Category: Evidence

Categories
Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Evidence Fair trial Gender / women-led Imminent risk Keywords Margin of appreciation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Separation of powers Standing/admissibility Switzerland Victim status Vulnerability

Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland

Summary:
In 2016, the Senior Women for Climate Protection Switzerland (German: ‘Verein KlimaSeniorinnen’), a Swiss organisation, brought proceedings concerning the alleged omissions of the Swiss federal government to adopt an adequate climate protection policy. They submitted that current domestic climate targets and measures are not sufficient to limit global warming to a safe level. This failure to prevent climate-related disasters, they argued, represents a failure to protect the rights under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the rights to life and respect for private and family life, respectively) of the organization’s members. In particular, they submitted evidence that their specific demographic (older women) is particularly impacted by heatwaves, citing health impacts and excess mortality risks. The respondent State, they argued, has failed to comply with its positive obligations to protect their rights, read in light of the environmental law principles of precaution and intergenerational equity.

The applicants also invoked two procedural rights under the Convention, namely the rights in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR (right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, respectively). In this regard they argued that the domestic courts failed to take their case seriously and provide an effective remedy to contest the violation of their rights.

These claims were rejected by the domestic instances at three levels of jurisdiction. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in its ruling, considered that the case represented an actio popularis, concerned questions better suited to the political arena, and did not raise an arguable claim of a rights violation. As a result, the applicants took their case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

This case was only the second climate change-related case to come to Strasbourg. Like the Duarte Agostinho case, this application raised novel questions before the Court, including the issue of victim status in climate cases, the standing of (environmental) NGOs to bring cases to the Court, and the extent of the State margin of appreciation in regard to environmental protection measures related to climate change, and the extent of the positive obligation to protect individuals from the risks to their life and health posed by climate change.

On 9 April 2024, in a historic ruling, the ECtHR declared this case admissible in part (for the association) and found that there had been violations of Articles 6(1) and 8 ECHR. In doing so, this case became the Court’s leading climate judgment, and a model for further climate-related cases in this system.

Third-party interventions:
There were an unusually large (for the ECtHR) number of third party interventions in this case: 23 in total, including eight States. The KlimaSeniorinnen association provided copies of all of the third-party interventions; these are available here. Some of the third-party interveners were also granted leave to intervene orally during the hearing before the Grand Chamber.

Grand Chamber hearing:
This was the first climate case heard by the European Court of Human Rights, followed immediately by the Carême v. France case. The Court has adjourned its examination of six other climate cases until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the three climate change cases before it, meaning that leading judgments clarifying the Convention obligations around cliamte change can be expected in these cases.

During the hearing, submissions were heard from the applicants, the respondent State, and two of the 23 total third-party interveners (the Government of Ireland & the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). A live summary of the hearing is available here.

General findings of the Court in its judgment of 9 April 2024:
The Court’s judgment is prefaced by a number of general findings that reflect its intended nature as a leading case. Noting the need to ensure effective protection of Convention rights without undermining the prohibition of actio popularis cases under the Convention system, the Court acknowledged that it had a role to play here, finding that “the current situation (…) involves compelling present‑day conditions, confirmed by scientific knowledge, which the Court cannot ignore in its role as a judicial body tasked with the enforcement of human rights.” At the same time, noting “the necessarily primary responsibility of the legislative and executive branches and the inherently collective nature of both the consequences and the challenges arising from the adverse effects of climate change”, it held that the isuse of victim status here raised an issue of the separation of powers, requiring particular consideration. Noting the global and complex nature of climate change, it held that “the necessity of combating climate change involves various conflicts, the weighing‑up of which falls, as stated previously, within the democratic decision‑making processes, complemented by judicial oversight by the domestic courts and this Court.”

In light of this, and before assessing the case, the Court set out a number of general considerations relating to climate‑change cases. This includes questions of causation, including the finding that despite indirect causal links, “the essence of the relevant State duties in the context of climate change relates to the reduction of the risks of harm for individuals”, meaning that it could not apply”a strict conditio sine qua non requirement” to matters of causation. This section also includes issues of proof and evidence, and references the “evolution of scientific knowledge, social and political attitudes and legal standards concerning the necessity of protecting the environment”. Here the Court established that “there are sufficiently reliable indications that anthropogenic climate change exists, that it poses a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights guaranteed under the Convention, that States are aware of it and capable of taking measures to effectively address it, that the relevant risks are projected to be lower if the rise in temperature is limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and if action is taken urgently, and that current global mitigation efforts are not sufficient to meet the latter target” (para. 436). And, importantly, it discarded the “drop in the bucket” argument made by the respondent State, stating that “The relevant test does not require it to be shown that “but for” the failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred. Rather, what is important, and sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State, is that reasonable measures which the domestic authorities failed to take could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm” (para. 444). It also stressed that there is no right to a healthy environment in the ECHR, but that it can and has nonetheless dealt with other environmental cases, reiterating its past approach that “the crucial element which must be present in determining whether, in the circumstances of a given case, an environmental harm has adversely affected one of the rights safeguarded by the Convention is the existence of a harmful effect on a person and not simply the general deterioration of the environment” (para. 446). It also noted that it is conscious of its subsidiary role and the direct democratic legitimation of national authorities to make decisions on climate policy, but that where State policy affects Convention rights, it has competence to intervene and “the Court’s competence in the context of climate-change litigation cannot, as a matter of principle, be excluded” (paras. 449-451).

The Court also set out the relevant principles for interpreting the ECHR, including the living instrument approach and the fact that while the Court “does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention” — including the Paris Agreement — it has consistently noted that it will interpret the Convention in harmony with other international law.

Admissibility:
On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case admissible in part. Under Article 34 ECHR, it used this judgment as an opportunity to create new standards on victim status specific to climate-related cases. In doing so, it set out the general standards on victim status, noting that it did not admit actio popularis cases and that the ECHR “does not permit individuals or groups of individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention” (para. 460). It noted that the notion of victim status must be applied flexibly, and that it’s distinct from locus standi, i.e. representative actions.

The Court then issued general considerations on victim status and locus standi in climate cases, noting that “there is cogent scientific evidence demonstrating that climate change has already contributed to an increase in morbidity and mortality, especially among certain more vulnerable groups, that it actually creates such effects and that, in the absence of resolute action by States, it risks progressing to the point of being irreversible and disastrous” (para. 478).

