Summary: On 10 June 2025, a climate case was filed in the Wellington High Court in Aotearoa New Zealand by the organizations Lawyers for Climate Action NZ and the Environmental Law Initiative (ELI). The case challenges decisions relating to the country’s first (2021-2025) and second emissions reduction plans (2026-2030), including the second plan’s offsetting-led approach, which prioritizes reforestation measures over emissions reductions.
Regarding the first emissions reductions plan, the plaintiffs challenge the ex post cancellation of various projects and actions set out in that plan by the current Government. They argue that domestic legislation, and particularly the Climate Change Response Act, “imposes guardrails on government’s ability to change and cancel climate policies on the fly.” They also challenge the absence of adequate public consultation concerning the changes.
Regarding the second emissions reductions plan, they allege that the Minister of Climate Change is under a legal duty to ensure that emissions budgets are met, which in turn requires the preparation and publication of emissions reductions plans setting out policies and strategies for meeting the emissions budget. The second emissions reduction plan has a wide uncertainty margin, and projects that New Zealand won’t achieve its 2035 target, meaning that according to the plaintiffs it is inadequate, unlawful and too limited in its modeling, as well as taking “an unrealistic and inadequate approach to risk management, relying on a ‘wait and see’ approach it calls ‘Adaptive Management'”. The plaintiffs further challenge the offsetting-led approach of the second emissions reductions plan, and more specifically the decision to prioritize reforestation measures over emissions reductions. They argue that this plan “proceeds on a fundamental error of fact – that forestry offsets and reductions are fungible, when that’s not the case”, and that it does not suffice to comply with the country’s obligations under the Paris Agreement.
Suggested citation: Wellington High Court, ELI and Lawyers for Climate Action NZ v. Minister of Climate Change, filed 10 June 2025 (pending).
On 6 February 2026, the youth-led association Aurora launched a climate lawsuit before the Nacka District Court against the government of Sweden alleging a violation of their rights to life, health and well-being as well as the prohibition of discrimination (based on age). The case is a follow-up to Anton Folley and Others v. Sweden (Aurora Case). That case was a class action suit brought by over 600 young individuals (supported by Aurora), which the Supreme Court of Sweden dismissed as inadmissible on the ground that the plaintiffs did not meet the high threshold for individual victim status articulated by the European Court of Human Rights in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerlandjudgment.
Relying upon the criteria for ‘victim status’ and the standing of associations to litigate climate cases laid down in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, Aurora argues that this fresh case is admissible and that the district court may proceed to examining the substantive claims.
Claims:
The substantive claims in Aurora II are largely the same as the claims which were made in the Aurora case, with the new petition drawing upon more recent climate jurisprudence, including the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change to support its case. In the petition, Aurora identifies a lack of measures or intermediate emission reduction targets envisaged for the period after 2030, and problematizes Sweden’s emissions debt (i.e. the exceedance of its national fair share of the global carbon budget) as failures to exercise due diligence in the discharge of positive obligation to protect individuals who Aurora represents from serious threats to the enjoyment of their rights. The petition also invokes the findings of the IPCC to argue that children and youth, who Aurora represents (majority born between 1998 and 2026), are at a particular risk from climate change, in order to demonstrate the disparate impact of Sweden’s failure to effectively contribute towards climate mitigation. The petition requests the court to handle the case with urgency, to declare violations of Articles 2, 8 and 14 and an order the government to pay legal costs incurred by the plaintiffs.
Response from the State
In June 2026, the Swedish government responded to the case. It agreed that the Aurora case should be heard on its merits, but argued that Sweden action on climate change is already sufficient to protect human rights. This means that the case will now move to examination by the district court, which will determine whether Sweden’s overall climate efforts are sufficient to protect human rights from the effects of the climate crisis.
The State’s submissions (in Swedish) can be downloaded below.
