Category: Switzerland

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Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fair trial Farming Just transition litigation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to development and work Right to health Right to life Right to property Separation of powers Standing/admissibility Switzerland Uncategorized Victim status Vulnerability

Uniterre et al. v. Swiss Department of the Environment (Swiss Farmers Case)

Summary:
On 5 March 2024, a group of nine individual Swiss farmers, along with 5 associations representing farming-related interests, submitted a request to the Swiss Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication (DETEC), demanding enhanced governmental action to protect them against the impacts of climate change. Noting increasing summer drought periods that particularly impact their human and constitutional rights and livelihoods, they alleged inadequacies in the existing Swiss climate policy response. In doing so, they submitted that:

As farmers and as associations defending the interests of farmers, the Petitioners and Petitioner Associations are particularly affected by climate change, which infringes their fundamental rights. It affects their harvests and jeopardizes the viability of their farms. Climate disruption has been encouraged by the Authority’s climate inaction. This serious negligence on the part of the Authority now justifies the filing of the present petition (translated from the original French).

Response by DETEC:
On 20 September 2024, DETEC rejected the petitioners’ request, finding that the alleged omissions did not impact the individual petitioners more intensely than other segments of the population, meaning that they lacked an interest worthy of protection, as well as standing. The same result was reached concerning the five petitioning associations (which are Uniterre, Kleinbauern-Vereinigung, Biogenève, Schweizer Bergheimat and Les jardins de cocagne).

The request to DETEC was made pursuant to Art. 25a of the Swiss Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), requesting that the government (and more specifically DETEC) should refrain from the alleged unlawful acts impacting the petitioners’ human and constitutional rights and livelihoods. Art. 25a APA provides that:

In other words, Art. 25a APA allows persons whose rights or obligations are impacted by ‘real acts’ of the federal authorities to seek a (subsequently legally contestable) ruling concerning the situation. This approach has been used by climate litigants to contest policy lacunae given that constitutionality review of existing federal legislation is not possible under Swiss Constitutional law. A similar request was the starting point of the landmark KlimaSeniorinnen case that was ultimately decided upon by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2024.

However, and much like the KlimaSeniorinnen association and its members, the present petitioners did not succeed with their request to DETEC. On 20 September 2024, DETEC rejected their request. Uniterre, one of the petitioning associations, argued that DETEC had thereby ignored the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, which established that there were access to justice issues for climate applicants in Switzerland by finding a violation of the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).

DETEC’s reasoning did note the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment. First, it argued that the ECtHR had not considered recent developments in Swiss climate policy, emphasizing that Switzerland had a “long history of climate policy” and had only “barely” missed its 2020 national emissions reductions target. DETEC also noted the domestic findings in the KlimaSeniorinnen case, where Swiss courts had left open the question of whether the applicant association in that case had standing. It did not, in doing so, mention the later ruling of the ECtHR, which found that the conduct of these domestic proceedings and particularly the domestic instances’ treatment of the association’s standing claim had violated fair trial rights. Instead, it relied only on the reasoning of the domestic instances in KlimaSeniorinnen to find that the plaintiffs in the present case did not have a sufficient interest to seek legal protection given that they had failed to demonstrate “how they are more affected by the material acts of which DETEC is accused than the rest of the agricultural world, or other economic sectors that may be impacted by global warming (forestry, fishing, etc.), or other groups of people (children, pregnant women, the elderly, etc.). Nor do the individual Claimants establish for each of them that a particular level and severity of damage is likely to be caused by climate change.” (translated from the original French). DETEC found that “what is at stake in the application is the protection of the community as a whole, and not just of individuals, so that it is akin to a form of actio popularis [meaning] that the individual applicants are pursuing public interests that cannot justify victim status.”

Concerning the standing of associations, DETEC noted that the Swiss federal executive had “rejected the extension of associations’ right of appeal to include climate issues, as set out by the European Court of Human Rights [in KlimaSeniorinnen]”. It also noted that the associations did not pursue the specific goal of defending the fundamental rights of their members or other affected individuals in Switzerland, and that alleging that they did do so would be impossible because the associations in question “were all created before the global awareness of the threat of anthropogenic global warming, and therefore before the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992.”

Overall, DETEC found that while it could not rule out “that the State’s material acts (actions or omissions) in the field of climate change are in principle capable of producing sufficient effects on the Petitioners to affect the right to protection of private and family life, the right to protection of the home guaranteed by art. 13 para. 1 Cst. as well as the guarantee of property (art. 26 Cst.) and economic freedom (art. 27 Cst.) [and] that Switzerland can, in a global context, have an influence on global warming, the fact remains that it is too small to have a decisive influence in this area, in the sense that there is no direct causal link between the actions or omissions of Switzerland and the effects of global warming, the latter being marked above all by the major industrial powers” (translated from the original French). This meant that “Switzerland’s material actions, while morally and politically relevant, have only a marginal effect on global climate change”.

Case before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal:
On 23 October 2024, the plaintiffs challenged the DETEC decision before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal. They invoked four main grounds for appeal, namely that:

  • By ignoring the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen ruling, the decision violates federal law, the principle of the separation of powers and the binding force of judgments of the ECtHR (art. 46 ECHR). In particular, the applicants argue that the federal executive has undermined judicial oversight “by arrogating to itself the right to emancipate itself from judicial control”.
  • DETEC’s actions and omissions are contrary to law, as is clear from the KlimaSeniorinnen ruling.
  • The (individual) appellants have standing to bring an action, contesting DETEC’s arguments about the limited impact of Swiss emissions on a global scale and arguing that there is no right to “l’égalité dans l’illégalité”. They emphasized the economic losses and health impacts facing the appellants, with impacts on several fundamental rights, and argued that the refusal to recognize the affectedness of the applicants represented a denial of access to justice and a violation of the right to a fair trial as enshrined in domestic law and Article 6 ECHR.
  • The appellant associations have standing as parties, and DETEC’s refusal to follow the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (KlimaSeniorinnen) in this regard had violated fair trial and access to justice entitlements enshrined, among others, in Art. 6 ECHR. The ECtHR had not required associations’ statutes to explicitly mention fundamental rights protection. Furthermore, the statutes and aims of the five associations all related to protecting smallholder, sustainable and/or biological farming, with one association (Uniterre) explicitly pursuing the protection of the human rights of peasants and other rural workers as recognized in the 2018 UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants (UNDROP).

The plaintiffs sought orders to the effect that:

  • An expert study should be commissioned concerning the contribution of climate change to worsening drought in Switzerland and reducing agricultural productivity;
  • The government should be ordered to take every measure needed to avoid negative climate impacts and contribution to chronic drought on Swiss territory, abstain from actions causing corresponding impacts, and take every measure capable of reducing or eliminating the impacts of climate change, chronic drought, and the rights violations complained of.
  • A violation of the right to life (Art. 10 of the Swiss Constitution/Art. 2 ECHR), the right to private life (Art. 13 of the Swiss Constitution/Art. 8 ECHR), the right to property (Art. 26 of the Swiss Constitution, Switzerland not having ratified the first additional protocol to the ECHR that enshrines this right), and the right to economic liberty (Art. 27 of the Swiss Constitution) had taken place.
  • A violation of the climate objectives and environmental protection requirements enshrined in domestic legislation had taken place, insufficient measures had been taken to ensure respect for the Paris Agreement, and overall the sum of the action taken with a direct or indirect impact on the climate had been insufficient.

Status of the case:
Pending before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal.

Case documents:
The full text of the initial request as submitted to the Swiss Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication (DETEC) is available below, as made available by Advocat.e.s pour le Climat (in French).

2024-03-05-Plainte-25a-PA-AvoC-caviardeeDownload

The DETEC decision is available below.

2024-09-24-DETEC-a-ANL-Decision-concernant-la-requete-du-5-mars-2024_caviardeeDownload

The full text of the appeal to the Federal Administrative Tribunal is available below.

2024-10-24-Recours-au-TAF_caviarde (1)Download

Further reading:

  • More information on the case is available via SwissInfo.
  • See also the comment by Charlotte E. Blattner, Robert Finger & Karin Ingold in Nature.

Suggested citation:
Swiss Federal Administrative Court, Uniterre et al. v. Swiss Department of the Environment (Swiss Farmers Case), case filed 23 October 2024 (pending).

Last updated:
2 June 2025.

