Category: Sea-level rise

Categories
Adaptation African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights Business responsibility / corporate cases Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Disability and health-related inequality Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation Environmental racism Evidence Extreme poverty Farming Gender / women-led Human dignity Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Minority rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Participation rights Private and family life Prohibition of torture Renewable energy Right to a healthy environment Right to assembly and association Right to development and work Right to education Right to freedom of expression Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to property Right to subsistence/food Rights of nature Sea-level rise Self-determination Standing/admissibility Victim status Vulnerability

African Court on Human and People’s Rights Climate Advisory Opinion

Summary:
On 2 May 2025, a request for an advisory opinion on climate change was submitted to the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The request was submitted by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), in collaboration with the African Climate Platform, and other African Civil society Organizations including the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, Natural Justice and resilient40, and seeks clarification of States’ obligations in the context of climate change.

Submitted under article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights and Rule 82(1) of the Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, the request submits that “[a]cross the continent, Africans are suffering the consequences of climate change, whether from rising temperatures, unrelenting droughts, catastrophic floods, vanishing biodiversity, or threats to livelihoods. Climate change in Africa has had prior, current and will have future consequences that impact the enjoyment of numerous rights.”

The request sets out impacts, disaggregating them region-by-region and in terms of the groups of people most affected by climate change (mentioning women and girls, children, the elderly, Indigenous peoples, and environmental human rights defenders in particular).

The request then goes on to discuss several issues of law, beginning with issues of admissibility and jurisdiction and then relying on a wide range of rights and instruments, namely:

  • a) the Constitutive Act of the African Union
  • b) the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), especially articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 60 and 61
  • c) African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)
  • d) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)
  • e) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
  • f) The Revised African Convention on Conservation of Nature
  • g) Any other Relevant Instrument.

In doing so, PALU invites the Court to consider international climate change law, including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as well as the UN Conventions on Combatting Desertification and on Biological Diversity.

Rights invoked in more detail:
PALU submits that “a rights-based climate approach is needed to address the challenges posed by climate change” and that the human rights framework “provides a robust legal framework upon which the Court may rely to define States’ responsibilities and duties in the context of climate change […] because the Charter clearly provides for collective rights and the explicit protection of the right to a healthy environment.” PALU accordingly invites the Court to consider the following provisions of the Banjul Charter:

  • Articles 2 and 3 (equality and non-discrimination)
  • Article 4 (right to life and inviolability of the human person)
  • Article 5 (right to respect for dignity and prohibition of all forms of exploitation and degradation, including slavery and torture)
  • Article 8 (freedom of conscience and religion)
  • Article 9 (freedom of information and opinion)
  • Article 10 (freedom of association)
  • Article 11 (freedom of assembly)
  • Article 12 (freedom of movement, residence and asylum; prohibition of mass expulsion)
  • Article 14 (right to property)
  • Article 16 (right to health)
  • Article 17 (right to education)
  • Article 18 (protection of the family, prohibition of age and gender discrimination)
  • Article 19 (equality of peoples, prohibition of domination)
  • Article 20 (right of peoples to existence and self-determination)
  • Article 21 (right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources)
  • Article 22 (right of peoples to their economic, social and cultural development)
  • Article 23 (right of peoples to national and international peace and security)
  • Article 24 (right of all peoples to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development)
  • The request also discusses the implied rights to food and shelter.

Issues for determination:
PALU submits the following issues for determination by the Court (paraphrased):

(a) Whether the Court can be seized with the question of obligations concerning climate change under the Banjul Charter and other relevant instruments?

(b) Whether the Court can interpret and lay down applicable custom and treaty law regarding States’ obligations and duties in the context of climate change?

If these questions are resolved in the affirmative, the Court is invited to further determine:

(a) What, if any, are States’ human and peoples’ rights obligations to protect and safeguard the rights of individuals and peoples of the past (ancestral rights), and present and future generations?

(b) Whether States have positive obligations to protect vulnerable populations including environmental human rights defenders, indigenous communities, women, children, youth, future generations, the current generation, past generations, the elderly and people with disabilities from the impact of climate change in line with the relevant treaties?

(c) What human rights obligations do States have to facilitate a just, transparent, equitable and accountable transition in the context of climate change in Africa?

(d) What are the obligations of African States in implementing adaptation, resilience and mitigation measures in response to climate change?

(e) What, if any, are applicable human rights obligations of States to compensate for loss, damage and reparations?

(f) What responsibilities, if any, do African States have in relation to third parties, including international monopolies, multinational corporations and non-state actors operating on the continent, to ensure that international and regional treaties and laws on climate change are respected, protected, promoted and implemented?

(g) What, if any, is the nature of the obligations on African States to cooperate with other states especially historical emitters to limit global warming to below the 1.5°C threshold, to avert an existential climate crisis for present and future generations on the continent?

Further reading:
For more information on the advisory opinion request, see this post by Yusra Suedi.

Suggested citation:
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Request for an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in addressing the climate crisis, filed 2 May 2025 (pending).

Last updated:
23 May 2025

Categories
Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Private and family life Public trust doctrine Right to culture Right to health Right to life Sea-level rise United States of America Vulnerability

Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska II

Summary:
On 22 May 2024, a group of young people supported by the NGO ‘Our Children’s Trust’ filed suit against the U.S. State of Alaska arguing that statutory requirements to develop and advance the Alaska Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project violate their public trust rights as well as their rights to substantive due process, life, liberty and property, and the right to protected natural resources for “current and future generations” under the Alaskan Constitution. They argue that this project will cause “existential harms to the lives, health, safety, and cultural traditions and identities of Alaska’s youth, and substantially limit their access to the vital natural resources upon which they depend.”

The case follows on an earlier case against Alaska, Sagoonick et al. v. Alaska I, which was rejected in 2022 by a divided Alaskan Supreme Court.

Claims made:
The case challenges legislation creating the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation, a state agency created to pursue building a new LNG pipeline. 

According to the plaintiffs, Alaska is “already in a state of climate disruption” and the contested project “would ensure continuing and substantially elevated levels of climate pollution for decades, locking in increasing and worsening harms to Youth Plaintiffs”. They argue that the youth plaintiffs are “uniquely vulnerable to climate change injuries and face disproportionate harms”. Arguing that climate pollution is already causing dangerous climate disruption in Alaska, injuring the plaintiffs in this case, they cite the following climate-related impacts:

  • temperature increase, heatwaves, and other heat-related changes;
  • thawing permafrost;
  • changing precipitation patterns, extreme weather events and droughts;
  • loss of sea, river, and lake ice;
  • ocean acidification;
  • melting glaciers and sea level rise; and
  • increasingly frequent and severe wildfires and smoke.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the contested provisions of State law violate their public trust rights to equal access to public trust resources and to sustained yield of public trust resources free from substantial impairment. They argued that the state of Alaska has a duty under the public trust doctrine to ensure “the continuing availability of public trust resources for present and future generations”.

In addition, they sought a declaration that they have a fundamental right to a climate system that sustains human life, liberty, and dignity under the Alaskan Constitution, which is being violated by the contested statutory provisions.

The youth plaintiffs also petitioned the court to enjoin the defendants from taking further actions to advance or develop the Alaska LNG Project. They sought costs and expenses as well as “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.”

Recent developments:
In October 2024, it was reported that the state of Alaska had asked the Court to dismiss the case.

