Category: Business responsibility / corporate cases

Categories
2026 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Just transition litigation Participation rights Participation rights Right to a healthy environment Right to culture South Africa

Sustaining the Wild Coast v. Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, South Africa

Summary:
On 14 August 2026, the Constitutional Court of South Africa issued a ruling concerning climate change, human rights, environmental protection, cultural rights, economic development, and sustainable development in the Sustaining the Wild Coast case.

The immediate question before the Constitutional Court concerned the appropriate remedy following unlawful administrative action. However, the judgment has broader constitutional significance. At issue is the Wild Coast, a roughly 250-kilometre stretch of coastline in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa with exceptional ecological, cultural, and economic importance. The area supports customary fishing practices, spiritual practices, and the livelihoods of coastal communities, while also providing habitat for endangered marine and bird species. The area enjoys protection as a recognised protected area in terms of South African national environmental management laws.

In 2013, Impact Africa applied for and was granted an exploration right to undertake seismic exploration for oil and gas. This right was renewed in 2017 and 2021. In 2021, Shell acquired a 50% participating interest in the exploration right. Shell then announced its intention to undertake a 3D seismic survey along the Wild Coast. The seismic survey involved the use of airguns to generate soundwaves directed towards the seabed in order to identify possible oil and gas deposits.

The applicants in this case, who are both non-governmental organizations and individuals, approached the High Court to prevent the respondents from conducting the seismic survey and set aside the decisions granting the exploration. The matter was heard in the High Court, which ordered an interdict preventing the seismic survey from proceeding pending review proceedings. The respondents then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which set aside the High Court’s order pending the application for the renewal of the exploration right. The applicants then appealed to the apex Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court situated the dispute within the interconnected relationship between people, the environment, and socio-economic development. In doing so, it considered the constitutional environmental right in section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; the rights of affected communities to participate in decisions affecting them; cultural and spiritual rights; dignity; livelihoods; intergenerational equity; and the state’s responsibilities in the context of climate change.

The environmental right in section 24 requires decision-makers to look beyond immediate consequences and consider future environmental conditions: it ‘requires an educated peek into the future with all the attendant uncertainties to safeguard the environment for those who will come after us’. The Court rejected an understanding of environmental protection and economic development as mutually exclusive, and warned against reducing cultural, spiritual, and environmental interests to interests that simply compete with economic development on equal terms. The Court stressed that economic development cannot be pursued without having regard to environmental consequences, while environmental protection cannot automatically prevent all forms of economic activity.

The Court clarified that this approach is relevant to climate change in that fossil-fuel development presents an obvious tension between economic development and environmental protection. This is because extraction may provide economic opportunities while contributing to greenhouse-gas emissions and potentially increasing long-term climate risks. In this regard, it noted that

In the context of extractive industries, the enquiry cannot be reduced to a formal balancing exercise that treats cultural, religious, spiritual and environmental concerns as merely competing interests against economic development. It is also ahistorical to place these interests on equal footing, given the long history of dispossession and marginalisation of coastal communities whose relationships with land and sea have often been subordinated to commercial extraction. Although job creation is a legitimate consideration, it cannot be assumed to be inherently beneficial without asking who receives those jobs, how secure they are and what social, ecological and cultural costs the affected communities are expected to bear. In this context, the communities’ constitutionally enshrined and protected rights are given practical force through procedural duties of meaningful consultation, participation and respect for their cultural and spiritual relationship with the environment. A just and equitable remedy should therefore not allow speculative or corporation-centred economic benefits to outweigh procedural justice where communities’ livelihoods, cultural identity and environmental interests are directly at stake (para. 132).

The judgment does not establish an absolute constitutional prohibition on fossil-fuel development. Instead, it requires these development decisions to be made within a lawful framework that properly considers environmental and climate consequences. The Court therefore understood environmental degradation, often caused by climate change, as potentially producing a cascade of human rights consequences. To this end, the Court permanently terminated Shell’s exploration rights and closed any renewal routes.

This case establishes a broader constitutional vision in which environmental decision-making must account for climate change, scientific uncertainty, community rights, cultural identity, dignity, and the interests of future generations. In this respect, the case strengthens the foundation for a rights-based approach to climate change action in South Africa. This case reaffirms that sustainable development requires genuine integration of environmental protection, human rights and socio-economic interests rather than the prioritisation of one at the expense of others.

Full text of the judgment:
The full text of the judgment is available for download below.

Sustaining the Wild Coast CaseDownload

Date of Decision:
14 August 2026.

Status:
Decided.

Suggested Citation:
Sustaining the Wild Coast NPC and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others; Natural Justice and Another v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others [2026] ZACC 33.

Credits:
This database entry was contributed by Michaela O’Donoghue, LLD Candidate in the Urban Law and Sustainability Governance Chair, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.

