation. This means that, in line with their international commitments, States need to put in place regulations and measures to prevent climate change. The global aims in the Paris Agreement are not enough; and “must inform the formulation of domestic policies, it is obvious that the said aims cannot of themselves suffice as a criterion for any assessment of Convention compliance of individual Contracting Parties to the Convention in this area. This is because “each individual State is called upon to define its own adequate pathway for reaching carbon neutrality, depending on the sources and levels of emissions and all other relevant factors within its jurisdiction.”

This means that Article 8 ECHR “requires that each Contracting State undertake measures for the substantial and progressive reduction of their respective GHG emission levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within, in principle, the next three decades” (ca. 2050). To avoid a disproportionate burden on future generations, this means immediate action needs to be taken and adequate intermediate reduction goals must be set for the interim period. The Court spelled out that this must be part of a binding regulatory framework at the national level, followed by adequate implementation, and that “the relevant targets and timelines must form an integral part of the domestic regulatory framework, as a basis for general and sectoral mitigation measures.”

In para. 550, the Court set out the criteria it would use to decide whether a State has remained within its margin of appreciation, namely whether the authorities had due regard to the need to:

“(a) adopt general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality and the overall remaining carbon budget for the same time frame, or another equivalent method of quantification of future GHG emissions, in line with the overarching goal for national and/or global climate-change mitigation commitments;
(b) set out intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways (by sector or other relevant methodologies) that are deemed capable, in principle, of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant time frames undertaken in national policies;
(c) provide evidence showing whether they have duly complied, or are in the process of complying, with the relevant GHG reduction targets (…);
(d) keep the relevant GHG reduction targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and
(e) act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures.”

These mitigation measures, it added, must be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account particular protection needs.

The Court also set out procedural safeguards, namely

(a) The publicity of relevant information; and
(b) The availability of procedures to take into account the views of the public, and in particular the interests of those affected.

Applying these principles to the case before it, the Court held that it could “take into account the overall situation in the respondent State”, including relevant information that came to light after the domestic proceedings, but that here, given an ongoing domestic legislative process, its assessment was limited to examining the domestic legislation as it stood on the date of the (internal) adoption of the judgment, which was 14 February 2024.

The Court noted that the currently existing 2011 CO₂ Act (in force since 2013) required that emissions reductions of 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. However, as far back as August 2009, the Swiss Federal Council had found that the scientific evidence under a 2-2.4°C warming limit required a reduction in global emissions of at least 50-85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Industrialised countries (like Switzerland) had to reduce their emissions by 25-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. for the higher 1.5°C limit, emissions would have to decline continuously, and the pathway 20% by 2020 pathway was insufficient to achieve that objective.

As the Government acknowledged, domestic assessments found that even the reduction target for 2020 had been missed. Between 2013 and 2020, Switzerland reduced its emissions by around 11% compared with 1990 levels, indicating the insufficiency of the authorities’ past action to take the necessary measures to address climate change.

A proposed revision of the CO2 Act for 2020-2030 proposed an overall reduction of 50% of emissions, including a domestic reduction of 30% by 2030 and measures to be taken abroad (“external emissions”). This proposal was rejected in a popular referendum in June 2021. Here the Court held that, “irrespective of the way in which the legislative process is organised from the domestic constitutional point of view”, there was a legislative lacuna, pointing to a failure on the part of the respondent State to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 to devise a regulatory framework setting the requisite objectives and goals.

Reflecting the updated Swiss NDC, the Climate Act was enacted, and envisages the principle of a net‑zero emissions target by 2050, but several lacunae remain, and “the Court has difficulty accepting that the mere legislative commitment to adopt the concrete measures “in good time” (…) satisfies the State’s duty”, especially because “the introduction of that new legislation is not sufficient to remedy the shortcomings identified in the legal framework applicable so far.”

Currently, the Swiss goal used more emissions than even a globally equal “per capita emissions” approach would entitle it to use.

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that there was no established methodology to determine a country’s carbon budget, and noted that an NDC under the Paris Agreement was not an appropriate substitute. The Court approved of the reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Neubauer, where it rejected the argument that it was impossible to determine the national carbon budget by emphasizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

Thus, “while acknowledging that the measures and methods determining the details of the State’s climate policy fall within its wide margin of appreciation, in the absence of any domestic measure attempting to quantify the respondent State’s remaining carbon budget, the Court has difficulty accepting that the State could be regarded as complying effectively with its regulatory obligation under Article 8” (para. 572). This meant that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (by a majority of 16-1).

On the issue of Article 6 ECHR, concerning the right of access to a court, the Court held that the issue of victim status should again be joined to the merits, and the Court again dove in with general principles, finding that it did not per se need to tailor these principles to the nature of climate change cases.

Examining these principles in the case before it, the Court held that “it cannot be said that the individual applicants’ claim was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise lacking in foundation in terms of the relevant domestic law (…). The Court is unable to agree with the finding of the FSC that the individual applicants’ claim could not be considered arguable for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention” (para. 618). It went on to find that interests defended by the association meant that the “dispute” raised by it had a direct and sufficient link to its members’ rights. Finding that Article 6 (1) applied to the complaint of the applicant association, the Court also considered it to have victim status.

For the individual applicants, however, the Court found that the dispute they had brought concerning the failure to effectively implement mitigation measures was not directly decisive for their specific rights. They had not shown that there was a sufficiently imminent and certain effect on their individual rights, and this part of their complaint was inadmissible.

For the association, among other things, the Court rejected the domestic courts’ findings that there was still some time to prevent global warming from reaching the critical limit, and noted that they “did not engage seriously or at all with the action brought by the applicant association.” There had accordingly been a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR, with the Court emphasizing “the key role which domestic courts have played and will play in climate-change litigation”.

The applicants also complained that they had not had access to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. Here the Court noted that Article 6 is a lex specialis to Article 13, the latter being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6, so there was no separate issue in its regard.

Remedies:
The individual applicants had made requests for just satisfaction for damage under Article 41 ECHR, but the organisation did not, so no award was made. The Court did award costs and expenses to the amount of EUR 80,000.

The applicants had also made an Art. 46 claim for a general measures order. Here the Court noted that it is primarily for the State to choose, under the supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used domestically to discharge its obligation to comply with the Court’s judgment, as long as the means are compatible with the conclusions and spirit of that judgment. The Court went on to hold that, “having regard to the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, the Court is unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the present judgment.” It noted the State’s broad margin of appreciation choose the means to discharge its Convention obligations, and found that the State was thus better placed than the Court to decide which specific measures to take.

Separate opinions:
A separate opinion by Judge Eicke is annexed to this judgment. He disagreed with the majority in several points, especially victim status and the merits of Art. 8. He presented his view as a disagreement of a “fundamental nature” that “goes to the very heart of the role of the Court within the Convention system and, more generally, the role of a court in the context of the unique and unprecedented challenges posed to humanity” because the majority had exceeded “the permissible limits of evolutive interpretation”.