It also held that (para. 479): the critical issues around climate change “arise from failures to act, or inadequate action”, meaning omissions in legislative or regulatory frameworks that require a special approach to victim status. Importantly, the Court also clarified that its findings on victim status in the context of complaints about omissions in climate policy “is without prejudice to the determination of victim status in circumstances where complaints by individuals concern alleged violations arising from a specific individual loss or damage already suffered by them” (para. 480), meaning that the specially approach spelled out for mitigation cases need not preclude other types of claims. However, it held, in the context of climate change, “a potentially a huge number of persons could claim victim status under the Convention”, which “would not sit well with the exclusion of actio popularis from the Convention mechanism and the effective functioning of the right of individual application” (para. 483). The Court clarified the difficult situation in which it found itself, between “disrupting national constitutional principles and the separation of powers” and depriving individuals affected in their rights from “any judicial recourse before the Court”, noting the “distinct representational disadvantage” of those most affected (para. 484). It then, in para 487 of the judgment, spelled out the criteria for individual victim status in climate cases. These are:

  • (a)  “a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change”, i.e. a significant level and severity of risk of adverse consequences; and
  • (b) “a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm.”

Given that there is no actio popularis under the Convention, the Court held, “the threshold for fulfilling these criteria is especially high”, and will depend on specific vulnerabilities and local circumstances as well as including considerations relating to: “the nature and scope of the applicant’s Convention complaint, the actuality/remoteness and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on the applicant’s life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicant’s vulnerability” (para. 488).

As to the standing of associations, the Court generally reiterated its previous Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others judgment, which had allowed representative standing for an organisation. It noted that recourse to collective bodies like associations can make defense of one’s interests more accessible in certain circumstances, including the context of climate change, noting that this general principle was also reflected in the Aarhus Convention, which it discussed extensively. The Court then set out some general principles on organizations’ victim status versus their standing as representatives of victims. In light of the former, it reiterated past case-law finding that “an association cannot rely on health considerations or nuisances and problems associated with climate change which can only be encountered by natural persons”. But it also recognized that understandings of the importance of litigation by associations had evolved, and that climate cases are complex and demanding and affect many individuals (para. 498). In addition, “the special feature of climate change as a common concern of humankind and the necessity of promoting intergenerational burden-sharing in this context (…), speak in favour of recognising the standing of associations before the Court in climate-change cases” (para. 499). However, this should not mean allowing an actio popularis: a test for associations’ standing is required. To design its test, the Court had regard to the Aarhus Convention while also noting key difference between its approach and that under Aarhus.

The test it devised for associations looks as follows: associations will have locus standi to bring climate cases about impacts on human lives and health where they:

  • (a) have been lawfully established in the relevant jurisdiction, or have standing to act there;
  • (b) pursue, under their statutory objectives, a dedicated purpose of defending the human rights of their members or other affected individuals in the jurisdiction concerned, and
  • (c) are genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of affected individuals in the jurisdiction who are subject to specific threats on their lives, health or well-being from climate change.

The Court also noted that it would consider additional factors, like the purpose for which the association was established, its non-profit character, the nature and extent of its activities, its membership and representativeness, its principles and transparency of governance and whether standing is in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

There was no need, however, to show that those on whose behalf the case has been brought would themselves have met the climate-specific victim-status requirements for individuals as set out earlier in the judgment.

Because the Court joined its actual analysis of the victim status requirement to the merits of the case, this is discussed in the following section.

Merits:
In setting out general principles on the applicability of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life), the Court noted past cases where the right was applicable to situations where there is a threat to life, but “where the person concerned did not die”. Although noting the evidence on vulnerable populations, the Court reiterated that the appropriate test here is one of whether there is a “real and imminent” risk to life, meaning that the risk must be serious, gennuine, sufficiently ascertainable and in physical proximity. It then tailored this last aspect to the nature of climate change, stating that it would suffice to show “an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant”. This means that, provided an applicant has victim status, “a serious risk of a significant decline in a person’s life expectancy owing to climate change ought also to trigger the applicability of Article 2.”

As for Article 8 ECHR, the Court stated generally that it was necessary to show an “actual interference” with the right, meaning that there needs to be “a direct and immediate link between the alleged environmental harm and the applicant’s private or family life or home”, and a

As for Article 8 ECHR, the Court stated generally that it was necessary to show an “actual interference” with the right, meaning that there needs to be “a direct and immediate link between the alleged environmental harm and the applicant’s private or family life or home”, and a certain level of severity. Drawing on its past environmental case-law, the Court went on to establish that “Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 519).

The Court then considered the applicability of Art. 8 ECHR to the case before it. As concerned the applicant association, it found that it met the criteria for standing by associations as set out earlier in the judgment, describing the KlimaSeniorinnen association as “a vehicle of collective recourse aimed at defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State”. The the complaints pursued by the association on behalf of its members, it held, fall within the scope of Article 8. The association accordingly had locus standi, and Article 8 was declared applicable to its complaint.

On applicants 2-5 (the individual applicants), the Court held that the threshold for meeting its two criteria (high-intensity exposure and a pressing need to ensure protection) was high. It was not enough to show that they were particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The crucial paragraph of the judgment here is para. 533: “while it may be accepted that heatwaves affected the applicants’ quality of life, it is not apparent from the available materials that they were exposed to the adverse effects of climate change, or were at risk of being exposed at any relevant point in the future, with a degree of intensity giving rise to a pressing need to ensure their individual protection (…). It cannot be said that the applicants suffered from any critical medical condition whose possible aggravation linked to heatwaves could not be alleviated by the adaptation measures available in Switzerland or by means of reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their complaint was accordingly declared inadmissible.

On the claims under Article 2, the Court held that it was not necessary to analyze this further, noting that its analysis would “have regard to the principles developed also under Article 2, which to a very large extent are similar to those under Article 8 (…) and which, when seen together, provide a useful basis for defining the overall approach to be applied in the climate-change context under both provisions.”