Categories
Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Evidence Fair trial Gender / women-led Imminent risk Keywords Margin of appreciation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Separation of powers Standing/admissibility Switzerland Victim status Vulnerability

Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland

Summary:
In 2016, the Senior Women for Climate Protection Switzerland (German: ‘Verein KlimaSeniorinnen’), a Swiss organisation, brought proceedings concerning the alleged omissions of the Swiss federal government to adopt an adequate climate protection policy. They submitted that current domestic climate targets and measures are not sufficient to limit global warming to a safe level. This failure to prevent climate-related disasters, they argued, represents a failure to protect the rights under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the rights to life and respect for private and family life, respectively) of the organization’s members. In particular, they submitted evidence that their specific demographic (older women) is particularly impacted by heatwaves, citing health impacts and excess mortality risks. The respondent State, they argued, has failed to comply with its positive obligations to protect their rights, read in light of the environmental law principles of precaution and intergenerational equity.

The applicants also invoked two procedural rights under the Convention, namely the rights in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR (right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, respectively). In this regard they argued that the domestic courts failed to take their case seriously and provide an effective remedy to contest the violation of their rights.

These claims were rejected by the domestic instances at three levels of jurisdiction. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in its ruling, considered that the case represented an actio popularis, concerned questions better suited to the political arena, and did not raise an arguable claim of a rights violation. As a result, the applicants took their case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

This case was only the second climate change-related case to come to Strasbourg. Like the Duarte Agostinho case, this application raised novel questions before the Court, including the issue of victim status in climate cases, the standing of (environmental) NGOs to bring cases to the Court, and the extent of the State margin of appreciation in regard to environmental protection measures related to climate change, and the extent of the positive obligation to protect individuals from the risks to their life and health posed by climate change.

On 9 April 2024, in a historic ruling, the ECtHR declared this case admissible in part (for the association) and found that there had been violations of Articles 6(1) and 8 ECHR. In doing so, this case became the Court’s leading climate judgment, and a model for further climate-related cases in this system.

Third-party interventions:
There were an unusually large (for the ECtHR) number of third party interventions in this case: 23 in total, including eight States. The KlimaSeniorinnen association provided copies of all of the third-party interventions; these are available here. Some of the third-party interveners were also granted leave to intervene orally during the hearing before the Grand Chamber.

Grand Chamber hearing:
This was the first climate case heard by the European Court of Human Rights, followed immediately by the Carême v. France case. The Court has adjourned its examination of six other climate cases until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the three climate change cases before it, meaning that leading judgments clarifying the Convention obligations around cliamte change can be expected in these cases.

During the hearing, submissions were heard from the applicants, the respondent State, and two of the 23 total third-party interveners (the Government of Ireland & the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). A live summary of the hearing is available here.

General findings of the Court in its judgment of 9 April 2024:
The Court’s judgment is prefaced by a number of general findings that reflect its intended nature as a leading case. Noting the need to ensure effective protection of Convention rights without undermining the prohibition of actio popularis cases under the Convention system, the Court acknowledged that it had a role to play here, finding that “the current situation (…) involves compelling present‑day conditions, confirmed by scientific knowledge, which the Court cannot ignore in its role as a judicial body tasked with the enforcement of human rights.” At the same time, noting “the necessarily primary responsibility of the legislative and executive branches and the inherently collective nature of both the consequences and the challenges arising from the adverse effects of climate change”, it held that the issue of victim status here raised an issue of the separation of powers, requiring particular consideration. Noting the global and complex nature of climate change, it held that “the necessity of combating climate change involves various conflicts, the weighing‑up of which falls, as stated previously, within the democratic decision‑making processes, complemented by judicial oversight by the domestic courts and this Court.”

In light of this, and before assessing the case, the Court set out a number of general considerations relating to climate‑change cases. This includes questions of causation, including the finding that despite indirect causal links, “the essence of the relevant State duties in the context of climate change relates to the reduction of the risks of harm for individuals”, meaning that it could not apply “a strict conditio sine qua non requirement” to matters of causation. This section also includes issues of proof and evidence, and references the “evolution of scientific knowledge, social and political attitudes and legal standards concerning the necessity of protecting the environment”. Here the Court established that “there are sufficiently reliable indications that anthropogenic climate change exists, that it poses a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights guaranteed under the Convention, that States are aware of it and capable of taking measures to effectively address it, that the relevant risks are projected to be lower if the rise in temperature is limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and if action is taken urgently, and that current global mitigation efforts are not sufficient to meet the latter target” (para. 436). And, importantly, it discarded the “drop in the bucket” argument made by the respondent State, stating that “The relevant test does not require it to be shown that “but for” the failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred. Rather, what is important, and sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State, is that reasonable measures which the domestic authorities failed to take could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm” (para. 444). It also stressed that there is no right to a healthy environment in the ECHR, but that it can and has nonetheless dealt with other environmental cases, reiterating its past approach that “the crucial element which must be present in determining whether, in the circumstances of a given case, an environmental harm has adversely affected one of the rights safeguarded by the Convention is the existence of a harmful effect on a person and not simply the general deterioration of the environment” (para. 446). It also noted that it is conscious of its subsidiary role and the direct democratic legitimation of national authorities to make decisions on climate policy, but that where State policy affects Convention rights, it has competence to intervene and “the Court’s competence in the context of climate-change litigation cannot, as a matter of principle, be excluded” (paras. 449-451).

The Court also set out the relevant principles for interpreting the ECHR, including the living instrument approach and the fact that while the Court “does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention” — including the Paris Agreement — it has consistently noted that it will interpret the Convention in harmony with other international law.

Admissibility:
On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case admissible in part. Under Article 34 ECHR, it used this judgment as an opportunity to create new standards on victim status specific to climate-related cases. In doing so, it set out the general standards on victim status, noting that it did not admit actio popularis cases and that the ECHR “does not permit individuals or groups of individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention” (para. 460). It noted that the notion of victim status must be applied flexibly, and that it’s distinct from locus standi, i.e. representative actions.

The Court then issued general considerations on victim status and locus standi in climate cases, noting that “there is cogent scientific evidence demonstrating that climate change has already contributed to an increase in morbidity and mortality, especially among certain more vulnerable groups, that it actually creates such effects and that, in the absence of resolute action by States, it risks progressing to the point of being irreversible and disastrous” (para. 478).

It also held that (para. 479): the critical issues around climate change “arise from failures to act, or inadequate action”, meaning omissions in legislative or regulatory frameworks that require a special approach to victim status. Importantly, the Court also clarified that its findings on victim status in the context of complaints about omissions in climate policy “is without prejudice to the determination of victim status in circumstances where complaints by individuals concern alleged violations arising from a specific individual loss or damage already suffered by them” (para. 480), meaning that the special approach spelled out for mitigation cases need not preclude other types of claims. However, it held, in the context of climate change, “a potentially a huge number of persons could claim victim status under the Convention”, which “would not sit well with the exclusion of actio popularis from the Convention mechanism and the effective functioning of the right of individual application” (para. 483). The Court clarified the difficult situation in which it found itself, between “disrupting national constitutional principles and the separation of powers” and depriving individuals affected in their rights from “any judicial recourse before the Court”, noting the “distinct representational disadvantage” of those most affected (para. 484). It then, in para 487 of the judgment, spelled out the criteria for individual victim status in climate cases. These are:

  • (a)  “a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change”, i.e. a significant level and severity of risk of adverse consequences; and
  • (b) “a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm.”

Given that there is no actio popularis under the Convention, the Court held, “the threshold for fulfilling these criteria is especially high”, and will depend on specific vulnerabilities and local circumstances as well as including considerations relating to: “the nature and scope of the applicant’s Convention complaint, the actuality/remoteness and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on the applicant’s life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicant’s vulnerability” (para. 488).

As to the standing of associations, the Court generally reiterated its previous Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others judgment, which had allowed representative standing for an organisation. It noted that recourse to collective bodies like associations can make defense of one’s interests more accessible in certain circumstances, including the context of climate change, noting that this general principle was also reflected in the Aarhus Convention. The Court then set out some general principles on organizations’ victim status versus their standing as representatives of victims. In light of the former, it reiterated past case-law finding that “an association cannot rely on health considerations or nuisances and problems associated with climate change which can only be encountered by natural persons”. But it also recognized that understandings of the importance of litigation by associations had evolved, and that climate cases are complex and demanding and affect many individuals (para. 498). In addition, “the special feature of climate change as a common concern of humankind and the necessity of promoting intergenerational burden-sharing in this context (…), speak in favour of recognising the standing of associations before the Court in climate-change cases” (para. 499). However, this should not mean allowing an actio popularis: a test for associations’ standing is required. To design its test, the Court had regard to the Aarhus Convention while also noting key difference between its approach and that under Aarhus.