2024.05.22.AK+LNG+ComplaintDownload

Last updated:
14 November 2024

Categories
2023 Adaptation Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Private and family life Right to life Sea-level rise The Netherlands

Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (Bonaire)

Summary:
On 11 May 2023, Greenpeace and seven residents of the Caribbean island of Bonaire sent a pre-litigation letter (Dutch: sommatie) to the office of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte. The letter claims that the Netherlands does not sufficiently protect the authors from climate change and thereby violates their human rights. Since 2010, Bonaire has been a special municipality of the Netherlands and part of the Caribbean Netherlands. In the pre-litigation letter, the plaintiffs claim that the duties of care arising from Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to life and the right to family life, have been breached. The inaction of the Netherlands in sufficiently addressing climate change, they argue, violates these human rights. Therefore, they have made the following demands:

  1. The Netherlands must implement the necessary measures to protect Bonaire from the consequences of climate change.
  2. The State shall develop and implement a policy which guarantees a 100% reduction of Dutch emission of all greenhouse gases in 2030 when compared to 1990 levels.
  3. Lastly, as part of and to realize the demands above, the State must implement all necessary measures to ensure that, in January 2040 at the latest, the joint volume of the national emission of all greenhouse gases will have been reduced by 100% when compared to 1990 emissions levels.

With the pre-litigation letter to the Prime Minister, the plaintiffs asked for negotiations to find a mutually agreeable decision on their demands. If no such negotiation is held, or if it is unsuccessful, the plaintiffs will submit the matter to the competent court.

Admissibility:
On 25 September 2024, Greenpeace announced that a court in the Hague had ruled that its action on behalf of the public interest of the people of Bonaire was admissible. A hearing will follow in 2025.

Status of Case:

Pending

Further reading:

Greenpeace Press Release: https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/59658/dutch-citizens-launch-legal-action-against-the-netherlands-over-climate-impacts-on-caribbean-island-bonaire/

pre-litigation-letter-BonaireDownload

Date last updated:

4 October 2024.

Categories
Adaptation Disability and health-related inequality Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to housing Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise The United Kingdom Vulnerability

R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs

Summary:
On 17 October 2023, the reportedly first-ever adaptation case in the United Kingdom was brought against the government before the UK’s High Court of Justice. The plaintiffs in this case included Kevin Jordan, a homeowner from Norfolk (UK), who alleged that his home was acutely threatened by coastal erosion, with the road leading up to it having already collapsed into the sea. Jordan brought his case together with the NGO ‘Friends of the Earth’ and disability rights activist Doug Paulley, a care home resident who alleged that his health conditions were being exacerbated by climate-aggravated heatwaves. Together, the plaintiffs challenged the UK’s National Adaptation Programme (NAP). Domestic law requires the production of new NAP every five years, and the most recent version — NAP3 — was published in July 2023. The claimants argued that NAP3 is deficient for the following reasons:

  1. Failure to set sufficiently specific objectives;
  2. Failure to conduct and publish information on the assessment of the risks involved in implementing NAP3;
  3. Failure to consider the unequal impacts of NAP3 on protected groups (on the grounds of age, race and disability); and
  4. Violation of Articles 2, 8, 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the rights to life, respect for private and family life, non-discrimination and property, respectively), as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998.

In regards to the alleged human rights violations, the plaintiffs invoked:

a. The well-established but urgent need for long-term policy and protected funding to enable care-homes (and similar healthcare settings) to adapt to excessive heat. This remains absent in NAP3 despite the increasing frequency and severity of annual heatwaves.
b. There being no new policy to manage overheating risks in existing health and social care buildings, such that they are properly refurbished as soon as reasonably practicable.
c. A lack of a commitment to provide adequate resources to support communities at imminent risk of being lost to erosion and flooding, including as to the established mental health and emotional wellbeing impacts for those affected.
d. Gaps, inconsistency and uncertainty in the potential allocation of funding provided for a range of areas, in particular for those communities that must (or are likely to have to) relocate and have their homes demolished.
e. There being no insurance or compensation schemes available for the worst affected by coastal erosion and who lose their homes.
f. No evidence of their being an express consideration, or reasoned analysis, of what a fair balance to strike would be between doing more to safeguard the human rights of vulnerable people and the interests of wider society.

https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2023/20231101_21608_complaint.pdf (emphasis added)

High Court Judgment:
In a judgment issued on 25 October 2024, the High Court of Justice for England and Wales rejected the applicants’ claims. Justice Chamberlain, in his judgment, found that there had been no error of law in this case. His ruling extensively considered the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, but found that “[u]nlike in the field of mitigation, and subject to the arguments about the effect of the ECHR as interpreted in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] (…), there is no internationally binding quantified standard governing how States must adapt to climate change. It would be very difficult to devise any such standard because the risks of climate change differ widely from state to state (and indeed within states). In some places, the main risk may be from flooding, in other places extreme heat or drought. Elsewhere, there may be a combination of risks, which all have to be addressed but some of which are more urgent than others. Moreover, the profile of risks, and the priorities attached to addressing them, may change over time” (para. 92 of the High Court ruling).

Assessing the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment overall, Judge Chamberlain found that while this judgment “represents a significant development of the case law in relation to climate change, not only as regards the standing of associations to bring claims before the Strasbourg Court, but also as regards the scope and extent of the positive obligations of the State and the margin of appreciation to be accorded when assessing whether those obligations have been discharged”, “the significance of the judgment for the UK’s climate change framework should not be overstated.” The Judge noted that KlimaSeniorinnen focused heavily on lacunae in domestic legislation and the targets set out in the Paris Agreement, whereas the law of the United Kingdom does not feature similar lacunae in mitigation target-setting.

Lawyers for the government in this case had sought to dismiss the findings of the ECtHR, as made in para. 552 of KlimaSeniorinnen, as an obiter dictum. This paragraph of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment reads as follows:

Furthermore, effective protection of the rights of individuals from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well-being and quality of life requires that the above-noted mitigation measures be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection. Such adaptation measures must be put in place and effectively applied in accordance with the best available evidence (…) and consistent with the general structure of the State’s positive obligations in this context (…).

Judge Chamberlain disagreed with the government as concerns the nature of this finding, noting the dangers of applying “common law concepts [the idea of obiter dicta] to the judgment of a court most of whose members come from different legal traditions.” Still, Judge Chamberlain noted that the Strasbourg Court’s findings were of a general nature (para. 101). He found that KlimaSeniorinnen “appears to indicate that the positive obligation imposed by Articles 2 and 8 [ECHR] extends to adopting and effectively implementing ‘adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account any relevant particular needs for protection'”, stemming from the State’s underlying regulatory obligation. He notes that “[w]hat that means in the context of adaptation measures, however, is far from clear” (para. 103), given that adaptation measures were not central to the KlimaSeniorinnen case, and that the international legal framework in this regard is less well-developed than for mitigation measures. He went on to anticipate future rulings from the ECtHR, considering it

(…) likely that, if the Strasbourg Court had in a future case to apply the reasoning in [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen] to the adaptation context, it would say that:
(a) the narrow margin of appreciation in relation to the mitigation aims was justified by reference to the internationally agreed objective of carbon neutrality by 2050 and the impact of one State’s default on other States;
(b) neither of these features applies in the field of adaptation; and
(c) accordingly, in the field of adaptation, States are to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation in setting the relevant objectives and a wider margin still in setting out the proposals and policies for meeting them (by analogy with the margin accorded to the State in setting the means for achieving the mitigation objectives).

