Category: Business responsibility / corporate cases

Categories
Adaptation Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Sea-level rise Switzerland

Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (aka Asmania et al. v. Holcim)

Summary:
On 11 July 2022, a case was filed with the conciliation authority in the Swiss canton of Zug concerning the greenhouse gas emissions of the corporate cement giant Holcim AG, which is headquartered in Zug. The case was brought by four Indonesian nationals, who live on the Indonesian island of Pari and earn their livelihoods through fishing and tourism. They argued that rising sea levels and floods, which are all caused or aggravated by climate change, are threatening their livelihoods. The cement industry is a major emitter of greenhouse gases, currently emitting approximately 8% of yearly global CO2 emissions, and Holcim is the market leader in this sector (responsible for, historically, 0.42% of global industrial emissions since 1750). On this basis, the plaintiffs seek compensation from Holcim for the damage to their property and for future damages. They also seek adaptation measures to protect themselves against future impacts, and argue that Holcim should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 43% (compared to 2019 levels) by 2030, and 69% by 2040. This demands more rapid change than what is foreseen by the company’s own commitment to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. On 19 December 2025, the cantonal court of Zug declared the case admissible, paving the way for a future judgment on the merits.

Background and scope of the claim:
The claim concerns the greenhouse gas emissions produced by the cement industry, which are largely made up of direct emissions. The plaintiffs noted that 3/4 of Holcim’s emissions are direct emissions, as opposed to the largely indirect emissions created by the fossil fuel industry. The plaintiffs’ claim is based on references to climate attribution science, including reports by the IPCC, and the findings by the US Climate Accountability Institute that Holcim is responsible for 0.42% of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since 1750.

With the support of Swiss Church Aid HEKS/EPER, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and the Indonesian environmental organization WALHI, the plaintiffs invoke Swiss civil law, more specifically a violation of their personality rights under the Swiss Civil Code (Arts. 28 f.) and tort law under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 41 ff.), to argue that their human rights have been violated through the effects of the company’s emissions and that even more severe violations are forthcoming if Holcim does not reduce its emissions. They argue that the company should assume historical responsibility for its past emissions, but also future responsibility in the sense of rapidly reducing its greenhouse gas emissions.

Further developments and civil claim:
As required under Swiss procedural law, the case was brought as a request for arbitration. Arbitration proceedings in the case commenced in the fall of 2022. However, in October 2022, it became clear that the efforts at arbitration would not succeed in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. The case then progressed as a civil claim, with the four plaintiffs filing a lawsuit at the Zug Cantonal Court in February 2023 and applying for legal aid. They argued that Holcim must be ordered to reduce its emissions and provide compensation in order to ensure that their home island remains habitable and their livelihoods, community and culture are protected.

In particular, they argued that – due to violations of their personality rights caused by its CO2 emissions – the defendant is liable for the property damage suffered, as well as future property damage, in proportion to its share of 0.42% of global greenhouse gas emissions. They argued that Holcim has actively interfered with absolute legal interests such as the protection of life and limb, freedom, personality, property, and possessions, and will continue to do so. They also argue that there is an adequate causal link between the unlawful violation of personality rights on the one hand and the property damage on the other. This is because every ton of greenhouse gasses emitted has a long-term impact on the climate, as CO2 is broken down very slowly. They thus allege that the defendant corporation has a human rights-based duty of care to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It must ensure that the global average temperature increase on the Earth’s surface does not exceed pre-industrial temperatures by more than 1.5°C as a result of its emissions. However, the defendant is not doing enough to comply with this limit, which is why it must be obliged to reduce its CO2 emissions to the extent requested.

The plaintiffs accordingly sought injunctive relief in the form of emissions reductions under Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (protection of personality rights), as well as claiming reparation for damages already incurred, future damages and moral damages (satisfaction) under Swiss tort law (under the Swiss Code of Obligations).

The Cantonal Court of Zug held a hearing in the case on 3 September 2025 and issued its ruling on the admissibility on 19 December 2025.

Judgment on admissibility:
On 19 December 2025, the first division of the cantonal court of Zug issued its decision concerning the admissibility of the case.

The three-judge formation examined whether the conditions for admissibility under the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure had been met. This included examining whether there was a legitimate interest, whether the court had territorial and material jurisdiction, and whether a concrete, clear claim had been made.

Territorial jurisdiction:
First, the Court considered whether the case fell under the applicability of the Lugano Convention, finding that – given Holcim’s seat in Switzerland, and the plaintiffs’ seat abroad – the Convention applied, and Switzerland was the right forum for bringing the case (para. 2). Turning to the provisions of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA), the Court held that – given that both parties were making claims based on Swiss law – there had been a tacit or implied choice of law, and Swiss law was therefore applicable (Art. 132 PILA) (para. 2.2).