According to Judge Eicke, the majority judgment creates a new right to “effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well‑being and quality of life arising from the harmful effects and risks caused by climate change”. While acknowledging the seriousness of the threat of climate change, and noting “(a) the absolute need for urgent action and (b) the sheer complexity of the challenges climate change (and the other aspects of the “triple planetary crisis”) pose (geo-)politically, practically, logistically as well as legal,” he argues that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances (Article 2(2) Paris Agreement) is “difficult to reconcile (if not wholly inconsistent) with the Court’s primary role of ensuring observance of a common minimum standard of protection applicable equally to all Contracting Parties”.

On victim status, Eicke argues that “there was, in fact, no dispute and no uncertainty about the “victim” status of the individual applicants in relation to the Article 6 § 1 complaint in this case; and therefore no need to join that question to the merits”. He sets out and adheres to the previously established case-law on victim status, refusing to join the majority in creating a new approach tailored to climate cases and arguing that exceptions should only be possible where individual applications document victim status are not “ever” likely to be possible. He argues that the judgment creates an actio popularis.

Under Articles 2 and 8, Eicke argues that while it would have been possible to find a procedural violation of Articles 2 or 8, “the substantive violation of Article 8 which the majority seeks to construct from this starting premise has no basis either in the text of the Convention nor in any of the Court’s case-law.” He considers that “the Court would already have achieved much if it had focussed on a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and, at a push, a procedural violation of Article 8 relating in particular to (…) the right of access to court and of access to information”. He accuses the majority of trying “to run before it could walk”, and “giving (false) hope that litigation and the courts can provide “the answer” without there being, in effect, any prospect of litigation (especially before this Court) accelerating the taking of the necessary measures towards the fight against anthropogenic climate change”, and mentions the risk that this judgment will distract from other efforts to tackle climate change.

Implementation measures taken:

N/A

Date of decision:
It was announced on 26 March 2024 that the Grand Chamber would issue its judgment in this case, along with the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber, in a hearing to be held on 9 April 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The judgment and a summary were made available on the Court’s HUDOC database immediately after the hearing.

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
This case was communicated to the respondent State, Switzerland, on 17 March 2021. On 26 April 2022, a Chamber of the Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, held a public hearing in this case on 29 March 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here. On 9 April 2024, the Court issued its judgment in the case.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, no. 53600/20, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:

The Court’s HUDOC database: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-209313
More information on the case in English: https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/english/.
All documents on the case: https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/dokumente/, including the application to the Court.

Webcast of the hearing:
To watch a webcast recording of the public hearing in this case, which was held before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 29 March 2023, click here (available in French and English).

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Tags European Court of Human Rights

Adaptation Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Imminent risk Non-discrimination Private and family life Right to housing Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise The United Kingdom Vulnerability

R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs

Post author By Corina Heri
Post date 10 Nov 2023
No Comments on R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs

Summary:
On 17 October 2023, the reportedly first-ever domestic adaptation case was brought against the United Kingdom before its High Court of Justice. The plaintiffs in this pending case include Kevin Jordan, a homeowner from Norfolk (UK), who alleges that his home is acutely threatened by coastal erosion, with the road leading up to it having already collapsed into the sea. Jordan has brought his case together with the NGO Friends of the Earth and disability rights activist Doug Paulley, a care home resident who alleges that his health conditions are being exacerbated by climate-aggravated heatwaves. Together, the plaintiffs challenge the UK’s National Adaptation Programme (NAP). Domestic law requires the production of new NAP every five years, and the most recent version — NAP3 — was published in July 2023. The claimants argue that NAP3 is deficient for the following reasons:

Failure to set sufficiently specific objectives;
Failure to conduct and publish information on the assessment of the risks involved in implementing NAP3;
Failure to consider the unequal impacts of NAP3 on protected groups (on the grounds of age, race and disability); and
Violation of Articles 2, 8, 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the rights to life, respect for private and family life, non-discrimination and property, respectively), as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998.

In regards to the alleged human rights violations, the plaintiffs invoke:

a. The well-established but urgent need for long-term policy and protected funding to enable care-homes (and similar healthcare settings) to adapt to excessive heat. This remains absent in NAP3 despite the increasing frequency and severity of annual heatwaves.
b. There being no new policy to manage overheating risks in existing health and social care buildings, such that they are properly refurbished as soon as reasonably practicable.
c. A lack of a commitment to provide adequate resources to support communities at imminent risk of being lost to erosion and flooding, including as to the established mental health and emotional wellbeing impacts for those affected.
d. Gaps, inconsistency and uncertainty in the potential allocation of funding provided for a range of areas, in particular for those communities that must (or are likely to have to) relocate and have their homes demolished.
e. There being no insurance or compensation schemes available for the worst affected by coastal erosion and who lose their homes.
f. No evidence of their being an express consideration, or reasoned analysis, of what a fair balance to strike would be between doing more to safeguard the human rights of vulnerable people and the interests of wider society.
https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2023/20231101_21608_complaint.pdf (emphasis added)

More information:
See the press release here, and the information document obtained by ClimateCaseChart here.

For reporting on the case, see the Guardian.

Suggested citation:
High Court of Justice for England and Wales, R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs, filed on 17 October 2023.

Tags Domestic court proceedings

Adaptation Biodiversity Children and young people Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Imminent risk Indonesia Loss & damage Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to development and work Right to education Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to subsistence/food Right to water Sea-level rise Vulnerability

Indonesian Youths and others v. Indonesia (Rasya Assegaf and 12 others v. Indonesia)

Post author By Corina Heri
Post date 8 Aug 2023
No Comments on Indonesian Youths and others v. Indonesia (Rasya Assegaf and 12 others v. Indonesia)

Summary:
This case was brought by thirteen children, youth, and members of vulnerable groups from different parts of Indonesia, all of whom allege that they are affected by the Indonesian Government’s response to climate change. The seven youth plaintiffs, aged 7-29, together with six adults whose involvement in agrarian and farming activities renders them particularly vulnerable, invoke their constitutitional rights to life, to live in physical and spiritual prosperity in a good and healthy environment, to self-development through the fulfillment of basic needs, to food and water, to education, to work and earn a decent living, as well as the minor plaintiffs’ rights as children. They brought their complaint to Indonesia’s National Commission of Human Rights, the counrty’s independent national human rights authority, calling on it to exercise its monitoring and mediating function.

The complaint in depth:
The plaintiffs in this case emphasize that the Indonesian government has recognized the country’s extreme vulnerablility to the impacts of climate change, including to sea level rise, heat waves, storm surges, tidal flooding, shifts in the wet and dry seasons, changes to rain patterns, decreased food production, disturbances in the availability of water, the spread of pests, plant and human diseases, the sinking of small islands, and the loss of biodiversity. They also emphasize that Indonesia is already experiencing many of these serious climate change impacts, and that these will only continue to get worse.