Pranav Ganesan, PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich
The Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (Bonaire) judgment of the Hague District Court has stolen the limelight as the new posterchild for strategic climate litigation. The plaintiff in this case, Greenpeace Netherlands, argued that the Dutch government failed in its duty to protect the residents of Bonaire, an island in the Caribbean which formally attained the status of a special municipality of the Netherlands in 2010. Although it is a special municipality (bijzondere gemeente), it is just as much a part of the Netherlands as any other province in the European Netherlands. The Dutch government owes obligations under international human rights law, including those arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), towards residents of the municipality. That international human rights law requires states to undertake climate mitigation measures and adaptation measures, as informed by international climate change law where relevant, has been affirmatively held in two advisory opinions from international courts and the European Court of Human Rights. And the proposition that the Dutch government’s duty of care towards its population essentially includes obligations under the ECHR was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in material respects, the Hague District Court’s reasoning was so heavily based on international law.[1] In terms of the scope of state conduct implicated in this case, it outdoes the Urgendacase,which only concerned contributions to the mitigation of climate change. The Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiff that the Dutch government had violated Article 8 ECHR as well as the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR), the former due to inadequate mitigation measures, inadequate implementation of those measures, delays in adopting an adaptation plan for Bonaire and late provision of procedural safeguards to the residents of Bonaire. In this blog, I provide a quick analysis of the District Court’s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement in the section on mitigation measures. Readers interested in learning about the adaptation component and how the court addressed discrimination claim are welcome to read this blogpost by Wewerinke-Singh.
There are areas in the judgment where the District Court’s assessment of the compatibility of the Dutch Climate law framework with international climate law is questionable. The first glaring issue is that the court made a finding of non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement based on the absence of ‘absolute emissions reduction targets’ in the Dutch Climate Act of 2019 (para 11.13.1). The problem identified by the court was that the targets were expressed as goals that the government would ‘strive to achieve.’ However, this does not mean that the targets are not absolute. The difference between absolute and relative emissions reductions targets being whether they are expressed as percentage reductions in comparison to the emissions during a fixed baseline year, as opposed to reductions from a business as usual scenario in case of relative targets (Winkler et al 2014, 636). The use of the expression ‘strive to achieve’ means that the nature of the obligation to achieve the target is one of conduct rather than result, reflecting the nature of the obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures in pursuance of NDCs communicated under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement (ICJ Advisory Opinion, paras 251-253). Another connected example is the court’s declaration that ‘UN standards’ require emission reduction targets to be expressed as percentage reductions to be achieved by the target date, in comparison to 2019 levels as opposed to the 1990 baseline (para 11.13.2). Moreover, strictly speaking, Article 12(8) of the UNFCCC does not require the EU to provide information about each member state’s national carbon budget like the court suggests (para 11.15.3). The court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions might be technically imprecise, but it is undoubtedly bold, being based on the need for exemplary efforts from a developed country like the Netherlands, and reflecting the appropriate sense of urgency in light of the results of the First Global Stocktake (para 11.9.4). Through its interpretive moves, the court effectively hardened ‘soft’ obligations (i.e. normative expectations) sourced from the Paris Agreement and COP decisions (on hard and soft obligations in the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, 2016).
A final noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the rather detailed response to how the notion of ‘equity’ in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Articles 2(1) and 4(1) of the Paris Agreement is to be applied in reviewing states’ mitigation commitments. Equity is an elusive concept, with debates on what an equitable distribution of the global emissions reduction burden entails having remained unsettled since the inception of international negotiations on the topic of climate mitigation (Oliver Herrera et al, 2025). The court provided the (un)acceptability of a ‘grandfathering approach’ as an example of one such debate (para 11.13.5). But it did not go so far as to hold that the grandfathering approach is legally impermissible because it is inequitable per se, or that an equal per capita emissions approach is the minimum standard under international law. Rather, it assessed the Netherlands’ policy negatively on account of its failure to justify why its current policy, which is based on the controversial grandfathering principle and falls short of the ambition required by the equal per capita emissions approach, is equitable in accordance with Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(1). It thus did not use equity to dictate the outcome of what exactly the Dutch government’s fair share of the global carbon emissions ought to be. At same time, it did not use the underlying controversy as a reason to entirely avoid reviewing the substance of the Dutch climate mitigation policy. This is underscored by its remedial findings, wherein the court declared that the Netherlands’ current mitigation commitments were inequitable, thereby leading to a breach of Article 8 (para 12.1), but dismissed Greenpeace’s request ordering the adoption of specific emissions reduction targets by the government, or at least a carbon budget reflecting the ‘equal per capita emissions approach’ (paras 8.1 (IV)-(VI), 11.55 and 11.58).