Categories
2025 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples' rights Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to development and work Right to health Sea-level rise South Africa

Green Connection NPC and Another v. Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment and Others

Summary:
On 13 August 2025, the Western Cape High Court (South Afria) delivered a judgment in a successful judicial review application that was brought by two public interest organisations, Green Connection NPC and Natural Justice, against the decisions to grant environmental authorisation to TotalEnergies and Shell for offshore oil and gas exploration drilling in Block 5/6/7, an area which is approximately 10,000km² off South Africa’s South-West coast between Cape Town and Cape Agulhas. The court upheld five of the six grounds of review and declared the decisions unlawful, remitting the matter to the Director-General (“the DG”) of the South African Department of Mineral Resources and Energy,  for reconsideration.

The review application concerned the granting of an environmental authorisation (“the EA”) to TotalEnergies and Shell in terms of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (“NEMA”), for the purpose of conducting exploration drilling to determine whether geological structures contain oil or gas – fossil fuels – in potentially extractable amounts. The application for an EA was lodged with the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy and it was granted by its DG on 17 April 2023. On 24 September 2023, the Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment dismissed the applicants’ internal joint appeal against the DG’s decision.

More details on the challenge:
Total and its co-venture partners, Shell and PetroSA, are co-holders of Exploration Right 12/3/224, granted under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 for Block 5/6/7. The block is situated 60-170km offshore at water depths of 700 and 3,200m. Following seismic surveys, Total sought to drill one exploration well and up to four additional wells.

The EA application triggered listed activities under the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations of 2014. Total commissioned technical modelling (drilling discharges, oil spill, underwater noise) and specialist studies (marine ecology, fisheries, socio-economic, cultural heritage, climate change). The Petroleum Agency SA reviewed the studies and recommended an approval. The DG granted the EA on 17 April 2023. The Minister dismissed an internal appeal on 24 September 2023, prompting the review application.

Rights at Stake:

  • Section 24(a) of the Constitution, the right to an environment not harmful to health or well-being.
  • Section 24(b) of the Constitution, the right to have the environment protected through reasonable measures preventing pollution and ecological degradation, promoting conservation, and securing ecologically sustainable development.
  • Interests of the whole community in coastal public property, including future generations and other living organisms dependent on the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008 (“ICMA”).
  • Rights of small-scale fishers and coastal communities to livelihood and cultural practices.

Claim:
The applicants’ review challenged the final environmental and social impact assessment report (“Final EIR”) prepared on behalf of TotalEnergies and the review grounds may be summarised as follows:

(a) Firstly, the Final EIR failed to properly assess and the state respondents failed to properly consider the socio-economic impact of the proposed project because it did not assess the socio-economic impact which a well blowout and consequent oil spill may cause on the fishing industry and small-scale fishers.

(b) Secondly, the decision-makers failed to consider the factors prescribed by ICMA.

(c) Thirdly, the Final EIR failed to assess and the state respondents failed properly to consider the need and desirability of the proposed project because no consideration was given to the climate change impacts which will be caused by burning any gas discovered by the proposed project.

(d) Fourthly, the Final EIR failed to assess and the state respondents failed to consider the transboundary impacts of the proposed project, both on Namibia and on international waters.

(e) Fifthly, neither the Final EIR nor the Environmental Management Programme Report included TotalEnergies’ Oil Spill Contingency Plan or Blow Out Contingency Plan.

(f) Sixthly, PASA delivered an appeal response report which at face value was submitted on behalf of the DG and was treated as such by the Minister.

Judgment:
On 13 August 2025, Judge Mangcu-Lockwood delivered judgment in favour of the applicants on the first five grounds of review and dismissed the sixth.

First Ground: The court held that once the Final EIR identified a potential blowout and oil spill as a potentially significant impact or risk, it was obliged to assess the consequences and probability of the impact or risk including those with a low degree of probability. The court rejected TotalEnergies’ distinction between a “risk” and an “impact” stating this was “against the spirit and purport of these Regulations. Both are required to be assessed in terms of the legislation, in equal measure.”

Second Ground: The court found that the DG’s decision made no specific mention of ICMA. Even based on a generous reading of the record, the court was unable to conclude that the Final EIR, and by extension the DG, considered ICMA factors. The court held:

“As the applicants point out, ICMA introduces concepts which are not present in NEMA or other aspects of environmental law, by conferring a special legal status on coastal public property, which afforded the environment a particularly high level of protection. It expressly provides that the State holds the coastal public property in trust for current and future generations. It creates the concept of the interests of the whole community, which specifically recognises the need to take into account the interests of other living organisms which are dependent on the coastal environment. As such the ICMA’s requirements cannot be satisfied by generic consideration of NEMA.”

The court found that the DG then failed to consider the ICMA factors and that his decision stood to be reviewed and set aside. The Minister’s decision was described as “woefully deficient” as it did not explicitly identify the ICMA factors to be considered and failed to set out any findings in respect thereof.

Third Ground: The court held there is “no doubt that climate change impact assessment must form part of the assessment to be conducted and considered before the grant of an environmental authorisation.” Regarding the distinction between exploration and production phases, the court stated: “Whilst it is correct that the specific activity for which the EA in this case is granted is exploration and not production… the two processes are intertwined. There would be no point in conducting an exploration activity unless an entity hoped to proceed to the next phase of production.”