The Court noted that, in accordance with the Swiss theory of double relevance, the Court examines issues relating to its jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of the allegations, grounds for the action, and claims of the plaintiffs, without taking into account the objections of the defendant and without taking evidence (para. 2.4). The defendant’s objections are only examined at the time of the substantive examination of the case; objections raised by the opposing party in this regard are generally irrelevant in the context of the admissibility. However, the Court does determine, already at this stage, whether the claims made are in principle qualified to fall in the Court’s jurisdiction and whether the case is abusive. Given that it had not been alleged by the defendant that the allegations made were unqualified or abusive, the Court considered that they should provisionally be considered as true under the theory of double relevance.

Material jurisdiction:
The Court then determined whether the case fell in its material jurisdiction in the sense that it concerned an issue of civil (as opposed to public) law, which was contested between the applicants. It held that the distinction between civil and public law is fluid and dependent on the nature of the individual case (para. 3.3.). In doing so, it rejected the defendant’s argument that climate protection is to be provided only through public law mechanisms, which was in turn based on the position that the Paris Agreement does not create obligations for corporations and the Swiss legislator had not created specific GHG emissions reductions obligations for corporate actors. This case, the defendant argued, was part of an abusive worldwide campaign by NGOs to accelerate climate protection through litigation. Courts, it furthermore held, lacked the competence to order general emissions reductions targets.

The Court rejected these arguments, noting that the defendant was a private actor with no public authority and that the case was based on civil law (specifically the norms on protection of the personality, Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code, and the liability provisions under Art. 41 ff. of the Swiss Code of Obligations). It noted that Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code protect individuals from unlawful violations of personality rights by third parties: any legal entity, including individuals, whose personality is unlawfully infringed may sue anyone involved in the infringement; any private actor who participates in the violation of personality rights is liable to be sued (para. 3.6.2.1). In codifying this protection of the personality, the legislature deliberately refrained from defining the term “personality.” Instead, it formulated Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code as a general clause to enable the further development of the law and the adaptation of the term to changing times and values. The personality, as protected by these norms, is accordingly defined in a wide way, as the “totality of the individual”, and grants physical, psychological, and social areas of protection, as long as a certain minimum threshold of interference is reached.

The Court accordingly held that the adverse effects asserted by the plaintiffs affect the scope of protection of personality rights under Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code. If the plaintiffs’ statements were accepted as true, climate change has an impact on their physical integrity and personal freedom. Since greenhouse gas emissions from companies such as the defendant are undisputedly partly responsible for climate change, the plaintiffs can invoke the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 f. of the Swiss Civil Code for their claims against the defendant, thereby asserting personal claims under federal civil law (para. 3.6.2.2.).

As concerned the resulting rights and duties arising under civil law, the Court held that courts are not required to create new general climate protection goals in order to answer this question, but that it suffices to enforce existing legislation (para. 3.6.3.). This means that judicial rulings do not replace democratically legitimate climate policies, but complement them.

In making this finding, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that engaging with this case would undermine the separation of powers (para. 3.7.). Instead, citing Art. 29a of the Federal Constitution (guarantee of legal remedy), it noted that every person has the right to have their case heard by a judicial authority in legal disputes. Political questions can be excluded from access to court proceedings, but this applies only to cases of an ‘obvious’ political nature. And in this case, the competence of the civil courts had not been excluded through legislation. It held: “the courts, not the legislative or executive branches, are responsible for assessing alleged violations of the law” (para. 3.7.1.).

Examining the multilayered normative frameworks applicable to climate change, the Court noted that it had not yet been established under Swiss law that fundamental or human rights to life or private- and family life could have a horizontal direct effect among private actors. However, it could not exclude “that this could happen for the first time in the context of a climate case” (para. 3.7.2.). Particularly when interpreting open legal norms of private law (such as the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code), fundamental rights may be taken into consideration. Reiterating past findings from the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Court held that these provisions of the Swiss Civil Code are a civil law iteration of Article 8 ECHR. Noting the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, it noted that the ECHR provides only a subsidiary minimum standard, meaning that domestic law could also provide more stringent protection. Accordingly, it held, indirect horizontal effect of the human right to respect for private and family life was possible, particularly when courts are called to examine legal questions that have not yet been answered to date. Court decisions accordingly act as signposts for the application of legislation, and can feed political debates and give impulses for political change.