The test it devised for associations looks as follows (§ 502): associations will have locus standi to bring climate cases about impacts on human lives and health where they:

  • (a) have been lawfully established in the relevant jurisdiction, or have standing to act there;
  • (b) pursue, under their statutory objectives, a dedicated purpose of defending the human rights of their members or other affected individuals in the jurisdiction concerned, and
  • (c) are genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of affected individuals in the jurisdiction who are subject to specific threats on their lives, health or well-being from climate change.

The Court also noted that it would consider additional factors, like the purpose for which the association was established, its non-profit character, the nature and extent of its activities, its membership and representativeness, its principles and transparency of governance and whether standing is in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

There was no need, however, to show that those on whose behalf the case has been brought would themselves have met the climate-specific victim-status requirements for individuals as set out earlier in the judgment.

Because the Court joined its actual analysis of the victim status requirement to the merits of the case, this is discussed in the following section.

Merits:
In setting out general principles on the applicability of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life), the Court noted past cases where the right was applicable to situations where there is a threat to life, but “where the person concerned did not die”. Although noting the evidence on vulnerable populations, the Court reiterated that the appropriate test here is one of whether there is a “real and imminent” risk to life, meaning that the risk must be serious, genuine, sufficiently ascertainable and in physical proximity. It then tailored this last aspect to the nature of climate change, stating that it would suffice to show “an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant”. This means that, provided an applicant has victim status, “a serious risk of a significant decline in a person’s life expectancy owing to climate change ought also to trigger the applicability of Article 2.”

As for Article 8 ECHR, the Court stated generally that it was necessary to show an “actual interference” with the right, meaning that there needs to be “a direct and immediate link between the alleged environmental harm and the applicant’s private or family life or home”, and a certain level of severity. Drawing on its past environmental case-law, the Court went on to establish that “Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 519).

The Court then considered the applicability of Art. 8 ECHR to the case before it. As concerned the applicant association, it found that it met the criteria for standing by associations as set out earlier in the judgment, describing the KlimaSeniorinnen association as “a vehicle of collective recourse aimed at defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State”. The complaints pursued by the association on behalf of its members, it held, fall within the scope of Article 8. The association accordingly had locus standi, and Article 8 was declared applicable to its complaint.

On applicants 2-5 (the individual applicants), the Court held that the threshold for meeting its two criteria (high-intensity exposure and a pressing need to ensure protection) was high. It was not enough to show that they were particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The crucial paragraph of the judgment here is para. 533: “while it may be accepted that heatwaves affected the applicants’ quality of life, it is not apparent from the available materials that they were exposed to the adverse effects of climate change, or were at risk of being exposed at any relevant point in the future, with a degree of intensity giving rise to a pressing need to ensure their individual protection (…). It cannot be said that the applicants suffered from any critical medical condition whose possible aggravation linked to heatwaves could not be alleviated by the adaptation measures available in Switzerland or by means of reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their complaint was accordingly declared inadmissible.

On the claims under Article 2, the Court held that it was not necessary to analyze this further, noting that its analysis would “have regard to the principles developed also under Article 2, which to a very large extent are similar to those under Article 8 (…) and which, when seen together, provide a useful basis for defining the overall approach to be applied in the climate-change context under both provisions.”

The Court then recapitulated more general principles now on the merits proper. It held that the Article 2 and 8 positive obligations are generally quite similar, requiring the State:

  • (a)  to put in place an adequate legislative and administrative framework and govern the licensing, setting-up, operation, security and supervision of the activity;
  • (b) to apply that framework effectively in practice;
  • (c) to remain within their margin of appreciation;
  • (d) to exercise due diligence and consider all competing interests;
  • (f) to provide access to essential information enabling individuals to assess risks to their health and lives;

Noting also that “the scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in the particular circumstances will depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation”.

In reviewing the domestic decision-making process, the Court has particular regard to the following considerations:

  • (a) Its subsidiary role;
  • (b) The need to consider all of the procedural aspects;
  • (c) The presence of appropriate investigations and studies;
  • (d) The public’s access to the conclusions of the relevant studies; and
  • (e) Whether or not the individuals concerned had an opportunity to protect their interests in the environmental decision-making process, i.e. participate effectively.

Turning to States’ positive obligations relation to climate, it first considered the State margin of appreciation. Having regard to the scientific evidence, the Court considered it justified to give climate protection considerable weight against competing considerations.

Regarding the margin of appreciation it distinguished between the scope of the margin as regards (i) the State’s commitment combating climate change and setting objectives in this respect, and (ii) the choice of means designed to achieve those objectives. The margin is more narrow with regard to the former. For the latter aspect, i.e. the choice of means, States have a wide margin of appreciation.

As to the content of States’ positive obligations under Article 8, this is primarily a regulatory obligation. This means that, in line with their international commitments, States need to put in place regulations and measures to prevent climate change. The global aims in the Paris Agreement are not enough; and “must inform the formulation of domestic policies, it is obvious that the said aims cannot of themselves suffice as a criterion for any assessment of Convention compliance of individual Contracting Parties to the Convention in this area. This is because “each individual State is called upon to define its own adequate pathway for reaching carbon neutrality, depending on the sources and levels of emissions and all other relevant factors within its jurisdiction.”

This means that Article 8 ECHR “requires that each Contracting State undertake measures for the substantial and progressive reduction of their respective GHG emission levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within, in principle, the next three decades” (ca. 2050). To avoid a disproportionate burden on future generations, this means immediate action needs to be taken and adequate intermediate reduction goals must be set for the interim period. The Court spelled out that this must be part of a binding regulatory framework at the national level, followed by adequate implementation, and that “the relevant targets and timelines must form an integral part of the domestic regulatory framework, as a basis for general and sectoral mitigation measures.”

In para. 550, the Court set out the criteria it would use to decide whether a State has remained within its margin of appreciation, namely whether the authorities had due regard to the need to:

  • “(a) adopt general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality and the overall remaining carbon budget for the same time frame, or another equivalent method of quantification of future GHG emissions, in line with the overarching goal for national and/or global climate-change mitigation commitments;
  • (b) set out intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways (by sector or other relevant methodologies) that are deemed capable, in principle, of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant time frames undertaken in national policies;
  • (c) provide evidence showing whether they have duly complied, or are in the process of complying, with the relevant GHG reduction targets (…);
  • (d) keep the relevant GHG reduction targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and
  • (e) act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures.”

These mitigation measures, it added, must be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account particular protection needs.

The Court also set out procedural safeguards, namely

  • (a) The publicity of relevant information; and
  • (b) The availability of procedures to take into account the views of the public, and in particular the interests of those affected.

Applying these principles to the case before it, the Court held that it could “take into account the overall situation in the respondent State”, including relevant information that came to light after the domestic proceedings, but that here, given an ongoing domestic legislative process, its assessment was limited to examining the domestic legislation as it stood on the date of the (internal) adoption of the judgment, which was 14 February 2024.

The Court noted that the currently existing 2011 CO2 Act (in force since 2013) required that emissions reductions of 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. However, as far back as August 2009, the Swiss Federal Council had found that the scientific evidence under a 2-2.4°C warming limit required a reduction in global emissions of at least 50-85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Industrialised countries (like Switzerland) had to reduce their emissions by 25-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. for the higher 1.5°C limit, emissions would have to decline continuously, and the pathway 20% by 2020 pathway was insufficient to achieve that objective.

As the Government acknowledged, domestic assessments found that even the reduction target for 2020 had been missed. Between 2013 and 2020, Switzerland reduced its emissions by around 11% compared with 1990 levels, indicating the insufficiency of the authorities’ past action to take the necessary measures to address climate change.

A proposed revision of the CO2 Act for 2020-2030 proposed an overall reduction of 50% of emissions, including a domestic reduction of 30% by 2030 and measures to be taken abroad (“external emissions”). This proposal was rejected in a popular referendum in June 2021. Here the Court held that, “irrespective of the way in which the legislative process is organised from the domestic constitutional point of view”, there was a legislative lacuna, pointing to a failure on the part of the respondent State to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 to devise a regulatory framework setting the requisite objectives and goals.