Overall, the Bonaire judgment shows how climate litigation can lead to precarious precedents. On the one hand, the way the Court engaged with the concept of equity provided an assessment of Dutch mitigation ambition which was notably pragmatic and might serve as inspiration for other courts when asked to answer the fair share question. On the other hand, the judgment risks signaling to states that legal texts—which negotiators toiled to craft in ‘constructively ambiguous’ terms—may be stretched by domestic courts to uncomfortable extents. Ultimately, the appellate court’s scrutiny of this case (should the Dutch government file an appeal) will reveal how this judgment will be remembered: whether it will be hailed for its boldness or criticized for its questionable interpretation of international treaties.
[1] André Nollkaemper commented: ‘Today’s judgment of the District Court of The Hague fully lives up to the reputation of Dutch courts as strongly international law-minded. […] The conclusion is firmly anchored in international law. With 29 references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, 64 references to the European Court’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, 64 to the UNFCCC, 62 to the Paris Agreement, and 12 to COP decisions, this surely ranks high on the list of climate change cases that are most shaped by international law.’
Summary: This case concerns a coal-fired power plant project conceived as part of the Kenyan development blueprint: Kenya Vision 2030. The Kenyan government determined that the 1050 MW power plant would be set up in Kwasasi (near Lamu Port). Amu Power Company Ltd. (Amu Power) won the bid for the project. Subsequently on 7 September 2016, the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) granted Amu Power the requisite license based on the Environmental & Social Impact Assessment study (ESIA) commissioned by the latter. Immediately thereafter, environmental groups and local community representatives challenged the license before the National Environment Tribunal (NET), naming both NEMA and Amu Power as the respondent parties.
On 26 June 2019, the NET delivered a decision wherein found fundamental deficiencies in public participation and noted the witness for Amu Power’s admission of the failure to consider climate impacts of the project in the ESIA study. It thus found the NEMA to have violated its statutory duty to ensure project’s compliance with the Environmental Management and Coordination Act 2009 read together with the Environmental Impact Assessment & Audit Regulations (EIA Regulations) and therefore cancelled the license.
Further, it recommended that Amu Power conduct a fresh ESIA study, including consideration of the Climate Change Act 2016 and compliance with all statutory requirements, should it wish to pursue the construction and operation of the project.
Amu Power challenged this decision by way of an appeal before the High Court of Malindi. On 25 October 2025, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the NET’s 2019 decision ordering a cancellation of the license.
Claims: The objectors contended that the operation of the plant would negatively impact the area’s air quality, contribute to climate change to such an extent that its operation would be contrary to Kenya’s National Climate Change Action Plan and Climate Change Act No. 11 of 2016, as well as Nationally Determined Contribution submitted to the UNFCCC which focuses on renewable energy rather than fossil fuels. Further, they argued the effluent discharge from the plant would impact marine biodiversity, potentially increasing seawater temperature by 9°C, which could infringe upon the rights of Lamu residents dependent on fishing, thus interfering with their their cultural rights and traditional way of life a set out in Article 44 and 43 of the Constitution. These contentions were meant to contextualize the crux of the case brought by the objectors, which concerned administrative failure. The objectors invoked the lack of effective public participation, inadequacies in the ESIA study, especially as it related to the plant’s impacts on human health, mitigation of environmental impacts and the failure to consider impacts on climate change, as grounds for cancellation of the license.
Amu Power argued that the project would displace a much higher amount of carbon dioxide than what could be generated by it, as electricity would be available to users at the lowest rates, also alluded to the added benefits revolving around climate change adaptation measures. It noted that the ESIA study sufficiently addresses the impacts of thermal effluents on the marine environment and local air pollution by also considering the appropriate the mitigation measures. Regarding climate change, Amu Power submitted that the Paris Agreement came into force on 4th November 2016 after the ESIA study had been concluded and the licence was issued. Lastly, Amu Power argued that the NET placed undue emphasis on procedural rather than the substance, i.e. the spirit behind public participation; and that in any case the flaws in the process were not significant enough to deprive the public participation process of its efficacy.