The Court then recapitulated more general principles now on the merits proper. It held that the Article 2 and 8 positive obligations are generally quite similar, requiring the State:

  • (a)  to put in place an adequate legislative and administrative framework and govern the licensing, setting-up, operation, security and supervision of the activity;
  • (b) to apply that framework effectively in practice;
  • (c) to remain within their margin of appreciation;
  • (d) to exercise due diligence and consider all competing interests;
  • (f) to provide access to essential information enabling individuals to assess risks to their health and lives;

Noting also that “the scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in the particular circumstances will depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation”.

In reviewing the domestic decision-making process, the Court has particular regard to the following considerations:

  • (a) Its subsidiary role;
  • (b) The need to consider all of the procedural aspects;
  • (c) The presence of appropriate investigations and studies;
  • (d) The public’s access to the conclusions of the relevant studies; and
  • (e) Whether or not the individuals concerned had an opportunity to protect their interests in the environmental decision-making process, i.e. participate effectively.

Turning to States’ positive obligations relation to climate, it first considered the State margin of appreciation. Having regard to the scientific evidence, the Court considered it justified to give climate protection considerable weight against competing considerations.

Regarding the margin of appreciation it distinguished between the scope of the margin as regards (i) the State’s commitment combating climate change and setting objectives in this respect, and (ii) the choice of means designed to achieve those objectives. The margin is more narrow with regard to the former. For the latter aspect, i.e. the choice of means, States have a wide margin of appreciation.

As to the content of States’ positive obligations under Article 8, this is primarily a regulatory obligation. This means that, in line with their international commitments, States need to put in place regulations and measures to prevent climate change. The global aims in the Paris Agreement are not enough; and “must inform the formulation of domestic policies, it is obvious that the said aims cannot of themselves suffice as a criterion for any assessment of Convention compliance of individual Contracting Parties to the Convention in this area. This is because “each individual State is called upon to define its own adequate pathway for reaching carbon neutrality, depending on the sources and levels of emissions and all other relevant factors within its jurisdiction.”

This means that Article 8 ECHR “requires that each Contracting State undertake measures for the substantial and progressive reduction of their respective GHG emission levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within, in principle, the next three decades” (ca. 2050). To avoid a disproportionate burden on future generations, this means immediate action needs to be taken and adequate intermediate reduction goals must be set for the interim period. The Court spelled out that this must be part of a binding regulatory framework at the national level, followed by adequate implementation, and that “the relevant targets and timelines must form an integral part of the domestic regulatory framework, as a basis for general and sectoral mitigation measures.”

In para. 550, the Court set out the criteria it would use to decide whether a State has remained within its margin of appreciation, namely whether the authorities had due regard to the need to:

  • “(a) adopt general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality and the overall remaining carbon budget for the same time frame, or another equivalent method of quantification of future GHG emissions, in line with the overarching goal for national and/or global climate-change mitigation commitments;
  • (b) set out intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways (by sector or other relevant methodologies) that are deemed capable, in principle, of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant time frames undertaken in national policies;
  • (c) provide evidence showing whether they have duly complied, or are in the process of complying, with the relevant GHG reduction targets (…);
  • (d) keep the relevant GHG reduction targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and
  • (e) act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures.”

These mitigation measures, it added, must be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account particular protection needs.

The Court also set out procedural safeguards, namely

  • (a) The publicity of relevant information; and
  • (b) The availability of procedures to take into account the views of the public, and in particular the interests of those affected.

Applying these principles to the case before it, the Court held that it could “take into account the overall situation in the respondent State”, including relevant information that came to light after the domestic proceedings, but that here, given an ongoing domestic legislative process, its assessment was limited to examining the domestic legislation as it stood on the date of the (internal) adoption of the judgment, which was 14 February 2024.

The Court noted that the currently existing 2011 CO2 Act (in force since 2013) required that emissions reductions of 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. However, as far back as August 2009, the Swiss Federal Council had found that the scientific evidence under a 2-2.4°C warming limit required a reduction in global emissions of at least 50-85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Industrialised countries (like Switzerland) had to reduce their emissions by 25-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. for the higher 1.5°C limit, emissions would have to decline continuously, and the pathway 20% by 2020 pathway was insufficient to achieve that objective.

As the Government acknowledged, domestic assessments found that even the reduction target for 2020 had been missed. Between 2013 and 2020, Switzerland reduced its emissions by around 11% compared with 1990 levels, indicating the insufficiency of the authorities’ past action to take the necessary measures to address climate change.

A proposed revision of the CO2 Act for 2020-2030 proposed an overall reduction of 50% of emissions, including a domestic reduction of 30% by 2030 and measures to be taken abroad (“external emissions”). This proposal was rejected in a popular referendum in June 2021. Here the Court held that, “irrespective of the way in which the legislative process is organised from the domestic constitutional point of view”, there was a legislative lacuna, pointing to a failure on the part of the respondent State to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 to devise a regulatory framework setting the requisite objectives and goals.

Reflecting the updated Swiss NDC, the Climate Act was enacted, and envisages the principle of a net‑zero emissions target by 2050, but several lacunae remain, and “the Court has difficulty accepting that the mere legislative commitment to adopt the concrete measures “in good time” (…) satisfies the State’s duty”, especially because “the introduction of that new legislation is not sufficient to remedy the shortcomings identified in the legal framework applicable so far.”

Currently, the Swiss goal used more emissions than even a globally equal “per capita emissions” approach would entitle it to use.

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that there was no established methodology to determine a country’s carbon budget, and noted that an NDC under the Paris Agreement was not an appropriate substitute. The Court approved of the reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Neubauer, where it rejected the argument that it was impossible to determine the national carbon budget by emphasizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

Thus, “while acknowledging that the measures and methods determining the details of the State’s climate policy fall within its wide margin of appreciation, in the absence of any domestic measure attempting to quantify the respondent State’s remaining carbon budget, the Court has difficulty accepting that the State could be regarded as complying effectively with its regulatory obligation under Article 8” (para. 572). This meant that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (by a majority of 16-1).

On the issue of Article 6 ECHR, concerning the right of access to a court, the Court held that the issue of victim status should again be joined to the merits, and the Court again dove in with general principles, finding that it did not per se need to tailor these principles to the nature of climate change cases.

