Category: Year

Categories
2021 Adaptation Biodiversity Domestic court Pakistan Right to development and work

D.G. Khan Cement Company v. Government of Punjab

Summary:
On 15 April 2021, the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled in a case challenging a decision to bar the construction of new or expanded cement plants in environmentally fragile zones by the government of Punjab. The owner of a cement company challenged the decision based on the constitutional right to freedom of trade, business, and profession under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Supreme Court upheld the government’s decision, based on evidence concerning risks to groundwater and other environmental impacts. The Court emphasized the role of the precautionary principle in applying the rights to life, sustainability, and dignity of communities, as well as the need to protect the rights of nature itself.

The Court emphasized the link between water resources and climate change, noting:

According to our National Climate Change Policy, 2012 water resources are inextricably linked with climate; this is why the projected climate change has such serious implications for Pakistan’s water resources. Freshwater resources in Pakistan are based on snow and glacier-melt and monsoon rains, both highly sensitive to climate change.

And:

One of the serious climate change threats to Pakistan is the rising temperatures resulting in enhanced heat and water-stressed conditions, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions, leading to reduced agricultural productivity. Notably, the Salt Range has an arid climate characterized by lack of water. According to our National Climate Change Policy, 2012 for Pakistan to continue on a development path, the more immediate and pressing task is to prepare itself for adaptation to climate change. (…) The goal of the Policy is to ensure that climate change is mainstreamed in the economically and socially vulnerable sectors of the economy and to steer Pakistan towards climate resilient development. The [contested measure], in the current facts of the case, is a climate resilient measure and in step with the National Climate Change Policy and the Constitution.

Discussing the role of future generations, the Court held:

Another important dimension of climate change is intergenerational justice and the need for climate democracy. The tragedy is that tomorrow’s generations aren’t here to challenge this pillaging of their inheritance. The great silent majority of future generations is rendered powerless and needs a voice. This Court should be mindful that its decisions also adjudicate upon the rights of the future generations of this country. It is important to question ourselves; how will the future generations look back on us and what legacy we leave for them? This Court and the Courts around the globe have a role to play in reducing the effects of climate change for our generation and for the generations to come. Through our pen and jurisprudential fiat, we need to decolonize our future generations from the wrath of climate change, by upholding climate justice at all times. Democracy, anywhere in the world is pillared on the rule of law, which substantially means rights based rule of law rather than rule based; which guarantees fundamental values of morality, justice, and human rights, with a proper balance between these and other needs of the society. Post climate change, democracies have to be redesigned and restructured to become more climate resilient and the fundamental principle of rule of law has to recognize the urgent need to combat climate change. Robust democracies need to be climate democracies in order to save the world and our further generations from being colonized at the hands of climate change. The preambular constitutional value of democracy under our Constitution is in effect climate democracy, if we wish to actualize our Constitution and the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution for ourselves and our future generations.

As a result, the court rejected all of the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant, dismissing the petition.

Suggested citation:
Supreme Court of Pakistan, D.G. Khan Cement Company v. Government of Punjab, 15 April 2021, case C.P.1290-L/2019.

Last updated:
25 June 2026.

Categories
2020 Business responsibility / corporate cases Deciding Body Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation France Keywords Paris Agreement Rights at stake State concerned Year

Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total

Summary:
On 25 June 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that TotalEnergies had failed to prepare an adequate vigilance plan under the French Law on the Duty of Vigilance of 27 March 2017, among other things because it had failed to include “scope 3” emissions, those associated with combustion of its fossil fuel products, in its “vigilance plan” required under the law.

The case began in 2019, when along with 13 municipalities and four other NGOs, the French environmental organization Notre Affaire à Tous requested the oil company Total to take measures to prevent human rights and environmental violations. After a meeting with Total in June 2019, the complainants issued a “mise en demeure” (a letter of formal notice) to the oil giant that is responsible for more than two-thirds of France’s greenhouse gas emissions. They granted Total three months to include reasonable greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in its “due diligence plan” before they would file a lawsuit.   

On 28 January 2020, the complainants asked the District Court of Nanterre to order Total to align its practices with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. According to the complainants, Total has not provided sufficient detail in its “vigilance plan” to reduce its emissions and that the company is still not in compliance with international climate agreements, such as the 2015 Paris Agreement. Among other requests, the complainants ask the Court to order Total to reduce its net emissions by 40% by 2040 (compared to 2019).