The Court then engaged with the defendant’s argument, based on the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, that the state’s duty of climate protection under Article 8 ECHR gives rise to very limitedly justiciable rights, and that the enactment of climate protection measures is a matter for democratic decision-making and not for the judiciary, because climate change raises complex scientific, political, economic, and other issues. The defendant had also called for the strict victim status requirements imposed in KlimaSeniorinnen to be transposed to disputes between private individuals, given their lack of a duty to protect.

The Court distinguished the case before it from KlimaSeniorinnen, noting that KlimaSeniorinnen was about general climate policy goals and the present case was about concrete impacts on individuals (para. 3.8). This meant that the defendant could not derive “any beneficial arguments from the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment for the present civil proceedings”.  Parliamentary discussions that criticized the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment likewise had no salience for these proceedings, and were irrelevant. Neither was foreign case-law cited by the defendant relevant for the court’s consideration of the case (para. 3.9.). Summarizing cases from courts in the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and Germany,  the Court held that these foreign courts have predominantly deemed private-law climate cases admissible and examined them in terms of substantive law. The defendant was therefore unable to derive anything in its favor from this foreign case law (para. 3.9.3.). As a result, the Court held, the case before it was a civil law one.

Whether a sufficiently concrete, clear claim had been made:
The Court then examined whether the plaintiffs have a legal interest in bringing the action. It held that, at the admissibility stage, this did not have to be conclusively proven; it sufficed if, on the balance of probabilities, the interest appeared to exist. Furthermore, the insignificance of the asserted claim (minima non curat praetor) does not lead to the loss of legal interest, unless there is an abuse of rights (para. 4.1.).

The plaintiffs argued that their interest legal protection is personal, practical, and current. Climate change poses an existential threat to small islands and low-lying coasts such as the island of Pari. It affects the livelihoods, health, well-being, food security, access to drinking water, and cultural values of the island’s inhabitants. Sea level rise damages settlements and destroys coastal infrastructure, leading to the loss of economic assets and biodiversity in traditional agricultural ecosystems, as well as a decline in fishing and tourism. The increasing uninhabitability of the island is forcing residents to leave their homes. What those affected have experienced firsthand is confirmed by scientific studies, including IPCC-reviewed science. They had also alleged a number of individualized impacts. They were accordingly affected by Holcim’s activities, notwithstanding the concurrent responsibility of other Carbon Majors.

Citing KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court held that IPCC-reviewed science was the relevant standard for determining any scientific questions related to these claims (para. 5.3.1.). It held that it was undisputed that climate change was having an impact on the world’s population. Engaging with the defendant’s argument that the case was an abstract public interest case, not an individualized claim, it held that the IPCC had noted that up to 3.6 billion people around the world are strongly at risk of impacts from climate change. This meant that the Court could not exclude that the case also had relevance for the interests of third parties. However, it held, “the personal affectedness of the plaintiffs goes beyond the general affectedness of persons who have not (yet) suffered damages from concrete events or have been exposed to an enhanced risk” (para. 5.5.3.). The affectedness of the plaintiffs had to be distinguished from that of the KlimaSeniorinnen applicants. While those applicants had benefitted from access to adaptation measures and their future risk of impact had not been demonstrated, the plaintiffs in this case “had no possibility to halt rising sea levels with reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their need for protection as accordingly more urgent (para. 5.5.4.). This reality likewise distinguished the plaintiffs in this case from those in similar German cases against BMW or Mercedes-Benz. The case was accordingly not to be characterized as an unacceptable actio popularis. In this regard, the Court cited the environmental case-law of the ECtHR concerning the garbage collection crisis in Campania, where the widespread nature of the issue likewise did not render the case an actio popularis.

The Court noted that the defendant was a major greenhouse gas emitter, a “Carbon Major”, and that it would be possible, through case-law, to create threshold criteria to distinguish the responsibility of such carbon major companies from smaller emitters (para. 5.5.6.). This meant that the case could not be rejected on the basis that it would lead to “litigation against everyone”. Climate change required action from both state and private actors if ecosystems, biodiversity, and the foundations of human life, health and welfare were to be protected. Noting the uncertainties involved in calculating probabilities of warming, the Court noted that it was possible that even under existing efforts, climate neutrality may not be achieved. Given the consequences of climate change, the long time during which greenhouse gasses remained in the atmosphere and the unavoidability of further warming and the resulting harms, it was not possible to wait until a universally agreed solution came to exist.

The Court also rejected the claim by the defendant that its contribution to climate change and sea level rise was marginal. The Court held that this does not relieve Holcim of its individual responsibility to contribute to the fight against climate change wherever possible. If the defendant’s line of argument were followed, national climate protection measures would also have to be denied legitimacy, as no country can stop climate change on its own. Neither were the plaintiffs required to bring a case against all emitters at once. In order to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, there is a budget of around 500 gigatons of CO2 remaining. This can only be achieved through immediate and drastic reductions in emissions. The plaintiffs’ interest in the injunction is therefore urgent and current, even if the desired climate neutrality is still a long way off (para. 5.8.). Neither were alternative avenues for achieving the desired protection evident (5.10.).