Examining these principles in the case before it, the Court held that “it cannot be said that the individual applicants’ claim was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise lacking in foundation in terms of the relevant domestic law (…). The Court is unable to agree with the finding of the FSC that the individual applicants’ claim could not be considered arguable for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention” (para. 618). It went on to find that interests defended by the association meant that the “dispute” raised by it had a direct and sufficient link to its members’ rights. Finding that Article 6 (1) applied to the complaint of the applicant association, the Court also considered it to have victim status.

For the individual applicants, however, the Court found that the dispute they had brought concerning the failure to effectively implement mitigation measures was not directly decisive for their specific rights. They had not shown that there was a sufficiently imminent and certain effect on their individual rights, and this part of their complaint was inadmissible.

For the association, among other things, the Court rejected the domestic courts’ findings that there was still some time to prevent global warming from reaching the critical limit, and noted that they “did not engage seriously or at all with the action brought by the applicant association.” There had accordingly been a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR, with the Court emphasizing “the key role which domestic courts have played and will play in climate-change litigation”.

The applicants also complained that they had not had access to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. Here the Court noted that Article 6 is a lex specialis to Article 13, the latter being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6, so there was no separate issue in its regard.

Remedies:
The individual applicants had made requests for just satisfaction for damage under Article 41 ECHR, but the organisation did not, so no award was made. The Court did award costs and expenses to the amount of EUR 80,000.

The applicants had also made an Art. 46 claim for a general measures order. Here the Court noted that it is primarily for the State to choose, under the supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used domestically to discharge its obligation to comply with the Court’s judgment, as long as the means are compatible with the conclusions and spirit of that judgment. The Court went on to hold that, “having regard to the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, the Court is unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the present judgment.” It noted the State’s broad margin of appreciation choose the means to discharge its Convention obligations, and found that the State was thus better placed than the Court to decide which specific measures to take.

Separate opinions:
A separate opinion by Judge Eicke is annexed to this judgment. He disagreed with the majority in several points, especially victim status and the merits of Art. 8. He presented his view as a disagreement of a “fundamental nature” that “goes to the very heart of the role of the Court within the Convention system and, more generally, the role of a court in the context of the unique and unprecedented challenges posed to humanity” because the majority had exceeded “the permissible limits of evolutive interpretation”.

According to Judge Eicke, the majority judgment creates a new right to “effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well‑being and quality of life arising from the harmful effects and risks caused by climate change”. While acknowledging the seriousness of the threat of climate change, and noting “(a) the absolute need for urgent action and (b) the sheer complexity of the challenges climate change (and the other aspects of the “triple planetary crisis”) pose (geo-)politically, practically, logistically as well as legal,” he argues that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances (Article 2(2) Paris Agreement) is “difficult to reconcile (if not wholly inconsistent) with the Court’s primary role of ensuring observance of a common minimum standard of protection applicable equally to all Contracting Parties”.

On victim status, Eicke argues that “there was, in fact, no dispute and no uncertainty about the “victim” status of the individual applicants in relation to the Article 6 § 1 complaint in this case; and therefore no need to join that question to the merits”. He sets out and adheres to the previously established case-law on victim status, refusing to join the majority in creating a new approach tailored to climate cases and arguing that exceptions should only be possible where individual applications document victim status are not “ever” likely to be possible. He argues that the judgment creates an actio popularis.

Under Articles 2 and 8, Eicke argues that while it would have been possible to find a procedural violation of Articles 2 or 8, “the substantive violation of Article 8 which the majority seeks to construct from this starting premise has no basis either in the text of the Convention nor in any of the Court’s case-law.” He considers that “the Court would already have achieved much if it had focussed on a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and, at a push, a procedural violation of Article 8 relating in particular to (…) the right of access to court and of access to information”. He accuses the majority of trying “to run before it could walk”, and “giving (false) hope that litigation and the courts can provide “the answer” without there being, in effect, any prospect of litigation (especially before this Court) accelerating the taking of the necessary measures towards the fight against anthropogenic climate change”, and mentions the risk that this judgment will distract from other efforts to tackle climate change.

Implementation measures taken:

N/A

Date of decision:
It was announced on 26 March 2024 that the Grand Chamber would issue its judgment in this case, along with the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber, in a hearing to be held on 9 April 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The judgment and a summary were made available on the Court’s HUDOC database immediately after the hearing.

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
This case was communicated to the respondent State, Switzerland, on 17 March 2021. On 26 April 2022, a Chamber of the Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, held a public hearing in this case on 29 March 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here. On 9 April 2024, the Court issued its judgment in the case.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, no. 53600/20, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:

Webcast of the hearing:
To watch a webcast recording of the public hearing in this case, which was held before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 29 March 2023, click here (available in French and English).

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Categories
2023 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Evidence Fossil fuel extraction Human dignity Indigenous peoples' rights Right to a healthy environment Right to health Standing/admissibility United States of America

Held and Others v. Montana

Summary:
In Held and Others, sixteen young plaintiffs aged between two and eighteen brought a case against the U.S. state of Montana alleging violations of the state constitution due to climate change. The youth plaintiffs in this case, which is to some extent comparable to the Juliana litigation, alleged that they are already experiencing ‘a host of adverse consequences’ from anthropogenic climate change in Montana, including increased temperatures, changing weather patterns, more acute droughts and extreme weather events, increasing wildfires and glacial melt. Fossil fuels extracted in Montana cause emissions higher than those of many countries, including Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Spain, or the United Kingdom. The plaintiffs argued that this was causing health risks, especially for children, and that the defendants, among them the state of Montana, its Governor, and various state agencies, had “act[ed] affirmatively to exacerbate the climate crisis” despite their awareness of the risks to the applicants. On 14 August 2023, Judge Kathy Seeley ruled wholly in favor of the youth plaintiffs, declaring that Montana had violated their constitutional rights and invalidating the statutory rule forbidding state authorities from considering the impacts of GHG emissions or climate change in decision-making related to fossil fuel extraction.

Claims made:
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of fossil fuel-based provisions of Montana’s State Energy Policy Act along with a provision of the Montana Environmental Policy Act which forbids state authorities from considering the impacts of GHG emissions or climate change in their environmental reviews (the “MEPA Limitation”). They also challenged the aggregate acts that the state has taken to implement and perpetuate a fossil fuel-based energy system under these statutes.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that their right to a clean and healthy environment includes a right a stable climate, and that existing approaches to greenhouse gas emissions in Montana violate constitutional provisions, including the right to a clean and healthy environment; the right to seek safety, health, and happiness; and the right to individual dignity and to equal protection. They also sought injunctive relief, namely an order to account for Montana’s greenhouse gas emissions and to develop and implement an emissions reductions plan.