Accordingly, he found that the current adaptation framework in the United Kingdom appears to “fall comfortably within the UK’s margin of appreciation under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR” and is not “contrary to any clear and consistent line of authority from the Strasbourg Court”. On this basis, he found that there was neither an error of law nor an incompatibility with human rights law evident in this case.

Friends-of-the-Earth-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Environment-Food-and-Rural-AffairsDownload

Application to the European Court of Human Rights:
In July 2025, Friends of the Earth announced that the case had been filed as an application before the European Court of Human Rights.

More information:
For reporting on the case, see coverage from the Guardian and the Independent.

Suggested citation:
High Court of Justice for England and Wales, R (Friends of the Earth Ltd, Kevin Jordan and Doug Paulley) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Road & Rural Affairs, [2024] EWHC 2707 (Admin), 25 October 2024.

Last updated:
13 November 2024

Categories
Adaptation Biodiversity Children and young people Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Imminent risk Indonesia Loss & damage Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to development and work Right to education Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to subsistence/food Right to water Sea-level rise Vulnerability

Indonesian Youths and others v. Indonesia (Rasya Assegaf and 12 others v. Indonesia)

Summary:
This case was brought by thirteen children, youth, and members of vulnerable groups from different parts of Indonesia, all of whom allege that they are affected by the Indonesian Government’s response to climate change. The seven youth plaintiffs, aged 7-29, together with six adults whose involvement in agrarian and farming activities renders them particularly vulnerable, invoke their constitutitional rights to life, to live in physical and spiritual prosperity in a good and healthy environment, to self-development through the fulfillment of basic needs, to food and water, to education, to work and earn a decent living, as well as the minor plaintiffs’ rights as children. They brought their complaint to Indonesia’s National Commission of Human Rights, the counrty’s independent national human rights authority, calling on it to exercise its monitoring and mediating function.

The complaint in depth:
The plaintiffs in this case emphasize that the Indonesian government has recognized the country’s extreme vulnerablility to the impacts of climate change, including to sea level rise, heat waves, storm surges, tidal flooding, shifts in the wet and dry seasons, changes to rain patterns, decreased food production, disturbances in the availability of water, the spread of pests, plant and human diseases, the sinking of small islands, and the loss of biodiversity. They also emphasize that Indonesia is already experiencing many of these serious climate change impacts, and that these will only continue to get worse.

In their submissions to the National Commission of Human Rights, the plaintiffs particularly emphasize the effects of heat stress combined with Indonesia’s humid climate; the loss of food security and livelihoods in fishing and tourism due to coral bleaching and a decrease in fish stocks; unpredictable precipitation patterns and resulting drought, water insecurity and flooding; and the impacts of heat and precipitation changes on agriculture, food and water security, and plant diseases and pests. They also emphasize the risks associated with tidal floods, high waves, saltwater intrusion and strong winds due to sea level rise, which endanger lives and will cause a loss of living space, shelter, food and water insecurity. In this regard, they note research by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank that shows that, in a high emissions scenario, and without adaptation, more than 4,2 million Indonesians will be affected by permanent tidal flooding by 2070–2100. This same research shows that 5.5-8 million Indonesian people will be affected by flooding from once-in-a-century storm surges by 2030. In addition, they note that climate change causes a higher incidence of vector-borne diseases affecting children and vulnerable populations, such as malaria, dengue fever, and cholera. Several of the plaintiffs have suffered from these diseases already. Other impacts on the health of children include air pollution, malnutrition and stunting, drowning during floods, coastal flodding, and mental health impacts such as climate anxiety. Citing a study from the American Psychological Association, they argue that experiencing extreme weather events leads to higher rates of depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, drug and alcohol use, domestic violence, and child abuse.

The plaintiffs emphasize that they have already experienced flooding, cyclones, extreme heat, vector-borne illness, climate anxiety, and impacts on their homes and agricultural or fishing livelihoods. They submit that the Government of Indonesia has a constitutional responsibility to protect them from the human rights impacts of the climate crisis, and allege that it has failed to do so by contributing to causing and exacerbating the climate crisis. Noting that Indonesia’s domestic law and its NDC under the Paris Agreement acknowledge the link between human rights and climate change, they submit that constitutional rights should be interpreted in harmony with international human rights law. This, they argue, means recognizing that Indonesia has obligations to mitigate and adapt to climate change, as well as cross-sectoral obligations to ensure that all climate adaptation and mitigation actions are inclusive, fair and participatory, and to prioritize the most affected and vulnerable populations.

The plaintiffs argue that the Indonesian government should prioritize mitigation through a moratorium on new coal-fired power plants and the licensing of palm oil plantation concesssions as well as by promoting sustainable polycultural and indigenous farming practices that will reduce its net GHG emissions and ensure crop resilience.

In terms of adaptation, the plaintiffs argue that Indonesia should ensure protection especially of those living in vulnerable areas, including small islands, riparian and lowland areas, coastal areas, and dry areas. This should take place through a community-oriented, inclusive and participative process, and should serve to upgrade infrastructure, provide social protection mechanisms, prioritize nature-based adaptation through ecosystem restoration, strengthen the resilience of food systems and ensure that adaptation does not take place at the expense of any vulnerable groups or future generations. In particular, they emphasize the rehabilitation of mangrove and coral ecosystems, given their function as natural flood and erosion protection; the promotion of sustainable agricultural practices, and procedural obligations to ensure consultation, information, inclusivity and equity.

The plaintiffs note Indonesia’s knowledge of climate change, its commitment to the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degree warming target under its Updated NDC, and its awareness of the risk of huge economic losses due to the dangers of climate change. Against this background, they argue that Indonesia has violated its human rights obligations by failing to mobilize the maximum available resources and take the highest possible level of ambition in mitigating its emissions, noting that it is one of the world’s largest emitters of land use change and energy emissions and the world’s seven largest emitter of cumulative emissions. They argue that, to align with the 1.5°C degree warming scenarios, Indonesia needs to limit its emissions from 660 to 687 million metric tons of CO2e by 2030. It is failing to do so, instead expanding its coal-fired power plant network and supporting ongoing deforestation.

The plaintiffs argue that these measures, i.e. the government’s failure to take adaptive steps, and its contribution to and exacerbation of climate change, have violated their right to a healthy environment, their right to health, their right to life and their rights to food and water. As concerns their right to development, the plaintiffs argue that “[t]he impact of climate change on the right to development has a ripple effect across all human rights”. They also link the government’s policies to impacts on their enjoyment on the right to education and the right to work and earn a decent living. Lastly, for the child applicants, they note risks for the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, access to education, proper food, proper housing, safe drinking water, and sanitation.

Measures requested:
The Plaintiffs request that the Commission:

  • State that climate change is a human rights crisis, and that each additional degree of heating will cause further impacts;
  • State that climate change has disrupted their rights to a healthy environment, life, health, and development through the fulfillment of basic needs, food, water, education, and employment; that the child plaintiffs are particularly vulnerable in this regard; and that the Government has violated its obligation to respect, protect, uphold and fulfill the plaintiffs’ human rights;
  • State that “the government has contributed to and continues to perpetuate the climate crisis by knowingly acting in disregard of the available scientific evidence on the necessary measures to mitigate climate change”, and that its actions — such as its approval of new coal-fired power plants, approval of large-scale deforestation and land clearing, and failure to implement basic adaptation measures — are an expression of this;
  • Recommmend immediate review of law and policy to reduce GHG emissions, mobilize resources, and minimize losses;
  • Recommend steps to reduce Indonesia’s national GHG emissions, including moratoria on new coal plants and on concessions for oil palm plantations, industrial forest plantations, and the clearing of peatlands; the promotion of sustainable and polycultural agricultural practices; and adaptation measures; and
  • Recommend an inclusive, fair, open, and effective approach to public participation in climate-related decision-making.