Fourth Ground: Applying sections 232 and 233 of the Constitution, which require consideration of customary and international law, the court held:

“There is accordingly an obligation arising from customary international law and international law upon South Africa to not allow its territory to be used in a manner which causes transboundary harm. The duty includes a requirement for an environmental impact assessment to be conducted where an activity such as the present exploration activity, which poses a risk of transboundary harm, is to be conducted.”

Fifth Ground: The court found that given more focused information would be provided in the Oil Spill Contingency Plan and Blow Out Contingency Plan in another round of submissions it was “difficult to conclude that there had been a full assessment.” Even more problematic was the lack of public participation regarding these plans.

Sixth Ground: The court dismissed this ground and found that PASA as an organ of state designated under section 70 of the MPRDA to perform public functions was entitled to submit an appeal response.

Remedy:
The court made the following order:

  1. Shell Exploration and Production South Africa BV was joined as the fifth respondent. There were no costs in relation to the joinder application.
  2. The applicants’ late service of the review application was condoned.
  3. The decision taken by the third respondent on 17 April 2023 to grant an environmental authorisation to TotalEnergies to conduct exploratory operations in Block 5/6/7 was reviewed and set aside.
  4. The decision taken by the first respondent on 24 September 2023 dismissing the appeal of the first and second applicants was reviewed and set aside.
  5. The decision of granting an environmental authorisation to TotalEnergies was remitted to the third respondent for reconsideration, which process must provide for the following:
  6. TotalEnergies must be afforded the opportunity to submit new or amended assessments to cure the deficiencies identified in the first to fifth grounds of review.
  7. Public participation must be conducted in regard to the new and/or amended assessments submitted by TotalEnergies before decision is made by the third respondent.
  8. The first to third respondents were ordered to pay the costs of this application, jointly and severally, on a scale C, including the costs of three counsel.

Status of the case:
The High Court judgment has set aside the environmental authorisation and the matter remitted for reconsideration. The State and Shell have filed applications for leave to appeal, either before the Supreme Court of Appeal or a full bench of the High Court of South Africa.

Case Documents:
Judgment of the High Court of South Africa can be found here.

Commentary:

Academic and professional commentary on the cases is available here, here, and here.

Related case:
For related case-law, see:

Suggested Citation:
High Court of South Africa, Western Cape (Cape Town), Division Green Connection NPC and Another v Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment and Others, case no. 5676/2024, 13 August 2025, Judge Mangcu Lockwood.

Last updated:
3 August 2026.

Credits:
This database entry was contributed by Camagu Luvo, LLD Candidate in the Urban Law and Sustainability Governance Chair, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.

Categories
2022 Biodiversity Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Fossil fuel extraction Namibia Participation rights Participation rights Vulnerability

Ncumcara Community Forest Management Association v. the Environmental Commissioner of Namibia

Summary:
Reconnaissance Energy Africa is a Canadian oil and gas drilling company which operates in Namibia, Botswana, and Angola exploring for oil and gas. In 2019, Reconnaissance Energy Africa obtained a license allowing them to carry out exploratory oil drilling in part of the Okavango Delta. The Okavango Delta is a large freshwater wetland which supplies drinking water to a drought-stricken region susceptible to adverse climate change effects and is inhabited by diverse plant and animal species. Communities in the Okavango Delta in Namibia (represented by the Ncumcara Community Forest Management Committee) opposed these exploratory drilling practices and contested Reconnaissance Energy Africa being granted the license.

The license was later amended, against which the communities objected in a letter addressed to the Environmental Commissioner on 27 May 2022. This letter went unanswered. The communities then appealed to the Minister of Mines and Energy asking for the decision to grant the oil drilling license be rescinded or reviewed. This complaint went unanswered. The communities then filed a complaint with the Namibian High Court asking the Court to require the Minister to respond and to prohibit further drilling. The case was heard in the High Court on 13 July 2022 during which the communities claimed that their (procedural) human rights were being infringed because of the drilling on community-managed land which was already vulnerable to climate change. The communities further argued that they had not been properly consulted as is required by Namibian law, and that the drilling jeopardises the region’s only source of freshwater by making it vulnerable to pollution and exposes already endangered wildlife to increased risk.

The communities sought an urgent interim junction prohibiting any further drilling in the region. The High Court considered section 50 of Namibia’s Environmental Management Act 7 of 2007 in terms of which appeals against the Environmental Commissioner must be brought before and decided by the Minister of Mines and Energy. The Court therefore held that it did not have jurisdiction, and that its intervention would only be allowed where the Minister refuses to make any decision, or if the Minister has already made a decision. The Minister had not done either, meaning that it was still within the Minister’s jurisdiction to consider the communities’ appeals for the drilling licence to be revoked and the drilling to stop. The High Court therefore rejected the communities’ requests, and Reconnaissance Energy Africa continues to conduct exploratory oil drilling in the Okavango Delta. The communities were ordered to pay the legal costs.

Text of the decision:
The text of the decision can be consulted and downloaded below.