Quantifiability of emissions reductions:
Holcim argued that the plaintiffs’ claims around the reductions of its CO2 emissions were insufficiently clear and concrete, and that it had not been defined which emissions fell under their understanding of scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. Likewise, it held, there were no binding legal obligations to conduct corporate climate reporting. Scientific standards in this regard were continually evolving, with the plaintiffs using current-day standards that were sure to change in the future. The plaintiffs, by contrast, argued that there was a domestic law obligation to report on greenhouse gas emissions under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 964b (4)).

The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it was unclear what fell under scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, noting that this terminology was used in Holcim’s own climate strategy. It also noted that Holcim had conducted reporting about its CO2 emissions, and that this was a sufficient basis for implementing an eventual judgment in the case.

The Court also rejected Holcim’s argument that the case and any eventual emissions reductions or damages obligations should be limited to itself as a parent company, and not extend to its subsidiaries. Here, the Court held that the parent company participates in the emissions of its subsidiaries, because it creates a climate strategy that encompasses and binds them. In any case, it held, Swiss tort law’s moral damages provisions also apply to a company’s subsidiaries.

Conclusion:
Finding that the claim fell within its jurisdiction and was sufficiently specific, the Court held that the case was admissible. It did not decide on the award of costs for the proceedings to date, reserving this issue to a decision on the merits.

Further information:
For more information, see the dossier compiled by the supporting NGOs in 2022 here, and at the time of the hearing in September 2025 below.

CallForClimateJustice_Dossier_Media_EN_2025Download

The full text of the judgment (German) is available here:

Entscheid+des+Kantonsgerichts+Zug+vom+17.12.2025+A1+2023+9Download

Suggested citation:
Cantonal Court of Zug, Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (Asmania et al. v. Holcim), case A1 2023 9, judgment (admissibility) of 19 December 2025.

Last updated:
22 December 2025

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Evidence Right to a healthy environment Right to health South Africa

South African ‘Deadly Air Case’

Summary:
This case concerns toxic air pollution in the Mpumalanga Highveld, which is home to a dozen coal-fired power plants, a coal-to-liquids plant and a refinery. The case was brought by two environmental organisations – groundWork and Vukani Environmental Justice Movement in Action – represented by the Centre for Environmental Rights.

The applicants have petitioned the court to declare the unsafe levels of air pollution to be a violation of section 24a of the South African Constitution, which provides that “everyone has the right to an environment not harmful to their health or wellbeing”. 

The outcome of the case is currently pending before the Pretoria High Court, and Judge Colleen Collins has reserved judgment.

Claims:
The applicants’ complaints concern exposure to toxic chemicals emitted by the coal plants. This includes sulphur dioxide, heavy metals like mercury, and fine particulate matter. According to the applicants, the coal plants are responsible for the majority of these emissions, which are causing chronic respiratory illnesses such as asthma and lung cancer, and which also increase the risk of strokes, heart attacks, birth defects and premature deaths. 

The area in question has been recognized as a hotspot of pollution in excess of permissible levels. It has been claimed that this pollution is responsible for up to 10,000 excess deaths per year. But the Government has pointed to the existence of clean air regulations, and argued that there is no scientific evidence proving the link between the air pollution and the harms allegedly suffered by any particular individual. It has also highlighted the need to realize the right to a healthy environment progressively.

Amicus curia intervention by the UNSR:
David R. Boyd, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights and the environment, intervened as an amicus curiae in this case. He argued that poor and marginalised people disproportionately carry the burden of toxic air pollution. It has been reported that Boyd’s arguments include consideration for the vulnerability of children to environmental threats.

Deciding body:
Pretoria High Court

Admissibility:
TBD

Merits:
TBD

Remedies and outcomes:
TBD

Further reading:
For more information from the Centre for Environmental Resources, click here.

Suggested citation:
South African ‘Deadly Air’ case, Pretoria High Court, hearings held on 17-19 May 2021.