Decision on the admissibility:
On 4 August 2021, a the Montana First Judicial District Court for Lewis and Clark County declared the case admissible in part. The prayer for injunctive relief in terms of emissions accounting, a remedial plan or policy, the appointment of expert to assist the court, and retain jurisdiction until such orders are complied with were rejected. However, the court declared the constitutional rights claims admissible, including the claim about the plaintiffs’ ‘fundamental constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment’, which — as the plaintiffs submitted — ‘includes a stable climate system that sustains human lives and liberties’.

Judge Seeley’s Ruling of 14 August 2023:
After a trial held from 12-23 June 2023, Judge Kathy Seeley of the First Judicial District Court of Montana issued a ruling in this case on 14 August 2023. Noting that “[t]he science is clear that there are catastrophic harms to the natural environment of Montana and Plaintiffs and future generations of the State due to anthropogenic climate change”, she ruled wholly in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that the state of Montana had violated their constitutional rights to equal protection, dignity, liberty, health and safety, and public trust, all of which are predicated on their right to a clean and healthful environment (p. 92-93).

In doing so, Judge Seeley ruled that the youth plaintiffs had standing to bring the case because they had proven that they had experienced significant injuries. The court set out the different impacts on the plaintiffs at length (p. 46-64). It ultimately found that the plaintiffs “have experienced past and ongoing injuries resulting from the State’s failure to consider GHGs and climate change, including injuries to their physical and mental health, homes and property, recreational, spiritual, and aesthetic interests, tribal and cultural traditions, economic security, and happiness” (p. 86 of the ruling). The judge also ruled that while mental health injuries based on state inaction on climate change do not on their own constitute a cognizable injury, “mental health injuries stemming from the effects of climate change on Montana’s environment, feelings like loss, despair, and anxiety, are cognizable injuries” (p. 86-87). The ruling recognizes that “[e]very additional ton of GHG emissions exacerbates Plaintiffs’ injuries and risks locking in irreversible climate injuries”, and that these injuries “will grow increasingly severe and irreversible without science-based actions to address climate change” (p. 87). As children and youth, the plaintiffs are disproportionately impacted by fossil fuel pollution and climate impacts, and their injuries are “concrete, particularized, and distinguishable from the public generally” (p. 87).

On causation, and having heard and evaluated testimony from several expert witnesses, the Court extensively reviewed the scientific evidence concerning the causation and progression of anthropogenic climate change and identified the Earth’s energy imbalance as the critical metric for determining levels of global warming (p. 22). Having established that “Montana is a major emitter of GHG emissions in the world in absolute terms, in per person terms, and historically”, and noting the state government’s continuing approval of fossil fuel projects despite its already extensive production of oil, gas and coal, the Court found that there was a “fairly traceable connection” between Montana’s statutes, its GHG emissions, climate change, and the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs (p. 87). Noting that the state government had the authority to limit fossil fuel-related activities, and having regard to the fact that the MEPA Limitation causes the state to ignore climate impacts and renewable energy alternatives to fossil fuels, as well as noting the economic and environmental advantages of a green energy transition for Montana, the Court noted that “current barriers to implementing renewable energy systems are not technical or economic, but social and political” (p. 83). The state of Montana, it held, “authorizes fossil fuel activities without analyzing GHGs or climate impacts, which result in GHG emissions in Montana and abroad that have caused and continue to exacerbate anthropogenic climate change” (p. 88). It noted also that these emissions were “nationally and globally significant”, and could accordingly not be considered de minimis; they “can be measured incrementally and cumulatively both in terms of immediate local effects and by mixing in the atmosphere and contributing to global climate change and an already destabilized climate system” (p. 88).

On the redressability of these impacts, the Court noted that the psychological satisfaction of the ruling itself did not constitute sufficient redress, and that declaring the relevant state statutory rules unconstitutional would provide partial redress because ongoing emissions will continue to cause harms to the plaintiffs. Noting that “[i]t is possible to affect future degradation to Montana’s environment and natural resources and injuries to these Plaintiffs”, and applying strict structiny to the state’s statutes, the Court found that the MEPA Limitation violates the right to a clean and healthful environment under the Montana Constitution, which protects children and future generations (among others) and includes the protection of the climate system. As a result, the Court tested whether the MEPA Limitation was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, finding that neither had the state authorities shown that it served a compelling governmental interest, nor was it narrowly tailored to serve any interest.

As a result, the judge invalidated the Montana legislation that promoted fossil fuels and prohibited analysis of GHG emissions and corresponding climate impacts.

Date filed:
13 March 2020

Date of admissibility decision:
4 August 2021

Date of Ruling:
14 August 2023

More information:
The original complaint is available from the Western Environmental Law Center.

The admissibility decision is available on climatecasechart.com.

Judge Seeley’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of 14 August 2023 are available below.

Held-v-MontanaDownload

Suggested citations:
Montana First District Court for Lewis and Clark county, Held and others v. State of Montana and others, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 14 August 2023, Cause no. CDV-2020-307.

Categories
Adaptation Biodiversity Children and young people Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Emissions reductions/mitigation Evidence Gender / women-led Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Inter-American Human Rights System Loss & damage Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Rights of nature Vulnerability

The 2023 Advisory Opinion Request to the IACtHR on the Climate Emergency

Summary:
On 9 January 2023, the governments of Colombia and Chile jointly filed a request for an advisory opinion on the climate emergency and human rights to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The two governments requested clarification of the scope of States’ obligations, both in their individual and collective dimensions, in responding to the climate emergency within the framework of international human rights law, taking into account the different effects that climate change has on people in different regions and on different population groups, nature and human survival.