Ncumcara Community Forest Management Committee v Environmental Commissioner – DecisionDownload

Date of decision:
29 July 2022

Status:
Decided

Court:
High Court of Namibia, Main Division, Windhoek Judgment

Suggested citation:
Ncumcara Community Forest Management Association v The Environmental Commissioner (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN2022/00289) [2022] NAHCMD 380 (29 July 2022)

Last updated:
3 August 2026

Credits:
This database entry was contributed by Michaela O’Donoghue, LLD Candidate in the Urban Law and Sustainability Governance Chair, Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Categories
2005 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Farming Fossil fuel extraction Human dignity Nigeria Right to life

Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. and Others

Summary:
The applicant brought the action on behalf of himself and the Iwherekan community in Delta State in the Niger Delta region. The community had for decades been subjected to continuous gas flaring by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The applicant argued that this practice caused severe health problems, degraded agricultural land and water sources, polluted the air, and contributed to broader adverse climate change effects. He contended that the continued flaring of gas violated constitutionally guaranteed rights to life and dignity (in terms of sections 33 and 34 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria) as well as protections under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The court held that the gas-flaring violated constitutionally guaranteed rights, including the right to a clean, poison-free, pollution-free, healthy environment. Having found this, the court declared the practice unconstitutional in the applicant’s community and ordered Shell and the NNPC to take immediate steps to stop flaring gas there. It also directed the Attorney General of the Federation to initiate amendments to the relevant legislation to align it with constitutional guarantees.

This case constitutionalised environmental protection, embedding it within Nigeria’s fundamental rights framework. Secondly, it recognised that environmental harm, including greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse effects of climate change, can amount to a violation of the rights to life and dignity. Thirdly, it demonstrated judicial willingness to confront powerful corporate and state actors where fundamental rights are implicated. The judgment ultimately situates climate change and environmental protection within the core of human rights law, affirming that the rights to life and dignity necessarily include the right to a healthy and sustainable environment.

Text of the decision:
The text of the decision can be consulted and downloaded below.

Gbemre v Shell (Decision)Download

Date of decision:
14 November 2005

Status:
Decided

Court:
Federal Court of Nigeria

Suggested citation:
Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company
Nigeria Limited and Others (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC 2005) (Federal High Court of Nigeria in the Benin Judicial Division, suit FHC/B/CS/53/05, 14 November 2005)

Last updated:
3 August 2026

Credits:
This database entry was contributed by Michaela O’Donoghue, LLD Candidate in the Urban Law and Sustainability Governance Chair, Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Categories
2020 Business responsibility / corporate cases Deciding Body Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation France Keywords Paris Agreement Rights at stake State concerned Year

Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total

Summary:
On 25 June 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that TotalEnergies had failed to prepare an adequate vigilance plan under the French Law on the Duty of Vigilance of 27 March 2017, among other things because it had failed to include “scope 3” emissions, those associated with combustion of its fossil fuel products, in its “vigilance plan” required under the law.

The case began in 2019, when along with 13 municipalities and four other NGOs, the French environmental organization Notre Affaire à Tous requested the oil company Total to take measures to prevent human rights and environmental violations. After a meeting with Total in June 2019, the complainants issued a “mise en demeure” (a letter of formal notice) to the oil giant that is responsible for more than two-thirds of France’s greenhouse gas emissions. They granted Total three months to include reasonable greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in its “due diligence plan” before they would file a lawsuit.   

On 28 January 2020, the complainants asked the District Court of Nanterre to order Total to align its practices with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. According to the complainants, Total has not provided sufficient detail in its “vigilance plan” to reduce its emissions and that the company is still not in compliance with international climate agreements, such as the 2015 Paris Agreement. Among other requests, the complainants ask the Court to order Total to reduce its net emissions by 40% by 2040 (compared to 2019).

The complainants argued that Total’s obligation to take measures to prevent human rights and environmental violations stems from the French Law on the Duty of Vigilance. This law obliges a company to establish a detailed “vigilance plan” which identifies and seeks to mitigate the risks to human rights, fundamental freedoms, the environment, and public health that may result directly or indirectly from a company’s activities.

Total claimed that the Nanterre District Court lacked jurisdiction and requested that the case be brought before the Commercial Court. On 11 February 2021, the pre-trial judge rejected this request and confirmed the jurisdiction of the District Court. In order to settle this dispute, the Versailles Court of Appeal confirmed the District Court’s jurisdiction and based its decision on “the legislator’s intention to entrust actions relating to ecological damage to specially designated judicial courts only.”

Voluntary interventions:
Amnesty International France and the municipality of Poitiers voluntarily intervened in the initial proceedings as ancillary parties (‘voluntary intervention’). In 2022, they were joined by voluntary interventions from the City of New York and the City of Paris, both in support of the plaintiffs, arguing that they had a significant interest in climate mitigation.

In its 2024 ruling (below), the Paris Court of Appeal found that Amnesty International and the City of Poitiers lacked an interest in the case, noting with regard to the latter that it had failed to establish that the territory under its jurisdiction is subject to specific harm related to climate change. Likewise, the City of New York had insufficiently demonstrated its authority to intervene voluntarily in these proceedings, rendering the intervention null and void pursuant to Article 117 of the French Code of Civil Procedure.

