Category: Indigenous peoples’ rights

Categories
Access to a remedy Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to health Right to life Russian Federation

Danilov et al. v. Russia (Russian Climate Case)

Summary:
In August 2023, a group of individuals and NGOs filed a climate application against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights. The applicants, made up of two NGOs and 18 individuals (including Indigenous persons and human‑rights defenders) challenges Russia’s climate policies and (in)actions for violating their human rights, citing Russia’s high per capita greenhouse gas emissions and particularly its high methane emissions. They argue that:

Russia is ranked as responsible for the third largest cumulative emissions since the beginning of the industrial era. Currently, it is the fourth largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world and the second biggest source of global energy-related methane emissions. As of 2021, it was the world’s largest exporter of fossil gas, the second largest exporter of oil, the third largest coal exporter and the largest gas flaring nation. It has the world’s second-largest coal reserves, and its 2020 Energy Strategy plans an increase in domestic coal production annually up to 2035. Russia has no quantifiable methane reduction plans and did not sign up to the COP26 global methane pledge. These factors materially affect global and Arctic climate risk.

As well as that:

Expert evidence shows Russia’s published policy from 2020 and 2021 allows emissions to continue rising to 2030 and only minimally decline thereafter — far above levels compatible with protecting human life and health or with Paris Agreement temperature targets. The Climate Action Tracker assesses Russia’s climate action as ‘critically insufficient’. The case argues that these policies breach constitutional and international human‑rights standards and Russia’s climate obligations. Most recently, Russia has issued a new emissions decree providing for a weaker 2035 emissions target. The new target is about 22% greater than Russia’s reported 2021 emissions.

After being rejected by the domestic courts, the applicants brought their case to the ECtHR, describing it as “the first and only climate challenge by Russian citizens to Russia’s policies at Strasbourg. Given Russia’s withdrawal/expulsion from the Council of Europe and the repressive context for human rights and environmental defenders, this is likely the last such case within a legally binding international forum during the critical climate mitigation window.” In Strasbourg, the applicants argue that the case remains in the Court’s temporal jurisdiction and invoke the rights to life, health, home and family life (Articles 2 and 8 ECHR), as well as the right to an effective remedy (Article 13 ECHR) and that prohibition of discrimination in relation to youth applicants and Indigenous applicants (Article 14 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 8 ECHR). They also argue that the Russian Government has sought to undermine the case, thereby interfering with their right to bring the case, in violation of Article 34 ECHR. Notably, it is reported that since the case began, both applicant NGO’s have been dissolved by the Russian courts, one applicant had his citizenship and that of family revoked and individual applicants and their lawyer have been designated ‘Foreign Agents’ under Russia’s Foreign Agent Law.

Further reading:
For a discussion of the case, see Joanna Evans, ‘The Russian Climate Case: A Crucial Test for the European Court of Human Rights’, Völkerrechtsblog, 15 December 2025, https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-russian-climate-case/.

More information on the case is provided by the applicants here.

Suggested citation:
ECtHR, Danilov et al. v. Russia, app. no. 9296/24, filed in August 2023.

Last updated:
24 June 2026.

Categories
Australia Disability and health-related inequality Emissions reductions/mitigation Evidence Fossil fuel extraction Human Rights Committee Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to culture Right to life

Poelina et al. v. Australia

Summary:
On 20 June 2026, a communication against Australia was filed with the UN Human Rights Committee. The authors of the communication, who live in five Australian states, argue that Australia’s continued licensing of fossil fuel projects violates their rights under several provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), namely the right to life (Article 6 ICCPR), the right to privacy, family, and home life (Article 17), and the right to culture (Article 27). Drawing on the International Court of Justice’s 2025 climate advisory opinion, as well as the ECtHR’s 2024 KlimaSeniorinnen judgment and the IACtHR’s 2025 climate advisory opinion, they submit that they have experienced several rights-impacting events, all of which were “made substantially more likely and severe by anthropogenic climate change, to which Australia materially contributes through its production of fossil fuels for export.” This includes extreme heat, bushfires or wildfires, flooding, and toxic algal blooms. The authors build their claims on past extreme events that impacted several authors’ Aboriginal culture and lands, which have been flooded and face toxic algal blooms destroying traditional food sources and ways of life. Two authors also risked their lives fighting the 2019-2020 bushfires, with one losing his home to the flames and another volunteering as a firefighter. Other authors live with disabilities or health conditions that place them particularly at risk from heat waves or floods.