Judgment of the High Court of Malindi: In its 2019 judgment, the High Court of Malindi re-affirmed the NET’s findings that the license was issued based on a fundamentally flawed public participation process. The Court emphasized the significance of these findings on the basis of the constitutional significance accorded to public participation. Article 10(1) of the Constitution provides those national values and principles of governance, which includes ‘participation of the people’ bind all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons when applying or interpreting the Constitution, enacting or interpreting any law, or making or implementing public policy decisions. Article 69(1)(d) requires the State to encourage public participation in the management, protection and conservation of the environment.
It further added that the findings regarding inadequate public participation are of over-arching significance, in that even if the NET had erred in assessing the ESIA’s consideration of mitigation measures concerning the treatment of effluents and climate change, as unsatisfactory, “the project and the study remain condemned due to insufficient public participation” (para. 179).
Links:
For the full judgment National Environmental Tribunal, see here.
For full judgment of the High Court of Malindi on the appeal by Amu Power against the judgment of the National Environmental Tribunal, see here.
Suggested case citation: Environment and Land Court at Malindi, Amu Power Company Ltd v Save Lamu & Others, ELCA No. 6 of 2019, 16 October 2019, Hon. Justice Mwangi Njoroge.
Summary: On 23 September 2025, the NGO Our Children’s Trust announced that it had filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging climate-related violations of human rights by the government of the United States of America on behalf of a group of youth. This petition follows the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on climate change, which was issued on 29 May 2025, as well as drawing on the climate advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The petitioners were formerly plaintiffs in the Juliana proceedings brought before US domestic courts on the basis of the public trust doctrine, among others.
Before the Inter-American Commission, the petitioners allege that the United States has known for decades that CO2 emissions cause climate change and that a transition away from fossil fuels is needed to protect human rights. They argue that, as the world’s largest emitter, the United States has played a leading role in causing climate change, and that its greenhouse gas emissions — and the resulting climate change — violate the human rights of children and youth, who are disproportionately impacted by its effects.
They claim before the Commission that the United States has failed to comply with its international obligations to guarantee the petitioners’ human rights, that it has a duty to prevent harm to the global climate system to guarantee those rights, that it brached its obligation to act with due diligence ot guarantee their rights and prevent harm to the climate system, that if violated its obligation to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions,a form of pollution, and that the United States’s deliberate emissions of greenhouse gasses violate the substantive rights of the petitioners as per the American Declaration, including the rights to life and health, the particular protections for children, equality and non-discrimination, the rights to home, property and private and family life, the right to culture, the right to dignity, and the right to a healthy climate.
They also invoke their procedural rights, namely the rights to access to justice and an effective remedy, alleging that the United States Department of Justice has deployed “extraordinary tactics” to silence the petitioners, and that the domestic courts failed to consider the merits of their claims.
In their request for relief, the petitioners inter alia request the Commission to:
order precautionary measures to prevent further irreparable harm;
join the admissibility and merits of the petition, in accordance with Article 37(4) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, given the serious and urgent nature of the case and the ongoing violations of Petitioners’ fundamental rights;
conduct an on-site country visit, including a visit with the Petitioners, and hold fact-finding hearings;
establish violations of Articles I (life), II (equality), V (private and family life), VI (family), VII (special protections for children), IX (inviolability of the home), XI (health), XIII (cultural life), XVIII (access to justice and effective remedies), XXIII (property), and XXIV (prompt and effective remedy) of the American Declaration and the rights to dignity (Preamble) and to a healthy climate; and
issue a country report with recommendations to the United States to remedy confirmed violations of international law, taking into account the clarifications of existing law set forth by the IACtHR and the ICJ in their in Advisory Opinions on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights and the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Our Children’s Trust with 15 Juliana Plaintiffs v. The United States of America, petition filed on 23 September 2025.
Summary: This case was brought by Michael John Smith (Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Kahu), who is the climate change spokesperson for a Māori development platform known as the Iwi Chairs’ Forum, and who is also the applicant in the case of Smith v. Attorney-General. In the present case, he brought proceedings against seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand who are involved in agriculture and energy sectors (namely Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd , Genesis Energy Ltd, Dairy Holdings Ltd, New Zealand Steel Ltd, Z Energy Ltd, Channel Infrastructure NZ Ltd and BT Mining Ltd.). He claimed that the emissions caused by these corporate actors constituted a public nuisance, acts of negligence, and a breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change. The New Zealand courts have issued a series of decisions on this case.