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Extreme poverty Gender / women-led Indigenous peoples' rights Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to subsistence/food Right to water Self-determination The Philippines Vulnerability

Greenpeace Southeast Asia and others v. the Carbon Majors

Summary:
This case was brought before the Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights (CHR) by 12 organisations and 20 individuals, as well as over a thousand Filipino citizens who expressed their support for the case through a petition, against the so-called ‘carbon majors’, i.e. high-emitting multinational and state-owned producers of natural gas, crude oil, coal and cement, including BP, Shell and Chevron. The applicants based their case on research indicating that these ‘carbon majors’ are responsible for a large percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions. Citing the Philippines’ high degree of vulnerability to the effects of climate change, the applicants alleged violations of the rights to life, health, food, water, sanitation, adequate housing, and self-determination. They also specifically invoked the rights of vulnerable groups, peoples and communities, including women, children, people living with disabilities, those living in extreme poverty, indigenous peoples, and displaced persons. They invoked also the right to development, labor rights, and the right to ‘a balanced and healthful ecology’. This petition was brought after a number particularly destructive typhoons that affected the Philippines, including Typhoon Haiyan.

As a result of the petition, the CHR began a dialogical and consultative process, called the National Inquiry on Climate Change (NICC). This process aims to determine the impact of climate change on the human rights of the Filipino people, as well as determining whether the Carbon Majors are responsible for climate change.

On 6 May 2022, the Human Rights Commission released the findings of its inquiry.

Responsible instance:
The case was brought before the Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights, which is an independent National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, established on 5 May 1987 by Executive Order No. 163.

Date filed:
22 September 2015

Procedural steps in the case:
On 10 December 2015, the Commission announced during the Paris Climate Change Conference that it would take cognizance of the case.

On 21 July 2016, the Commission enjoined the respondent Carbon Majors to file their comments or answers to the petition within forty-five days. Out of the 47 respondents summoned, 15 submitted a response. Thirteen amicus curiae briefs were received. The applicants filed a reply, to which seven of the carbon majors filed a rejoinder.

Beginning July and November 2017, the Commission conducted community visits and dialogues to select climate impacted areas.

On 11 December 2017, the parties held a first preliminary conference. The Commission used this opportunity to deny the respondents’ jurisdictional objections to the case. It asserted its authority to investigate the case and hold public hearings in 2018 in Manila, New York, and London.

In 2018, the Commission held six public hearings in the case.

Outcome of the NICC:
On 6 May 2022, the Human Rights Commission released the findings of its inquiry. In his introductory note, Commissioner Roberto Eugenio T. Cadiz outlined the lengths taken by the Commission to engage with the “carbon majors” over this case, and noted that corporate actors, and not just States, have an obligation to respect and uphold human rights under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). He also noted the unprecedented nature of the claim, and the Commission’s own lack of resources in dealing with it. And he rejected the argument by the “carbon majors” that the Commission did not have territorial or subject matter jurisdiction to deal with the case, noting the interrelated nature of all human rights and the impact on the people of the Philippines.

In its report, the Commission began by reviewing the best available scientific knowledge on climate change. It set out, “as established by peer-reviewed science, that climate change is real and happening on a global scale”, and that it is anthropogenic, i.e. caused by human activity. It then set out that climate change is a human rights issue, noting its adverse impacts on human rights both internationally and in the Philippines. It focused particularly on impacts concerning the right to life, the right to health, the right to food security, the right to water and sanitation, the right to livelihood, the right to adequate housing, the right to the preservation of culture, the right to self-determination and to development, and the right to equality and non-discrimination, focusing on the rights of women, children, indigenous peoples, older persons, people living in poverty, LGBTQIA+ rights. It also noted the impacts on the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment and on the rights of future generations and intergenerational equity.

After considering the duties of States to protect human rights, as the primary duty-bearers of human rights law, the Commission found that these rights also include extraterritorial obligations, and that while a balance between sovereignty and human rights must be sought, “States’ duty to protect is not confined to territorial jurisdiction”. It relied on international environmental law to identify the concrete procedural and substantive obligations on States in the context of climate change, and their obligation to protect vulnerable sectors against discrimination.

The Commission considered that the refusal of governments to engage in meaningful mitigation action regarding climate change constitutes a human rights violation. It held that “[t]he pursuit of the State obligation to mitigate climate change cannot just be framed as aspirational, where the standard of fulfillment is vague and the timeline is uncertain. Concrete metrics must be set against which States may be held accountable. Failing this, States enable the human rights of their citizens to be harmed, which equates to a violation of their duty to protect human rights” (p. 87). The absence of meaningful action to address global warming, it held, suffices in this regard; these obligations of States include an obligation to regulate corporate activities, and to establish a policy environment that discourages reliance on fossil fuels.