Reflecting the updated Swiss NDC, the Climate Act was enacted, and envisages the principle of a net‑zero emissions target by 2050, but several lacunae remain, and “the Court has difficulty accepting that the mere legislative commitment to adopt the concrete measures “in good time” (…) satisfies the State’s duty”, especially because “the introduction of that new legislation is not sufficient to remedy the shortcomings identified in the legal framework applicable so far.”

Currently, the Swiss goal used more emissions than even a globally equal “per capita emissions” approach would entitle it to use.

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that there was no established methodology to determine a country’s carbon budget, and noted that an NDC under the Paris Agreement was not an appropriate substitute. The Court approved of the reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Neubauer, where it rejected the argument that it was impossible to determine the national carbon budget by emphasizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

Thus, “while acknowledging that the measures and methods determining the details of the State’s climate policy fall within its wide margin of appreciation, in the absence of any domestic measure attempting to quantify the respondent State’s remaining carbon budget, the Court has difficulty accepting that the State could be regarded as complying effectively with its regulatory obligation under Article 8” (para. 572). This meant that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (by a majority of 16-1).

On the issue of Article 6 ECHR, concerning the right of access to a court, the Court held that the issue of victim status should again be joined to the merits, and the Court again dove in with general principles, finding that it did not per se need to tailor these principles to the nature of climate change cases.

Examining these principles in the case before it, the Court held that “it cannot be said that the individual applicants’ claim was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise lacking in foundation in terms of the relevant domestic law (…). The Court is unable to agree with the finding of the FSC that the individual applicants’ claim could not be considered arguable for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention” (para. 618). It went on to find that interests defended by the association meant that the “dispute” raised by it had a direct and sufficient link to its members’ rights. Finding that Article 6 (1) applied to the complaint of the applicant association, the Court also considered it to have victim status.

For the individual applicants, however, the Court found that the dispute they had brought concerning the failure to effectively implement mitigation measures was not directly decisive for their specific rights. They had not shown that there was a sufficiently imminent and certain effect on their individual rights, and this part of their complaint was inadmissible.

For the association, among other things, the Court rejected the domestic courts’ findings that there was still some time to prevent global warming from reaching the critical limit, and noted that they “did not engage seriously or at all with the action brought by the applicant association.” There had accordingly been a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR, with the Court emphasizing “the key role which domestic courts have played and will play in climate-change litigation”.

The applicants also complained that they had not had access to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. Here the Court noted that Article 6 is a lex specialis to Article 13, the latter being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6, so there was no separate issue in its regard.

Remedies:
The individual applicants had made requests for just satisfaction for damage under Article 41 ECHR, but the organisation did not, so no award was made. The Court did award costs and expenses to the amount of EUR 80,000.

The applicants had also made an Art. 46 claim for a general measures order. Here the Court noted that it is primarily for the State to choose, under the supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used domestically to discharge its obligation to comply with the Court’s judgment, as long as the means are compatible with the conclusions and spirit of that judgment. The Court went on to hold that, “having regard to the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, the Court is unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the present judgment.” It noted the State’s broad margin of appreciation choose the means to discharge its Convention obligations, and found that the State was thus better placed than the Court to decide which specific measures to take.

Separate opinions:
A separate opinion by Judge Eicke is annexed to this judgment. He disagreed with the majority in several points, especially victim status and the merits of Art. 8. He presented his view as a disagreement of a “fundamental nature” that “goes to the very heart of the role of the Court within the Convention system and, more generally, the role of a court in the context of the unique and unprecedented challenges posed to humanity” because the majority had exceeded “the permissible limits of evolutive interpretation”.

According to Judge Eicke, the majority judgment creates a new right to “effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well‑being and quality of life arising from the harmful effects and risks caused by climate change”. While acknowledging the seriousness of the threat of climate change, and noting “(a) the absolute need for urgent action and (b) the sheer complexity of the challenges climate change (and the other aspects of the “triple planetary crisis”) pose (geo-)politically, practically, logistically as well as legal,” he argues that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances (Article 2(2) Paris Agreement) is “difficult to reconcile (if not wholly inconsistent) with the Court’s primary role of ensuring observance of a common minimum standard of protection applicable equally to all Contracting Parties”.

On victim status, Eicke argues that “there was, in fact, no dispute and no uncertainty about the “victim” status of the individual applicants in relation to the Article 6 § 1 complaint in this case; and therefore no need to join that question to the merits”. He sets out and adheres to the previously established case-law on victim status, refusing to join the majority in creating a new approach tailored to climate cases and arguing that exceptions should only be possible where individual applications document victim status are not “ever” likely to be possible. He argues that the judgment creates an actio popularis.

Under Articles 2 and 8, Eicke argues that while it would have been possible to find a procedural violation of Articles 2 or 8, “the substantive violation of Article 8 which the majority seeks to construct from this starting premise has no basis either in the text of the Convention nor in any of the Court’s case-law.” He considers that “the Court would already have achieved much if it had focussed on a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and, at a push, a procedural violation of Article 8 relating in particular to (…) the right of access to court and of access to information”. He accuses the majority of trying “to run before it could walk”, and “giving (false) hope that litigation and the courts can provide “the answer” without there being, in effect, any prospect of litigation (especially before this Court) accelerating the taking of the necessary measures towards the fight against anthropogenic climate change”, and mentions the risk that this judgment will distract from other efforts to tackle climate change.

Implementation measures taken:

N/A

Date of decision:
It was announced on 26 March 2024 that the Grand Chamber would issue its judgment in this case, along with the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber, in a hearing to be held on 9 April 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The judgment and a summary were made available on the Court’s HUDOC database immediately after the hearing.

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
This case was communicated to the respondent State, Switzerland, on 17 March 2021. On 26 April 2022, a Chamber of the Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, held a public hearing in this case on 29 March 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here. On 9 April 2024, the Court issued its judgment in the case.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, no. 53600/20, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:

Webcast of the hearing:
To watch a webcast recording of the public hearing in this case, which was held before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 29 March 2023, click here (available in French and English).

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Categories
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Children and young people Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Emissions reductions/mitigation Estonia European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Extraterritorial obligations Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Non-discrimination Norway Paris Agreement Poland Portugal Private and family life Prohibition of torture Right to life Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia Spain Standing/admissibility Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands The United Kingdom Turkey Ukraine Victim status

Duarte Agostinho et al. v. Austria et al. (“Portuguese Children’s Case”)

Summary:
This case was brought by a group of six young people, acting together as the ‘Youth for Climate Justice’, against 33 Council of Europe Member States. Theirs was the first climate case to come before the ECtHR. In their application, the six applicants, aged between 8 and 21 at the time, argued that the 33 respondent States failed to comply with their positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, read in the light of the commitments made under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. They claimed that their right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) was being threatened by the effects of climate change in their home State of Portugal, including through the harms caused by forest fires. Moreover, they claimed that their right to respect for their private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR was being threatened by heatwaves that forced them to spend more time indoors. They also noted their anxiety about their uncertain future, and the fact that, as young people, they stand to experience the worst effects of climate change. They accordingly alleged a violation of Article 14 ECHR (non-discrimination), given the particular impacts of climate change on their generation. According to the applicants, the absence of adequate measures to limit global emissions constitutes, in itself, a breach of the obligations incumbent on States.

This was the first climate application brought before the European Court of Human Rights, and it was brought with the support of the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN). The issues raised here were novel in the Strasbourg context. In addition, in communicating the case, the Court also proprio motu raised an issue under Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case inadmissible on jurisdiction and non-exhaustion grounds.

Domestic proceedings:
None: this case was brought directly to the ECtHR. The applicants submitted that, given the complexity of the case and their limited financial means, as well as the limited prospects of success before domestic instances, requiring them to exhaust the domestic remedies in each of the 33 respondent States would impose an excessive and disproportionate burden on them.

Relinquishment:
On 29 June 2022, the 7-judge Chamber to which the case had originally been allocated relinquished jurisdiction over it in favour of the Court’s 17-judge Grand Chamber. Relinquishment is possible where a case either (a) raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or its Protocols, or (b) might lead to a result inconsistent with the Court’s case-law (Rule 72, paras 1-2 of the Rules of Court).