Relying on scientific reports and expert evidence (especially the Anderson and Calverley report), the authors submit that current levels of GHG emissions mean that “there are less than two years remaining to ensure warming is limited to 1.5°C”. They also argue against models that tolerate overshooting 1.5°C, arguing that States cannot rely on unproven carbon removal technologies to return below that level of warming and that technologies to remove or sequester carbon, notably carbon, capture, and storage (CCS) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR), remain unproven and ineffective.

The core of the communication is the argument that Australia has failed the “stringent due diligence” standard, which the ICJ has interpreted as requiring states to “use all means at their disposal” to prevent significant harm to the climate system by aligning their actions with a global pathway that limits warming to 1.5°C. In an illustrative list of internationally wrongful acts, the ICJ listed “fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies” (para 427). Based on this finding, the communication argues that Australia’s ongoing conduct relating to fossil fuel exploration, production and subsidies violates the authors’ ICCPR rights.

The authors note that Australia is “one of the world’s leading historical and current producers of fossil fuels for export” (as of 2024, the second largest global exporter of coal, and the third largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, with ca. 80% of Australia’s total fossil fuel CO2 footprint coming from fossil fuel exports as of 2022). Despite its international obligations to act on climate change, the authors submit, the Australian government’s policy “remains to maximise fossil fuel exports, and Australia continues to subsidise and approve fossil fuel projects that will export fossil fuels for decades to come, in some cases into the 2070s.”

To make this argument, the authors submit that due diligence to prevent significant environmental harm must be informed by the precautionary principle; that due diligence requires Australia to regulate third parties within its jurisdiction and control; that due diligence requires assessment of the cumulative effects of activities within Australia’s jurisdiction or control; that due diligence requires adopting mitigation measures that reflect best available science; that due diligence requires adopting mitigation measures that reflect best available science; that a State’s failure to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in ways consistent with due diligence is conduct attributable to that State that may violate human rights; that a State’s failure to regulate its export of fossil fuels, consistent with due diligence, is also attributable conduct that may violate human rights obligations; that there is a sufficient causal nexus between Australia’s non-compliance with human rights and the specific harms experienced by the authors; that legal standards of causation for individual harm in the context of climate harms are flexible, as demonstrated by various courts; that there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus to satisfy the ICJ’s approach to causation when assessing injury; that Australia’s fossil fuel exports are a material contribution to climate change and have caused, and will foreseeably cause, harm to the authors; that continued fossil fuel production means that Australia is not taking the necessary measures to prevent harm to the climate system; and that these acts and omissions are violating ICCPR rights.

Attribution science (the Thiery, Watkins, Cook and Crisp reports):
The Communication extensively details the concrete impacts faced by the applicants, and is accompanied by several expert reports that attribute the harms experienced to the impacts of climate change. The “Thiery report” concerns overall climate attribution, including heatwaves, bushfires, ocean warming, severe storms, drought, algal blooms, and sea-level rise; the “Watkins Report” concerns flooding; and the “Cook Report” concerns toxic algal blooms. The authors also submitted two reports by Dr George Crisp on climate-related health impacts for two of the authors.

Export emissions (the Anderson and Claverly report):
The Communication challenges Australia’s plans to produce fossil fuel for export on the basis a report by Anderson and Claverly. The report evaluates whether the estimated carbon budgets compatible with ‘achieving around a 50% chance of not exceeding 1.5°C and around 83% chance of not exceeding 2°C’ of global warming can accommodate emissions from Australia’s projected coal and LNG exports. The authors of the report conclude that ‘under assumptions favourable to Australia,’ the evidence is unequivocal that Australia’s planned export pathways are not compatible with the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals.

Admissibility (the Peel Report):
On the admissibility of the communication, concerning the absence of proceedings on the domestic level, the authors argue that they have satisfied the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule because Australian law does not offer redress for the harms at stake and the rights violations invoked.

To support this argument, they submit a report authored by Prof. Jacqueline Peel, who together with two co-author shows that there are no effective remedies available to the Authors to redress their alleged harms to the standards set out previously by the Committee, as there are no effective judicial or administrative avenues to compel Australia to align its production of fossil fuels for export with pathways for 1.5°C of warming. This is due to the fact, in particular, that Australian courts cannot compel the government to align fossil fuel exports with a 1.5°C pathway; that there is no constitutional or national-level statutory bill of rights in Australia; that existing statutory frameworks do not provide an effective remedy; and that there is no common law duty of care owed to the Authors in this context. In doing so, the report reflects the Committee’s own reasoning in Daniel Billy and Others v. Australia (2022), where the Committee found that the communication was admissible because no effective remedy was available to the Authors.