However, the Court held that the City of Paris had a legitimate interest in preserving its rights by supporting the legal actions brought before the Paris Judicial Court aimed at mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. It declared the City of Paris’s voluntary intervention admissible, noting its engagement with mitigation action.

Dismissal of the preventive suit in July 2023:
On 6 July 2023, a pre-trial judge dismissed the preventive lawsuit on procedural grounds, noting that the plaintiffs’ notice to sue and their claims in the summons were not identical, as well as standing concerns in climate litigation generally.

Appeal:
The plaintiffs appealed the 2023 decision to the Paris Court of Appeal. On 18 June 2024, Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the case, meaning that it will proceed to trial. The Court declared the claims by the associations Notre Affaire à Tous, Sherpa, Zéa, and France Nature Environnement admissible. In doing so, it held that claims made in summons may be more expansive than those in a notice to sue, and also that claims under the French Civil Code concerning environmental harm have a different purpose than those brought under the French law on the duty of vigilance, meaning that the former is not displaced by the existence of the latter.

Concerning the standing of the plaintiff municipalities, the Court noted the general competence clause, based on article L2121-29 of the general code of local authorities, that grants them competence concerning the affairs of the municipality affecting a local public interest, with their action being limited to the territories they administer. However, it held that the applicant municipalities had insufficiently shown a specific interest to sue, e.g. specific climate-related impacts on their territory.

Ruling of 25 June 2026:
On 25 June 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that Total had failed to prepare an adequate vigilance plan, among other things because it had failed to include ‘scope 3’ emissions, those associated with combustion of its fossil fuel products, in the plan.

The court ruled that:

  • 1) the climate risks and impacts to which the company may contribute through its operations fall within the scope of the duty of care law of parent companies and contracting entities.
  • 2) The negative climate impacts caused by the release of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere, resulting from TotalEnergies’s operations, must be identified in the company’s risk assessment as part of its due diligence plan, as part of the duty of companies to take action based on their specific circumstances regarding serious risks and harms related to climate change.
  • 3) Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions are considered emissions resulting from the group’s activities under the law, due, in particular, to the inherent link between oil and gas production and the combustion of these products by users. Consequently, TotalEnergies’ due diligence plan, which did not include Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions, is incomplete. The court ordered TotalEnergies to complete its due diligence plan within six months, with provisional enforcement, by including Scope 3 emissions and related measures in its risk mapping.

The court clarified that since climate risks pose a serious, present, and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights—as recognized by the scientific community and international courts—companies must take these risks into account in their due diligence plans, as identifying them is an essential part of preventing serious human rights abuses. It held that the duty of vigilance law is not intended to hold companies liable for the risks related to climate change that result from all human activity on the planet since the Industrial Revolution. Instead, it calls on them to take preventive action, in accordance with their specific circumstances, to address the serious risks and harms to which their activities contribute, in line with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct—which served as the framework for the legal provisions of the French law—by establishing a duty of care that is a duty of means rather than a duty of result. In doing so, it held that since climate risks constitute a serious, present, and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights according to the consensus view of scientists and international courts, companies must take these risks into account in their due diligence plans, as their identification is part of preventing serious human rights violations (citing the ECtHR’s judgment in KlimaSeniorinnen and the ICJ’s climate advisory opinion).

The case was adjourned until 21 January 2027, before the pretrial judge of the 34th Civil Chamber of the Paris Judicial Court, for review of the incorporation of these measures into the due diligence plan.

Suggested case citation:
Nanterre District Court, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total SA, complaint of 28 January 2020.

Paris Court of Appeal, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total SA, N° RG 23/14348, Judgment of 18 June 2024.

Paris Court of Appeal, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total SA, N° RG 23/14348, Judgment of 25 June 2026.

Case documents:

The ruling of 25 June 2026, and related press release (both in French) are available for download below.

Jugement-34e-chambre-25-juin-2026Download
CP-25.06.2026-34eme-chambreDownload

Links:

  • For the full complaint (in French), see here.
  • For an unofficial translation of the complaint (in English), see here.
  • For the order confirming the jurisdiction of the Nanterre District Court (in French), see here.
  • For the 2024 judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal, see here.

Last updated:
25 June 2026.

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Fossil fuel extraction Right to a healthy environment

Ugandan Farmers v. EACOP Ltd.

Summary:
In May 2026, it was reported that a group of Ugandan farmers and environmental advocates were preparing a case that would challenge the construction of the nearly-completed East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) in UK courts. The pipeline, which is set to transport crude oil from Uganda to Tanzanian, is operated by a corporate actor registered in the United Kingdom (EACOP Ltd.), with TotalEnergies as a majority stakeholder in the project. The claimants in this case argue that the project threatens their right to a healthy environment, as guaranteed by the Ugandan Constitution.

This case follows other legal efforts to halt the pipeline project by litigating, among others, before the East African Court of Justice in Arusha.

More information on this case will be shared as it becomes available.

Last updated:
24 June 2026.