The complainants argued that Total’s obligation to take measures to prevent human rights and environmental violations stems from the French Law on the Duty of Vigilance. This law obliges a company to establish a detailed “vigilance plan” which identifies and seeks to mitigate the risks to human rights, fundamental freedoms, the environment, and public health that may result directly or indirectly from a company’s activities.

Total claimed that the Nanterre District Court lacked jurisdiction and requested that the case be brought before the Commercial Court. On 11 February 2021, the pre-trial judge rejected this request and confirmed the jurisdiction of the District Court. In order to settle this dispute, the Versailles Court of Appeal confirmed the District Court’s jurisdiction and based its decision on “the legislator’s intention to entrust actions relating to ecological damage to specially designated judicial courts only.”

Voluntary interventions:
Amnesty International France and the municipality of Poitiers voluntarily intervened in the initial proceedings as ancillary parties (‘voluntary intervention’). In 2022, they were joined by voluntary interventions from the City of New York and the City of Paris, both in support of the plaintiffs, arguing that they had a significant interest in climate mitigation.

In its 2024 ruling (below), the Paris Court of Appeal found that Amnesty International and the City of Poitiers lacked an interest in the case, noting with regard to the latter that it had failed to establish that the territory under its jurisdiction is subject to specific harm related to climate change. Likewise, the City of New York had insufficiently demonstrated its authority to intervene voluntarily in these proceedings, rendering the intervention null and void pursuant to Article 117 of the French Code of Civil Procedure.

However, the Court held that the City of Paris had a legitimate interest in preserving its rights by supporting the legal actions brought before the Paris Judicial Court aimed at mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. It declared the City of Paris’s voluntary intervention admissible, noting its engagement with mitigation action.

Dismissal of the preventive suit in July 2023:
On 6 July 2023, a pre-trial judge dismissed the preventive lawsuit on procedural grounds, noting that the plaintiffs’ notice to sue and their claims in the summons were not identical, as well as standing concerns in climate litigation generally.

Appeal:
The plaintiffs appealed the 2023 decision to the Paris Court of Appeal. On 18 June 2024, Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the case, meaning that it will proceed to trial. The Court declared the claims by the associations Notre Affaire à Tous, Sherpa, Zéa, and France Nature Environnement admissible. In doing so, it held that claims made in summons may be more expansive than those in a notice to sue, and also that claims under the French Civil Code concerning environmental harm have a different purpose than those brought under the French law on the duty of vigilance, meaning that the former is not displaced by the existence of the latter.

Concerning the standing of the plaintiff municipalities, the Court noted the general competence clause, based on article L2121-29 of the general code of local authorities, that grants them competence concerning the affairs of the municipality affecting a local public interest, with their action being limited to the territories they administer. However, it held that the applicant municipalities had insufficiently shown a specific interest to sue, e.g. specific climate-related impacts on their territory.

Ruling of 25 June 2026:
On 25 June 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that Total had failed to prepare an adequate vigilance plan, among other things because it had failed to include ‘scope 3’ emissions, those associated with combustion of its fossil fuel products, in the plan.

The court ruled that:

  • 1) the climate risks and impacts to which the company may contribute through its operations fall within the scope of the duty of care law of parent companies and contracting entities.
  • 2) The negative climate impacts caused by the release of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere, resulting from TotalEnergies’s operations, must be identified in the company’s risk assessment as part of its due diligence plan, as part of the duty of companies to take action based on their specific circumstances regarding serious risks and harms related to climate change.
  • 3) Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions are considered emissions resulting from the group’s activities under the law, due, in particular, to the inherent link between oil and gas production and the combustion of these products by users. Consequently, TotalEnergies’ due diligence plan, which did not include Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions, is incomplete. The court ordered TotalEnergies to complete its due diligence plan within six months, with provisional enforcement, by including Scope 3 emissions and related measures in its risk mapping.

The court clarified that since climate risks pose a serious, present, and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights—as recognized by the scientific community and international courts—companies must take these risks into account in their due diligence plans, as identifying them is an essential part of preventing serious human rights abuses. It held that the duty of vigilance law is not intended to hold companies liable for the risks related to climate change that result from all human activity on the planet since the Industrial Revolution. Instead, it calls on them to take preventive action, in accordance with their specific circumstances, to address the serious risks and harms to which their activities contribute, in line with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct—which served as the framework for the legal provisions of the French law—by establishing a duty of care that is a duty of means rather than a duty of result. In doing so, it held that since climate risks constitute a serious, present, and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights according to the consensus view of scientists and international courts, companies must take these risks into account in their due diligence plans, as their identification is part of preventing serious human rights violations (citing the ECtHR’s judgment in KlimaSeniorinnen and the ICJ’s climate advisory opinion).