On 6 March 2020, the High Court of New Zealand struck out the first two causes of action (public nuisance and acts of negligence), but allowed the third (reach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change) to proceed.
After, on 21 October 2021, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Smith’s appeal and upheld the cross appeal of the respondents, Mr Smith received leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on 31 March 2022. On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court unanimously allowed Mr Smith’s appeal, and reinstated his statement of claim, and referred the case back to the High Court to proceed to trial (for more detail on the Supreme Court’s judgment, see below). After a series of procedural decisions, a substantive hearing in the case by the High Court was scheduled for April 2027.
Current state of the proceedings: On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court of New Zealand reinstated the two dismissed tort causes of action and remanded the case to the lower court (the High Court). It held that the public rights pleaded laid an appropriate foundation for a nuisance claim. It also held that it was premature, at this stage of the proceeding, to conclude that the common law was insufficient to address the tortious aspects of climate change. Determining whether the actions of respondents, seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand, amount to a ‘substantial and unreasonable interference’ to public rights is a fact inquiry to be analyzed according to policy factors and human rights obligations.
On remand, the interlocutory applications raised noteworthy cost questions. The sixth defendant, BT Mining, sought an order for security for costs and Mr. Smith applied for protected cost orders (PCO). Here, the court has a wide latitude of discretion. It dismisses BT Mining’s request citing, among other considerations, access to justice concerns. Regarding Mr. Smith however, the court relies on the Edwards factors: (1) whether an issue of significant general or public importance is raised; (2) whether the applicant’s stance is seriously arguable; (3) whether the applicant is genuinely impecunious; (4) the position of the respondent, including “any unjust advantage likely to accrue to it absent the order”; and (5) any reasonable alternatives to making the order.
Reluctant to grant, the court emphasized the exceptional nature of a PCO in these proceedings. Mr. Smith, however, draws on Munkara v Santos NA Barossa Pty Ltd (No 4), an Australian Federal Court decision that ordered nonparty funders, the Environmental Defense Office, to pay costs to Santos, an oil company who defeated claimants’ petition for injunctive relief in the construction of a pipeline, to remind the court of the significant chilling effect of potential costs exposure on charitable funders. The court draws a distinction between a third-party funder and a ‘pure funder’ to reason that it would be highly unlikely for a costs award to be made against one that did not seek to benefit financially from the litigation nor seek to control its course. Unsatisfactory, but absent disclosure of third-party donor(s), the court declines Mr. Smith’s PCO application in its entirety. The decision, however, is without prejudice, leaving the door open to re-application with third-party funder identification.
Suggested citation: Smith v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2024] NZSC 5, [2024] 1 NZLR 134.
Summary: On 7 April 2025, a group of five individuals litigants and nine civil society organisations presented a request for adaptation measures to the French authorities. Building on GHG emissions reductions litigation, including the ECtHR’s 2024 KlimaSeniorinnen case, this legal action seeks adaptation measures by the French government. The litigants, who are supported by Oxfam France, Notre Affaire à Tous, and Greenpeace France, seek a revision of the third National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change (PNACC 3) and, more broadly, the adoption of any useful measures to ensure or reinforce France’s adaptation to the effects of climate change. The action argues that the State has a general obligation to take adaptation measures, which must be aimed in particular at strengthening adaptive capacities, increasing resilience to climate change and reducing vulnerability to such change (I.A), and by sectoral and cross-cutting obligations (I.B).
This obligation, they argue, flows not only from domestic constitutional law, but is also clarified and reinforced by international and EU law (including the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement) and by the law of the Council of Europe, specifically the European Convention on Human Rights. This instrument, they argue, drawing on the ECtHR’s recently climate case-law and its broader environmental jurisprudence and focusing particularly on the right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8 ECHR) and the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR), obliges the State to put in place an appropriate legislative and regulatory framework to effectively protect human life and health against the risks and consequences of climate change. It also requires the State to take preventive measures of a practical nature, in order to protect citizens whose lives may be at risk, and to mitigate the most serious consequences of climate change. And, finally, it requires the State to ensure the effective application of the framework and of the adaptation measures thus put in place, on the basis of the best available science. Reiterating long-standing case-law of the ECtHR, the litigants argue that the French state has an obligation to take all necessary measures to limit exposure to natural risks resulting from climate change, and to ensure that those affected are informed of the existence of such risks.