Developments in the case:
The case is still pending. However, in receiving the case during a hearing held on 14 July 2022, two of the Commissioners heard directly from the plaintiffs and welcomed the petition. Commissioner Choirul Anam stated that “climate change is an enormous problem, which influences various human rights. It is our job to push for better government actions in responding to climate change.”

Further information:
The text of the complaint in this case is available (in Bahasa and English) from ClimateCaseChart.com.

For a comment, see Margaretha Quina and Mae Manupipatpong, ‘Indonesian Human Rights Commission’s First Human Rights Complaint on the Impacts of Climate Change’, Climate Law Blog, 22 November 2022, available here.

Suggested citation:
National Commission of Human Rights of Indonesia, Indonesian Youths and others v. Indonesia, complaint filed on 14 July 2022.

Last updated:
8 August 2023.

Categories
2023 Biodiversity Children and young people Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Sea-level rise Separation of powers Standing/admissibility United States of America Victim status Vulnerability

Navahine F., a Minor v. Dept. of Transportation of Hawai’i et al.

Summary:
In January 2022, fourteen young people filed suit against the Department of Transportation of the US state of Hawai’i (HDOT), its Director, the state’s Governor, and the State itself. In Hawai’i Circuit Court, they alleged that the state’s transportation system violated the Hawai‘ian Constitution’s public trust doctrine and the right to a clean and healthful environment that it enshrines. The plaintiffs argued that the state and its authorities had “engaged in an ongoing pattern and practice of promoting, funding, and implementing transportation projects that lock in and escalate the use of fossil fuels, rather than projects that mitigate and reduce emissions”. Arguing that Hawai’i was the most carbon-dependent state in the nation, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They made a variety of arguments about the destruction of the Hawai’ian environment, coral reefs, native species of plants and marine life, and beaches; about their health and well-being, including about climate anxiety and about existing health conditions that are aggravated by the effects of climate change; about flooding and its impact on their ability to go to school; about water and food security, including impacts on traditional food sources, traditional and indigenous ways of life and culture; about wildfires; and about climate anxiety.

Claims made:
The plaintiffs note that Article XI, section 1 of the Hawai’i Constitution requires Defendants “[f]or the benefit of present and future generations,” to “conserve and protect Hawai’i’s natural beauty and all natural resources.” Article XI, section 1 further declares that “[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.” The Constitution also explicitly recognizes the right to a clean and healthful environment. Noting the special vulnerability of Hawai’i to climate-related ecological damage, including from sea-level rise, and the disproportionate harm to children and youth, including the lifetime exposure disparities concerning extreme events such as heat waves, wildfires, crop failures, droughts, and floods, they allege that the state of Hawai’i, through its Department of Transportation, has “systematically failed to exercise its statutory and constitutional authority and duty to implement Hawai’i’s climate change mitigation goals and to plan for and ensure construction and operation of a multimodal, electrified transportation system that reduces vehicle miles traveled and greenhouse gas emissions, and helps to eliminate Hawai’i’s dependence on imported fossil fuels”.

Ruling on Motion to Dismiss:
On 6 April 2023, the First Circuit Court rejected the respondent’s motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The state had argued that the public trust doctrine did not apply to the climate, “because climate is not air, water, land, minerals, energy resource or some other “localized” natural resource.” It had also argued that any efforts by the state would not have an impact on climate change given the scale of the problem.

The Court held in this regard that, in any event, the state as trustee had an obligation to keep its assets, i.e. its trust property, from falling into disrepair. It thereby rejected the argument that climate change was “too big a problem” and the idea that the state had no obligation to reasonably monitor and maintain its natural resources by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and planning alternatives to fossil-fuel heavy means of transportation. The Court also recognized that “the alleged harms are not hypothetical or only in the future. They are current, ongoing, and getting worse.”

On the argument that the applicants did not have a sufficient interest in the case, the Court held that the plaintiffs “stand to inherit a world with severe climate change and the resulting damage to our natural resources. This includes rising temperatures, sea level rise, coastal erosion, flooding, ocean warming and acidification with severe impacts on marine life, and more frequent and extreme droughts and storms. Destruction of the environment is a concrete interests (sic).”

Finding that arguments based on the political question doctrine were premature in this case, and citing case-law finding that this doctrine does not bar claim based on public trust duties, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the case.

Trial date set:
It was announced in August 2023 that trial dates for this case had been scheduled for 24 June-12 July 2024 at the Environmental Court of the First Circuit for Hawai’i. This would make this only the second-ever constitutional rights climate case to go to trial in the United States, after the Held and others v. Montana case. The case will be heard by First Circuit Judge John Tonaki.

Settlement Agreement:
On 20 June 2024, Hawai’i officials announced a groundbreaking Settlement Agreement with plaintiffs, marking a significant milestone. The Court approved the historic Navahine Agreement as fair and in the best interests of the youth plaintiffs. This landmark Agreement upholds children’s constitutional rights to a climate capable of sustaining life and mandates transformative changes in Hawai’i’s transportation system.

The Agreement emphasises HDOT’s responsibility to preserve Hawai’i’s public trust resources and ensure a clean and healthy environment for all residents. By 2045, HDOT is committed to achieving zero emissions across all modes of transportation, including ground, sea, and interisland air travel. The Agreement also includes numerous provisions for immediate and ongoing action by HDOT, such as establishing a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Plan, creating designated units and roles within HDOT, forming a youth council, improving transportation infrastructure budgeting processes, and making immediate, ambitious investments in clean transportation infrastructure. The Court will retain jurisdiction over the agreement until 2045 to oversee compliance with its terms.

This Settlement Agreement sets a precedent as the first of its kind, where government defendants collaborate with youth plaintiffs to address constitutional climate concerns. It commits to the systemic decarbonization of Hawai’i’s transportation sector, aiming to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and lessen dependence on fossil fuels.

Further information:
For the ruling of the First Circuit Court, see here. For the text of Settlement Agreement, see here.

Suggested citation:
First Circuit Court of the State of Hawai’i, Navahine F., a Minor v. Dept. of Transportation et al., Civ. No. 1CCV-22-0000631, ruling of 6 April 2023.

Last updated:
24 June 2024

Categories
2022 Biodiversity Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Gender / women-led Human dignity Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to water Sea-level rise South Africa Standing/admissibility

African Climate Alliance et. al. v. Minister of Mineral Resources & Energy et. al. (#CancelCoal case)

Summary:
On 10 November 2021, three South African NGOs (the African Climate Alliance, Vukani Environmental Justice Movement in Action and groundWork) initiated a constitutional challenge against the South African government’s plans to augment its coal-fired electricity capacity. Also known as the #CancelCoal case, this challenge invokes the protection of environmental rights, the rights of children, the right to life and human dignity, the right to water, healthcare and food, and the right to equality and protection from discrimination. Noting that South Africa is one of the top 15 current global greenhouse gas emitters, the plaintiffs argue that the procurement of 1500 MW of new coal-fired power stations threatens the rights of present and future generations in South Africa, who will be “left to deal with the consequences of extreme weather events, heatwaves, droughts, coastal flooding, famine, cyclones and social upheavals”. They submit that the constitutional rights violations caused by the new coal plants “will disproportionately impact the poor and the vulnerable, including women, children and young people”.