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life The Netherlands

Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell Plc (No. 2)

Summary:
On 21 April 2026, the Dutch NGO Milieudefensie delivered summons to oil and gas giant Shell Plc, in its second collective legal action against the company following the first Milieudefensie case (decided on appeal in 2024). This second case, under Section 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), is brought on behalf of current and future generations of Dutch citizens after the corporate actor moved its seat from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom. Milieudefensie summoned Shell to appear at a hearing to be held at the District Court of Amsterdam on 29 July 2026.

In its 273-page summons, Milieudefensie covers issues of jurisdiction, the requirements for a collective suit under Section 3:305a DCC, the scientific evidence underpinning its case, the risk of reaching climate tipping points for Europe and for the Netherlands, international climate policy and the global 1.5-degree temperature target, the important role played by non-state actors and their corporate responsibilities to respect human rights, the inhibiting influence of the oil and gas industry, including Shell, on infrastructural carbon lock-ins, including through its historical undermining of climate science and strategies to delay climate action, as well as its lobbying against the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD or CS3D) of 13 June 2024.

Milieudefensie sets out the framework for assessing Shell’s responsibility under Sections 3:296 and 6:162 DCC, fleshing this out by invoking the societal duty of care under domestic law, as well as the doctrine of hazardous negligence, human rights law (particularly Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, the rights to life and respect for private and family life), international customary law, international soft law, and legal principles including the precautionary principle, the climate law principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), and the principle of intergenerational justice. In particular, the summons argues that

“[s]ince the Urgenda judgment, it has been widely recognised in court judgments that dangerous climate change leads to human rights violations. Not only the ECHR, but also the IACtHR and the ICJ have recently found this. Numerous (supreme) national courts have independently reached the same conclusion. Within Europe, for example, reference can be made to the case law of the [German] Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Court of Appeal in Brussels. Outside Europe, the situation is no different. For example, the Lahore High Court in Pakistan, the Supreme Court of Colombia, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, the District Court of Montana (United States) and the Supreme Court of India have all ruled that human rights can be relied on in order to be protected against the effects of climate change. In view of the above, there can be no misunderstanding that human rights (indirectly) have a horizontal effect when the unwritten duty-of-care standard is fleshed out. Nor can there be any debate about the fact that dangerous climate change leads to human rights violations and that human rights can be relied on for protection against dangerous climate change. The only question that remains is what assessment framework needs to be applied here. “

Milieudefensie argues that Shell bears a share of the responsibility to prevent dangerous climate change, discussing its level of knowledge and the foreseeability of harm by arguing that Shell has long known about the fact that fossil fuels cause climate change, with serious consequences for people and the environment, has known that it is making a substantial contribution to climate change and that it needs to take (precautionary) measures. It sets out Shell’s two-pillared obligations: first, a reduction obligation for Scope 1, 2 and 3 CO2 emissions, and second, an obligation not to develop new oil and gas fields.

Concerning the first pillar of obligations, Milieudefensie argues that “Shell must make an equitable contribution (a “fair share”) to preventing dangerous climate change and limiting global warming to 1.5°C by reducing its emissions.” In doing so, it invokes UN reports to argue that:

  • companies must demonstrate maximum ambition to achieve (net) zero CO2 emissions as quickly as possible, but by 2050 at the latest;
  • companies must set ambitious and credible interim targets for the short and medium term on the road to the above-mentioned goal of net zero CO2 emissions that represent a fair share of the global reduction target; and
  • the (interim) targets should cover all Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions and should aim for absolute CO2 emission reductions.  

It also submits that “Shell can be considered to be an influential Western company in several respects; it has both substantial emissions and large transition capabilities and a large historical responsibility. These are all relevant circumstances under the above-mentioned climate protocols (as evidenced by e.g. the reference to the CBDR principle and the need to take on a fair share of the global target) for asking Shell to take on an above-average responsibility and requiring it to reduce its emissions faster than the global average.”

As concerns the second pillar of obligations, Milieudefensie argues that Shell’s obligation not to pursue new fossil fuel projects is “based on the doctrine of hazardous negligence, human rights law, the legal principles discussed, soft law and other objective points of reference, is that Shell must cease the development and production of new oil and gas fields. After all, the carbon budget with a 50% probability of 1.5°C is already exceeded with the operation of the existing fossil-fuel infrastructure alone, and new oil and gas fields are therefore incompatible with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C by the end of this century. “

Milieudefensie concludes that Shell is breaching its societal duty of care under domestic law, and seeks the following provisionally enforceable remedies:

  • Emissions reductions, covering annual Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, as per the table below;
  • A prohibition of achieving these reductions through divestment, i.e. through transfer of shares or assets;
  • To prohibit Shell from making use of carbon credits for the purpose of achieving the emission reductions described;
  • To order Shell to achieve that the Shell Group ceases, continues to cease and does not start the production of new oil and gas from fields.

More information:
The full text of the summons (translated into English by Milieudefensie) is available below. For more information on the case, see here.