In their submissions to the National Commission of Human Rights, the plaintiffs particularly emphasize the effects of heat stress combined with Indonesia’s humid climate; the loss of food security and livelihoods in fishing and tourism due to coral bleaching and a decrease in fish stocks; unpredictable precipitation patterns and resulting drought, water insecurity and flooding; and the impacts of heat and precipitation changes on agriculture, food and water security, and plant diseases and pests. They also emphasize the risks associated with tidal floods, high waves, saltwater intrusion and strong winds due to sea level rise, which endanger lives and will cause a loss of living space, shelter, food and water insecurity. In this regard, they note research by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank that shows that, in a high emissions scenario, and without adaptation, more than 4,2 million Indonesians will be affected by permanent tidal flooding by 2070–2100. This same research shows that 5.5-8 million Indonesian people will be affected by flooding from once-in-a-century storm surges by 2030. In addition, they note that climate change causes a higher incidence of vector-borne diseases affecting children and vulnerable populations, such as malaria, dengue fever, and cholera. Several of the plaintiffs have suffered from these diseases already. Other impacts on the health of children include air pollution, malnutrition and stunting, drowning during floods, coastal flodding, and mental health impacts such as climate anxiety. Citing a study from the American Psychological Association, they argue that experiencing extreme weather events leads to higher rates of depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, drug and alcohol use, domestic violence, and child abuse.

The plaintiffs emphasize that they have already experienced flooding, cyclones, extreme heat, vector-borne illness, climate anxiety, and impacts on their homes and agricultural or fishing livelihoods. They submit that the Government of Indonesia has a constitutional responsibility to protect them from the human rights impacts of the climate crisis, and allege that it has failed to do so by contributing to causing and exacerbating the climate crisis. Noting that Indonesia’s domestic law and its NDC under the Paris Agreement acknowledge the link between human rights and climate change, they submit that constitutional rights should be interpreted in harmony with international human rights law. This, they argue, means recognizing that Indonesia has obligations to mitigate and adapt to climate change, as well as cross-sectoral obligations to ensure that all climate adaptation and mitigation actions are inclusive, fair and participatory, and to prioritize the most affected and vulnerable populations.

The plaintiffs argue that the Indonesian government should prioritize mitigation through a moratorium on new coal-fired power plants and the licensing of palm oil plantation concesssions as well as by promoting sustainable polycultural and indigenous farming practices that will reduce its net GHG emissions and ensure crop resilience.

In terms of adaptation, the plaintiffs argue that Indonesia should ensure protection especially of those living in vulnerable areas, including small islands, riparian and lowland areas, coastal areas, and dry areas. This should take place through a community-oriented, inclusive and participative process, and should serve to upgrade infrastructure, provide social protection mechanisms, prioritize nature-based adaptation through ecosystem restoration, strengthen the resilience of food systems and ensure that adaptation does not take place at the expense of any vulnerable groups or future generations. In particular, they emphasize the rehabilitation of mangrove and coral ecosystems, given their function as natural flood and erosion protection; the promotion of sustainable agricultural practices, and procedural obligations to ensure consultation, information, inclusivity and equity.

The plaintiffs note Indonesia’s knowledge of climate change, its commitment to the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degree warming target under its Updated NDC, and its awareness of the risk of huge economic losses due to the dangers of climate change. Against this background, they argue that Indonesia has violated its human rights obligations by failing to mobilize the maximum available resources and take the highest possible level of ambition in mitigating its emissions, noting that it is one of the world’s largest emitters of land use change and energy emissions and the world’s seven largest emitter of cumulative emissions. They argue that, to align with the 1.5°C degree warming scenarios, Indonesia needs to limit its emissions from 660 to 687 million metric tons of CO2e by 2030. It is failing to do so, instead expanding its coal-fired power plant network and supporting ongoing deforestation.

The plaintiffs argue that these measures, i.e. the government’s failure to take adaptive steps, and its contribution to and exacerbation of climate change, have violated their right to a healthy environment, their right to health, their right to life and their rights to food and water. As concerns their right to development, the plaintiffs argue that “[t]he impact of climate change on the right to development has a ripple effect across all human rights”. They also link the government’s policies to impacts on their enjoyment on the right to education and the right to work and earn a decent living. Lastly, for the child applicants, they note risks for the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, access to education, proper food, proper housing, safe drinking water, and sanitation.

Measures requested:
The Plaintiffs request that the Commission:

State that climate change is a human rights crisis, and that each additional degree of heating will cause further impacts;
State that climate change has disrupted their rights to a healthy environment, life, health, and development through the fulfillment of basic needs, food, water, education, and employment; that the child plaintiffs are particularly vulnerable in this regard; and that the Government has violated its obligation to respect, protect, uphold and fulfill the plaintiffs’ human rights;
State that “the government has contributed to and continues to perpetuate the climate crisis by knowingly acting in disregard of the available scientific evidence on the necessary measures to mitigate climate change”, and that its actions — such as its approval of new coal-fired power plants, approval of large-scale deforestation and land clearing, and failure to implement basic adaptation measures — are an expression of this;
Recommmend immediate review of law and policy to reduce GHG emissions, mobilize resources, and minimize losses;
Recommend steps to reduce Indonesia’s national GHG emissions, including moratoria on new coal plants and on concessions for oil palm plantations, industrial forest plantations, and the clearing of peatlands; the promotion of sustainable and polycultural agricultural practices; and adaptation measures; and
Recommend an inclusive, fair, open, and effective approach to public participation in climate-related decision-making.

Developments in the case:
The case is still pending. However, in receiving the case during a hearing held on 14 July 2022, two of the Commissioners heard directly from the plaintiffs and welcomed the petition. Commissioner Choirul Anam stated that “climate change is an enormous problem, which influences various human rights. It is our job to push for better government actions in responding to climate change.”

Further information:
The text of the complaint in this case is available (in Bahasa and English) from ClimateCaseChart.com.

For a comment, see Margaretha Quina and Mae Manupipatpong, ‘Indonesian Human Rights Commission’s First Human Rights Complaint on the Impacts of Climate Change’, Climate Law Blog, 22 November 2022, available here.

Suggested citation:
National Commission of Human Rights of Indonesia, Indonesian Youths and others v. Indonesia, complaint filed on 14 July 2022.

Last updated:
8 August 2023.

2023 Biodiversity Children and young people Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Right to a healthy environment Sea-level rise Separation of powers Standing/admissibility United States of America Victim status Vulnerability

Navahine F., a Minor v. Dept. of Transportation of Hawai’i et al.