More details on the challenge:
In terms of standing, the applicant organizations brought their case in their own direct interest, in the interests of their members, in the public interest, and in the interest of the environment, noting the “far reaching consequences for present and future generations”.

The applicants invoke section 24 of the South African Constitution, which recognizes the right to a healthy environment. They argue that, by ratifying international agreements on climate change, including the Paris Agreement, the State recognizes the threat for this right posed by climate change. They also invoke section 28(2) of the Constitution, which guarantees the protection of the best interests of the child, arguing that “children are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and the further health risks caused by coal-fired power stations”. Noting that South Africa’s first NDC, submitted in 2015 and revised in 2021, committed to peaking emissions from 2020-2025, with net zero to be achieved by 2050, they submit scientific evidence from the IPCC to show the level of threat at hand and the different emissions reductions pathways discussed. Coal, they argue, “is the single most significant contributor to climate change”, and South Africa’s plants to procure more coal-fired power plants is “directly at odds” with global calls for action against coal, despite its vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, including from heat, storms, drought, rising sealevels, loss of species and biodiversity, and the psychological harms linked to climate change, as well as economic costs associated with responding to the effects of climate change, which will “divert scarce resources allocated to alleviating powerty and promoting sustainable development”.

The applicants also argue that the government’s references to “clean coal” are scientifically unfounded, and that it is unrealistic to argue that carbon capture technologies will mitigate the impacts of the new coal plants. “Climate change is the ultimate collective action problem”, they submit, and collective efforts are needed. South Africa’s support for coal undermines the global efforts in this regard, is inconsistent with South Africa’s “fair share” obligations, and is detrimental to the environment in a number of ways.

Invoking the constitutional right to equality together with environmental rights, the applicants argue that the action in question produces unfair discrimination “on intersecting grounds of race, gender, and social origin. This is because poor, black South Africans, and particularly women and children, are the primary victims of ecological degradation and air pollution caused by coal-fired power. They will also be the worst affected by the climate crisis”, as recognized in the government’s Environmental Impact Assessment (para. 358 of the application).

In terms of remedies, the applicants seek the review and setting aside of the decisions to procure new coal plants.

Further developments:
On 8 December 2021, the President of South Africa issued notice that he does not intend to oppose the application and shall abide by the decision of the court. On the same date, the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy issued notice of his intention to oppose the application.

On 12 December 2022, in what was described as an “early victory” in the case, the Pretoria High Court ordered the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy to release records relating to the decision to seek new coal power, and to pay the costs of the application.

Further reading:

The full application form in this case is available from climatecasechart.com, as are further documents on the case.

Suggested citation:
High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division (Pretoria), African Climate Alliance and others v. Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and others, case no. 56907/2021, filed on 10 November 2021.

Last updated:
26 June 2023.

Categories
Adaptation Australia Climate-induced displacement Human Rights Committee Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Private and family life Right to culture Right to life Sea-level rise Standing/admissibility Vulnerability

Billy et al. v. Australia (Torres Straits Islanders case)

Summary:
This petition against Australia was brought to the UN Human Rights Committee by a group of eight indigenous Torres Straits Islanders in 2019, in their own names and on behalf of their children. In their petition, they argued that the Australian government had violated their rights, as inhabitants of low-lying islands, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because of its inaction in addressing climate change (failure to mitigate emissions and to take adaptation measures).

Rights at stake:
The applicants in this case invoked a series of rights in the ICCPR, on behalf of themselves and their children, contesting the respondent State’s failure to adopt mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and cease the promotion of fossil fuels. To support this, they drew on Article 27 (the right to culture), Article 17 (the right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home), and Article 6 (the right to life) ICCPR. They argued that the indigenous peoples of the Torres Strait Islands, especially those who reside on low-lying islands, are among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. They considered that the Australian government must ensure both mitigation and adaptation measures in order to adequately protect their rights. Previously, the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA), a government body, had stated that “the effects of climate change threaten the islands themselves as well as marine and coastal ecosystems and resources, and therefore the life, livelihoods and unique culture of Torres Strait Islanders.”

Outcome:

On 21 July 2022, the Human Rights Committee adopted its Views in this case.

Observations of the State:

The Australian Government argued that the case was inadmissible, contesting the relevance of climate-related international agreements and its own ability to be held (legally or practically) responsible for climate-related harms. It also submitted that it was not possible to attribute climate change to the State party under international human rights law.

The HRC’s considerations on the admissibility:

On the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Government’s position was that it did not owe a duty of care for failing to regulate environmental harm, and that it was not required to provide a remedy where (including in the present case) it understood there to be no breach of ICCPR rights. This question was accordingly reserved to the examination of the merits.

Concerning mitigation measures, the HRC noted that Australia is and has been a major greenhouse gas emitter, and ranks high on economic and development indices. As a result, it found that the alleged (in)actions fell under its jurisdiction under articles 1 or 2 of the Optional Protocol.

Concerning the imminence of the risk concerned, and accordingly the issue of victim status / standing, the Committee found that the authors of this Communication, “as members of peoples who are the longstanding inhabitants of traditional lands consisting of small, low-lying islands that presumably offer scant opportunities for safe internal relocation – are highly exposed to adverse climate change impacts”. Given the uncontested dependence of their lives and cultures on natural resources and phenomena, and their inability to finance adaptation measures on their own, the authors were considered to be “extremely vulnerable to intensely experiencing severely disruptive climate change impacts”. Given the authors’ allegations of serious ongoing adverse impacts, the HRC declared their claims under articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27 of the ICCPR admissible.

Merits:

Article 6

The Committee recalled that the right to life cannot be interpreted restrictively, and that it requires States to adopt protective measures (i.e. that it entails positive obligations). It recalled its own General Comment No. 36, issued in 2018, in establishing that the right to life also extends to reasonably foreseeable threats to life, including adverse climate change impacts and environmental degradation.

The Committee rejected Australia’s allegation that the interpretation of the ICCPR contained in this General Comment was not compatible with the rules of treaty interpretation under general international law. It then went on to recall its own earlier Teitiota v. New Zealand case (on climate-induced displacement), ultimately finding that the authors were not currently facing health impacts or real and reasonably foreseeable risks of being exposed harms to their right to life. The Committee also noted that the right-to-life claim being made largely related to the authors’ ability to maintain their culture, which falls under article 27 ICCPR.

Regarding the authors’ submission that, absent urgent action, their islands will become uninhabitable within 10 to 15 years, the Committee noted the adaptation and mitigation measures currently planned or being taken, and found that the time frame of 10 to 15 years could allow for additional protective measures or relocation programmes. As a result, it found that there had been no violation of the right to life in this case.

Article 17

The authors claimed that climate change already affects their private, family and home life, given that they may be forced to abandon their homes. The Committee considered that the authors’ dependence on marine and terrestrial resources and ecosystems is a component of their traditional indigenous way of life, falling under the scope of Article 17 ICCPR.

Considering the adaptation measures and related plans in place, the Committee noted the existence of unexplained delays in seawall construction and the lack of explanation concerning the loss of marine resources, crops and fruit trees. It noted the ongoing inundation of villages and ancestral burial lands; the withering of traditional gardens through salinification; the decline of nutritionally and culturally important marine species; coral bleaching and ocean acidification; and the authors’ anxiety and distress. The Committee also noted the importance of community lands for the authors’ most important cultural ceremonies. It accordingly found that:

“that when climate change impacts – including environmental degradation on traditional [indigenous] lands (…) – have direct repercussions on the right to one’s home, and the adverse consequences of those impacts are serious because of their intensity or duration and the physical or mental harm that they cause, then the degradation of the environment may adversely affect the well-being of individuals and constitute foreseeable and serious violations of private and family life and the home.”