Summons Milieudefensie v. Shell (No. 2)Download

Suggested citation:
District Court of Amsterdam, Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell Plc (No. 2), summons issued 21 April 2026.

Categories
Belgium Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Farming Fossil fuel extraction Private and family life Right to life

Falys et al. v. TotalEnergies (‘The Farmer Case’)

Summary:

In March 2024, Hugues Falys, a farmer located in Belgium, filed a legal action at the Commercial Court of Tournai (Belgium) against TotalEnergies. He was joined by Ligue des Droits Humains, Greenpeace Belgium and FIAN Belgium.

The objective of the legal action is to claim compensation for damages suffered by Falys as a result of climate breakdown, and to force TotalEnergies to move away from fossil fuels. The plaintiffs argue that Falys’s farm in Lessines (BE) has suffered a number of extreme weather events, including heatwaves and droughts, resulting in major financial losses, extra workload, stress and worry.

The civil liability action is based on articles 1382 and 1383 of the former Belgian Civil Code. In their submissions to the court, the plaintiffs have put forward human rights arguments as one line of interpretation of the relevant provisions, inter alia referring the ECtHR’s judgment in KlimaSeniorinnen multiple times.

Relevant developments:

On March 18 2026, the Commercial Court of Tournai found the action to be admissible, thereby recognising that carbon majors can be held accountable in Belgium for causing climate change even if their headquarters is in another state. With regards to the merits of the case, the Court postponed its judgment to 9 September 2026 to await the decision in a similar case against TotalEnergies in France.

See also:

Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total.

Links:

For the main conclusions of the plaintiffs (in French), see here.

For an unofficial translation of the main conclusions of the plaintiffs (in English), see here.

For the Court’s admissibility judgment of 18 March 2026 (in French), see here.

Last updated:

20 March 2026.

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights New Zealand

Smith v. Fonterra

Summary:
This case was brought by Michael John Smith (Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Kahu), who is the climate change spokesperson for a Māori development platform known as the Iwi Chairs’ Forum, and who is also the applicant in the case of Smith v. Attorney-General. In the present case, he brought proceedings against seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand who are involved in agriculture and energy sectors (namely Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd , Genesis Energy Ltd, Dairy Holdings Ltd, New Zealand Steel Ltd, Z Energy Ltd, Channel Infrastructure NZ Ltd and BT Mining Ltd.). He claimed that the emissions caused by these corporate actors constituted a public nuisance, acts of negligence, and a breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change. The New Zealand courts have issued a series of decisions on this case.

On 6 March 2020, the High Court of New Zealand struck out the first two causes of action (public nuisance and acts of negligence), but allowed the third (reach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change) to proceed.

After, on 21 October 2021, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Smith’s appeal and upheld the cross appeal of the respondents, Mr Smith received leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on 31 March 2022. On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court unanimously allowed Mr Smith’s appeal, and reinstated his statement of claim, and referred the case back to the High Court to proceed to trial (for more detail on the Supreme Court’s judgment, see below). After a series of procedural decisions, a substantive hearing in the case by the High Court was scheduled for April 2027.

Current state of the proceedings:
On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court of New Zealand reinstated the two dismissed tort causes of action and remanded the case to the lower court (the High Court). It held that the public rights pleaded laid an appropriate foundation for a nuisance claim. It also held that it was premature, at this stage of the proceeding, to conclude that the common law was insufficient to address the tortious aspects of climate change. Determining whether the actions of respondents, seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand, amount to a ‘substantial and unreasonable interference’ to public rights is a fact inquiry to be analyzed according to policy factors and human rights obligations.

On remand, the interlocutory applications raised noteworthy cost questions. The sixth defendant, BT Mining, sought an order for security for costs and Mr. Smith applied for protected cost orders (PCO). Here, the court has a wide latitude of discretion. It dismisses BT Mining’s request citing, among other considerations, access to justice concerns. Regarding Mr. Smith however, the court relies on the Edwards factors: (1) whether an issue of significant general or public importance is raised; (2) whether the applicant’s stance is seriously arguable; (3) whether the applicant is genuinely impecunious; (4) the position of the respondent, including “any unjust advantage likely to accrue to it absent the order”; and (5) any reasonable alternatives to making the order.

Reluctant to grant, the court emphasized the exceptional nature of a PCO in these proceedings. Mr. Smith, however, draws on Munkara v Santos NA Barossa Pty Ltd (No 4), an Australian Federal Court decision that ordered nonparty funders, the Environmental Defense Office, to pay costs to Santos, an oil company who defeated claimants’ petition for injunctive relief in the construction of a pipeline, to remind the court of the significant chilling effect of potential costs exposure on charitable funders. The court draws a distinction between a third-party funder and a ‘pure funder’ to reason that it would be highly unlikely for a costs award to be made against one that did not seek to benefit financially from the litigation nor seek to control its course. Unsatisfactory, but absent disclosure of third-party donor(s), the court declines Mr. Smith’s PCO application in its entirety. The decision, however, is without prejudice, leaving the door open to re-application with third-party funder identification.

Suggested citation:
Smith v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2024] NZSC 5, [2024] 1 NZLR 134.