The case was adjourned until 21 January 2027, before the pretrial judge of the 34th Civil Chamber of the Paris Judicial Court, for review of the incorporation of these measures into the due diligence plan.

Suggested case citation:
Nanterre District Court, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total SA, complaint of 28 January 2020.

Paris Court of Appeal, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total SA, N° RG 23/14348, Judgment of 18 June 2024.

Paris Court of Appeal, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total SA, N° RG 23/14348, Judgment of 25 June 2026.

Case documents:

The ruling of 25 June 2026, and related press release (both in French) are available for download below.

Jugement-34e-chambre-25-juin-2026Download
CP-25.06.2026-34eme-chambreDownload

Links:

  • For the full complaint (in French), see here.
  • For an unofficial translation of the complaint (in English), see here.
  • For the order confirming the jurisdiction of the Nanterre District Court (in French), see here.
  • For the 2024 judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal, see here.

Last updated:
25 June 2026.

Categories
2026 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Finland Private and family life Right to life

Greenpeace Finland & the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation v. Government of Finland

Summary:

Greenpeace Finland and Finnish Association for Nature Conservation have sought judicial review by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court of the government’s plans for implementation of climate targets under the 2022 Climate Act. These plans are detailed in the Government Report on the National Energy and Climate Strategy and Medium-Term Climate Plan, both of which were issued in December 2025. The plaintiffs argue that the measures envisaged by the government are insufficient to achieve the targets set out in the Climate Act, and alternative pathways towards the achievement of the targets have not been assessed, and thus the government is in breach of its statutory duty.    

The plaintiffs have approached the highest administrative court in Finland directly (rather than via the appellate route), arguing that the impugned government decisions implicate civil rights and obligations as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen & Others v. Switzerland judgment.

Last updated:

17 March 2026.

Links:

For the press release by the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, click here.

Categories
2026 Biodiversity Class action Deforestation Domestic court Mexico Right to a healthy environment

Community Representative of San Bartolo Coyotepec v. State of Oaxaca

Summary:
On 11 March 2024, a representative of the community of San Bartolo Coyotepec in Mexico’s State of Oaxaca filed an amparo petition with the Ninth District Court of the State of Oaxaca, arguing that the human right to a healthy environment had been violated because municipal, state, and federal authorities had failed to protect Benito Juárez National Park and the corresponding Ecological Reserve and Protected Natural Area. On 20 March 2025, the case was rejected by the Ninth District Court given the failure to demonstrate a concrete, direct, and imminent harm resulting from the alleged failure to protect the designated areas.

The applicant appealed, arguing that the first instance judge had failed to reason his decision, had shifted the burden of proof to his detriment, and had improperly evaluated the evidence concerning the progressive deterioration of the protected natural areas in question.

On 20 October 2025, the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico accepted the case for review. On 24 February 2026, the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of Justice ordered that the case be remanded to the Ninth District Court to amend the ruling that denied constitutional protection, gather evidence and determine whether the applicant’s human right to a healthy environment had been violated. It established that, pursuant to Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution, which enshrines the right to a suitable environment, any person who inhabits or uses an ecosystem and benefits from its environmental services may go to court to demand its protection, without needing to prove direct individual harm.

In doing so, the Court explicitly linked the case to climate change. It noted the interconnectedness of the three aspects of the ‘triple planetary crisis’ (climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution), and held that none of these aspects can be treated in isolation from each other. It noted the applicant’s framing of the territory in question as a carbon sink. It also extensively cited the 2025 advisory opinions on climate change of the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). It particularly emphasized the IACtHR’s finding that “urged States to maximize the scope of protection of the right to the environment, recognizing that this right protects not only individuals, but also the components of the environment—such as forests, rivers, seas, and other ecosystems—as autonomous legal interests, even in the absence of certainty or immediate evidence of a direct risk to specific individuals” (para. 43). In doing so, it noted that according to the IACtHR climate change poses an imminent risk to life, health, food security, and the balance of ecosystems on a global scale (para. 42), as well as extensively citing the ICJ’s discussion of the right to a healthy environment in its climate advisory opinion (para. 35).

With this decision, the Court reaffirmed the “adjacent environment” doctrine in environmental matters. This means that individuals who live in or use the area of influence of an ecosystem and receive its environmental benefits may file an amparo petition, even if they do not live immediately adjacent to the Protected Natural Area. Furthermore, the Court noted that environmental protection must be analyzed in accordance with the precautionary principle, meaning that the absence of scientific certainty regarding the benefits of the ecosystem in question cannot be used to deny its protection or to disregard the relationship between people and the natural environment.