The Commission then turned to business responsibilities, noting that “a State’s failure to perform [its duty to enact and enforce appropriate laws to ensure that corporate actors respect human rights] does not render business enterprises free from the responsibility of respecting human rights.” Referring to the UNGP framework and the UN Global Compact as well as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, it applied these standards to the context of climate change. It found that:

  • The anthropogenic contributions of the “carbon majors” to climate change is quantifiable and substantial;
  • The “carbon majors” had early awareness, notice or knowledge of their products’ adverse impacts on the environment and climate systems;
  • The “carbon majors” engaged in willful obfuscation or obstruction to prevent meaningful climate action;
  • The “carbon majors” have the corporate responsibility to undertake human rights due diligence and provide remediation, including through every entity in their value chain;
  • And the UNGPs may be relied on under the law of the Philippines.

It went on to issue a number of recommendations. Concerning States, it called for climate justice, including a pooling of resources and sharing of skills, and urged governments to:

  • Undertake to discourage dependence on fossil fuels, including by phasing out all coal power fossil fuel subsidies and other incentives;
  • To collaborate on innovative climate action and guarantee the enjoyment by all of the benefits of science and technology;
  • To cooperate towards the creation of a legally binding instrument to strengthen the implementation of the UNGPs, and provide redress to victims of corporate human rights impacts;
  • To concretize the responsibilities of corporate actors in the climate context;
  • To discourage anthropogenic contributions to climate change and compensate victims;
  • To ensure access to adaptation measures by all, as well as equality and non-discrimination in climate adaptation and mitigation measures;
  • And to ensure a just transition towards an environmentally sustainable economy;
  • As well as to fulfil climate finance commitments and devise new mechanisms for loss and damage from climate change-related events;
  • To adequately support and protect environmental defenders and climate activists;
  • To promote climate change awareness and education;
  • To include military operations and supply chains in carbon accounting;
  • And to strengthen shared efforts to conserve and restore forests and other terrestrial ecosystems.

The Commission also formulated concrete recommendations for the “carbon majors” themselves, urging them to:

  • Publicly disclose their due diligence and climate and human rights impact assessment results, and the measures taken in response thereto;
  • Desist from all activities that undermine the findings of climate science, including “climate denial propaganda” and lobbying activities;
  • Cease further exploration of new oil fields, keep fossil fuel reserves in the ground, and lead the just transition to clean energy;
  • Contribute to a green climate fund for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures;
  • And continually engage with experts, CSOs, and other stakeholders to assess and improve the corporate climate response through “a new chapter of cooperation towards a united front for climate action”.

Speaking directly to financial institutions and investors, the Commission noted their ability to “steer companies and industries towards a sustainable path by aligning lending and investment portfolios with targets set by science”. It considered that their role in financing sectors and projects that generate greenhouse gas emissions make them “similarly accountable for global warming”. Accordingly, they were urged to:

  • Refrain from financing fossil fuel related projects and instead direct capital towards green projects; and
  • Exert social, political and economic pressure on the fossil fuel industry to transition to clean energy by divesting financial instruments related to fossil fuels.

The Commission concluded by noting the role of UN institutions, NHRIs, and courts — reviewing examples of climate litigation such as the Urgenda or Leghari cases, noting that “even when courts do not rule in favor of the claimants, they still contribute to meaningful climate response through their elucidation of the law and the rights and obligations of the parties”. Similarly, NGOs, CSOs, the legal profession and individuals are recommended to champion human rights and continue engaging in strategic litigation to strengthen business and human rights norms, change policy, increase governments’ ambitions, and create precedents.

The Commission furthermore addressed the Philippines’ own lackluster record of climate action, making concrete recommendations to the government to, among other things, formulate a national action plan on business and human rights, declare a climate and environmental alert, and revisit its NDC under the Paris Agreement as well as implement coal moratoriums, transition to low-carbon transportation systems, implementing REDD+ measures and data building and reporting mechanisms, and create legislative change. It also recommended to the domestic judiciary to create rules of evidence for attributing climate change impacts and assessing damages, and take note of the anthropogenic nature of climate change.

Full text of the report:
The report of 6 May 2022 is available for download below.

CHRP-NICC-Report-2022Download

Suggested citation:
Philippines Human Rights Commission, In Re: National Inquiry on the Impact of Climate Change on the Human Rights of the Filipino People and the Responsibility therefor, if any, of the ‘Carbon Majors’, case nr. CHR-NI-2016-0001, Report of 6 May 2022.

Further information:
The full text of the petition is available here.

A blogpost on the importance of the report by Annalisa Savaresi and Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh is available on the GNHRE blog.

For additional resources provided by the Commission, such as transcripts of hearings and evidence submitted, click here.