Last updated:
19 September 2025.

Categories
Adaptation African Court on Human & Peoples' Rights Business responsibility / corporate cases Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Disability and health-related inequality Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation Environmental racism Evidence Extreme poverty Farming Gender / women-led Human dignity Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Minority rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Participation rights Private and family life Prohibition of torture Renewable energy Right to a healthy environment Right to assembly and association Right to development and work Right to education Right to freedom of expression Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to property Right to subsistence/food Rights of nature Sea-level rise Self-determination Standing/admissibility Victim status Vulnerability

African Court on Human and People’s Rights Climate Advisory Opinion

Summary:
On 2 May 2025, a request for an advisory opinion on climate change was submitted to the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The request was submitted by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), in collaboration with the African Climate Platform, and other African Civil society Organizations including the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, Natural Justice and resilient40, and seeks clarification of States’ obligations in the context of climate change.

Submitted under article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights and Rule 82(1) of the Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, the request submits that “[a]cross the continent, Africans are suffering the consequences of climate change, whether from rising temperatures, unrelenting droughts, catastrophic floods, vanishing biodiversity, or threats to livelihoods. Climate change in Africa has had prior, current and will have future consequences that impact the enjoyment of numerous rights.”

The request sets out impacts, disaggregating them region-by-region and in terms of the groups of people most affected by climate change (mentioning women and girls, children, the elderly, Indigenous peoples, and environmental human rights defenders in particular).

The request then goes on to discuss several issues of law, beginning with issues of admissibility and jurisdiction and then relying on a wide range of rights and instruments, namely:

  • a) the Constitutive Act of the African Union
  • b) the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), especially articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 60 and 61
  • c) African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)
  • d) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)
  • e) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
  • f) The Revised African Convention on Conservation of Nature
  • g) Any other Relevant Instrument.

In doing so, PALU invites the Court to consider international climate change law, including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as well as the UN Conventions on Combatting Desertification and on Biological Diversity.

Rights invoked in more detail:
PALU submits that “a rights-based climate approach is needed to address the challenges posed by climate change” and that the human rights framework “provides a robust legal framework upon which the Court may rely to define States’ responsibilities and duties in the context of climate change […] because the Charter clearly provides for collective rights and the explicit protection of the right to a healthy environment.” PALU accordingly invites the Court to consider the following provisions of the Banjul Charter:

  • Articles 2 and 3 (equality and non-discrimination)
  • Article 4 (right to life and inviolability of the human person)
  • Article 5 (right to respect for dignity and prohibition of all forms of exploitation and degradation, including slavery and torture)
  • Article 8 (freedom of conscience and religion)
  • Article 9 (freedom of information and opinion)
  • Article 10 (freedom of association)
  • Article 11 (freedom of assembly)
  • Article 12 (freedom of movement, residence and asylum; prohibition of mass expulsion)
  • Article 14 (right to property)
  • Article 16 (right to health)
  • Article 17 (right to education)
  • Article 18 (protection of the family, prohibition of age and gender discrimination)
  • Article 19 (equality of peoples, prohibition of domination)
  • Article 20 (right of peoples to existence and self-determination)
  • Article 21 (right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources)
  • Article 22 (right of peoples to their economic, social and cultural development)
  • Article 23 (right of peoples to national and international peace and security)
  • Article 24 (right of all peoples to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development)
  • The request also discusses the implied rights to food and shelter.

Issues for determination:
PALU submits the following issues for determination by the Court (paraphrased):

(a) Whether the Court can be seized with the question of obligations concerning climate change under the Banjul Charter and other relevant instruments?

(b) Whether the Court can interpret and lay down applicable custom and treaty law regarding States’ obligations and duties in the context of climate change?

If these questions are resolved in the affirmative, the Court is invited to further determine:

(a) What, if any, are States’ human and peoples’ rights obligations to protect and safeguard the rights of individuals and peoples of the past (ancestral rights), and present and future generations?

(b) Whether States have positive obligations to protect vulnerable populations including environmental human rights defenders, indigenous communities, women, children, youth, future generations, the current generation, past generations, the elderly and people with disabilities from the impact of climate change in line with the relevant treaties?

(c) What human rights obligations do States have to facilitate a just, transparent, equitable and accountable transition in the context of climate change in Africa?

(d) What are the obligations of African States in implementing adaptation, resilience and mitigation measures in response to climate change?

(e) What, if any, are applicable human rights obligations of States to compensate for loss, damage and reparations?

(f) What responsibilities, if any, do African States have in relation to third parties, including international monopolies, multinational corporations and non-state actors operating on the continent, to ensure that international and regional treaties and laws on climate change are respected, protected, promoted and implemented?

(g) What, if any, is the nature of the obligations on African States to cooperate with other states especially historical emitters to limit global warming to below the 1.5°C threshold, to avert an existential climate crisis for present and future generations on the continent?

Further reading:
For more information on the advisory opinion request, see this post by Yusra Suedi.

Suggested citation:
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Request for an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in addressing the climate crisis, filed 2 May 2025 (pending).

Last updated:
23 May 2025