Relief sought:
The authors seek for their ICCPR rights to be upheld and note that the violation of these rights cannot be addressed only through mitigation of emissions released in Australia or through adaptation measures. Instead, they argue, exported (“Scope 3”) emissions from Australia’s fossil fuel exports materially contribute to climate harms. They seek for the Committee to:

  • Declare that the Australian government’s acts and omissions related to fossil fuel production for export, and its failure to adequately regulate the public and private operators involved, violate its human rights obligations to prevent a global average temperature increase of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels.
  • Establish violations of the authors’ rights to life; privacy, family, and home life; and culture under the Covenant.
  • Recommend the creation of a domestic process to review the compatibility of Australia’s fossil fuel exports with pathways to limit warming to 1.5°C.
  • Recommend an urgent phaseout of production of fossil fuels for export, including ceasing relevant public subsidies.
  • Recommend that Australia pause approvals for fossil fuel production projects for export.

Case documents:
The communication in this case can be downloaded below.

unhrc-poelina-et-al-v-australia-20-06-2026_redactedDownload

Suggested citation:
UN Human Rights Committee, Anne Poelina, Barry Traill, Brendon Donohue, Catherine, Jack Egan, Latishamarie Francis, Pamelarose Francis, Melissa Fisher, Sama Youhana and Rikki Dank v. Australia, Communication of 20 June 2026.

Categories
Canada Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples' rights Participation rights Participation rights

Maltais et al. v. Minister of Environment, Climate Change and Nature and Attorney General of Canada

Summary:
On 15 June 2026, an application for judicial review was brought in Canadian Federal Court against the Canadian Minister of Environment, Climate Change and Nature and the Attorney General of Canada. The applicants are Marie Maltais, Sophia Mathur, Shirley Barnea, the NGO Environmental Defence Canada and the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment, supported by Ecojustice. The second applicant in the case was also an applicant in the earlier case of Mathur et al. v. the Queen in Right of Ontario.

The application alleges that the Minister failed to amend Canada’s Emissions Reductions Plan (ERP) for 2030 in ways that bring it into compliance with legal obligations under the Canadian Net Zero Accountability Act (CNZEAA). The case thus primarily concerns compliance with the targets set out under a domestic climate law, but also involves a procedural rights element given that amendments to an ERP require public and Indigenous consultation under domestic law. This refers to the fact that the CNZEAA allows the Minister to amend the ERP, but in doing so must provide interested persons, Indigenous peoples and others to make submissions.

Application:
The full text of the application can be downloaded below.

Maltais_2026-06-15-Issued-Notice-of-Application-T-2843-26Download

Further information:
The applicants held a press conference concerning the application on 16 June 2026, which can be watched here.

A press release on the case is available here.

Suggested citation:
Federal Court of Canada, Maltais et al. v. Minister of Environment, Climate Change and Nature and Attorney General of Canada, file no. T-2843-26, filed 15 June 2026 (pending).

Last updated:
22 June 2026.

Categories
2024 Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Committee on the Rights of the Child Finland Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Just transition litigation Minority rights Non-discrimination Participation rights Participation rights Renewable energy Right to culture Right to health Standing/admissibility Uncategorized

M. E. V., S. E. V. and B. I. V. v. Finland

Summary:

On 13 September 2024, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) adopted views in the communication M. E. V., S. E. V. and B. I. V. v. Finland. The communication concerned the granting of a mineral exploration permit on the traditional territory of the Sámi people without previous impact assessment (EIA) or free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). The authors of the communication were three sisters, all minors (aged 13, 15 and 16) at the time of filing. They submitted that their rights under articles 8 (right to preservation of identity), 27 (adequate standard of living) and 30 (minority rights) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), interpreted in light of article 24 (right to health) and all read alone and in conjunction with article 2.1 (non-discrimination), were violated by Finland in permitting a mineral exploration project on their traditional territory without proper EIA and without obtaining the FPIC of their community. They requested interim measures to stop the exploration activity.

The communication concerned the “Lätäs 1” mineral exploration permit sought by a Finnish government agency in 2014, requesting permission to explore deposits of gold, copper and iron by drilling 100 to 300 meter deep holes into the bedrock in 20 locations in the authors’ traditional reindeer herding territory.

The authors argued that “in a situation where the sustainability and transmission to new generations of Sámi reindeer herding culture is already under threat”, given the cumulative impact of past interventions in their territory, as aggravated by climate change, any new intervention violated their right, as Indigenous children, individually and in community with each other and other Sámi, not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture under article 30 CRC.

The authors noted also that: “Finland’s CO2 emissions put it on place 57 among all countries in absolute terms, and 29 per capita, as responsible for climate change, is an argument of why the mineral exploration project object of the current communication violates the Convention in the current circumstances created by climate change. While the authors understand that mitigating climate change requires replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy, they fear that badly chosen forms of such transition may have serious impact on their culture if the transition entails mining (to get battery minerals for electric cars and solar panel systems) and windmill parks in the Sámi territory which already is subject to other great pressures”.