During the course of the proceedings, the complaint against Ukraine was withdrawn by the applicants. The Russian Federation ceased to be a Council of Europe Member State during the course of the proceedings, but this was not an obstacle to considering the application as concerns anything taking place before the end of its membership (on 16 September 2022).

In February 2023, the Court announced that it would hold a public Grand Chamber hearing in this case, along with two other climate cases pending before it (Carême v. France and KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v. Switzerland). It announced that it would adjourn the remaining climate cases pending before it in the meantime. The oral stage in these three cases was staggered: Carême and KlimaSeniorinnen were heard on 29 March 2023, while the hearing in Duarte Agostinho was heard by the same composition of the Grand Chamber on 27 September 2023.

Grand Chamber hearing:
A hearing in this case was held on 27 September 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here.

During the hearing, the respondent States pooled their submissions to a large extent, with additional arguments from the Netherlands, Portugal, and Turkiye. Third-party interveners also received leave to appear during the oral hearing, namely the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, the EU’s European Commission, and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). The substance of the hearing focused largely on admissibility issues, namely victim status, the (non-)exhaustion of domestic remedies and the extraterritoriality of Convention obligations. The judges also asked a number of questions to the parties before retiring to consider the admissibility and merits of the case.

Admissibility:
From the blog post on the case by Ayyoub (Hazhar) Jamali available on our blog

After months of anticipation, the ECtHR delivered its judgment on 9 April 2024. The Court found the case inadmissible on two key grounds. Firstly, it ruled out jurisdiction regarding non-territorial states, narrowing the scope of accountability in this complex legal landscape to applicants’ home states. Secondly, it dismissed the application against Portugal due to a lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The Court acknowledged its jurisdiction concerning Portugal but denied it concerning other non-territorial states. It recognized that under Article 1 of the Convention, jurisdiction primarily pertains to territorial boundaries, implying that individuals can only claim Convention violations against the territorial state where they reside. However, the Court reiterated that the Convention’s reach can extend beyond national borders in two main forms: when a state exercises effective control over an area (spatial concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdiction ratione loci), and when there is state agent authority or control over individuals (personal concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdiction ratione personae) (para 170). In the present case, as neither of these two criteria appeared applicable, the Court denied jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘special features’ for establishing the respondent states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants within the specific context of climate change. It emphasized that determining whether the ECHR applies extraterritorially requires examining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, indicating that the state concerned is exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants. This primarily involves exploring the nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent state.

The Court acknowledged that states have ultimate control over public and private activities within their territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions. It noted their international-law commitments, particularly those outlined in the Paris Agreement, which states have incorporated into their domestic laws and policy documents, as well as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement (para 192). Furthermore, the Court recognized the complex and multi-layered causal relationship between activities within a state’s territory that produce greenhouse gas emissions and their adverse impacts on the rights and well-being of individuals residing outside its borders (para 193). It emphasised that while climate change is a global phenomenon, each state bears responsibility for addressing it. However, the Court concluded that these considerations alone cannot justify creating a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation or expanding existing ones (para 195). It emphasised that the ECHR protection system is primarily based on principles of territorial jurisdiction and subsidiarity.

The Court further denied the applicants’ claim that bringing a case against Portugal alone would be ineffective and that they had no other means of holding the respondent states accountable for the impact of climate change on their Convention rights. It distinguished between jurisdiction and responsibility, which constitutes a separate matter to be examined in relation to the merit of the complaint (para 202).

The Court further rejected the applicants’ claim concerning the reach of the Convention outside of national boundaries by their reliance on a test of ‘control over the applicants’ Convention interests’. It reasoned that, according to its established case-law, extraterritorial jurisdiction as conceived under Article 1 ECHR requires control over the person him- or herself rather than the person’s interests as such (para 204-206). It highlighted that, except for specific cases under Article 2 concerning intentional deprivation of life by state agents, there is no precedent for a criterion like ‘control over Convention interests’ as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction (paragraph 205). Consequently, the Court argued that adopting such an extension would represent a significant departure from established principles under Article 1.

The Court stated that otherwise, and given the multilateral dimension of climate change, almost anyone adversely affected by climate change anywhere in the world could be brought within the jurisdiction of any Contracting Party for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR in relation to that Party’s actions or omissions to tackle climate change. It also rejected the suggestion that such an extension of jurisdiction could be limited to the Convention’s legal space. It reasoned that, given the nature of climate change, including its causes and effects, an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction by reference to that criterion would be artificial and difficult to justify (para 206).

Moreover, the Court acknowledged the significance of developments in international law, particularly with regards to the interpretations provided by bodies such as the Inter-American Court and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It recognised the relevance of these interpretations in shaping the understanding of jurisdiction within the context of human rights treaties. However, the Court noted that these bodies had adopted distinct notions of jurisdiction, which had not been recognised in its own case-law. While the Court considered the insights provided by these international instruments and bodies, it concluded that they did not provide sufficient grounds for extending the extraterritorial jurisdiction of respondent states under the Convention, particularly as proposed by the applicants (para 209-210). Therefore, while remaining attentive to legal developments and global responses to issues such as climate change, the Court found no basis within the Convention for expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction as advocated by the applicants.

In conclusion, the Court found no grounds in the Convention for extending the respondent states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation.

Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
Regarding Portugal, the applicants’ home state, there was no extraterritoriality issue. Here the Court examined whether effective remedies existed within the Portuguese legal system that the applicants were required to use under the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule. Despite the applicants’ argument that broad constitutional provisions alone could not provide effective and certain remedies, the Court disagreed, highlighting various remedies available in Portugal. These included, for example, constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment, actio popularis claims for environmental protection, etc (para 217-223). The Court emphasised the importance of affording domestic courts the opportunity to address issues before having recourse to international remedies. Consequently, the complaint against Portugal was found inadmissible. The Court also rejected the suggestion that it should rule on the issue of climate change before domestic courts had the opportunity to do so, reaffirming the principle of subsidiarity and the role of domestic jurisdictions in adjudicating such matters (para 228).

Victim Status
The Court found it challenging to determine whether the applicants met the criteria for victim status as set out on the same day in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment against Switzerland. The lack of clarity is attributed, in part, to the applicants’ failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court found that, in any event, the application was inadmissible for the reasons previously outlined. Therefore, the Court declined to examine further whether the applicants could claim victim status (para 229-230).

Date:
9 April 2024

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
Communicated by the Court on 30 November 2020. Relinquished to the Grand Chamber on 29 June 2022. Grand Chamber hearing held on 27 September 2023. Decision announced at a Grand Chamber hearing held on 9 April 2024, along with rulings in the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other Member States, no. 39371/20, decision (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:
For more information on this case, see the following links.

  • For more background on the case and profiles on the applicants, click here: https://youth4climatejustice.org/. 
  • For all of the case documents, including the submissions from the respondent States and the third-party interveners, see here.
  • For analyses of the Grand Chamber hearing, see this post on our own blog by Viktoriya Gurash, or this post on Verfassungsblog by Corina Heri.
  • For the judgment, click here.
  • For the Court’s Q&A on the three climate cases, click here.

Last updated:
9 April 2024

Categories
Climate activists and human rights defenders European Court of Human Rights Right to assembly and association Right to freedom of expression Switzerland

Lausanne Action Climate v. Switzerland

Summary:

On 5 November 2021, four climate activists submitted an application to the European Court of Human Rights challenging the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s dismissal of their appeals of criminal convictions concerning the occupation of the premises of the Lausanne branch of Credit Suisse bank in 2018. The applicants invoked the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly in Articles 10 and 11 ECHR.

On November 22, 2018, twelve activists occupied the bank’s lobby for one hour. Disguised as Roger Federer, the bank’s ambassador, they engaged in a wild game of tennis to denounce the banking giant’s investments in fossil fuels and urge the tennis star to terminate his sponsorships deals with CS. The applicants were charged with trespassing and acquitted at first instance, but later found guilty on appeal by the Public Prosecutor of the canton of Vaud. The applicants invoked a provision in the Swiss Penal Code with permits illegal actions under certain conditions, i.e. under conditions of lawful necessity given imminent danger. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court did not agree with this argumentation, noting that the activists also had legal methods at their disposal in order to draw attention to the climate crisis.