Post author By Corina Heri
Post date 7 Aug 2023
No Comments on Navahine F., a Minor v. Dept. of Transportation of Hawai’i et al.

Summary:
In January 2022, fourteen young people filed suit against the Department of Transportation of the US state of Hawai’i, its Director, the state’s Governor, and the State itself. In Hawai’i Circuit Court, they alleged that the state’s transportation system violated the Hawai‘ian Constitution’s public trust doctrine and the right to a clean and healthful environment that it enshrines. The plaintiffs argued that the state and its authorities had “engaged in an ongoing pattern and practice of promoting, funding, and implementing transportation projects that lock in and escalate the use of fossil fuels, rather than projects that mitigate and reduce emissions”. Arguing that Hawai’i was the most carbon-dependent state in the nation, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They made a variety of arguments about the destruction of the Hawai’ian environment, coral reefs, native species of plants and marine life, and beaches; about their health and well-being, including about climate anxiety and about existing health conditions that are aggravated by the effects of climate change; about flooding and its impact on their ability to go to school; about water and food security, including impacts on traditional food sources, traditional and indigenous ways of life and culture; about wildfires; and about climate anxiety.

Claims made:
The plaintiffs note that Article XI, section 1 of the Hawai’i Constitution requires Defendants “[f]or the benefit of present and future generations,” to “conserve and protect Hawai’i’s natural beauty and all natural resources.” Article XI, section 1 further declares that “[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.” The Constitution also explicitly recognizes the right to a clean and healthful environment. Noting the special vulnerability of Hawai’i to climate-related ecological damage, including from sea-level rise, and the disproportionate harm to children and youth, including the lifetime exposure disparities concerning extreme events such as heat waves, wildfires, crop failures, droughts, and floods, they allege that the state of Hawai’i, through its Department of Transportation, has “systematically failed to exercise its statutory and constitutional authority and duty to implement Hawai’i’s climate change mitigation goals and to plan for and ensure construction and operation of a multimodal, electrified transportation system that reduces vehicle miles traveled and greenhouse gas emissions, and helps to eliminate Hawai’i’s dependence on imported fossil fuels”.

Ruling on Motion to Dismiss:
On 6 April 2023, the First Circuit Court rejected the respondent’s motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The state had argued that the public trust doctrine did not apply to the climate, “because climate is not air, water, land, minerals, energy resource or some other “localized” natural resource.” It had also argued that any efforts by the state would not have an impact on climate change given the scale of the problem.

The Court held in this regard that, in any event, the state as trustee had an obligation to keep its assets, i.e. its trust property, from falling into disrepair. It thereby rejected the argument that climate change was “too big a problem” and the idea that the state had no obligation to reasonably monitor and maintain its natural resources by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and planning alternatives to fossil-fuel heavy means of transportation. The Court also recognized that “the alleged harms are not hypothetical or only in the future. They are current, ongoing, and getting worse.”

On the argument that the applicants did not have a sufficient interest in the case, the Court held that the plaintiffs “stand to inherit a world with severe climate change and the resulting damage to our natural resources. This includes rising temperatures, sea level rise, coastal erosion, flooding, ocean warming and acidification with severe impacts on marine life, and more frequent and extreme droughts and storms. Destruction of the environment is a concrete interests (sic).”

Finding that arguments based on the political question doctrine were premature in this case, and citing case-law finding that this doctrine does not bar claim based on public trust duties, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the case.

Trial date set:
It was announced in August 2023 that trial dates for this case had been scheduled for 24 June-12 July 2024 at the Environmental Court of the First Circuit for Hawai’i. This would make this only the second-ever constitutional rights climate case to go to trial in the United States, after the Held and others v. Montana case. The case will be heard by First Circuit Judge John Tonaki.

Further information:
For the ruling of the First Circuit Court, see here.

Suggested citation:
First Circuit Court of the State of Hawai’i, Navahine F., a Minor v. Dept. of Transportation et al., Civ. No. 1CCV-22-0000631, ruling of 6 April 2023.

Last updated:
16 August 2023

Tags Domestic court proceedings

Access to a remedy Children and young people Extreme poverty Haiti Human dignity Inter-American Human Rights System Right to life Vulnerability

Petition of Children of Cité Soleil and SAKALA

Post author By ganesanpranav
Post date 2 Aug 2023
No Comments on Petition of Children of Cité Soleil and SAKALA

Summary:

On 4 February 2021, six children of Cité Soleil, Haiti and a community center established to provide safe harbor for children in Cité Soleil (SAKALA Community Center for Peaceful Alternatives) communicated a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging human rights violations arising from the adverse environmental conditions that they are subject to.

Facts of the case:

The petitioners’ concern relates to the local waste management system in Cité Soleil, which is woefully inadequate and exposes residents to risks arising from toxic waste and fumes. They complain that waste from other cities is brought into Cité Soleil but not contained in sanitary landfills or subjected to waste treatment. Piles of trash are burnt in the open, worsening the air quality, and floods carry the trash into residential areas, and lead to the contamination of water sources. They argue that climate-related adverse events magnify the adverse environmental conditions that children in Cité Soleil are faced with, aggravating their vulnerability.

Claims:

The petitioners allege that Haiti is engaged in violations of the rights of the child, the right to dignity, the right to life, and the right to judicial protection of children in Cité Soleil. They request the Commission to recommend Haiti to undertake concrete measures addressing the environmental pollution problem and providing specialized and adequate medical care to the children. Aside from requesting an investigation on the matter and granting the reliefs sought, the petitioners have requested the Commission to grant precautionary measures of protection in the interim- requiring Haiti to take urgent measures and protect the children in Cité Soleil from harm.

Status of the case:

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is yet to decide on the admissibility of the petition.

Links:

For the petition (in English), click here.

Last updated:

2 August 2023.

Tags Inter-American Commission of Human Rights

2023 Canada Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Right to life Standing/admissibility Vulnerability

Mathur et al. v. HM the Queen in Right of Ontario

Post author By Corina Heri
Post date 22 Jun 2023
No Comments on Mathur et al. v. HM the Queen in Right of Ontario

Summary:
On 25 November 2019, seven Canadian young people and the NGO Ecojustice brought a case against the State of Ontario, arguing that it had failed to take adequate action to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions and contesting the State’s “dangerously inadequate GHG reduction target” as set out under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act of 2018. Under this legislation, Ontario aims to reduce GHG emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. To contest the adequacy of this target, and the previous repeal of the more ambitious Climate Change Act (with its target of 45% reductions by 2030), the applicants invoked sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom (the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right to equal protection under the law). Arguing that they have a serious and genuine interest in this case, which also impacts all Ontario youth and future generations, they noted that climate change will cause heat-related fatalities, harms to human health, increased fire activity and the spread of disease, increased flooding and other extreme weather events, harmful algal blooms and exposure to contaminants, harms to Indigenous peoples, and psychological harms and mental distress.