Finding that Australia had failed to discharge its positive obligation to implement adequate adaptation measures to protect the authors’ home, private life and family, the HRC found a violation of the authors’ rights under article 17 ICCPR.

Article 27

Article 27 ICCPR recognizes the right of members of minority indigenous groups to the enjoyment of culture, and protects the survival and continued development of their cultural identity. Interpreted in the light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, this right enshrines the inalienable right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their traditional territories and natural resources. Here, the authors argued that their ability to maintain their culture has already been impaired due to climate change impacts, which have eroded their traditional lands and natural resources, for which there is no substitute on mainland Australia. The Committee found that these climate impacts represent a threat that was reasonably foreseeable by the State party, as the authors’ community had been raising the issue since the 1990s. While noting existing seawall construction projects, it considered that the delay in initiating these projects indicated an inadequate response by the State party to the threat in question. It found that the failure to adopt timely and adequate adaptation measures “to protect the authors’ collective ability to maintain their traditional way of life, to transmit to their children and future generations their culture and traditions and use of land and sea resources discloses a violation of the State party’s positive obligation to protect the authors’ right to enjoy their minority culture.” Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 27 ICCPR.

As a result of its findings concerning Articles 17 and 27 ICCPR, the HRC considered it not necessary to examine the authors’ remaining claims under article 24 (1) ICCPR.

Remedies:

Under Article 2 (3) (a) ICCPR, the HRC noted that the State was required to make full reparation to the authors, which meant providing adequate compensation; engaging in meaningful consultations with their communities to conduct needs assessments; continuing its adaptation measures and monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of existing measures; and taking steps to prevent similar violations in the future. The Committee requested the State to provide it with information about the measures taken in this regard within 180 days.

Separate opinions:

Several HRC members appended individual opinions to the Views. These include:

  • The individual opinion by Committee Member Duncan Laki Muhumuza, arguing that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life);
  • The individual opinion by Committee Member Gentian Zyberi, concurring but arguing that the Committee had focused too heavily on adaptation measures, and should instead have more clearly linked the right under Article 27 ICCPR to mitigation measures;
  • The joint opinion by Committee Members Arif Bulkan, Marcia V. J. Kran and Vasilka Sancin (partially dissenting), who argued that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life). They argued in particular that the “real and foreseeable risk” standard employed by the majority interpreted Article 6 too restrictively, and was inappropriate here as it had been borrowed from the dissimilar context of its refugee cases (Teitiota v. New Zealand, the HRC’s first climate-induced displacement case).

Full decision:

The HRC’s Views are available here.

Further reading:

  • Maria Antonia Tigre, ‘U.N. Human Rights Committee finds that Australia is violating human rights obligations towards Torres Strait Islanders for climate inaction’, available here.
  • Verena Kahl, ‘Rising Before Sinking: The UN Human Rights Committee’s landmark decision in Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia,’ Verfassungsblog, 3 October 2022, available here.
  • Nicole Barrett and Aishani Gupta, ‘Why Did the UN Human Rights Committee Refuse Broader Protections for Climate Change Victims?’, Opinio Juris blog, 5 October 2022, available here.
  • Christina Voigt, ‘UNHRC is Turning up the Heat: Human Rights Violations Due to Inadequate Adaptation Action to Climate Change’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 26 September 2022, available here.
  • Monica Feria-Tinta, ‘Torres Strait Islanders: United Nations Human Rights Committee Delivers Ground-Breaking Decision on Climate Change Impacts on Human Rights’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 27 September 2022, available here.

Suggested citation:

UN Human Rights Committee, Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia, Communication No. 3624/2019, 22 September 2022, UN Doc. CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019.

Categories
Adaptation Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Sea-level rise Switzerland

Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (aka Asmania et al. v. Holcim)

Summary:
On 11 July 2022, a case was filed with the conciliation authority in the Swiss canton of Zug concerning the greenhouse gas emissions of the corporate cement giant Holcim AG, which is headquartered in Zug. The case was brought by four Indonesian nationals, who live on the Indonesian island of Pari and earn their livelihoods through fishing and tourism. They argued that rising sea levels and floods, which are all caused or aggravated by climate change, are threatening their livelihoods. The cement industry is a major emitter of greenhouse gases, currently emitting approximately 8% of yearly global CO2 emissions, and Holcim is the market leader in this sector (responsible for, historically, 0.42% of global industrial emissions since 1750). On this basis, the plaintiffs seek compensation from Holcim for the damage to their property and for future damages. They also seek adaptation measures to protect themselves against future impacts, and argue that Holcim should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 43% (compared to 2019 levels) by 2030, and 69% by 2040. This demands more rapid change than what is foreseen by the company’s own commitment to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. On 19 December 2025, the cantonal court of Zug declared the case admissible, paving the way for a future judgment on the merits.

Background and scope of the claim:
The claim concerns the greenhouse gas emissions produced by the cement industry, which are largely made up of direct emissions. The plaintiffs noted that 3/4 of Holcim’s emissions are direct emissions, as opposed to the largely indirect emissions created by the fossil fuel industry. The plaintiffs’ claim is based on references to climate attribution science, including reports by the IPCC, and the findings by the US Climate Accountability Institute that Holcim is responsible for 0.42% of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since 1750.

With the support of Swiss Church Aid HEKS/EPER, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and the Indonesian environmental organization WALHI, the plaintiffs invoke Swiss civil law, more specifically a violation of their personality rights under the Swiss Civil Code (Arts. 28 f.) and tort law under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 41 ff.), to argue that their human rights have been violated through the effects of the company’s emissions and that even more severe violations are forthcoming if Holcim does not reduce its emissions. They argue that the company should assume historical responsibility for its past emissions, but also future responsibility in the sense of rapidly reducing its greenhouse gas emissions.

Further developments and civil claim:
As required under Swiss procedural law, the case was brought as a request for arbitration. Arbitration proceedings in the case commenced in the fall of 2022. However, in October 2022, it became clear that the efforts at arbitration would not succeed in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. The case then progressed as a civil claim, with the four plaintiffs filing a lawsuit at the Zug Cantonal Court in February 2023 and applying for legal aid. They argued that Holcim must be ordered to reduce its emissions and provide compensation in order to ensure that their home island remains habitable and their livelihoods, community and culture are protected.

In particular, they argued that – due to violations of their personality rights caused by its CO2 emissions – the defendant is liable for the property damage suffered, as well as future property damage, in proportion to its share of 0.42% of global greenhouse gas emissions. They argued that Holcim has actively interfered with absolute legal interests such as the protection of life and limb, freedom, personality, property, and possessions, and will continue to do so. They also argue that there is an adequate causal link between the unlawful violation of personality rights on the one hand and the property damage on the other. This is because every ton of greenhouse gasses emitted has a long-term impact on the climate, as CO2 is broken down very slowly. They thus allege that the defendant corporation has a human rights-based duty of care to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It must ensure that the global average temperature increase on the Earth’s surface does not exceed pre-industrial temperatures by more than 1.5°C as a result of its emissions. However, the defendant is not doing enough to comply with this limit, which is why it must be obliged to reduce its CO2 emissions to the extent requested.