Context:

Although it has not yet specifically considered the right to protest or to civil disobedience in the context of climate change, the European Court of Human Rights has extensive case-law on the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. For example, in the case of Bumbeș v. Romania, it found a violation of these rights when an activist was fined for handcuffing himself to a government car park barrier in protest against a mining project. Here, the Court noted that, while States have a margin of appreciation in this context, the imposition of sanctions in response to political expression can have a chilling effect on public speech.

More information:

The application form in this case has not been made publicly available, and the ECtHR has yet to communicate the case. More information will be added here as it becomes public.

Notably, because it is different in focus from the mitigation cases pending before the ECtHR as of early 2023, this case had not been adjourned awaiting a ruling in the Grand Chamber’s three climate cases, as had seven other pending climate cases.

For media reports on this case, click here and here (in French) and here (in English).

Last updated:

17 March 2023

Categories
Access to a remedy Austria Children and young people Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights France Gender / women-led Italy Non-discrimination Norway Paris Agreement Portugal Private and family life Right to life Switzerland Turkey

De Conto and Uricchio v. Italy and 32 other States

Summary:
In 2021, two further cases in the style of the Duarte Agostinho application were brought before the European Court of Human Rights, this time by two young people from Italy. The cases were brought against 33 Council of Europe Member States, and refer to storms, forest fires and heat waves experienced by the applicants, as well as associated physical and psychological distress. The applicants, two women aged 18 and 20 at the time of filing, invoked Articles 2, 8, 13 and 14. They made arguments about the positive obligations to protect against environmental harm under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, discrimination against younger generations, and a lack of access to effective domestic remedies given the excessive burden of being required to bring domestic proceedings in 33 States.

The application forms in these cases have not been made publicly available, and the cases had not yet been communicated by the Court at the time of writing. It had been announced, however, that the cases have been adjourned pending the outcome of Grand Chamber proceedings in three other climate cases (see the following section). More information on the cases will be published as it becomes available.

Status of case:

Adjourned until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the climate change cases pending before it (see the ECtHR’s press release here).

Suggested citation:

ECtHR, De Conto v. Italy and 32 other States, application no. 14620/21, submitted on 3 March 2021.

ECtHR, Uricchio v. Italy and 32 other States, application no. 14615/21, submitted on 3 March 2021.

More information (via climatecasechart.com):

On the De Conto case.

On the Uricchio case.

Last updated:

15 March 2023.

Categories
Adaptation Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Sea-level rise Switzerland

Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (aka Asmania et al. v. Holcim)

Summary:
On 11 July 2022, a case was filed with the conciliation authority in the Swiss canton of Zug concerning the greenhouse gas emissions of the corporate cement giant Holcim AG, which is headquartered in Zug. The case was brought by four Indonesian nationals, who live on the Indonesian island of Pari and earn their livelihoods through fishing and tourism. They argued that rising sea levels and floods, which are all caused or aggravated by climate change, are threatening their livelihoods. The cement industry is a major emitter of greenhouse gases, currently emitting approximately 8% of yearly global CO2 emissions, and Holcim is the market leader in this sector (responsible for, historically, 0.42% of global industrial emissions since 1750). On this basis, the plaintiffs seek compensation from Holcim for the damage to their property and for future damages. They also seek adaptation measures to protect themselves against future impacts, and argue that Holcim should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 43% (compared to 2019 levels) by 2030, and 69% by 2040. This demands more rapid change than what is foreseen by the company’s own commitment to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. On 19 December 2025, the cantonal court of Zug declared the case admissible, paving the way for a future judgment on the merits.

Background and scope of the claim:
The claim concerns the greenhouse gas emissions produced by the cement industry, which are largely made up of direct emissions. The plaintiffs noted that 3/4 of Holcim’s emissions are direct emissions, as opposed to the largely indirect emissions created by the fossil fuel industry. The plaintiffs’ claim is based on references to climate attribution science, including reports by the IPCC, and the findings by the US Climate Accountability Institute that Holcim is responsible for 0.42% of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since 1750.

With the support of Swiss Church Aid HEKS/EPER, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and the Indonesian environmental organization WALHI, the plaintiffs invoke Swiss civil law, more specifically a violation of their personality rights under the Swiss Civil Code (Arts. 28 f.) and tort law under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 41 ff.), to argue that their human rights have been violated through the effects of the company’s emissions and that even more severe violations are forthcoming if Holcim does not reduce its emissions. They argue that the company should assume historical responsibility for its past emissions, but also future responsibility in the sense of rapidly reducing its greenhouse gas emissions.

Further developments and civil claim:
As required under Swiss procedural law, the case was brought as a request for arbitration. Arbitration proceedings in the case commenced in the fall of 2022. However, in October 2022, it became clear that the efforts at arbitration would not succeed in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. The case then progressed as a civil claim, with the four plaintiffs filing a lawsuit at the Zug Cantonal Court in February 2023 and applying for legal aid. They argued that Holcim must be ordered to reduce its emissions and provide compensation in order to ensure that their home island remains habitable and their livelihoods, community and culture are protected.

In particular, they argued that – due to violations of their personality rights caused by its CO2 emissions – the defendant is liable for the property damage suffered, as well as future property damage, in proportion to its share of 0.42% of global greenhouse gas emissions. They argued that Holcim has actively interfered with absolute legal interests such as the protection of life and limb, freedom, personality, property, and possessions, and will continue to do so. They also argue that there is an adequate causal link between the unlawful violation of personality rights on the one hand and the property damage on the other. This is because every ton of greenhouse gasses emitted has a long-term impact on the climate, as CO2 is broken down very slowly. They thus allege that the defendant corporation has a human rights-based duty of care to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It must ensure that the global average temperature increase on the Earth’s surface does not exceed pre-industrial temperatures by more than 1.5°C as a result of its emissions. However, the defendant is not doing enough to comply with this limit, which is why it must be obliged to reduce its CO2 emissions to the extent requested.

The plaintiffs accordingly sought injunctive relief in the form of emissions reductions under Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (protection of personality rights), as well as claiming reparation for damages already incurred, future damages and moral damages (satisfaction) under Swiss tort law (under the Swiss Code of Obligations).

The Cantonal Court of Zug held a hearing in the case on 3 September 2025 and issued its ruling on the admissibility on 19 December 2025.

Judgment on admissibility:
On 19 December 2025, the first division of the cantonal court of Zug issued its decision concerning the admissibility of the case.

The three-judge formation examined whether the conditions for admissibility under the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure had been met. This included examining whether there was a legitimate interest, whether the court had territorial and material jurisdiction, and whether a concrete, clear claim had been made.

Territorial jurisdiction:
First, the Court considered whether the case fell under the applicability of the Lugano Convention, finding that – given Holcim’s seat in Switzerland, and the plaintiffs’ seat abroad – the Convention applied, and Switzerland was the right forum for bringing the case (para. 2). Turning to the provisions of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA), the Court held that – given that both parties were making claims based on Swiss law – there had been a tacit or implied choice of law, and Swiss law was therefore applicable (Art. 132 PILA) (para. 2.2).

The Court noted that, in accordance with the Swiss theory of double relevance, the Court examines issues relating to its jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of the allegations, grounds for the action, and claims of the plaintiffs, without taking into account the objections of the defendant and without taking evidence (para. 2.4). The defendant’s objections are only examined at the time of the substantive examination of the case; objections raised by the opposing party in this regard are generally irrelevant in the context of the admissibility. However, the Court does determine, already at this stage, whether the claims made are in principle qualified to fall in the Court’s jurisdiction and whether the case is abusive. Given that it had not been alleged by the defendant that the allegations made were unqualified or abusive, the Court considered that they should provisionally be considered as true under the theory of double relevance.

Material jurisdiction:
The Court then determined whether the case fell in its material jurisdiction in the sense that it concerned an issue of civil (as opposed to public) law, which was contested between the applicants. It held that the distinction between civil and public law is fluid and dependent on the nature of the individual case (para. 3.3.). In doing so, it rejected the defendant’s argument that climate protection is to be provided only through public law mechanisms, which was in turn based on the position that the Paris Agreement does not create obligations for corporations and the Swiss legislator had not created specific GHG emissions reductions obligations for corporate actors. This case, the defendant argued, was part of an abusive worldwide campaign by NGOs to accelerate climate protection through litigation. Courts, it furthermore held, lacked the competence to order general emissions reductions targets.