Claims made:
Noting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the leading role of developed countries under the Paris Agreement, the applicants argued that Ontario’s current emissions reductions target compromises their right to life, liberty and security of the person “in a serious and pervasive manner that does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice”. They furthermore submitted that the target violated the right to liberty of Ontario’s youth and future generations, because it impacted their ability to make choices about their futures. They invoked the principle of “societal preservation” and human dignity, and argued for the recognition of a right to a stable climate system. Concerning the right to equal protection under the law, they argued that youth and future generations are in a uniquely vulnerable situation given their age and exclusion from political participation and the fact that they will be disproportionately impacted by climate change.

Relief sought:
Among other things, the applicants sought the invalidation of the existing emissions reductions targets and the rules for setting such targets, a declaration that it violates unwritten constitutional principles about avoiding harm, a recognition of the right to a stable climate system, and an order that Ontario must set out a science based GHG reduction target consistent with its share of global emissions.

Decision on admissibility:
On 12 November 2020, the Superior Court of Justice for Ontario rejected a motion from the government to dismiss the case. The government had invoked the absence of a right to a stable climate from the Charter, the plaintiffs’ alleged lack standing to represent future generations, and the absence of sufficient evidence or a reasonable cause of action.

Hearing:
A hearing in this case was heard from 12-14 September 2022.

Judgment:
On 14 April 2023, the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario delivered its judgment in the case. The Court found that, although the policies in question were justiciable given that the applicants had challenged specific state acts and legislation, the applicants had not established a violation of their rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In her judgment, Justice Vermette noted that the issue of establishing Ontario’s “fair share” of the remaining carbon budget was not a justiciable issue, and “should be determined in another forum” (para. 109). Justice Vermette did consider it “indisputable that, as a result of climate change, the Applicants and Ontarians in general are experiencing an increased risk of death and an increased risk to the security of the person” (para. 120). However, she disagreed with the applicants’ characterization of the emissions reductions target as “authorizing, incentivizing, facilitating and creating the very level of dangerous GHG that will lead to the catastrophic consequences of climate change for Ontarians”, finding that “the target does not authorize or incentivize GHG” (para. 122).

While the target was not legally meaningless, and justiciable under the Charter, Justice Vermette found (contrary to the arguments of the applicants) that the question at issue was whether the Charter imposed positive obligations. Leaving this question open, albeit acknowledging that “the Applicants make a compelling case that climate change and the existential threat that it poses to human life and security of the person present special circumstances that could justify the imposition of positive obligations under section 7 of the Charter”, Justice Vermette found that any putative deprivation of Charter rights at stake was not contrary to “the principles of fundamental justice”, i.e. neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate. This test applies because the relevant right in the Charter, i.e. its Article 7, stipulates that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

Concerning the equality claim under Article 15 of the Charter, Justice Vermette found that Ontario’s climate policy did not distinguish based on age, but made a temporal distinction, and that accordingly there was no violation of that provision either.

Further reading:

The original application is available in full from Climate Case Chart, as is the admissibility order.

The judgment in the case is available here.

A comment on the judgment in this case, as well as its context, is available from Christie A. MacLeod, Annafaye Dunbar, and Rosemarie Sarrazin (Miller Thomson) here.

Suggested citation:
Superior Court of Justice for Ontario, Mathur v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 2316, 14 April 2023.

Last updated:
22 June 2023.

Tags Domestic court proceedings

Adaptation Biodiversity Children and young people Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Emissions reductions/mitigation Evidence Gender / women-led Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Inter-American Human Rights System Loss & damage Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Rights of nature Vulnerability

The 2023 Advisory Opinion Request to the IACtHR on the Climate Emergency

Post author By Corina Heri
Post date 3 Apr 2023
No Comments on The 2023 Advisory Opinion Request to the IACtHR on the Climate Emergency

Summary:
On 9 January 2023, the governments of Colombia and Chile jointly filed a request for an advisory opinion on the climate emergency and human rights to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The two governments requested clarification of the scope of States’ obligations, both in their individual and collective dimensions, in responding to the climate emergency within the framework of international human rights law, taking into account the different effects that climate change has on people in different regions and on different population groups, nature and human survival.

The governments asked the Inter-American Court to answer a series of questions grouped into six thematic areas, namely:

A. On the scope of States’ obligations to protect and prevent, including regarding their obligations to mitigate, adapt, regulate and monitor, and their response to loss and damage;

B. On States’ obligations to protect the right to life given the existing climate science, and taking into account the right of access to information and transparency of information, including under the Escazú Agreement;

C. On the obligations of States with respect to the rights of children and new generations, given especially the vulnerability of children;

D. On the State’s obligations concerning consultative and judicial procedures, taking into account the limited remaining carbon budget;

E. On the protective and preventative obligations concerning environmental and land rights defenders, as well as women, indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities; and

F. On shared and differentiated obligations and responsibilities in terms of the rights of States, the obligation of cooperation and given the impacts on human mobility (migration and forced displacement of people).

Extended summary:
In their request to the IACtHR, the two governments submit that they are already dealing with the consequences of the climate emergency, including the proliferation of droughts, floods, landslides and fires. These, they submit, underscore the need for a response based on the principles of equity, justice, cooperation and sustainability, as well as human rights. The two governments note that climate change is already putting humans and future generations at risk, but that its effects are not being experienced uniformly across the international community. Instead, given their geography, climatic conditions, socioeconomic conditions and infrastructure, they are particularly being felt in the most vulnerable communities, including several countries in the Americas. They emphasize that these effects are not proportionate to these countries’ and communities’ contribution to climate change.

The governments, in their request, emphasize the relevance of the right to a healthy environment, as well as other interrelated substantive and procedural rights (affecting life, human survival and future generations). They review the existing scientific evidence concerning the impacts and progression of climate change from the IPCC, and note the vulnerability of the Andean region. Emphasizing the utility of the human rights framework for understanding these harms, and “to advance and accelerate the collective response to the climate emergency in each State, regionally and globally”, they ask the Court to answer a series of questions “in order to provide guidance towards solutions based on human rights, with an intersectional perspective.” In doing so, they note the need for clear inter-American standards to accelerate the response to the climate emergency, arguing that while the concrete measures taken may vary, human rights obligations should be the framework for accelerating the response in a just, equitable and sustainable way.

The two governments refer to the 2017 Advisory Opinion of the IACtHR, which recognized the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous and individual right, and referred to the negative effects of climate change. However, they argue, there is a need to further clarify the human rights imapcts of climate change, and corresponding obligations. In this regard, they raise the existence also of collective rights for the protection of nature under international human rights and environmental law, and cite the need to protect fundamental biomes like the Amazon and to understand States’ shared but differentiated responsibilities in a way that copes with loss and damage. The two governments invite the Court to set out clear standards against the background of litigation and related developments, citing the Vanuatu advisory opinion request to the ICJ, the pending cases before the European Court of Human Rights, and the UN HRC’s Billy and ors. v. Australia case. An advisory opinion from the Court, they argue, would provide States with guidance for setting out domestic policies and programmes.