The governments asked the Inter-American Court to answer a series of questions grouped into six thematic areas, namely:

A. On the scope of States’ obligations to protect and prevent, including regarding their obligations to mitigate, adapt, regulate and monitor, and their response to loss and damage;

B. On States’ obligations to protect the right to life given the existing climate science, and taking into account the right of access to information and transparency of information, including under the Escazú Agreement;

C. On the obligations of States with respect to the rights of children and new generations, given especially the vulnerability of children;

D. On the State’s obligations concerning consultative and judicial procedures, taking into account the limited remaining carbon budget;

E. On the protective and preventative obligations concerning environmental and land rights defenders, as well as women, indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities; and

F. On shared and differentiated obligations and responsibilities in terms of the rights of States, the obligation of cooperation and given the impacts on human mobility (migration and forced displacement of people).

Extended summary:
In their request to the IACtHR, the two governments submit that they are already dealing with the consequences of the climate emergency, including the proliferation of droughts, floods, landslides and fires. These, they submit, underscore the need for a response based on the principles of equity, justice, cooperation and sustainability, as well as human rights. The two governments note that climate change is already putting humans and future generations at risk, but that its effects are not being experienced uniformly across the international community. Instead, given their geography, climatic conditions, socioeconomic conditions and infrastructure, they are particularly being felt in the most vulnerable communities, including several countries in the Americas. They emphasize that these effects are not proportionate to these countries’ and communities’ contribution to climate change.

The governments, in their request, emphasize the relevance of the right to a healthy environment, as well as other interrelated substantive and procedural rights (affecting life, human survival and future generations). They review the existing scientific evidence concerning the impacts and progression of climate change from the IPCC, and note the vulnerability of the Andean region. Emphasizing the utility of the human rights framework for understanding these harms, and “to advance and accelerate the collective response to the climate emergency in each State, regionally and globally”, they ask the Court to answer a series of questions “in order to provide guidance towards solutions based on human rights, with an intersectional perspective.” In doing so, they note the need for clear inter-American standards to accelerate the response to the climate emergency, arguing that while the concrete measures taken may vary, human rights obligations should be the framework for accelerating the response in a just, equitable and sustainable way.

The two governments refer to the 2017 Advisory Opinion of the IACtHR, which recognized the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous and individual right, and referred to the negative effects of climate change. However, they argue, there is a need to further clarify the human rights imapcts of climate change, and corresponding obligations. In this regard, they raise the existence also of collective rights for the protection of nature under international human rights and environmental law, and cite the need to protect fundamental biomes like the Amazon and to understand States’ shared but differentiated responsibilities in a way that copes with loss and damage. The two governments invite the Court to set out clear standards against the background of litigation and related developments, citing the Vanuatu advisory opinion request to the ICJ, the pending cases before the European Court of Human Rights, and the UN HRC’s Billy and ors. v. Australia case. An advisory opinion from the Court, they argue, would provide States with guidance for setting out domestic policies and programmes.

The questions asked:

A. On the State’s obligations of prevention and protection

Question A.1: What is the scope of States’ obligation to prevent climate phenomena created by global warming, including extreme events and slow-onset events, in accordance with their inter-American treaty obligations and in light of the Paris Agreement and the scientific consensus that calls to limit the increase in global temperature to 1.5°C?

Question A.2: In particular, what actions should States take to minimize the impact of climate-related damage, in light of their obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)? In this regard, what differentiated measures must be taken with respect to vulnerable populations or intersectional considerations?

Question A.2.A.: What must States consider in implementing their obligation to (i) regulate, (ii) monitor and oversee, (iii) order and approve social and environmental impact studies, (iv) establish a contingency plan, and (v) mitigate activities within their jurisdiction that aggravate or may aggravate the climate emergency?

Question A.2.B.: What principles should guide action towards mitigation, adaptation and the response to loss and damage created by the climate emergency in affected communities?

B. On the State’s obligations to protect the right to life given the existing scientific consensus

Taking into account the right to access to information and the obligations concerning the active production and transparency of information derived from Arts. 14, 4.1 and 5.1. of the ACHR, in light of Arts. 5 and 6 of the Escazú Agreement, the governments ask the Court to determine:

Question B.1.: What is the scope of States’ obligations in the face of the climate emergency, in terms of:

  • (i) the environmental information required;
  • (ii) the mitigation and climate adaptation measures to be adopted to address the climate emergency and the impacts of such measures, including specific just transition policies for groups and people particularly vulnerable to global warming;
  • iii) responses to prevent, minimize and address economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;
  • iv) the production of information and access to information on greenhouse gas emissions levels, air pollution, deforestation, and short-lived climate pollutants, analysis of sectors or activities that contribute to emissions, and more; and
  • v) establishing impacts on people, such as on human mobility (migration and forced displacement), effects on health and life, non-economic losses, etc.?

Question B.2.: To what extent does access to environmental information constitute a right that must be ensured to guarantee the rights to life, property, health, participation and access to justice, among other rights that are negatively affected by climate change, in accordance with the State’s obligations under the ACHR?

C. On the differentiated obligations of States with respect to the rights of children and new generations

Citing Art. 19 ACHR and Art. 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and recognizing the consensus of the scientific community that identifies children as the group most vulnerable in the long term to the imminent risks to life and well-being expected to result from the climate emergency, the govenments ask the Court to determine:

Question C.1.: What is the nature and scope of a State Party’s obligation to adopt timely and effective measures in the face of the climate emergency to ensure the protection of children’s rights derived from its obligations under Articles 1, 4, 5, 11 and 19 ACHR?

Question C.2: What is the nature and extent of a State Party’s obligation to provide children with meaningful and effective means to freely and fully express their views, including the opportunity to initiate, or otherwise participate in, any judicial or administrative proceedings concerning the prevention of climate change that constitutes a threat to their lives?

D. On the State’s obligations concerning consultative and judicial procedures

In consideration of Arts. 8 and 25 ACHR, and taking into account the scientific finding that there is a limited greenhouse gas budget that can still be emitted before reaching a dangerous and irrevocable level of climate change, and that this budget would be exhausted within a decade, the States ask the Court to clarify:

Question D.1.: What is the nature and extent of the State Parties’ obligation concerning to the provision of effective judicial remedies to provide adequate and timely protection and redress for the impairment of rights due to the climate emergency?

Question D.2.: To what extent should the obligation to consult take into account the climatic consequences of a given activity or projections concerning the emergency?

E. On the protective and preventative obligations concerning environmental and land rights defenders, as well as for women, indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities

In accordance with Arts. 1.1 and 2 ACHR and Art. 9 of the Escazú Agreement, the governments as the IACtHR to determine:

Question E.1.: What measures and policies should States adopt in order to facilitate the work of environmental defenders?