The plaintiffs accordingly sought injunctive relief in the form of emissions reductions under Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (protection of personality rights), as well as claiming reparation for damages already incurred, future damages and moral damages (satisfaction) under Swiss tort law (under the Swiss Code of Obligations).

The Cantonal Court of Zug held a hearing in the case on 3 September 2025 and issued its ruling on the admissibility on 19 December 2025.

Judgment on admissibility:
On 19 December 2025, the first division of the cantonal court of Zug issued its decision concerning the admissibility of the case.

The three-judge formation examined whether the conditions for admissibility under the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure had been met. This included examining whether there was a legitimate interest, whether the court had territorial and material jurisdiction, and whether a concrete, clear claim had been made.

Territorial jurisdiction:
First, the Court considered whether the case fell under the applicability of the Lugano Convention, finding that – given Holcim’s seat in Switzerland, and the plaintiffs’ seat abroad – the Convention applied, and Switzerland was the right forum for bringing the case (para. 2). Turning to the provisions of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA), the Court held that – given that both parties were making claims based on Swiss law – there had been a tacit or implied choice of law, and Swiss law was therefore applicable (Art. 132 PILA) (para. 2.2).

The Court noted that, in accordance with the Swiss theory of double relevance, the Court examines issues relating to its jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of the allegations, grounds for the action, and claims of the plaintiffs, without taking into account the objections of the defendant and without taking evidence (para. 2.4). The defendant’s objections are only examined at the time of the substantive examination of the case; objections raised by the opposing party in this regard are generally irrelevant in the context of the admissibility. However, the Court does determine, already at this stage, whether the claims made are in principle qualified to fall in the Court’s jurisdiction and whether the case is abusive. Given that it had not been alleged by the defendant that the allegations made were unqualified or abusive, the Court considered that they should provisionally be considered as true under the theory of double relevance.

Material jurisdiction:
The Court then determined whether the case fell in its material jurisdiction in the sense that it concerned an issue of civil (as opposed to public) law, which was contested between the applicants. It held that the distinction between civil and public law is fluid and dependent on the nature of the individual case (para. 3.3.). In doing so, it rejected the defendant’s argument that climate protection is to be provided only through public law mechanisms, which was in turn based on the position that the Paris Agreement does not create obligations for corporations and the Swiss legislator had not created specific GHG emissions reductions obligations for corporate actors. This case, the defendant argued, was part of an abusive worldwide campaign by NGOs to accelerate climate protection through litigation. Courts, it furthermore held, lacked the competence to order general emissions reductions targets.

The Court rejected these arguments, noting that the defendant was a private actor with no public authority and that the case was based on civil law (specifically the norms on protection of the personality, Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code, and the liability provisions under Art. 41 ff. of the Swiss Code of Obligations). It noted that Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code protect individuals from unlawful violations of personality rights by third parties: any legal entity, including individuals, whose personality is unlawfully infringed may sue anyone involved in the infringement; any private actor who participates in the violation of personality rights is liable to be sued (para. 3.6.2.1). In codifying this protection of the personality, the legislature deliberately refrained from defining the term “personality.” Instead, it formulated Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code as a general clause to enable the further development of the law and the adaptation of the term to changing times and values. The personality, as protected by these norms, is accordingly defined in a wide way, as the “totality of the individual”, and grants physical, psychological, and social areas of protection, as long as a certain minimum threshold of interference is reached.

The Court accordingly held that the adverse effects asserted by the plaintiffs affect the scope of protection of personality rights under Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code. If the plaintiffs’ statements were accepted as true, climate change has an impact on their physical integrity and personal freedom. Since greenhouse gas emissions from companies such as the defendant are undisputedly partly responsible for climate change, the plaintiffs can invoke the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 f. of the Swiss Civil Code for their claims against the defendant, thereby asserting personal claims under federal civil law (para. 3.6.2.2.).

As concerned the resulting rights and duties arising under civil law, the Court held that courts are not required to create new general climate protection goals in order to answer this question, but that it suffices to enforce existing legislation (para. 3.6.3.). This means that judicial rulings do not replace democratically legitimate climate policies, but complement them.

In making this finding, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that engaging with this case would undermine the separation of powers (para. 3.7.). Instead, citing Art. 29a of the Federal Constitution (guarantee of legal remedy), it noted that every person has the right to have their case heard by a judicial authority in legal disputes. Political questions can be excluded from access to court proceedings, but this applies only to cases of an ‘obvious’ political nature. And in this case, the competence of the civil courts had not been excluded through legislation. It held: “the courts, not the legislative or executive branches, are responsible for assessing alleged violations of the law” (para. 3.7.1.).

Examining the multilayered normative frameworks applicable to climate change, the Court noted that it had not yet been established under Swiss law that fundamental or human rights to life or private- and family life could have a horizontal direct effect among private actors. However, it could not exclude “that this could happen for the first time in the context of a climate case” (para. 3.7.2.). Particularly when interpreting open legal norms of private law (such as the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code), fundamental rights may be taken into consideration. Reiterating past findings from the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Court held that these provisions of the Swiss Civil Code are a civil law iteration of Article 8 ECHR. Noting the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, it noted that the ECHR provides only a subsidiary minimum standard, meaning that domestic law could also provide more stringent protection. Accordingly, it held, indirect horizontal effect of the human right to respect for private and family life was possible, particularly when courts are called to examine legal questions that have not yet been answered to date. Court decisions accordingly act as signposts for the application of legislation, and can feed political debates and give impulses for political change.

The Court then engaged with the defendant’s argument, based on the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, that the state’s duty of climate protection under Article 8 ECHR gives rise to very limitedly justiciable rights, and that the enactment of climate protection measures is a matter for democratic decision-making and not for the judiciary, because climate change raises complex scientific, political, economic, and other issues. The defendant had also called for the strict victim status requirements imposed in KlimaSeniorinnen to be transposed to disputes between private individuals, given their lack of a duty to protect.

The Court distinguished the case before it from KlimaSeniorinnen, noting that KlimaSeniorinnen was about general climate policy goals and the present case was about concrete impacts on individuals (para. 3.8). This meant that the defendant could not derive “any beneficial arguments from the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment for the present civil proceedings”.  Parliamentary discussions that criticized the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment likewise had no salience for these proceedings, and were irrelevant. Neither was foreign case-law cited by the defendant relevant for the court’s consideration of the case (para. 3.9.). Summarizing cases from courts in the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and Germany,  the Court held that these foreign courts have predominantly deemed private-law climate cases admissible and examined them in terms of substantive law. The defendant was therefore unable to derive anything in its favor from this foreign case law (para. 3.9.3.). As a result, the Court held, the case before it was a civil law one.

Whether a sufficiently concrete, clear claim had been made:
The Court then examined whether the plaintiffs have a legal interest in bringing the action. It held that, at the admissibility stage, this did not have to be conclusively proven; it sufficed if, on the balance of probabilities, the interest appeared to exist. Furthermore, the insignificance of the asserted claim (minima non curat praetor) does not lead to the loss of legal interest, unless there is an abuse of rights (para. 4.1.).