Suggested citation:
Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico, Community Representative of San Bartolo Coyotepec v. State of Oaxaca, direct amparo petition no. 6714/2025, 24 February 2026.

Amparo ruling:

AR450_2025Download

Last updated:
24 June 2026.

Categories
2024 Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Committee on the Rights of the Child Finland Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Just transition litigation Minority rights Non-discrimination Participation rights Participation rights Renewable energy Right to culture Right to health Standing/admissibility Uncategorized

M. E. V., S. E. V. and B. I. V. v. Finland

Summary:

On 13 September 2024, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) adopted views in the communication M. E. V., S. E. V. and B. I. V. v. Finland. The communication concerned the granting of a mineral exploration permit on the traditional territory of the Sámi people without previous impact assessment (EIA) or free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). The authors of the communication were three sisters, all minors (aged 13, 15 and 16) at the time of filing. They submitted that their rights under articles 8 (right to preservation of identity), 27 (adequate standard of living) and 30 (minority rights) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), interpreted in light of article 24 (right to health) and all read alone and in conjunction with article 2.1 (non-discrimination), were violated by Finland in permitting a mineral exploration project on their traditional territory without proper EIA and without obtaining the FPIC of their community. They requested interim measures to stop the exploration activity.

The communication concerned the “Lätäs 1” mineral exploration permit sought by a Finnish government agency in 2014, requesting permission to explore deposits of gold, copper and iron by drilling 100 to 300 meter deep holes into the bedrock in 20 locations in the authors’ traditional reindeer herding territory.

The authors argued that “in a situation where the sustainability and transmission to new generations of Sámi reindeer herding culture is already under threat”, given the cumulative impact of past interventions in their territory, as aggravated by climate change, any new intervention violated their right, as Indigenous children, individually and in community with each other and other Sámi, not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture under article 30 CRC.

The authors noted also that: “Finland’s CO2 emissions put it on place 57 among all countries in absolute terms, and 29 per capita, as responsible for climate change, is an argument of why the mineral exploration project object of the current communication violates the Convention in the current circumstances created by climate change. While the authors understand that mitigating climate change requires replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy, they fear that badly chosen forms of such transition may have serious impact on their culture if the transition entails mining (to get battery minerals for electric cars and solar panel systems) and windmill parks in the Sámi territory which already is subject to other great pressures”.

Views of the UNCRC:

The UNCRC, in its Views on the communication, engaged with the State’s objection that the climate aspects of the case had not been raised in the domestic proceedings, whereby the authors had argued that their climate-related claims were raised “only to substantiate their claims on articles 8, 27 and 30 of the Convention, and
not to present a separate claim based on climate change.” The UNCRC accordingly found that all available domestic remedies had been exhausted (para. 8.4).

Although the Committee ‘noted’ the authors’ claim concerning the difficulties of transmission of Sámi herding culture created by climate change and other threats, it did not further engage with these claims in the remainder of its Views, which ultimately found that:

9.24 (…) to ignore the right of Indigenous peoples to use and enjoy land rights and to refrain from taking appropriate measures to ensure respect in practice for their right to offer free, prior and informed consent whenever their rights may be affected by projects carried out in their traditional territories, constitutes a form of discrimination, as it results in nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by Indigenous peoples, on an equal footing, of their rights to their ancestral territories, natural resources and, as a result, their identity. The Committee moreover considers that the discrimination suffered by an Indigenous people also impacts their children, whose
preservation of cultural identity is crucial as they represent the continuity of their distinct people.

(…)

9.25 The Committee therefore concludes that the information before it reveals that the granting of the exploration permits without having ensured the effective participation of the authors in a consultation process based on a prior impact assessment of the exploration works on the consequences for Sámi reindeer herding, amounted to violations of the authors’ rights under articles 8, 27 and 30, read in conjunction with article 2.1 of the Convention.

Views:

CRC-C-97-D-172-2022_E_UVDownload

Commentary on the case:

Counsel for the applicants has written about this case that, based on this and other Indigenous rights cases, they “anticipate new cases by the Sámi and other Indigenous peoples concerning states’ positive obligation to undertake positive measures and to treat Indigenous peoples differently from the mainstream population, including when the preservation and transmission to new generations of their distinctive cultures and livelihoods so require in the challenging times of climate change.”

Suggested citation:

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, M. E. V., S. E. V. and B. I. V. v. Finland, CRC/C/97/D/172/2022, Views of 13 September 2024.