Views of the UNCRC:

The UNCRC, in its Views on the communication, engaged with the State’s objection that the climate aspects of the case had not been raised in the domestic proceedings, whereby the authors had argued that their climate-related claims were raised “only to substantiate their claims on articles 8, 27 and 30 of the Convention, and
not to present a separate claim based on climate change.” The UNCRC accordingly found that all available domestic remedies had been exhausted (para. 8.4).

Although the Committee ‘noted’ the authors’ claim concerning the difficulties of transmission of Sámi herding culture created by climate change and other threats, it did not further engage with these claims in the remainder of its Views, which ultimately found that:

9.24 (…) to ignore the right of Indigenous peoples to use and enjoy land rights and to refrain from taking appropriate measures to ensure respect in practice for their right to offer free, prior and informed consent whenever their rights may be affected by projects carried out in their traditional territories, constitutes a form of discrimination, as it results in nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by Indigenous peoples, on an equal footing, of their rights to their ancestral territories, natural resources and, as a result, their identity. The Committee moreover considers that the discrimination suffered by an Indigenous people also impacts their children, whose
preservation of cultural identity is crucial as they represent the continuity of their distinct people.

(…)

9.25 The Committee therefore concludes that the information before it reveals that the granting of the exploration permits without having ensured the effective participation of the authors in a consultation process based on a prior impact assessment of the exploration works on the consequences for Sámi reindeer herding, amounted to violations of the authors’ rights under articles 8, 27 and 30, read in conjunction with article 2.1 of the Convention.

Views:

CRC-C-97-D-172-2022_E_UVDownload

Commentary on the case:

Counsel for the applicants has written about this case that, based on this and other Indigenous rights cases, they “anticipate new cases by the Sámi and other Indigenous peoples concerning states’ positive obligation to undertake positive measures and to treat Indigenous peoples differently from the mainstream population, including when the preservation and transmission to new generations of their distinctive cultures and livelihoods so require in the challenging times of climate change.”

Suggested citation:

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, M. E. V., S. E. V. and B. I. V. v. Finland, CRC/C/97/D/172/2022, Views of 13 September 2024.

Categories
2026 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to life Separation of powers United States of America

Kaarina Dunn et al. v. Public Service Comission of Wisconsin, et al.

Summary:
On 23 April 2026, a court in the US state of Wisconsin ruled in a youth climate case against the Wisconsin Public Service Commission and the Wisconsin State legislature. The case was filed by fifteen young people ranging in age from 8-17. The youth plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of statues governing the approval of fossil fuel-fired power plants because those statutes limit the ability of the first respondent, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, to consider air quality impacts of when issuing permits for such plants. In doing so, they had invoked their rights, under the Wisconsin state constitution, to liberty and to life, as well as the rights to a stable climate system and to access, enjoy and use navigable waters (both of which they considered inherent within the constitution). They also alleged a violation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.

According to the Plaintiffs, climate change has rendered them unable to enjoy Wisconsin’s natural resources, like its rivers and lakes, as well as prevented them from engaging in recreational activities, like swimming and skiing. Some are deprived of their Indigenous cultural traditions, while others have experienced asthma and contracted Lyme disease.

The judge tasked with resolving this case, Judge Julie Genovese, ruled that “[w]hile the court is sympathetic to the youths and admires their willingness to access the courts in their quest to protect the planet, I conclude that the case must be dismissed because environmental policy is a nonjusticiable political question”. The judge discussed Wisconsin’s political question doctrine, which “dictates that courts will not decide questions that require the court to determine what the best or wisest public policy would be”, and “also embodies a practical component, recognizing that matters of economic and social policy are not reasonably “susceptible to judicial management or resolution.””

The judge concluded that:

“by substituting this court’s judgment for the legislature, the court
would be showing a lack of respect for the legislative and executive branches. Plaintiffs do not like these policy decisions. (…) Because Plaintiffs think it is technologically and economically feasible for Wisconsin to be carbon free by 2050, they conclude that by invalidating the statutes and thus their limitations, the PSC will decide to stop approving fossil fuel-fired plants, and Plaintiffs’ carbon free goal will be achieved. While the court may agree with Plaintiffs’ policy preferences, it would show a blatant lack of respect for our elected officials and the agency defendants to substitute my judgment for theirs, and strike the limitations imposed by the legislature and executed by the PSC. Accordingly, because the court concludes that the legislature’s policy decisions represent a nonjusticiable political question, this case must be dismissed.”