Categories
2021 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation The Netherlands

Milieudefensie and others v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC

Summary:

This case was brought as a class action tort suit by a group of NGOs, as well as more than 17,000 individuals represented by Milieudefensie. The applicants claimed that Royal Dutch Shell had an obligation to reduce its carbon emissions relative to 2019 levels by 2030 across its entire energy portfolio. It represents a groundbreaking advance in the context of business responsibility for human rights impacts. A Dutch district court issued a historic decision, ordering Shell to sharply reduce its CO2 emissions, aligning with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Shell appealed the judgment. The appeals court has ruled in favour of Shell, overturning the previous order requiring the company to slash its carbon emissions by 45% by 2030.

Facts:

The court extensively discussed the science on climate change and its impacts, reductions targets, and the existing international instruments at length. It reiterated the reduction goals set out in the Paris Agreement.

Admissibility:

The court described the case as a public interest action. These are allowed under Dutch law, and the court noted that the common interest of preventing dangerous climate change by reducing CO2 emissions can be protected in a class action. It discussed at length whether the cases shared a ‘similar interest’, which is a requirement under the Dutch Civil Code. This requirement entails that the interests in question must be suitable for bundling into a class action so as to safeguard an the legal protection of the stakeholders.

In determining whether the individual applicants had locus standi, the court held that they had no separate interest beyond that represented by Milieudefensie before the court, and wrote off the individual claims.

Merits:

Relying on domestic law, human rights law, and soft law instruments, the domestic court interpreted the unwritten standard of care contained in Dutch domestic tort law.

Book 6, Section 162 of the Dutch Civil Code proscribes acts that conflict with what is generally accepted according to unwritten law. The court held that this standard of care also applies to Royal Dutch Shell. Applying this standard, the court held that Shell was obliged to reduce its CO2 emissions by net 45% at end 2030, relative to 2019. This reduction obligation relates to Shell’s entire energy portfolio and all of its aggregate emissions. This is an obligation of result for the activities of the Shell group itself, and a best-efforts obligation with respect to its business relations and end-users. Because Shell has the ability to influence these relations, it is expected to use its influence to bring about emissions reductions.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision:

The appeals court acknowledged that while Shell has ‘an obligation toward citizens to limits its CO2 emissions,’ it was not legally required to reduce emissions by a specific percentage such as the 45% set in the original ruling. The court cited an absence of an agreed-upon standard within climate science about the exact amount of emission reduction required for individual companies. Moreover, the court emphasised that ensuring human rights protection, including protection from climate change, is primarily up to the government. The court noted that Shell was already working to curb emissions in its production processes and argued that even if Shell halted its fuel sales, other companies might simply fill the gap to meet ongoing demand for fossil fuels, effectively resulting in no reduction in overall emissions.

Supreme Court Appeal:
Milieudefensie appealed the case to the Dutch Supreme Court, seeking a specific emissions reductions order. On 22 May 2026, this case was heard before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.

Status of case:

Decided (under appeal)

Suggested case citation:

The Hague Court of Appeal, Milieudefensie and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Others, case number 200.302.332/01, Judgment of 12 November 2024 (under appeal).

Links:

For full judgments by the District Court and Appeals Court (in English), see here and here.

Last updated:
24 June 2026

Categories
2021 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Extraterritorial obligations Standing/admissibility The United Kingdom

Okpabi and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell and Others

Summary:
In October and December 2015, the Ogale and Bille Nigerian communities filed parallel complaints against the UK company Royal Dutch Shell plc (Shell) and its Nigerian subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in the UK High Court. The claimants sought a remedy for the extensive oil pollution caused by Shell arguing that it had affected their livelihoods and the environment. They claimed that Shell had failed to prevent oil spills and did not conduct proper clean-up. The plaintiffs argued that Shell had not seriously prevented contamination of agricultural land and waterways. They argued that Shell, as the parent company, owed them duty of care because it exercised significant control over the material aspects of SPDC’s operations and was responsible for them.

In January 2017, the High Court held that the claimants could not sue Shell in English Courts. The Court held that there was not sufficient evidence that Shell exercised a high degree of oversight, control or direction over SPDC. It therefore had no legal responsibility as a parent company for pollution by its Nigerian subsidiary. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision in February 2018. The Court held that the parent company did not hold a duty of care towards the affected communities. In May 2020 the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the UK Supreme Court, arguing that the parent company Shell owed them a common law duty of care in respect to the extensive environmental harmed caused by their business operations in Nigeria. On 12 February 2021, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ruled that the case could proceed in the UK Courts. The decision determined that there is an arguable case that Shell is legally responsible for the pollution caused by the activities of its subsidiary to the Ogale and Bille communities.

Date of decision:
12 February 2021

Admissibility:
The UK Supreme Court ruled that UK courts have jurisdiction over the case, due to the fact that the parent company may owe the plaintiffs a duty of care and therefore the action against Shell constitutes a triable issue.