The plaintiffs argued that their interest legal protection is personal, practical, and current. Climate change poses an existential threat to small islands and low-lying coasts such as the island of Pari. It affects the livelihoods, health, well-being, food security, access to drinking water, and cultural values of the island’s inhabitants. Sea level rise damages settlements and destroys coastal infrastructure, leading to the loss of economic assets and biodiversity in traditional agricultural ecosystems, as well as a decline in fishing and tourism. The increasing uninhabitability of the island is forcing residents to leave their homes. What those affected have experienced firsthand is confirmed by scientific studies, including IPCC-reviewed science. They had also alleged a number of individualized impacts. They were accordingly affected by Holcim’s activities, notwithstanding the concurrent responsibility of other Carbon Majors.

Citing KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court held that IPCC-reviewed science was the relevant standard for determining any scientific questions related to these claims (para. 5.3.1.). It held that it was undisputed that climate change was having an impact on the world’s population. Engaging with the defendant’s argument that the case was an abstract public interest case, not an individualized claim, it held that the IPCC had noted that up to 3.6 billion people around the world are strongly at risk of impacts from climate change. This meant that the Court could not exclude that the case also had relevance for the interests of third parties. However, it held, “the personal affectedness of the plaintiffs goes beyond the general affectedness of persons who have not (yet) suffered damages from concrete events or have been exposed to an enhanced risk” (para. 5.5.3.). The affectedness of the plaintiffs had to be distinguished from that of the KlimaSeniorinnen applicants. While those applicants had benefitted from access to adaptation measures and their future risk of impact had not been demonstrated, the plaintiffs in this case “had no possibility to halt rising sea levels with reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their need for protection as accordingly more urgent (para. 5.5.4.). This reality likewise distinguished the plaintiffs in this case from those in similar German cases against BMW or Mercedes-Benz. The case was accordingly not to be characterized as an unacceptable actio popularis. In this regard, the Court cited the environmental case-law of the ECtHR concerning the garbage collection crisis in Campania, where the widespread nature of the issue likewise did not render the case an actio popularis.

The Court noted that the defendant was a major greenhouse gas emitter, a “Carbon Major”, and that it would be possible, through case-law, to create threshold criteria to distinguish the responsibility of such carbon major companies from smaller emitters (para. 5.5.6.). This meant that the case could not be rejected on the basis that it would lead to “litigation against everyone”. Climate change required action from both state and private actors if ecosystems, biodiversity, and the foundations of human life, health and welfare were to be protected. Noting the uncertainties involved in calculating probabilities of warming, the Court noted that it was possible that even under existing efforts, climate neutrality may not be achieved. Given the consequences of climate change, the long time during which greenhouse gasses remained in the atmosphere and the unavoidability of further warming and the resulting harms, it was not possible to wait until a universally agreed solution came to exist.

The Court also rejected the claim by the defendant that its contribution to climate change and sea level rise was marginal. The Court held that this does not relieve Holcim of its individual responsibility to contribute to the fight against climate change wherever possible. If the defendant’s line of argument were followed, national climate protection measures would also have to be denied legitimacy, as no country can stop climate change on its own. Neither were the plaintiffs required to bring a case against all emitters at once. In order to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, there is a budget of around 500 gigatons of CO2 remaining. This can only be achieved through immediate and drastic reductions in emissions. The plaintiffs’ interest in the injunction is therefore urgent and current, even if the desired climate neutrality is still a long way off (para. 5.8.). Neither were alternative avenues for achieving the desired protection evident (5.10.).

Quantifiability of emissions reductions:
Holcim argued that the plaintiffs’ claims around the reductions of its CO2 emissions were insufficiently clear and concrete, and that it had not been defined which emissions fell under their understanding of scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. Likewise, it held, there were no binding legal obligations to conduct corporate climate reporting. Scientific standards in this regard were continually evolving, with the plaintiffs using current-day standards that were sure to change in the future. The plaintiffs, by contrast, argued that there was a domestic law obligation to report on greenhouse gas emissions under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 964b (4)).

The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it was unclear what fell under scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, noting that this terminology was used in Holcim’s own climate strategy. It also noted that Holcim had conducted reporting about its CO2 emissions, and that this was a sufficient basis for implementing an eventual judgment in the case.

The Court also rejected Holcim’s argument that the case and any eventual emissions reductions or damages obligations should be limited to itself as a parent company, and not extend to its subsidiaries. Here, the Court held that the parent company participates in the emissions of its subsidiaries, because it creates a climate strategy that encompasses and binds them. In any case, it held, Swiss tort law’s moral damages provisions also apply to a company’s subsidiaries.

Conclusion:
Finding that the claim fell within its jurisdiction and was sufficiently specific, the Court held that the case was admissible. It did not decide on the award of costs for the proceedings to date, reserving this issue to a decision on the merits.

Further information:
For more information, see the dossier compiled by the supporting NGOs in 2022 here, and at the time of the hearing in September 2025 below.

CallForClimateJustice_Dossier_Media_EN_2025Download

The full text of the judgment (German) will be made available here in due course.

Suggested citation:
Cantonal Court of Zug, Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (Asmania et al. v. Holcim), case A1 2023 9, judgment (admissibility) of 19 December 2025.

Last updated:
22 December 2025

Categories
2021 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Indigenous peoples' rights Non-discrimination Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise United States of America

Aji P. and Others v. the State of Washington

Summary:
This case was brought by 13 young people aged between 8 and 18 who sued the US State of Washington, its Governor, and various other state agencies, arguing that the state had “injured and continue[d] to injure them by creating, operating, and maintaining a fossil fuel-based energy and transportation system that [the State] knew would result in greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, dangerous climate change, and resulting widespread harm.” In doing so, they invoked their “fundamental and inalienable constitutional rights to life, liberty, property, equal protection, and a healthful and pleasant environment, which includes a stable climate system that sustains human life and liberty.” They also invoked the impacts on indigenous peoples’ rights. The plaintiffs requested the judiciary to “[o]rder [the state] to develop and submit to the Court . . . an enforceable state climate recovery plan”.

A number of amici filed briefs in the case. For example, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Quinault Indian Nation, and Suquamish Tribe argued that local tribes were already seeing impacts on their traditional lands and abutting marine waters. The Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW-US) noted the well-documented impacts of climate change on human and constitutional rights. The League of Women Voters of Washington argued that access to judicial action was particularly important for minors who did not enjoy access to the right to vote. And a group of environmental NGOs submitted that “the right to a healthful and pleasant environment underlies our continued ability to claim our explicitly-guaranteed rights to life and liberty.”

On 8 February 2021, the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington held that it “firmly believe[d] that the right to a stable environment should be fundamental.” It also recognized “the extreme harm that greenhouse gas emissions inflict on the environment and its future stability.” However, it held that “it would be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for the court to resolve the Youths’ claims.” It accordingly dismissed the claim.

On 6 October 2021, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington denied the petition for review in this case. González, C.J. (dissenting) noted that the plaintiffs “asked this court to recognize a fundamental right to a healthful and pleasant environment that may be inconsistent with our State’s maintenance of a fossil-fuel-based energy and transportation system that it knows will result in greenhouse gas emissions. These greenhouse gases hasten a rise in the earth’s temperature. This temperature change foreshadows the potential collapse of our environment. In its place is an unstable climate system, conceivably unable to sustain human life and continued enjoyment of ordered liberty under law. Today, we have an opportunity to consider whether these are the sorts of harms that are remediable under Washington’s law and constitution. We should have granted review to decide that question”.

Suggested citation:
Court of Appeals of the State of Washington (USA), Aji P. v. State, 16 Wash. App. 2d 177, 480 P.3d 438, 16 Wn. App. 2d 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

Last updated:
5 July 2022