Categories
2026 Adaptation Constitutional Law Separation of powers Zambia

Climate Action Professionals Zambia v. Attorney General of Zambia

Summary:

Climate Action Professionals Zambia (CAPZ) is a non-governmental organisation consisting of young professionals and students advocating for climate change redress in Zambia. CAPZ filed a petition on 31 October 2025 against the Attorney General of Zambia challenging the state’s alleged failure to implement the key climate governance mechanisms envisaged by the Green Economy and Climate Change Act 18 of 2024 (GECCA). The GECCA mandates the state to establish key climate governance mechanisms to address climate change effects in the country. The GECCA was enacted on 20 December 2024, published on 26 December 2024, and came into force on 10 October 2025. The key climate governance mechanisms which the GECCA envisages include national adaptation and mitigation plans, a greenhouse gas inventory management system, and a green economy and climate change fund, amongst others.

In the petition, CAPZ argued that in spite of the GECCA’s entry into force, the state had failed to establish or implement several of the mechanisms envisaged by the GECCA, and thereby violated Article 257(g) of the Zambian Constitution which provides: ‘the State shall, in the utilisation of natural resources and management of the environment (…) establish and implement mechanisms that address climate change.’ CAPZ sought relief in the form of a declaratory order stating that the state had violated Article 257(g), as well as a mandatory order ordering the state to establish and implement the mechanisms within a given time period.

The Attorney General opposed the petition on the ground that neither the Constitution nor the GECCA imposed an immediate obligation to realise the mechanisms upon the GECCA’s entry into force. The Attorney General argued that Article 257(g) is directive in nature, requiring progressive implementation subject to capacity and resources, and the incomplete operationalisation of certain mechanisms does not amount to constitutional non-compliance. The Attorney General also raised a separation of powers concern, stating that the point of question in the matter concerned policy and administrative matters, and not constitutional interpretation.

The Constitutional Court decided the case on 25 March 2026 and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Court characterised the specific mechanisms at issue as being within the realm of statutory implementation, not constitutional obligations. Being a matter of statutory compliance, rather than constitutional compliance, it should have been brought before the ordinary courts rather than the Constitutional Court.

Case documents:

The judgment can be found here. The documents are also available for download below:

Climate Action Professionals Zambia v Attorney General – Decision-1Download
Climate Action Professionals Zambia v Attorney General – PetitionDownload

Date of Decision:

25 March 2026.

Suggested citation:

Constitutional Court of Zambia, Climate Action Professionals Zambia v. Attorney General of Zambia, (2025/CCZ/0025) [2026] ZMCC 7, 25 March 2026, Judge Chinsunka.

Status of the case:

Decided.

Last updated:

01 June 2026.

Credits:

This database entry was contributed by Michaela O’Donoghue, LLD Candidate in the Urban Law and Sustainability Governance Chair, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.

Categories
2026 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to life Separation of powers United States of America

Kaarina Dunn et al. v. Public Service Comission of Wisconsin, et al.

Summary:
On 23 April 2026, a court in the US state of Wisconsin ruled in a youth climate case against the Wisconsin Public Service Commission and the Wisconsin State legislature. The case was filed by fifteen young people ranging in age from 8-17. The youth plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of statues governing the approval of fossil fuel-fired power plants because those statutes limit the ability of the first respondent, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, to consider air quality impacts of when issuing permits for such plants. In doing so, they had invoked their rights, under the Wisconsin state constitution, to liberty and to life, as well as the rights to a stable climate system and to access, enjoy and use navigable waters (both of which they considered inherent within the constitution). They also alleged a violation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.

According to the Plaintiffs, climate change has rendered them unable to enjoy Wisconsin’s natural resources, like its rivers and lakes, as well as prevented them from engaging in recreational activities, like swimming and skiing. Some are deprived of their Indigenous cultural traditions, while others have experienced asthma and contracted Lyme disease.

The judge tasked with resolving this case, Judge Julie Genovese, ruled that “[w]hile the court is sympathetic to the youths and admires their willingness to access the courts in their quest to protect the planet, I conclude that the case must be dismissed because environmental policy is a nonjusticiable political question”. The judge discussed Wisconsin’s political question doctrine, which “dictates that courts will not decide questions that require the court to determine what the best or wisest public policy would be”, and “also embodies a practical component, recognizing that matters of economic and social policy are not reasonably “susceptible to judicial management or resolution.””