Full text of the judgment:
The full text of the judgment is available for download below.

Decision Wisconsin 2026Download

Submission on behalf of the state:
The submission made on behalf of the state government can be downloaded below.

Filing Legislature’s attorney Ryan WalshDownload
Categories
2019 Domestic court Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Kenya Participation rights

Amu Power Company Ltd v Save Lamu & Others

Summary:
This case concerns a coal-fired power plant project conceived as part of the Kenyan development blueprint: Kenya Vision 2030. The Kenyan government determined that the 1050 MW power plant would be set up in Kwasasi (near Lamu Port). Amu Power Company Ltd. (Amu Power) won the bid for the project. Subsequently on 7 September 2016, the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) granted Amu Power the requisite license based on the Environmental & Social Impact Assessment study (ESIA) commissioned by the latter. Immediately thereafter, environmental groups and local community representatives challenged the license before the National Environment Tribunal (NET), naming both NEMA and Amu Power as the respondent parties.

On 26 June 2019, the NET delivered a decision wherein found fundamental deficiencies in public participation and noted the witness for Amu Power’s admission of the failure to consider climate impacts of the project in the ESIA study. It thus found the NEMA to have violated its statutory duty to ensure project’s compliance with the Environmental Management and Coordination Act 2009 read together with the Environmental Impact Assessment & Audit Regulations (EIA Regulations) and therefore cancelled the license.

Further, it recommended that Amu Power conduct a fresh ESIA study, including consideration of the Climate Change Act 2016 and compliance with all statutory requirements, should it wish to pursue the construction and operation of the project.

Amu Power challenged this decision by way of an appeal before the High Court of Malindi. On 25 October 2025, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the NET’s 2019 decision ordering a cancellation of the license.

Claims:
The objectors contended that the operation of the plant would negatively impact the area’s air quality, contribute to climate change to such an extent that its operation would be contrary to Kenya’s National Climate Change Action Plan and Climate Change Act No. 11 of 2016, as well as Nationally Determined Contribution submitted to the UNFCCC which focuses on renewable energy rather than fossil fuels. Further, they argued the effluent discharge from the plant would impact marine biodiversity, potentially increasing seawater temperature by 9°C, which could infringe upon the rights of Lamu residents dependent on fishing, thus interfering with their their cultural rights and traditional way of life a set out in Article 44 and 43 of the Constitution. These contentions were meant to contextualize the crux of the case brought by the objectors, which concerned administrative failure. The objectors invoked the lack of effective public participation, inadequacies in the ESIA study, especially as it related to the plant’s impacts on human health, mitigation of environmental impacts and the failure to consider impacts on climate change, as grounds for cancellation of the license. 

Amu Power argued that the project would displace a much higher amount of carbon dioxide than what could be generated by it, as electricity would be available to users at the lowest rates, also alluded to the added benefits revolving around climate change adaptation measures. It noted that the ESIA study sufficiently addresses the impacts of thermal effluents on the marine environment and local air pollution by also considering the appropriate the mitigation measures. Regarding climate change, Amu Power submitted that the Paris Agreement came into force on 4th November 2016 after the ESIA study had been concluded and the licence was issued. Lastly, Amu Power argued that the NET placed undue emphasis on procedural rather than the substance, i.e. the spirit behind public participation; and that in any case the flaws in the process were not significant enough to deprive the public participation process of its efficacy.

Judgment of the High Court of Malindi:
In its 2019 judgment, the High Court of Malindi re-affirmed the NET’s findings that the license was issued based on a fundamentally flawed public participation process. The Court emphasized the significance of these findings on the basis of the constitutional significance accorded to public participation. Article 10(1) of the Constitution provides those national values and principles of governance, which includes ‘participation of the people’ bind all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons when applying or interpreting the Constitution, enacting or interpreting any law, or making or implementing public policy decisions. Article 69(1)(d) requires the State to encourage public participation in the management, protection and conservation of the environment.

It further added that the findings regarding inadequate public participation are of over-arching significance, in that even if the NET had erred in assessing the ESIA’s consideration of mitigation measures concerning the treatment of effluents and climate change, as unsatisfactory, “the project and the study remain condemned due to insufficient public participation” (para. 179).

Links:

  • For the full judgment National Environmental Tribunal, see here.
  • For full judgment of the High Court of Malindi on the appeal by Amu Power against the judgment of the National Environmental Tribunal, see here.

Suggested case citation:
Environment and Land Court at Malindi, Amu Power Company Ltd v Save Lamu & Others, ELCA No. 6 of 2019, 16 October 2019, Hon. Justice Mwangi Njoroge.

Last updated:
30 October 2025.