The questions asked:

A. On the State’s obligations of prevention and protection

Question A.1: What is the scope of States’ obligation to prevent climate phenomena created by global warming, including extreme events and slow-onset events, in accordance with their inter-American treaty obligations and in light of the Paris Agreement and the scientific consensus that calls to limit the increase in global temperature to 1.5°C?

Question A.2: In particular, what actions should States take to minimize the impact of climate-related damage, in light of their obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)? In this regard, what differentiated measures must be taken with respect to vulnerable populations or intersectional considerations?

Question A.2.A.: What must States consider in implementing their obligation to (i) regulate, (ii) monitor and oversee, (iii) order and approve social and environmental impact studies, (iv) establish a contingency plan, and (v) mitigate activities within their jurisdiction that aggravate or may aggravate the climate emergency?

Question A.2.B.: What principles should guide action towards mitigation, adaptation and the response to loss and damage created by the climate emergency in affected communities?

B. On the State’s obligations to protect the right to life given the existing scientific consensus

Taking into account the right to access to information and the obligations concerning the active production and transparency of information derived from Arts. 14, 4.1 and 5.1. of the ACHR, in light of Arts. 5 and 6 of the Escazú Agreement, the governments ask the Court to determine:

Question B.1.: What is the scope of States’ obligations in the face of the climate emergency, in terms of:

(i) the environmental information required;
(ii) the mitigation and climate adaptation measures to be adopted to address the climate emergency and the impacts of such measures, including specific just transition policies for groups and people particularly vulnerable to global warming;
iii) responses to prevent, minimize and address economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;
iv) the production of information and access to information on greenhouse gas emissions levels, air pollution, deforestation, and short-lived climate pollutants, analysis of sectors or activities that contribute to emissions, and more; and
v) establishing impacts on people, such as on human mobility (migration and forced displacement), effects on health and life, non-economic losses, etc.?

Question B.2.: To what extent does access to environmental information constitute a right that must be ensured to guarantee the rights to life, property, health, participation and access to justice, among other rights that are negatively affected by climate change, in accordance with the State’s obligations under the ACHR?

C. On the differentiated obligations of States with respect to the rights of children and new generations

Citing Art. 19 ACHR and Art. 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and recognizing the consensus of the scientific community that identifies children as the group most vulnerable in the long term to the imminent risks to life and well-being expected to result from the climate emergency, the govenments ask the Court to determine:

Question C.1.: What is the nature and scope of a State Party’s obligation to adopt timely and effective measures in the face of the climate emergency to ensure the protection of children’s rights derived from its obligations under Articles 1, 4, 5, 11 and 19 ACHR?

Question C.2: What is the nature and extent of a State Party’s obligation to provide children with meaningful and effective means to freely and fully express their views, including the opportunity to initiate, or otherwise participate in, any judicial or administrative proceedings concerning the prevention of climate change that constitutes a threat to their lives?

D. On the State’s obligations concerning consultative and judicial procedures

In consideration of Arts. 8 and 25 ACHR, and taking into account the scientific finding that there is a limited greenhouse gas budget that can still be emitted before reaching a dangerous and irrevocable level of climate change, and that this budget would be exhausted within a decade, the States ask the Court to clarify:

Question D.1.: What is the nature and extent of the State Parties’ obligation concerning to the provision of effective judicial remedies to provide adequate and timely protection and redress for the impairment of rights due to the climate emergency?

Question D.2.: To what extent should the obligation to consult take into account the climatic consequences of a given activity or projections concerning the emergency?

E. On the protective and preventative obligations concerning environmental and land rights defenders, as well as for women, indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities

In accordance with Arts. 1.1 and 2 ACHR and Art. 9 of the Escazú Agreement, the governments as the IACtHR to determine:

Question E.1.: What measures and policies should States adopt in order to facilitate the work of environmental defenders?

Question E.2.: What specific considerations should be taken into account to guarantee women human rights defenders’ right to defend the healthy environment and their land?

Question E.3.: What specific considerations should be taken into account to guarantee the right to defend the healthy environment and land in light of intersectional factors and differentiated impacts, among others, on indigenous peoples, peasant communities and Afro-descendants?

Question E.4.: In the face of the climate emergency, what information should the State produce and publish in order to determine the possibility of investigating various crimes committed against human rights defenders, including reports of threats, kidnappings, homicides, forced displacement, gender violence, discrimination, etc.?

Question E.5.: What due diligence measures should States take into account to ensure that attacks and threats against environmental defenders in the context of the climate emergency do not go unpunished?

F. On shared and differentiated obligations and responsibilities in terms of the rights of States

Bearing in mind that the climate emergency affects the entire world, and that obligations to cooperate and repair arise from the ACHR and other international treaties:

Question F.1.: What considerations and principles should States and international organizations, collectively and regionally, take into account in analyzing shared but differentiated responsibilities in the face of climate change from a human rights and intersectionality perspective?

Question F.2.: How should States act both individually and collectively to guarantee the right to reparation for the damages generated by their actions or omissions in the face of the climate emergency, taking into account considerations of equity, justice and sustainability?

Taking into account that the climate crisis has a greater impact on some regions and populations, among them, the Caribbean, island and coastal countries and territories of the Americas, and their inhabitants:

Question F.3.: How should the obligations of cooperation between States be interpreted?

Question F.4.: What obligations and principles should guide the actions of States in order to ensure the right to life and survival of the most affected regions and populations in different countries and in the region?

Considering that one of the impacts of the climate emergency is to aggravate the factors that lead to human mobility (migration and forced displacement of people):

Question F.5.: What obligations and principles should guide the individual and coordinated actions to be taken by States in the region to address non-voluntary human mobility exacerbated by the climate emergency?

Consultation procedure:

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR (Art. 73(3)), all interested parties (individuals and organizations) are invited to present a written opinion on the issues covered in the advisory opinion request. The President of the Court has established 18 August 2023 as the deadline for doing so. More information is available here.

Further information:

The text of the advisory opinion request is available here (in the official Spanish version as filed with the Court) and it has also been translated to English, French and Portuguese by the Court’s Secretariat.

For a comment by Juan Auz and Thalia Viveros-Uehara, see ‘Another Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency? The Added Value of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 2 March 2023, available here.

For a comment from Maria Antonia Tigre, see ‘A Request for an Advisory Opinion at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Initial Reactions’, Climate Law Blog, 17 February 2023, available here.