The judge concluded that:

“by substituting this court’s judgment for the legislature, the court
would be showing a lack of respect for the legislative and executive branches. Plaintiffs do not like these policy decisions. (…) Because Plaintiffs think it is technologically and economically feasible for Wisconsin to be carbon free by 2050, they conclude that by invalidating the statutes and thus their limitations, the PSC will decide to stop approving fossil fuel-fired plants, and Plaintiffs’ carbon free goal will be achieved. While the court may agree with Plaintiffs’ policy preferences, it would show a blatant lack of respect for our elected officials and the agency defendants to substitute my judgment for theirs, and strike the limitations imposed by the legislature and executed by the PSC. Accordingly, because the court concludes that the legislature’s policy decisions represent a nonjusticiable political question, this case must be dismissed.”

Full text of the judgment:
The full text of the judgment is available for download below.

Decision Wisconsin 2026Download

Submission on behalf of the state:
The submission made on behalf of the state government can be downloaded below.

Filing Legislature’s attorney Ryan WalshDownload
Categories
2026 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Non-discrimination Right to health Right to life Standing/admissibility Sweden Uncategorized

Aurora v. Sweden (Aurora Case II)

Summary

On 6 February 2026, the youth-led association Aurora launched a climate lawsuit before the Nacka District Court against the government of Sweden alleging a violation of their rights to life, health and well-being as well as the prohibition of discrimination (based on age). The case is a follow-up to Anton Folley and Others v. Sweden (Aurora Case). That case was a class action suit brought by over 600 young individuals (supported by Aurora), which the Supreme Court of Sweden dismissed as inadmissible on the ground that the plaintiffs did not meet the high threshold for individual victim status articulated by the European Court of Human Rights in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland judgment.

Relying upon the criteria for ‘victim status’ and the standing of associations to litigate climate cases laid down in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, Aurora argues that this fresh case is admissible and that the district court may proceed to examining the substantive claims.

Claims:

The substantive claims in Aurora II are largely the same as the claims which were made in the Aurora case, with the new petition drawing upon more recent climate jurisprudence, including the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change to support its case. In the petition, Aurora identifies a lack of measures or intermediate emission reduction targets envisaged for the period after 2030, and problematizes Sweden’s emissions debt (i.e. the exceedance of its national fair share of the global carbon budget) as failures to exercise due diligence in the discharge of positive obligation to protect individuals who Aurora represents from serious threats to the enjoyment of their rights. The petition also invokes the findings of the IPCC to argue that children and youth, who Aurora represents (majority born between 1998 and 2026), are at a particular risk from climate change, in order to demonstrate the disparate impact of Sweden’s failure to effectively contribute towards climate mitigation. The petition requests the court to handle the case with urgency, to declare violations of Articles 2, 8 and 14 and an order the government to pay legal costs incurred by the plaintiffs.

Response from the State

In June 2026, the Swedish government responded to the case. It agreed that the Aurora case should be heard on its merits, but argued that Sweden action on climate change is already sufficient to protect human rights. This means that the case will now move to examination by the district court, which will determine whether Sweden’s overall climate efforts are sufficient to protect human rights from the effects of the climate crisis.

The State’s submissions (in Swedish) can be downloaded below.

Statens svaromålDownload

Links

  • For the petition (in Swedish) filed by Aurora, see here.
  • For the press release by Aurora announcing the case, see here.

Status

Pending

Suggested citation

Nacka District Court, Aurora v. Sweden, filed on 6 February 2026 (pending).

Last updated

2 July 2026.

Categories
2026 Blog Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Margin of appreciation Private and family life The Netherlands

Bonaire Climate Case: Creative or Questionable Interpretation of International Climate Law?

Pranav Ganesan, PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich

The Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (Bonaire) judgment of the Hague District Court has stolen the limelight as the new posterchild for strategic climate litigation. The plaintiff in this case, Greenpeace Netherlands, argued that the Dutch government failed in its duty to protect the residents of Bonaire, an island in the Caribbean which formally attained the status of a special municipality of the Netherlands in 2010. Although it is a special municipality (bijzondere gemeente), it is just as much a part of the Netherlands as any other province in the European Netherlands. The Dutch government owes obligations under international human rights law, including those arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), towards residents of the municipality. That international human rights law requires states to undertake climate mitigation measures and adaptation measures, as informed by international climate change law where relevant, has been affirmatively held in two advisory opinions from international courts and the European Court of Human Rights. And the proposition that the Dutch government’s duty of care towards its population essentially includes obligations under the ECHR was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in material respects, the Hague District Court’s reasoning was so heavily based on international law.[1] In terms of the scope of state conduct implicated in this case, it outdoes the Urgenda case,which only concerned contributions to the mitigation of climate change. The Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiff that the Dutch government had violated Article 8 ECHR as well as the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR), the former due to inadequate mitigation measures, inadequate implementation of those measures, delays in adopting an adaptation plan for Bonaire and late provision of procedural safeguards to the residents of Bonaire. In this blog, I provide a quick analysis of the District Court’s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement in the section on mitigation measures. Readers interested in learning about the adaptation component and how the court addressed discrimination claim are welcome to read this blogpost by Wewerinke-Singh.