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights New Zealand

Smith v. Fonterra

Summary:
This case was brought by Michael John Smith (Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Kahu), who is the climate change spokesperson for a Māori development platform known as the Iwi Chairs’ Forum, and who is also the applicant in the case of Smith v. Attorney-General. In the present case, he brought proceedings against seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand who are involved in agriculture and energy sectors (namely Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd , Genesis Energy Ltd, Dairy Holdings Ltd, New Zealand Steel Ltd, Z Energy Ltd, Channel Infrastructure NZ Ltd and BT Mining Ltd.). He claimed that the emissions caused by these corporate actors constituted a public nuisance, acts of negligence, and a breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change. The New Zealand courts have issued a series of decisions on this case.

On 6 March 2020, the High Court of New Zealand struck out the first two causes of action (public nuisance and acts of negligence), but allowed the third (reach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change) to proceed.

After, on 21 October 2021, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Smith’s appeal and upheld the cross appeal of the respondents, Mr Smith received leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on 31 March 2022. On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court unanimously allowed Mr Smith’s appeal, and reinstated his statement of claim, and referred the case back to the High Court to proceed to trial (for more detail on the Supreme Court’s judgment, see below). After a series of procedural decisions, a substantive hearing in the case by the High Court was scheduled for April 2027.

Current state of the proceedings:
On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court of New Zealand reinstated the two dismissed tort causes of action and remanded the case to the lower court (the High Court). It held that the public rights pleaded laid an appropriate foundation for a nuisance claim. It also held that it was premature, at this stage of the proceeding, to conclude that the common law was insufficient to address the tortious aspects of climate change. Determining whether the actions of respondents, seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand, amount to a ‘substantial and unreasonable interference’ to public rights is a fact inquiry to be analyzed according to policy factors and human rights obligations.

On remand, the interlocutory applications raised noteworthy cost questions. The sixth defendant, BT Mining, sought an order for security for costs and Mr. Smith applied for protected cost orders (PCO). Here, the court has a wide latitude of discretion. It dismisses BT Mining’s request citing, among other considerations, access to justice concerns. Regarding Mr. Smith however, the court relies on the Edwards factors: (1) whether an issue of significant general or public importance is raised; (2) whether the applicant’s stance is seriously arguable; (3) whether the applicant is genuinely impecunious; (4) the position of the respondent, including “any unjust advantage likely to accrue to it absent the order”; and (5) any reasonable alternatives to making the order.

Reluctant to grant, the court emphasized the exceptional nature of a PCO in these proceedings. Mr. Smith, however, draws on Munkara v Santos NA Barossa Pty Ltd (No 4), an Australian Federal Court decision that ordered nonparty funders, the Environmental Defense Office, to pay costs to Santos, an oil company who defeated claimants’ petition for injunctive relief in the construction of a pipeline, to remind the court of the significant chilling effect of potential costs exposure on charitable funders. The court draws a distinction between a third-party funder and a ‘pure funder’ to reason that it would be highly unlikely for a costs award to be made against one that did not seek to benefit financially from the litigation nor seek to control its course. Unsatisfactory, but absent disclosure of third-party donor(s), the court declines Mr. Smith’s PCO application in its entirety. The decision, however, is without prejudice, leaving the door open to re-application with third-party funder identification.

Suggested citation:
Smith v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2024] NZSC 5, [2024] 1 NZLR 134.

Last updated:
19 September 2025.

Categories
Adaptation African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights Business responsibility / corporate cases Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Disability and health-related inequality Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation Environmental racism Evidence Extreme poverty Farming Gender / women-led Human dignity Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Minority rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Participation rights Private and family life Prohibition of torture Renewable energy Right to a healthy environment Right to assembly and association Right to development and work Right to education Right to freedom of expression Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to property Right to subsistence/food Rights of nature Sea-level rise Self-determination Standing/admissibility Victim status Vulnerability

African Court on Human and People’s Rights Climate Advisory Opinion

Summary:
On 2 May 2025, a request for an advisory opinion on climate change was submitted to the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The request was submitted by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), in collaboration with the African Climate Platform, and other African Civil society Organizations including the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, Natural Justice and resilient40, and seeks clarification of States’ obligations in the context of climate change.

Submitted under article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights and Rule 82(1) of the Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, the request submits that “[a]cross the continent, Africans are suffering the consequences of climate change, whether from rising temperatures, unrelenting droughts, catastrophic floods, vanishing biodiversity, or threats to livelihoods. Climate change in Africa has had prior, current and will have future consequences that impact the enjoyment of numerous rights.”

The request sets out impacts, disaggregating them region-by-region and in terms of the groups of people most affected by climate change (mentioning women and girls, children, the elderly, Indigenous peoples, and environmental human rights defenders in particular).