Tags Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Adaptation Biodiversity Children and young people Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Human dignity Imminent risk Paris Agreement Peru Private and family life Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to water Vulnerability

Álvarez et al. v. Peru

Summary:
This amparo case was filed before the Superior Court of Justice of Lima, Peru, on 16 December 2019. Brought by a group of young Peruvians, it alleges that the government has not taken adequate measures halt deforestation in the Amazon rainforest, a major carbon sink, and to take adequate mitigation and adaptation measures in the face of climate change. They submit that this particularly harms the rights of young people, whose futures are in jeopardy because of climate change.

Before the court, they invoke the constitutional and human right to a healthy environment, drawing in particular on the Peruvian Constitution, the ICESCR, and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (also known as the “Protocol of San Salvador”). They also invoke their right to human dignity (Art. 1 of the Peruvian Constitution) and their right to life (Art. 2.1 of the Peruvian Constitution), along with — among others — the right to health and to water. They also invoke the preventive and precautionary principles and draw on constitutional principles concerning the conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of natural resources, the social function of law, the best interests of the child, solidarity and intergenerational equity.

The claimants submit that public policies on environmental protection are insufficient “to mitigate a problem that, according to scientific evidence, is worsening and threatens the very survival of the human species on the planet. This scenario is even more acute for the claimants – minors, born between 2005 and 2011 – whose future is severely compromised as a result of the current climate and ecological crisis. The conditions for their well-being and that of their descendants for decades to come depend, to a large extent, on the actions taken today. Tomorrow will be too late. In Peru – a megadiverse country that is vulnerable to climate change – the problem is particularly pressing. The plaintiffs, therefore, have suffered a violation of their fundamental right to enjoy a healthy environment, as well as threats to their fundamental rights to life, to a “life project” (“proyeto de vida”), to water and to health” (translation from the original Spanish by climaterightsdatabase.com)

Further information:

The complaint (in Spanish) has been made public by climatecasechart.com.

For an interview with one of the applicants in this case, see here.

Suggested citation:

Superior Court of Justice of Lima, Álvarez et al. v. Peru, constitutional complaint submitted on 16 December 2019.

Last updated:

17 March 2023

Tags Domestic court proceedings

Adaptation Australia Climate-induced displacement Human Rights Committee Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Private and family life Right to culture Right to life Sea-level rise Standing/admissibility Vulnerability

Billy et al. v. Australia (Torres Straits Islanders case)

Post author By Corina Heri
Post date 21 Jul 2022
No Comments on Billy et al. v. Australia (Torres Straits Islanders case)

Summary:
This petition against Australia was brought to the UN Human Rights Committee by a group of eight indigenous Torres Straits Islanders in 2019, in their own names and on behalf of their children. In their petition, they argued that the Australian government had violated their rights, as inhabitants of low-lying islands, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because of its inaction in addressing climate change (failure to mitigate emissions and to take adaptation measures).

Rights at stake:
The applicants in this case invoked a series of rights in the ICCPR, on behalf of themselves and their children, contesting the respondent State’s failure to adopt mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and cease the promotion of fossil fuels. To support this, they drew on Article 27 (the right to culture), Article 17 (the right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home), and Article 6 (the right to life) ICCPR. They argued that the indigenous peoples of the Torres Strait Islands, especially those who reside on low-lying islands, are among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. They considered that the Australian government must ensure both mitigation and adaptation measures in order to adequately protect their rights. Previously, the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA), a government body, had stated that “the effects of climate change threaten the islands themselves as well as marine and coastal ecosystems and resources, and therefore the life, livelihoods and unique culture of Torres Strait Islanders.”

Outcome:

On 21 July 2022, the Human Rights Committee adopted its Views in this case.

Observations of the State:

The Australian Government argued that the case was inadmissible, contesting the relevance of climate-related international agreements and its own ability to be held (legally or practically) responsible for climate-related harms. It also submitted that it was not possible to attribute climate change to the State party under international human rights law.

The HRC’s considerations on the admissibility:

On the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Government’s position was that it did not owe a duty of care for failing to regulate environmental harm, and that it was not required to provide a remedy where (including in the present case) it understood there to be no breach of ICCPR rights. This question was accordingly reserved to the examination of the merits.

Concerning mitigation measures, the HRC noted that Australia is and has been a major greenhouse gas emitter, and ranks high on economic and development indices. As a result, it found that the alleged (in)actions fell under its jurisdiction under articles 1 or 2 of the Optional Protocol.

Concerning the imminence of the risk concerned, and accordingly the issue of victim status / standing, the Committee found that the authors of this Communication, “as members of peoples who are the longstanding inhabitants of traditional lands consisting of small, low-lying islands that presumably offer scant opportunities for safe internal relocation – are highly exposed to adverse climate change impacts”. Given the uncontested dependence of their lives and cultures on natural resources and phenomena, and their inability to finance adaptation measures on their own, the authors were considered to be “extremely vulnerable to intensely experiencing severely disruptive climate change impacts”. Given the authors’ allegations of serious ongoing adverse impacts, the HRC declared their claims under articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27 of the ICCPR admissible.

Merits:

Article 6

The Committee recalled that the right to life cannot be interpreted restrictively, and that it requires States to adopt protective measures (i.e. that it entails positive obligations). It recalled its own General Comment No. 36, issued in 2018, in establishing that the right to life also extends to reasonably foreseeable threats to life, including adverse climate change impacts and environmental degradation.

The Committee rejected Australia’s allegation that the interpretation of the ICCPR contained in this General Comment was not compatible with the rules of treaty interpretation under general international law. It then went on to recall its own earlier Teitiota v. New Zealand case (on climate-induced displacement), ultimately finding that the authors were not currently facing health impacts or real and reasonably foreseeable risks of being exposed harms to their right to life. The Committee also noted that the right-to-life claim being made largely related to the authors’ ability to maintain their culture, which falls under article 27 ICCPR.

Regarding the authors’ submission that, absent urgent action, their islands will become uninhabitable within 10 to 15 years, the Committee noted the adaptation and mitigation measures currently planned or being taken, and found that the time frame of 10 to 15 years could allow for additional protective measures or relocation programmes. As a result, it found that there had been no violation of the right to life in this case.

Article 17

The authors claimed that climate change already affects their private, family and home life, given that they may be forced to abandon their homes. The Committee considered that the authors’ dependence on marine and terrestrial resources and ecosystems is a component of their traditional indigenous way of life, falling under the scope of Article 17 ICCPR.

Considering the adaptation measures and related plans in place, the Committee noted the existence of unexplained delays in seawall construction and the lack of explanation concerning the loss of marine resources, crops and fruit trees. It noted the ongoing inundation of villages and ancestral burial lands; the withering of traditional gardens through salinification; the decline of nutritionally and culturally important marine species; coral bleaching and ocean acidification; and the authors’ anxiety and distress. The Committee also noted the importance of community lands for the authors’ most important cultural ceremonies. It accordingly found that:

“that when climate change impacts – including environmental degradation on traditional [indigenous] lands (…) – have direct repercussions on the right to one’s home, and the adverse consequences of those impacts are serious because of their intensity or duration and the physical or mental harm that they cause, then the degradation of the environment may adversely affect the well-being of individuals and constitute foreseeable and serious violations of private and family life and the home.”