The Court rejected these arguments, noting that the defendant was a private actor with no public authority and that the case was based on civil law (specifically the norms on protection of the personality, Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code, and the liability provisions under Art. 41 ff. of the Swiss Code of Obligations). It noted that Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code protect individuals from unlawful violations of personality rights by third parties: any legal entity, including individuals, whose personality is unlawfully infringed may sue anyone involved in the infringement; any private actor who participates in the violation of personality rights is liable to be sued (para. 3.6.2.1). In codifying this protection of the personality, the legislature deliberately refrained from defining the term “personality.” Instead, it formulated Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code as a general clause to enable the further development of the law and the adaptation of the term to changing times and values. The personality, as protected by these norms, is accordingly defined in a wide way, as the “totality of the individual”, and grants physical, psychological, and social areas of protection, as long as a certain minimum threshold of interference is reached.

The Court accordingly held that the adverse effects asserted by the plaintiffs affect the scope of protection of personality rights under Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code. If the plaintiffs’ statements were accepted as true, climate change has an impact on their physical integrity and personal freedom. Since greenhouse gas emissions from companies such as the defendant are undisputedly partly responsible for climate change, the plaintiffs can invoke the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 f. of the Swiss Civil Code for their claims against the defendant, thereby asserting personal claims under federal civil law (para. 3.6.2.2.).

As concerned the resulting rights and duties arising under civil law, the Court held that courts are not required to create new general climate protection goals in order to answer this question, but that it suffices to enforce existing legislation (para. 3.6.3.). This means that judicial rulings do not replace democratically legitimate climate policies, but complement them.

In making this finding, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that engaging with this case would undermine the separation of powers (para. 3.7.). Instead, citing Art. 29a of the Federal Constitution (guarantee of legal remedy), it noted that every person has the right to have their case heard by a judicial authority in legal disputes. Political questions can be excluded from access to court proceedings, but this applies only to cases of an ‘obvious’ political nature. And in this case, the competence of the civil courts had not been excluded through legislation. It held: “the courts, not the legislative or executive branches, are responsible for assessing alleged violations of the law” (para. 3.7.1.).

Examining the multilayered normative frameworks applicable to climate change, the Court noted that it had not yet been established under Swiss law that fundamental or human rights to life or private- and family life could have a horizontal direct effect among private actors. However, it could not exclude “that this could happen for the first time in the context of a climate case” (para. 3.7.2.). Particularly when interpreting open legal norms of private law (such as the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code), fundamental rights may be taken into consideration. Reiterating past findings from the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Court held that these provisions of the Swiss Civil Code are a civil law iteration of Article 8 ECHR. Noting the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, it noted that the ECHR provides only a subsidiary minimum standard, meaning that domestic law could also provide more stringent protection. Accordingly, it held, indirect horizontal effect of the human right to respect for private and family life was possible, particularly when courts are called to examine legal questions that have not yet been answered to date. Court decisions accordingly act as signposts for the application of legislation, and can feed political debates and give impulses for political change.

The Court then engaged with the defendant’s argument, based on the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, that the state’s duty of climate protection under Article 8 ECHR gives rise to very limitedly justiciable rights, and that the enactment of climate protection measures is a matter for democratic decision-making and not for the judiciary, because climate change raises complex scientific, political, economic, and other issues. The defendant had also called for the strict victim status requirements imposed in KlimaSeniorinnen to be transposed to disputes between private individuals, given their lack of a duty to protect.

The Court distinguished the case before it from KlimaSeniorinnen, noting that KlimaSeniorinnen was about general climate policy goals and the present case was about concrete impacts on individuals (para. 3.8). This meant that the defendant could not derive “any beneficial arguments from the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment for the present civil proceedings”.  Parliamentary discussions that criticized the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment likewise had no salience for these proceedings, and were irrelevant. Neither was foreign case-law cited by the defendant relevant for the court’s consideration of the case (para. 3.9.). Summarizing cases from courts in the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and Germany,  the Court held that these foreign courts have predominantly deemed private-law climate cases admissible and examined them in terms of substantive law. The defendant was therefore unable to derive anything in its favor from this foreign case law (para. 3.9.3.). As a result, the Court held, the case before it was a civil law one.

Whether a sufficiently concrete, clear claim had been made:
The Court then examined whether the plaintiffs have a legal interest in bringing the action. It held that, at the admissibility stage, this did not have to be conclusively proven; it sufficed if, on the balance of probabilities, the interest appeared to exist. Furthermore, the insignificance of the asserted claim (minima non curat praetor) does not lead to the loss of legal interest, unless there is an abuse of rights (para. 4.1.).

The plaintiffs argued that their interest legal protection is personal, practical, and current. Climate change poses an existential threat to small islands and low-lying coasts such as the island of Pari. It affects the livelihoods, health, well-being, food security, access to drinking water, and cultural values of the island’s inhabitants. Sea level rise damages settlements and destroys coastal infrastructure, leading to the loss of economic assets and biodiversity in traditional agricultural ecosystems, as well as a decline in fishing and tourism. The increasing uninhabitability of the island is forcing residents to leave their homes. What those affected have experienced firsthand is confirmed by scientific studies, including IPCC-reviewed science. They had also alleged a number of individualized impacts. They were accordingly affected by Holcim’s activities, notwithstanding the concurrent responsibility of other Carbon Majors.

Citing KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court held that IPCC-reviewed science was the relevant standard for determining any scientific questions related to these claims (para. 5.3.1.). It held that it was undisputed that climate change was having an impact on the world’s population. Engaging with the defendant’s argument that the case was an abstract public interest case, not an individualized claim, it held that the IPCC had noted that up to 3.6 billion people around the world are strongly at risk of impacts from climate change. This meant that the Court could not exclude that the case also had relevance for the interests of third parties. However, it held, “the personal affectedness of the plaintiffs goes beyond the general affectedness of persons who have not (yet) suffered damages from concrete events or have been exposed to an enhanced risk” (para. 5.5.3.). The affectedness of the plaintiffs had to be distinguished from that of the KlimaSeniorinnen applicants. While those applicants had benefitted from access to adaptation measures and their future risk of impact had not been demonstrated, the plaintiffs in this case “had no possibility to halt rising sea levels with reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their need for protection as accordingly more urgent (para. 5.5.4.). This reality likewise distinguished the plaintiffs in this case from those in similar German cases against BMW or Mercedes-Benz. The case was accordingly not to be characterized as an unacceptable actio popularis. In this regard, the Court cited the environmental case-law of the ECtHR concerning the garbage collection crisis in Campania, where the widespread nature of the issue likewise did not render the case an actio popularis.

The Court noted that the defendant was a major greenhouse gas emitter, a “Carbon Major”, and that it would be possible, through case-law, to create threshold criteria to distinguish the responsibility of such carbon major companies from smaller emitters (para. 5.5.6.). This meant that the case could not be rejected on the basis that it would lead to “litigation against everyone”. Climate change required action from both state and private actors if ecosystems, biodiversity, and the foundations of human life, health and welfare were to be protected. Noting the uncertainties involved in calculating probabilities of warming, the Court noted that it was possible that even under existing efforts, climate neutrality may not be achieved. Given the consequences of climate change, the long time during which greenhouse gasses remained in the atmosphere and the unavoidability of further warming and the resulting harms, it was not possible to wait until a universally agreed solution came to exist.

The Court also rejected the claim by the defendant that its contribution to climate change and sea level rise was marginal. The Court held that this does not relieve Holcim of its individual responsibility to contribute to the fight against climate change wherever possible. If the defendant’s line of argument were followed, national climate protection measures would also have to be denied legitimacy, as no country can stop climate change on its own. Neither were the plaintiffs required to bring a case against all emitters at once. In order to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, there is a budget of around 500 gigatons of CO2 remaining. This can only be achieved through immediate and drastic reductions in emissions. The plaintiffs’ interest in the injunction is therefore urgent and current, even if the desired climate neutrality is still a long way off (para. 5.8.). Neither were alternative avenues for achieving the desired protection evident (5.10.).

Quantifiability of emissions reductions:
Holcim argued that the plaintiffs’ claims around the reductions of its CO2 emissions were insufficiently clear and concrete, and that it had not been defined which emissions fell under their understanding of scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. Likewise, it held, there were no binding legal obligations to conduct corporate climate reporting. Scientific standards in this regard were continually evolving, with the plaintiffs using current-day standards that were sure to change in the future. The plaintiffs, by contrast, argued that there was a domestic law obligation to report on greenhouse gas emissions under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 964b (4)).