The request then goes on to discuss several issues of law, beginning with issues of admissibility and jurisdiction and then relying on a wide range of rights and instruments, namely:

  • a) the Constitutive Act of the African Union
  • b) the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), especially articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 60 and 61
  • c) African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)
  • d) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)
  • e) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
  • f) The Revised African Convention on Conservation of Nature
  • g) Any other Relevant Instrument.

In doing so, PALU invites the Court to consider international climate change law, including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as well as the UN Conventions on Combatting Desertification and on Biological Diversity.

Rights invoked in more detail:
PALU submits that “a rights-based climate approach is needed to address the challenges posed by climate change” and that the human rights framework “provides a robust legal framework upon which the Court may rely to define States’ responsibilities and duties in the context of climate change […] because the Charter clearly provides for collective rights and the explicit protection of the right to a healthy environment.” PALU accordingly invites the Court to consider the following provisions of the Banjul Charter:

  • Articles 2 and 3 (equality and non-discrimination)
  • Article 4 (right to life and inviolability of the human person)
  • Article 5 (right to respect for dignity and prohibition of all forms of exploitation and degradation, including slavery and torture)
  • Article 8 (freedom of conscience and religion)
  • Article 9 (freedom of information and opinion)
  • Article 10 (freedom of association)
  • Article 11 (freedom of assembly)
  • Article 12 (freedom of movement, residence and asylum; prohibition of mass expulsion)
  • Article 14 (right to property)
  • Article 16 (right to health)
  • Article 17 (right to education)
  • Article 18 (protection of the family, prohibition of age and gender discrimination)
  • Article 19 (equality of peoples, prohibition of domination)
  • Article 20 (right of peoples to existence and self-determination)
  • Article 21 (right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources)
  • Article 22 (right of peoples to their economic, social and cultural development)
  • Article 23 (right of peoples to national and international peace and security)
  • Article 24 (right of all peoples to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development)
  • The request also discusses the implied rights to food and shelter.

Issues for determination:
PALU submits the following issues for determination by the Court (paraphrased):

(a) Whether the Court can be seized with the question of obligations concerning climate change under the Banjul Charter and other relevant instruments?

(b) Whether the Court can interpret and lay down applicable custom and treaty law regarding States’ obligations and duties in the context of climate change?

If these questions are resolved in the affirmative, the Court is invited to further determine:

(a) What, if any, are States’ human and peoples’ rights obligations to protect and safeguard the rights of individuals and peoples of the past (ancestral rights), and present and future generations?

(b) Whether States have positive obligations to protect vulnerable populations including environmental human rights defenders, indigenous communities, women, children, youth, future generations, the current generation, past generations, the elderly and people with disabilities from the impact of climate change in line with the relevant treaties?

(c) What human rights obligations do States have to facilitate a just, transparent, equitable and accountable transition in the context of climate change in Africa?

(d) What are the obligations of African States in implementing adaptation, resilience and mitigation measures in response to climate change?

(e) What, if any, are applicable human rights obligations of States to compensate for loss, damage and reparations?

(f) What responsibilities, if any, do African States have in relation to third parties, including international monopolies, multinational corporations and non-state actors operating on the continent, to ensure that international and regional treaties and laws on climate change are respected, protected, promoted and implemented?

(g) What, if any, is the nature of the obligations on African States to cooperate with other states especially historical emitters to limit global warming to below the 1.5°C threshold, to avert an existential climate crisis for present and future generations on the continent?

Further reading:
For more information on the advisory opinion request, see this post by Yusra Suedi.

Suggested citation:
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Request for an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in addressing the climate crisis, filed 2 May 2025 (pending).

Last updated:
23 May 2025

Categories
Brazil Class action Deforestation Domestic court Environmental racism Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Just transition litigation Minority rights Non-discrimination Rights of nature

São Paulo State Public Defender’s Office v. São Paulo State Land Institute Foundation (ITESP) et al.

Summary:
On 31 March 2014, the São Paulo State Public Defender’s Office brought a “Public Civil Action” against the São Paulo State Land Institute Foundation (ITESP), the São Paulo State Foundation for Forest Conservation and Production (Fundação Florestal), and the State of São Paulo. The case sought annulment of the decision to protect biodiversity by creating a new State Park, the Alto Ribeira Tourist State Park (PETAR), despite the fact that the area in question overlapped with a traditional Quilombola territory, or a territory settled by Afro-Brazilian descendants of escaped slaves. The ruling highlights environmental racism as causing the marginalization of this community. The plaintiffs argued that the Quilombola are protectors of nature and have a relationship of mutual dependence with it and requested territorial recognition.