There are areas in the judgment where the District Court’s assessment of the compatibility of the Dutch Climate law framework with international climate law is questionable. The first glaring issue is that the court made a finding of non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement based on the absence of ‘absolute emissions reduction targets’ in the Dutch Climate Act of 2019 (para 11.13.1). The problem identified by the court was that the targets were expressed as goals that the government would ‘strive to achieve.’ However, this does not mean that the targets are not absolute. The difference between absolute and relative emissions reductions targets being whether they are expressed as percentage reductions in comparison to the emissions during a fixed baseline year, as opposed to reductions from a business as usual scenario in case of relative targets (Winkler et al 2014, 636). The use of the expression ‘strive to achieve’ means that the nature of the obligation to achieve the target is one of conduct rather than result, reflecting the nature of the obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures in pursuance of NDCs communicated under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement (ICJ Advisory Opinion, paras 251-253). Another connected example is the court’s declaration that ‘UN standards’ require emission reduction targets to be expressed as percentage reductions to be achieved by the target date, in comparison to 2019 levels as opposed to the 1990 baseline (para 11.13.2). Moreover, strictly speaking, Article 12(8) of the UNFCCC does not require the EU to provide information about each member state’s national carbon budget like the court suggests (para 11.15.3). The court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions might be technically imprecise, but it is undoubtedly bold, being based on the need for exemplary efforts from a developed country like the Netherlands, and reflecting the appropriate sense of urgency in light of the results of the First Global Stocktake (para 11.9.4). Through its interpretive moves, the court effectively hardened ‘soft’ obligations (i.e. normative expectations) sourced from the Paris Agreement and COP decisions (on hard and soft obligations in the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, 2016).

A final noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the rather detailed response to how the notion of ‘equity’ in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Articles 2(1) and 4(1) of the Paris Agreement is to be applied in reviewing states’ mitigation commitments. Equity is an elusive concept, with debates on what an equitable distribution of the global emissions reduction burden entails having remained unsettled since the inception of international negotiations on the topic of climate mitigation (Oliver Herrera et al, 2025). The court provided the (un)acceptability of a ‘grandfathering approach’ as an example of one such debate (para 11.13.5). But it did not go so far as to hold that the grandfathering approach is legally impermissible because it is inequitable per se, or that an equal per capita emissions approach is the minimum standard under international law. Rather, it assessed the Netherlands’ policy negatively on account of its failure to justify why its current policy, which is based on the controversial grandfathering principle and falls short of the ambition required by the equal per capita emissions approach, is equitable in accordance with Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(1). It thus did not use equity to dictate the outcome of what exactly the Dutch government’s fair share of the global carbon emissions ought to be. At same time, it did not use the underlying controversy as a reason to entirely avoid reviewing the substance of the Dutch climate mitigation policy. This is underscored by its remedial findings, wherein the court declared that the Netherlands’ current mitigation commitments were inequitable, thereby leading to a breach of Article 8 (para 12.1), but dismissed Greenpeace’s request ordering the adoption of specific emissions reduction targets by the government, or at least a carbon budget reflecting the ‘equal per capita emissions approach’ (paras 8.1 (IV)-(VI), 11.55 and 11.58).

Overall, the Bonaire judgment shows how climate litigation can lead to precarious precedents. On the one hand, the way the Court engaged with the concept of equity provided an assessment of Dutch mitigation ambition which was notably pragmatic and might serve as inspiration for other courts when asked to answer the fair share question. On the other hand, the judgment risks signaling to states that legal texts—which negotiators toiled to craft in ‘constructively ambiguous’ terms—may be stretched by domestic courts to uncomfortable extents. Ultimately, the appellate court’s scrutiny of this case (should the Dutch government file an appeal) will reveal how this judgment will be remembered: whether it will be hailed for its boldness or criticized for its questionable interpretation of international treaties.

[1] André Nollkaemper commented: ‘Today’s judgment of the District Court of The Hague fully lives up to the reputation of Dutch courts as strongly international law-minded. […] The conclusion is firmly anchored in international law. With 29 references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, 64 references to the European Court’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, 64 to the UNFCCC, 62 to the Paris Agreement, and 12 to COP decisions, this surely ranks high on the list of climate change cases that are most shaped by international law.’