Question E.2.: What specific considerations should be taken into account to guarantee women human rights defenders’ right to defend the healthy environment and their land?

Question E.3.: What specific considerations should be taken into account to guarantee the right to defend the healthy environment and land in light of intersectional factors and differentiated impacts, among others, on indigenous peoples, peasant communities and Afro-descendants?

Question E.4.: In the face of the climate emergency, what information should the State produce and publish in order to determine the possibility of investigating various crimes committed against human rights defenders, including reports of threats, kidnappings, homicides, forced displacement, gender violence, discrimination, etc.?

Question E.5.: What due diligence measures should States take into account to ensure that attacks and threats against environmental defenders in the context of the climate emergency do not go unpunished?

F. On shared and differentiated obligations and responsibilities in terms of the rights of States

Bearing in mind that the climate emergency affects the entire world, and that obligations to cooperate and repair arise from the ACHR and other international treaties:

Question F.1.: What considerations and principles should States and international organizations, collectively and regionally, take into account in analyzing shared but differentiated responsibilities in the face of climate change from a human rights and intersectionality perspective?

Question F.2.: How should States act both individually and collectively to guarantee the right to reparation for the damages generated by their actions or omissions in the face of the climate emergency, taking into account considerations of equity, justice and sustainability?

Taking into account that the climate crisis has a greater impact on some regions and populations, among them, the Caribbean, island and coastal countries and territories of the Americas, and their inhabitants:

Question F.3.: How should the obligations of cooperation between States be interpreted?

Question F.4.: What obligations and principles should guide the actions of States in order to ensure the right to life and survival of the most affected regions and populations in different countries and in the region?

Considering that one of the impacts of the climate emergency is to aggravate the factors that lead to human mobility (migration and forced displacement of people):

Question F.5.: What obligations and principles should guide the individual and coordinated actions to be taken by States in the region to address non-voluntary human mobility exacerbated by the climate emergency?

Consultation procedure:

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR (Art. 73(3)), all interested parties (individuals and organizations) are invited to present a written opinion on the issues covered in the advisory opinion request. The President of the Court has established 18 August 2023 as the deadline for doing so. More information is available here.

Further information:

  • The text of the advisory opinion request is available here (in the official Spanish version as filed with the Court) and it has also been translated to English, French and Portuguese by the Court’s Secretariat.
  • For a comment by Juan Auz and Thalia Viveros-Uehara, see ‘Another Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency? The Added Value of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 2 March 2023, available here.
  • For a comment from Maria Antonia Tigre, see ‘A Request for an Advisory Opinion at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Initial Reactions’, Climate Law Blog, 17 February 2023, available here.
Categories
Business responsibility Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Evidence Right to a healthy environment Right to health South Africa

South African ‘Deadly Air Case’

Summary:
This case concerns toxic air pollution in the Mpumalanga Highveld, which is home to a dozen coal-fired power plants, a coal-to-liquids plant and a refinery. The case was brought by two environmental organisations – groundWork and Vukani Environmental Justice Movement in Action – represented by the Centre for Environmental Rights.

The applicants have petitioned the court to declare the unsafe levels of air pollution to be a violation of section 24a of the South African Constitution, which provides that “everyone has the right to an environment not harmful to their health or wellbeing”. 

The outcome of the case is currently pending before the Pretoria High Court, and Judge Colleen Collins has reserved judgment.

Claims:
The applicants’ complaints concern exposure to toxic chemicals emitted by the coal plants. This includes sulphur dioxide, heavy metals like mercury, and fine particulate matter. According to the applicants, the coal plants are responsible for the majority of these emissions, which are causing chronic respiratory illnesses such as asthma and lung cancer, and which also increase the risk of strokes, heart attacks, birth defects and premature deaths. 

The area in question has been recognized as a hotspot of pollution in excess of permissible levels. It has been claimed that this pollution is responsible for up to 10,000 excess deaths per year. But the Government has pointed to the existence of clean air regulations, and argued that there is no scientific evidence proving the link between the air pollution and the harms allegedly suffered by any particular individual. It has also highlighted the need to realize the right to a healthy environment progressively.

Amicus curia intervention by the UNSR:
David R. Boyd, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights and the environment, intervened as an amicus curiae in this case. He argued that poor and marginalised people disproportionately carry the burden of toxic air pollution. It has been reported that Boyd’s arguments include consideration for the vulnerability of children to environmental threats.

Deciding body:
Pretoria High Court

Admissibility:
TBD

Merits:
TBD

Remedies and outcomes:
TBD

Further reading:
For more information from the Centre for Environmental Resources, click here.

Suggested citation:
South African ‘Deadly Air’ case, Pretoria High Court, hearings held on 17-19 May 2021.

Categories
2022 Adaptation Czechia Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Evidence Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Separation of powers Standing/admissibility Victim status

Klimatická žaloba ČR and others v. Czechia

Summary:
This case was brought by a group of applicants, named in the brief as the climate action NGO Klimatická žaloba ČR, a municipality, two peasants, several foresters, and a man from Prague who suffers from environmental anxiety. The case was brought on 21 April 2021, and contested failures to provide adequate and necessary mitigation and adaptation measures to protect against the adverse effects of climate change. It alleged that the Government’s failures to adequately address climate change violated the rights to life, health, a healthy environment, and other rights guaranteed by the Czech constitution, the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and the European Convention on Human Rights.

The applicants sought a declaration that the Czech government failed to respect their rights by ensuring sufficient emissions reductions to meet the Paris Agreement’s targets. They also sought an order setting the Czech carbon budget at 800 Mt CO2 from January 2021 until the end of the century.

In June 2022, the court of first instance issued a judgment that was partially favorable to the the applicants. However, in February 2023 the court of second instance annulled the first-instance judgment, referring the case back to the first-instance court. More details about the judgments follow below.

Judgment of 15 June 2022:
On 15 June 2022, the Municipal Court of Prague issued a (now overturned, see below) judgment in this case. It rejected the action against the Government of the Czech Republic. However, it found that the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Transport had failed to provide specific mitigation measures leading to a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. These authorities were required to have a complete and precise plan of measures in place to meet this goal, which was not the case at the time of judgment; they were accordingly enjoined to cease their interference with the applicants’ rights by adopting an adequate mitigation plan.