Ruling of 29 December 2023:
On 29 December 2023, a ruling was issued upholding the claim of the Quilombola community of Bombas and invalidating the decision to create the State Park to the extent that it overlapped with the Quilombola territory. The court established that it could review the conformity of domestic law against international human rights norms, finding also that ILO Convention 169 was hierarchically superior to domestic constitutional law. It also highlighted the difficulty of balancing the interests of the Quilombola community and PETAR, noting that both concerned internationally recognised human rights – the Quilombola community given its traditional customs, connection to nature and unique culture, and PETAR as a World Heritage Site at the heart of the Atlantic Rainforest that was home to a number of rare species of flora and fauna.

Exploring the issue of environmental racism, the court found that:

The Socio-Environmental Institute (ISA) recently produced a series of reports recognising that the Bombas community is subject to environmental racism. The issue is linked in the sense that despite the abstraction and supposed generality of the law, when it is applied to a specific case in environmental terms, because it disregards original realities (the way of life of the traditional community from the way of life of the urbanised community), it imposes burdens that make survival almost unbearable, because it creates prohibitions that affect the subsistence of groups that feed themselves, sustain themselves, produce minimal income and extract essential elements for their maintenance from the environment. Not that this isn’t also the case in urbanised society, after all, there’s no denying that all consumer goods originate from materials that are exploited on a large scale in world production and that originate from nature, such as oil.

To say that there is a precise separation between humans and the environment, as well as that there is real protection, is in itself a huge contradiction. After all, we are all on a planet and making use of its resources (…).

Ultimately, the court found the decision establishing the Park to be incompatible with Article 68 of the Transitional Constitutional Provisions Act (ADCT) and ILO Convention 169. Although the decision noted the problem of environmental racism, it found that the marginalization at stake stemmed from combined social, environmental, historical, and legal factors. It affirmed the relationship between traditional communities and the environment and the need to halt human impacts on natural ecosystems.

As noted by Climatecasechart, the original claim did not reference climate change; this connection was introduced judicially in the ruling of 2023.

On 5 March 2024, the São Paulo State Attorney General’s Office appealed. In doing so, it highlighted the threat of climate change and the importance of carbon sinks, such as the State Park in question.

Further information:
To read the full judgment in the case (in Portuguese), click here.

Last updated:
12 February 2025.

Categories
2022 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Indigenous peoples' rights Public trust doctrine Uncategorized United States of America

Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska I

Summary:
In 2017, sixteen children and young people — including some who were members of Alaskan Indigenous peoples — filed suit against the U.S. State of Alaska arguing by the state’s climate and energy policy violated their constitutional rights. Because the policy in question authorized and facilitated activities producing greenhouse gas emissions, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their due process rights to life, liberty, and property under the Alaskan Constitution, as well as their right to a stable climate system. The argued that the state government and relevant agencies had, “knowingly and with deliberate indifference”, created a dangerous situation for them, in violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs also made an equal protection claim and alleged a violation of Alaska’s public trust doctrine.

The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief. They sought a declaration that the state had a constitutional duty to protect their constitutional rights, as well as a duty under the public trust doctrine to protect Alaska’s waters, atmosphere, land, fish, wildlife, and other public trust resources. They sought a declaration that the state’s climate and energy policy had violated their rights and placed them “in a position of danger with deliberate indifference to their safety” and had “materially caused, contributed to, and/or exacerbated climate change and discriminated against Youth Plaintiffs as members of a protected class, and with respect to their fundamental rights”. They sought an order for the state to prepare a complete and accurate accounting of Alaska’s GHG emissions and an enforceable state climate recovery plan.

Alaska Superior Court Judgment:
On 30 October 2018, the Alaska Superior Court rejected the case, arguing that it was indistinguishable from previous climate cases based on the public trust doctrine and that it concerned political questions which were not justiciable. The plaintiffs appealed.

Alaska Supreme Court Judgment:
In 2022, on appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case (see full text of the judgment below). The Court found that the applicants’ claims concerned non-justiciable political questions and found that it could not make “the legislative policy judgments necessary to grant the requested injunctive relief.”

Judge Maassen, dissenting, argued that he was “no longer convinced that nothing can be gained by clarifying Alaskans’ constitutional rights and the State’s corresponding duties in the context of climate change”, and that the public trust doctrine under the Alaskan Constitution provided a right to a livable climate.

Additional developments:
A follow-up case, Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska II, was filed in 2022.

Sagoonick IDownload

Suggested citation:
Supreme Court of Alaska, Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska I, 28 January 2022, No. 3AN-17-09910 CI.

Last updated:
14 November 2024