Finding that Australia had failed to discharge its positive obligation to implement adequate adaptation measures to protect the authors’ home, private life and family, the HRC found a violation of the authors’ rights under article 17 ICCPR.

Article 27

Article 27 ICCPR recognizes the right of members of minority indigenous groups to the enjoyment of culture, and protects the survival and continued development of their cultural identity. Interpreted in the light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, this right enshrines the inalienable right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their traditional territories and natural resources. Here, the authors argued that their ability to maintain their culture has already been impaired due to climate change impacts, which have eroded their traditional lands and natural resources, for which there is no substitute on mainland Australia. The Committee found that these climate impacts represent a threat that was reasonably foreseeable by the State party, as the authors’ community had been raising the issue since the 1990s. While noting existing seawall construction projects, it considered that the delay in initiating these projects indicated an inadequate response by the State party to the threat in question. It found that the failure to adopt timely and adequate adaptation measures “to protect the authors’ collective ability to maintain their traditional way of life, to transmit to their children and future generations their culture and traditions and use of land and sea resources discloses a violation of the State party’s positive obligation to protect the authors’ right to enjoy their minority culture.” Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 27 ICCPR.

As a result of its findings concerning Articles 17 and 27 ICCPR, the HRC considered it not necessary to examine the authors’ remaining claims under article 24 (1) ICCPR.

Remedies:

Under Article 2 (3) (a) ICCPR, the HRC noted that the State was required to make full reparation to the authors, which meant providing adequate compensation; engaging in meaningful consultations with their communities to conduct needs assessments; continuing its adaptation measures and monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of existing measures; and taking steps to prevent similar violations in the future. The Committee requested the State to provide it with information about the measures taken in this regard within 180 days.

Separate opinions:

Several HRC members appended individual opinions to the Views. These include:

The individual opinion by Committee Member Duncan Laki Muhumuza, arguing that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life);
The individual opinion by Committee Member Gentian Zyberi, concurring but arguing that the Committee had focused too heavily on adaptation measures, and should instead have more clearly linked the right under Article 27 ICCPR to mitigation measures;
The joint opinion by Committee Members Arif Bulkan, Marcia V. J. Kran and Vasilka Sancin (partially dissenting), who argued that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life). They argued in particular that the “real and foreseeable risk” standard employed by the majority interpreted Article 6 too restrictively, and was inappropriate here as it had been borrowed from the dissimilar context of its refugee cases (Teitiota v. New Zealand, the HRC’s first climate-induced displacement case).

Full decision:

The HRC’s Views are available here.

Further reading:

Maria Antonia Tigre, ‘U.N. Human Rights Committee finds that Australia is violating human rights obligations towards Torres Strait Islanders for climate inaction’, Climate Law Blog, 27 September 2022, available here.

Verena Kahl, ‘Rising Before Sinking: The UN Human Rights Committee’s landmark decision in Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia,’ Verfassungsblog, 3 October 2022, available here.

Nicole Barrett and Aishani Gupta, ‘Why Did the UN Human Rights Committee Refuse Broader Protections for Climate Change Victims?’, Opinio Juris blog, 5 October 2022, available here.

Christina Voigt, ‘UNHRC is Turning up the Heat: Human Rights Violations Due to Inadequate Adaptation Action to Climate Change’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 26 September 2022, available here.

Monica Feria-Tinta, ‘Torres Strait Islanders: United Nations Human Rights Committee Delivers Ground-Breaking Decision on Climate Change Impacts on Human Rights’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 27 September 2022, available here.

Suggested citation:

UN Human Rights Committee, Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia, Communication No. 3624/2019, 22 September 2022, UN Doc. CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019.

Tags Domestic court proceedings

Imminent risk Indigenous peoples' rights International Court of Justice Paris Agreement Sea-level rise Vanuatu Vulnerability

Request for an ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change

Post author By Corina Heri
Post date 5 Jul 2022
No Comments on Request for an ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change

Summary:
On 29 March 2023, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resultion requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify States’ international obligations concerning climate change. This resolution, Res. A/77/L.58, was prepared on the initiative of the Government of Vanuatu, and was adopted by consensus by the UNGA. The request is currently pending before the ICJ.

Background:
In September 2021, during the UN General Assembly’s annual meeting, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu, Hon. Bob Loughman Weibur, announced that the country would build a coalition of States to seek an advisory opinion on climate change from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The initiative received support from a large number of co-sponsoring states.

The proposal aims to contest “environmental devastation and large-scale violations of human rights for the most vulnerable”. Under the slogan of “bringing the world’s biggest problem to the world’s highest court”, this initative was originally spearheaded by a group of students from the University of the South Pacific. By July 2022, the alliance behind the initative included over 1500 civil society organisations in 130 countries. It also received the endorsement of the Organisation of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (OACPS).

In July 2022, Vanuatu’s Minister of Climate Change, Hon. Silas Bule Melve, clarified the country’s ambitions for the advisory opinion. He stated that “[t]his is not a court case, and we do not seek to assign blame. But we do seek a credible way to bolster climate ambition moving forward to save the Paris Agreement and our blue planet”. The Republic’s legal team in this endeavor is led by Julian Aguon and Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh of the Pacific law firm Blue Ocean Law.

This approach follows an earlier initiative from 2012, by Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, which did not manage to rally a majority of General Assembly members in suport of presenting a question concerning climate change to the ICJ.

Question put to the ICJ:
The resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 29 March 2023. It decided, in accordance with Article 96 UN Charter, to request the ICJ, pursuant to Article 65 of its Statute, to render an advisory opinion on the following question:

“Having particular regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the duty of due diligence, the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of prevention of significant harm to the environment and the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment,

(a) What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations;

(b) What are the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment, with respect to:

(i) States, including, in particular, small island developing States, which due to their geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or specially affected by or are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change?

(ii) Peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change?”

Additional developments:
On 25 April 2023, the President of the ICJ made an Order organizing the proceedings and fixing time limits for written submissions by States and international organisations in this case.

In June 2023, the Court authorized the European Union, the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law and the International Union for Conservation of Nature to participate in the proceedings.

Further reading:

For more on Vanuatu’s original initiative, see here.
For a summary and analysis of the initiative, see the post on our blog by Pranav Ganesan.
For analysis by Maria Antonia Tigre and Jorge Alejandro Carrillo Bañuelos on the Sabin Center’s Climate Law Blog, see here.

Last updated:
6 July 2023.

Tags International Court of Justice (ICJ)