Categories
2019 Domestic court Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Kenya Participation rights

Amu Power Company Ltd v Save Lamu & Others

Summary:
This case concerns a coal-fired power plant project conceived as part of the Kenyan development blueprint: Kenya Vision 2030. The Kenyan government determined that the 1050 MW power plant would be set up in Kwasasi (near Lamu Port). Amu Power Company Ltd. (Amu Power) won the bid for the project. Subsequently on 7 September 2016, the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) granted Amu Power the requisite license based on the Environmental & Social Impact Assessment study (ESIA) commissioned by the latter. Immediately thereafter, environmental groups and local community representatives challenged the license before the National Environment Tribunal (NET), naming both NEMA and Amu Power as the respondent parties.

On 26 June 2019, the NET delivered a decision wherein found fundamental deficiencies in public participation and noted the witness for Amu Power’s admission of the failure to consider climate impacts of the project in the ESIA study. It thus found the NEMA to have violated its statutory duty to ensure project’s compliance with the Environmental Management and Coordination Act 2009 read together with the Environmental Impact Assessment & Audit Regulations (EIA Regulations) and therefore cancelled the license.

Further, it recommended that Amu Power conduct a fresh ESIA study, including consideration of the Climate Change Act 2016 and compliance with all statutory requirements, should it wish to pursue the construction and operation of the project.

Amu Power challenged this decision by way of an appeal before the High Court of Malindi. On 25 October 2025, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the NET’s 2019 decision ordering a cancellation of the license.

Claims:
The objectors contended that the operation of the plant would negatively impact the area’s air quality, contribute to climate change to such an extent that its operation would be contrary to Kenya’s National Climate Change Action Plan and Climate Change Act No. 11 of 2016, as well as Nationally Determined Contribution submitted to the UNFCCC which focuses on renewable energy rather than fossil fuels. Further, they argued the effluent discharge from the plant would impact marine biodiversity, potentially increasing seawater temperature by 9°C, which could infringe upon the rights of Lamu residents dependent on fishing, thus interfering with their their cultural rights and traditional way of life a set out in Article 44 and 43 of the Constitution. These contentions were meant to contextualize the crux of the case brought by the objectors, which concerned administrative failure. The objectors invoked the lack of effective public participation, inadequacies in the ESIA study, especially as it related to the plant’s impacts on human health, mitigation of environmental impacts and the failure to consider impacts on climate change, as grounds for cancellation of the license. 

Amu Power argued that the project would displace a much higher amount of carbon dioxide than what could be generated by it, as electricity would be available to users at the lowest rates, also alluded to the added benefits revolving around climate change adaptation measures. It noted that the ESIA study sufficiently addresses the impacts of thermal effluents on the marine environment and local air pollution by also considering the appropriate the mitigation measures. Regarding climate change, Amu Power submitted that the Paris Agreement came into force on 4th November 2016 after the ESIA study had been concluded and the licence was issued. Lastly, Amu Power argued that the NET placed undue emphasis on procedural rather than the substance, i.e. the spirit behind public participation; and that in any case the flaws in the process were not significant enough to deprive the public participation process of its efficacy.

Judgment of the High Court of Malindi:
In its 2019 judgment, the High Court of Malindi re-affirmed the NET’s findings that the license was issued based on a fundamentally flawed public participation process. The Court emphasized the significance of these findings on the basis of the constitutional significance accorded to public participation. Article 10(1) of the Constitution provides those national values and principles of governance, which includes ‘participation of the people’ bind all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons when applying or interpreting the Constitution, enacting or interpreting any law, or making or implementing public policy decisions. Article 69(1)(d) requires the State to encourage public participation in the management, protection and conservation of the environment.

It further added that the findings regarding inadequate public participation are of over-arching significance, in that even if the NET had erred in assessing the ESIA’s consideration of mitigation measures concerning the treatment of effluents and climate change, as unsatisfactory, “the project and the study remain condemned due to insufficient public participation” (para. 179).

Links:

  • For the full judgment National Environmental Tribunal, see here.
  • For full judgment of the High Court of Malindi on the appeal by Amu Power against the judgment of the National Environmental Tribunal, see here.

Suggested case citation:
Environment and Land Court at Malindi, Amu Power Company Ltd v Save Lamu & Others, ELCA No. 6 of 2019, 16 October 2019, Hon. Justice Mwangi Njoroge.

Last updated:
30 October 2025.