Merits:
TBD

Remedies:
TDB

Suggested citation:
UK Supreme Court, Okpabi and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell and Others, UKSC 2018/0068, Judgment of 12 February 2021, [2021] UKSC 3.

See also:
The similar (on the facts) case of Milieudefensie and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC (before the Dutch courts).

For the full judgment, click here.

To watch a webcast of the hearing, click here.

Categories
2020 Business responsibility / corporate cases Deciding Body Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Keywords Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Rights at stake The United Kingdom Year

R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd

Summary:
On 26 June 2018, the UK Secretary of State for Transport adopted the Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS), which governs the construction of a third runway at Heathrow Airport. This led to challenges from several environmental campaigners, including Friends of the Earth Ltd and Plan B Earth. Among other grounds, it was argued that the Secretary of State had disregarded the UK Government’s commitments under the Paris Agreement (ratified on 17 November 2016 by the UK) when designating the ANPS.

In 2019 the Divisional Court dismissed all of the objectors’ claims in two separate judgments. However, in 2020 the Court of Appeal allowed part of Friends of the Earth’s and Plan B Earth’s grounds, and held that the ANPS was unlawful (see judgment here). The Secretary of State did not appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision. However, Heathrow Airport Ltd, owner of Heathrow Airport, sought and was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court (UKSC). Heathrow Airport stated that it had already invested a large sum of money in promoting the third runway. On 16 December 2020, the Supreme Court unanimously decided to allow Heathrow Airport’s appeal on all grounds, ruling that the ANPS was lawful. However, the judgment states clearly that the climate must be considered at the planning permission stage of the third runway.

Human rights claims:
Under Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, Friends of the Earth et al. argued against interpreting section 5(8) of the Planning Act 2008 in a way that excluded consideration of the Paris Agreement temperature limit. This would result in the development of large-scale national projects posing an unacceptable risk to people’s lives and homes, in breach of Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The Supreme Court found that this reasoning must fail for two reasons. First, this argument had already been raised as a separate ground before the Divisional Court, where it was rejected. This decision was not appealed to the Court of Appeal, and was therefore not considered subject to the UKSC proceedings. Secondly, even if this argument were within the scope of the appeal, it would not have succeeded because any effect of the third runway on the lives and families of those affected by the consequences of climate change would result not from the designation of the ANPS but from granting permission to develop the construction project. As Heathrow Airport Ltd. had conceded, and the respondents agreed, the ANPS requires the third runway to be evaluated against the emissions targets in place if and when an application to develop the runway were to be made (para 113 of the UKSC judgment).

Further information:
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision, Plan B Earth announced in a press release that it intends to take the judgment to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that reliance upon the 2 degrees Celsius target is a violation of the right to life (see here). Additionally, Plan B Earth served a pre-action letter on the UK Government alleging that its failure to develop a plan to address climate change is a violation of human rights as well as domestic and international law (see here).

Date of decision:
16 December 2020

Suggested case citation:
UK Supreme Court, R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd, UKSC 2020/0042, Judgment of 16 December 2020, [2020] UKSC 52

Case documents:
For the full judgment, click here.

To watch a webcast of the hearing, click here.

Further reading:
Joanne Hawkins, ‘A lesson in un-creativity: (R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52’, 23(4) Environmental Law Review (2021), 344-349. Available here.

Categories
2020 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation France Standing/admissibility

Les Amis de la Terre, Survie v. Total SA

Summary:

Total S.A. is a French energy company with oil projects in Uganda and Tanzania. According to the French “loi de vigilance”, companies with a certain size that meet certain criteria must develop a “plan de vigilance” documenting how they and the companies in their supply chain respect human rights and the environment in their business activities. The applicants claim that Total’s environmental plan (part of the “plan de vigilance”) is not suitable for achieving the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. In addition to better respect for human rights, the NGOs have demanded that Total take more effective measures to protect the environment. The first instance court, the Nanterre Civil Court of Justice, found that it had no jurisdiction over the case and that it fell instead within the jurisdiction of the commercial courts. The applicant NGOs appealed. The Court of Appeal of Versailles confirmed the judgment of the first instance, and the NGOs are now considering filing an appeal before the French Supreme Court.

Admissibility:
The Court confirmed the judgment of the first instance court, which had decided that the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the commercial court. 

Date of filing:
16 March 2020

Date of decision:
10 December 2020

Suggested citation:
Court of Appeal of Versailles, Les Amis de la Terre, Survie v. Total SA, case no. RG20/01692, decision of 10 December 2020.

Full judgment:
The full judgment is available here.