The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it was unclear what fell under scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, noting that this terminology was used in Holcim’s own climate strategy. It also noted that Holcim had conducted reporting about its CO2 emissions, and that this was a sufficient basis for implementing an eventual judgment in the case.

The Court also rejected Holcim’s argument that the case and any eventual emissions reductions or damages obligations should be limited to itself as a parent company, and not extend to its subsidiaries. Here, the Court held that the parent company participates in the emissions of its subsidiaries, because it creates a climate strategy that encompasses and binds them. In any case, it held, Swiss tort law’s moral damages provisions also apply to a company’s subsidiaries.

Conclusion:
Finding that the claim fell within its jurisdiction and was sufficiently specific, the Court held that the case was admissible. It did not decide on the award of costs for the proceedings to date, reserving this issue to a decision on the merits.

Further information:
For more information, see the dossier compiled by the supporting NGOs in 2022 here, and at the time of the hearing in September 2025 below.

CallForClimateJustice_Dossier_Media_EN_2025Download

The full text of the judgment (German) is available here:

Entscheid+des+Kantonsgerichts+Zug+vom+17.12.2025+A1+2023+9Download

Suggested citation:
Cantonal Court of Zug, Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (Asmania et al. v. Holcim), case A1 2023 9, judgment (admissibility) of 19 December 2025.

Last updated:
22 December 2025

Categories
2022 Austria Belgium Cyprus Denmark European Court of Human Rights France Germany Greece Luxembourg Private and family life Right to life Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands The United Kingdom

Soubeste and 4 other applications v. Austria and 11 other States

Summary:
On 21 June 2022, it was reported that an application had been filed at the European Court of Human Rights concerning membership in the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994 (ECT), which entered into force in 1998. The case was brought by five young people, aged between 17 and 31, who allege that the 12 respondent States’ membership of the ECT stymies climate action, thereby violating their rights under Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life) ECHR.

It was further reported that the 12 respondent States in this case are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Britain. In these States, corporate actors in the fossil fuel sector can bring legal action against the respective governments for losses of profits due to energy-related measures, thereby raising the costs of the green energy transition or making it illusory. The applicants argue that their Convention rights have been violated as a result.

In this regard, the IPCC pointed out in Chapter 14 of Working Group III report in the Sixth Assessment Cycle in 2022 (available here) that “bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, include provisions for using a system of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) designed to protect the interests of investors in energy projects from national policies that could lead their assets to be stranded. Numerous scholars have pointed to ISDS being able to be used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed at phasing out the use of their assets”. It also noted that “international investment agreements may lead to ‘regulatory chill’, which may lead to countries refraining from or delaying the adoption of mitigation policies, such as phasing out fossil fuels”.

Status of case:

The case was initially adjourned until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the climate change cases pending before it (see the ECtHR’s press release here).

On 24 July 2024, it was reported that the applicants had withdrawn their application after the European Union agreed to leave the ECT and the governments of France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom initiated the procedures to terminate their membership in the treaty.

Suggested case citation:

European Court of Human Rights, Soubeste and 4 other applications v. Austria and 11 other States (nos. 31925/22, 31932/22, 31938/22, 31943/22, and 31947/22), application filed on 21 June 2022 (not yet communicated).

Last updated:

15 March 2023

Categories
2021 Deciding Body Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Keywords Paris Agreement Right to assembly and association Right to freedom of expression Rights at stake State concerned Switzerland Year

Credit Suisse Climate Activists Trial (Geneva)

Summary:
On 13 October 2018, during a climate march in Geneva, a young climate activist from the collective “BreakFree Suisse” spread his hands smeared with red paint all over the facade of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse, leaving red handprints to denounce investments in fossil fuels. According to the climate activist, these red handprints symbolized the blood of the various victims of climate change.

On 20 February 2020, the activist was found guilty by the Tribunal de police (“Police Court”) for property damage.

On 14 October 2020, the Cour de Justice (“Court of Justice”) acquitted the climate activist and argued that the young man had acted in a putative state of necessity due to climate change.

A year later, on 28 September 2021, the Swiss Bundesgericht (“Federal Supreme Court”) overturned this decision and referred the case back to the Cour de Justice. The Bundesgericht argued that climate change and the resulting consequences do not represent an imminent danger to individual legal interests.

Consequently, on 31 March 2022, the Cour de Justice revised its first decision and ordered the climate activist to pay a symbolic fine of 100 Swiss francs as well as compensation for material damage.

In a similar case in Lausanne, climate activists from the same collective were on trial after occupying the entrance halls of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse.  

Rights invoked:
The activist invoked his rights to freedom of expression (Article 10 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) and assembly and association (Article 11 ECHR).

The Swiss Bundesgericht held that Article 11 ECHR only protects the right to freedom of “peaceful assembly”. With his behavior, the young man committed an act of vandalism, which is incompatible with freedom of expression. Accordingly, the Court found that the activist could not rely on Articles 10 and 11 ECHR.  

Further proceedings:
It was reported that applications concerning both of these cases have been filed at the European Court of Human Rights.

Date:
28 September 2021

Suggested citation:
Swiss Bundesgericht, N.B. v. Credit Suisse, 6B_1310/2020, 6B_1298/2020, Judgment of 28 September 2021.

Links:
For the Federal Supreme Court’s judgment, see here.

For the Cour de justice’s second judgment, see here.

For the Cour de Justice’s first judgment, see here.

For the Tribunal de police’s judgment, see here.

Categories
2021 Deciding Body Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Imminent risk Keywords Paris Agreement Right to assembly and association Right to freedom of expression Rights at stake State concerned Switzerland Year

Credit Suisse Climate Activists Trial (Lausanne)

Summary:
On 22 November 2018, a group of 20 to 30 climate activists from the collective “BreakFree Suisse”, among them the 12 complainants, occupied the entry halls of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse in Lausanne to demonstrate against the bank’s investment in fossil fuels. The protest aimed to draw attention to this issue by condemning the participation of the Swiss tennis player Roger Federer in the advertising campaign of this bank. To do so, the activists were dressed in sports clothes and staged a tennis match. While some activists complied with the police request to leave the premises, others had to be dragged out by the police.

The activists argued that they had been in a “justifiable state of emergency” (rechtfertigender Notstand) due to climate change and that their protest was therefore lawful.

On 13 January 2020, the Tribunal de police de l’arrondissement de Lausanne (“Police Court of the district of Lausanne”) ruled in favor of the protesters. The judge found that climate change posed an imminent threat and that the protest was therefore a necessary and proportionate means to achieve the activists’ intended goal.

On 22 September 2020, this decision was overruled by the Tribunal Cantonal du Vaud (“Vaud Cantonal Tribunal”). The Court argued that the activists could have protested the bank by using other means, such as political or legal instruments. It further found that climate change is an imminent threat and that measures must be taken to address it. However, the Tribunal Cantonal du Vaud doubted that the protest could have led to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, it also noted that the Swiss government is aware of the issue and has already taken necessary measures, such as ratifying the Paris Agreement. Finally, the Court held that it is not yet too late to take the necessary protective measures to combat climate change.

On 26 May 2021, the Swiss Bundesgericht (“Swiss Federal Supreme Court”) mainly upheld the Tribunal Cantonal du Vaud’s decision. It argued further that climate change may be considered an imminent threat and that the activists did not intend to protect a specific legal interest, but rather collective interests, namely the environment, health, or the well-being of the population, and thus, the protest was not lawful.

In a similar case in Geneva, a climate activist from the same collective was on trial after putting red handprints all over the front of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse.

Rights invoked:
The complainants invoked their rights to freedom of expression (Article 10 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) and assembly and association (Article 11 ECHR).

The Swiss Bundesgericht argued that the complainants are not entitled to invoke Articles 10 and 11 ECHR in this context because they had no right to enter private property to take their actions. The freedom of assembly does not include the right to gather on private property without the owner’s consent. Consequently, the claimants could not rely on Articles 10 and 11 ECHR.

Date of decision:
26 May 2021

Suggested case citation:
Swiss Bundesgericht, 12 climate protesters v. ministère public central du canton de Vaud, 6B_1295/2020, Judgment of 26 May 2021.


Links:
For the judgment of the Swiss Bundesgericht (in French), see here.

For the judgment of the Tribunal Cantonal du Vaud (in French), see here.

For the judgment of the Tribunal de police de l’arrondissement de Lausanne (in French), see here.