Admissibility:
Citing the environmental case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the court noted that inaction in protecting the environment may violate human rights, as well as the right to a favourable environment under Article 7 of the Czech Constitution and Article 35(1) of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. It accordingly recognized the standing of the individual applicants in the case. Because domestic law grants associations the right to bring cases not only concerning their own rights, but also concerning those of their members, and because the court found that climate change affects the entire territory of the Czech Republic, the applicants associations had standing to bring an interference action. Likewise, the applicant municipality had standing, given that climate change can affect the legitimate interests of citizens living in its territory and that its basic duty “is to take care of the overall development of its territory and the needs of its citizens, and to protect the public interest. It is therefore desirable that a municipality should be able to take care of the rights of its citizens to a favourable environment in the same way as an environmental association”.

Reasoning on the merits:
In its (now-overturned) judgment, the court noted that the Czech Code of Administrative Justice does not allow an action for interference to protect the rights of third parties (actio popularis / public interest litigation), but found that the applicants’ affectedness in the present case was sufficiently direct, noting that “the link between climate change and human (in)action is so compelling and close that, when considering the directness of interference, the two are an inseparable whole.” It argued that the applicants had suffered a direct interference with their right to a favourable environment, given that the case was about climate change’s “local adverse manifestations” (para. 198). Citing the precautionary principle (para. 211) and IPCC reports (para. 216-220), the court went on to find that “living in sustainable climatic conditions [is] a prerequisite for the undisturbed exercise of other human rights, such as the right to life, health, property rights, the right to engage in economic activity” (para. 210). It recognized that climate change has adverse impacts on human living conditions, including through heat stress, the spread of infectious diseases, and reduced diversity and access to food (para. 221). Citing the Urgenda case, the court went on to find that climate change interfereed directly with the applicants’ right to a healthy environment (para. 224-225), and that “[r]esidence, age, sex, health, etc. only determine the extent of the interference” (para. 223).

The court found that while the Paris Agreement was part of the domestic legal order, and bound the Czech Republic, its 2 degree target was not legally binding. However, drawing on scholarship, the IPCC, and the Urgenda judgment, the court found that the obligation in Art. 4(2) of the Paris Agreement to implement mitigation measures to achieve the Czech nationally determined contribution (NDC) was binding on the State (para. 248-250). Although the Czech Republic had not in fact submitted its own NDC, the EU had set emissions levels for all Member States, and the resulting emissions reduction target was individually applicable to the Czech Republic (para. 251). Citing developments taking place as part of the EU’s Green Deal, it found that “the Defendants should have established a plan for achieving the Paris Agreement’s (EU NDC) 2030 target without undue delay” (para. 280). It noted too that “the Defendants have no reasonable reason to wait until 2023 to develop and then implement the measures.” Failing to fulfil the corresponding emissions reductions obligations, the court held, constituted a violation of the applicants’ rights.

The Municipal Court agreed with the applicants and the scientific studies, including IPCC reports, that they had submitted in evidence “that a global carbon budget of 900 GtCO2 since January 2018 is consistent with the Paris Agreement commitment” (para. 239). The court extensively engaged with the different evidentiary bases of the argument.

In terms of adaptation measures, the court found that the Defendants had not breached their obligation to adopt and implement adaptation measures under Article 5(4) of the European Climate Law. The Defendants had adopted an extensive action plan reflecting adaptation gaps, based on scientific knowledge, and involving a range of public and private actors (para. 329).

In a paragraph of central importance, and revolving around the “drop in the ocean” argument, the court held that:

“[C]limate change would also occur if the defendants acted to mitigate and adapt to climate change. However, if the defendants had properly fulfilled their obligations, climate change would have been milder and averting dangerous climate change under Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement would have been more likely. This conclusion follows from the non-negligible impact of human activity on climate change. Defendants’ failure to act is therefore a partial cause of the current adverse impacts of climate change. The Municipal Court notes that the individual responsibility of the States Parties to the Paris Agreement cannot be excluded by reference to the level of emission contributions of other States. Such an approach would make effective legal protection impossible where the State in question is not a significant emitter of greenhouse gases on a global scale and would be inconsistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility of the Parties under Article 2(2) of the Paris Agreement” (para. 325).

This quotation, and those throughout this post, come from the unofficial translation of the judgment provided by the applicants.

The court did not examine the complaints concerning the rights to property, to private and family life, to life and health, to carry out economic activity and to self-government.

Remedies:
The Court issued not only a declaratory but also a constitutive ruling, meaning that it instructed the authorities to remedy their inaction and adopt a mitigation plan that is sufficiently specific within the meaning of Article 4(2) and (14) Paris Agreement and aims at meeting the EU NDC target. The choice of specific mitigation measures leading to a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 was left to the defendants’ discretion. The court held that it “could not, in view of the principle of separation of powers, order the defendants to develop specific mitigation measures” (para. 334). It did, however, reimburse the costs of the proceedings.

Judgment of 20 February 2023:
On 20 February 2023, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, examining an appeal on points of law by the Ministry of the Environment, annulled the decision of the Municipal Court of Prague and referred the case back to it. The decision to overturn was mainly based on the fact that the obligation to reduce GHG emissions by 55% is collectively shared by all Member States of the European Union, but a specific distribution of these obligations has not yet been establish by EU law or policy. The Supreme Administrative Court also found that the applicants had not sufficiently specified the areas in which the defendants had allegedly breached their obligations by inaction, therefore interfering with the rights of the applicants.

Date filed:
21 April 2021

More information:
The complaint is available here (in Czech).

An unofficial translation of the first-instance judgment into English and a press release are available from the applicants.

The second-instance judgment is available here (in Czech, through the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Climate Case Chart database). A commentary of this decision by a lawyer member of Klimatická žaloba ČR is available here (in Czech).

Suggested citations:
Municipal Court of Prague, Klimatická žaloba ČR and others v. the Czech Republic and others, Judgment No. 14A 101/2021 of 15 June 2022.

Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, Klimatická žaloba ČR v Czech Republic [2023] 9 As 116/2022 – 166 of 20 February 2023.

Last updated:
15 June 2023