The action began as a request addressed to the state, which is a procedural requirement under French law before bringing a case to the Council of State (Conseil d’État). If the state responds in an unsatisfactory way or not at all, the case can be then be taken to the Council of State.
Summary: On 29 May 2025, a case was filed on behalf of 22 youth plaintiffs from five US states (Montana, Oregon, Hawai‘i, California, and Florida) before the US District Court in the District of Montana with the support of the NGO Our Children’s Trust and others. The plaintiffs in this case contested a series of climate-related executive orders issued by the Trump administration, arguing that these measures threaten their constitutional rights to life, health, and safety. This includes executive orders aimed at “unleashing” fossil fuels, anti-clean energy measures and those removing climate science-related information from federal websites.
The case was brought against US President Donald Trump as well as various government agencies and offices including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the Interior (DOI), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the United States of America itself.
Measures challenged: The lawsuit challenged three specific executive orders, as well as measures to delete climate science information from government websites. The contested executive orders are the following:
Executive Order 14154: “Unleashing American Energy” (which prioritizes oil, gas, and coal over renewable energy).
Executive Order 14156: “Declaring a National Energy Emergency” (which directs federal agencies to invoke emergency powers to fast-track fossil fuel production).
Executive Order 14261: “Reinvigorating America’s Beautiful Clean Coal Industry” (designating coal as a “mineral” under federal policy, thereby granting it priority status for extraction and development on public lands).
Claims made: The youth plaintiffs argued that the Trump administration’s executive orders violate their constitutional right to life (under the fifth amendment to the US Constitution) by increasing climate pollution. They also argue that the measures are an act of executive overreach, or in other words an ultra vires act going beyond presidential powers, and that augmenting fossil fuel production, suppressing climate science, and blocking clean energy solutions is a violation of the ‘state-created danger doctrine’, which triggers a governmental duty to protect against government-induced harm.
Dismissal of the case: On 15 October 2025, the United States District Court for the State of Montana dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing, denying them leave to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs appealed this decision with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on 2 June 2026, affirming the decision of the district court to dismiss the case. The Ninth Circuit Court held that:
by effectively challenging hundreds of current and anticipated agency actions in one lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to circumvent the jurisdictional and procedural rules Congress has established for challenges to agency actions. Such a sweeping injunction against hundreds of agency actions in one lawsuit is unprecedented.
Suggested citation: US District Court of Montana, Lighthiser et al. v. Trump, CV 25–54–BU–DLC, 15 October 2025.
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Lighthiser et al. v. Trump, D.C. No. 2:25-cv-00054-DLC, 2 June 2026.
Summary: In a case before the EFTA Court concerning the EU’s emissions trading scheme, referred by the Oslo District Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, the EFTA Court acknowledged the link between human rights and climate change. The case concerned the obligation to surrender greenhouse gas emissions allowances granted under the scheme in the context of a corporate restructuring, with the EFTA Court finding that EU law precludes national legislation from providing that the obligation to surrender emissions allowances may be settled by dividend in a compulsory debt settlement in connection with the restructuring of an insolvent company.
In doing so, the Court held in para. 35 of its ruling (issued in 9 August 2024) that:
[I]t must be recalled that combating climate change is an objective of fundamental importance given its adverse effects and the severity of its consequences, including the grave risk of their irreversibility and its impact on fundamental rights (compare the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 April 2024, Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2024:0409JUD005360020).
Suggested citation: EFTA Court, Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA v. Norway, Case E-12/23, Judgment of 9 August 2024.
Summary: On 5 March 2024, a group of nine individual Swiss farmers, along with 5 associations representing farming-related interests, submitted a request to the Swiss Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication (DETEC), demanding enhanced governmental action to protect them against the impacts of climate change. Noting increasing summer drought periods that particularly impact their human and constitutional rights and livelihoods, they alleged inadequacies in the existing Swiss climate policy response. In doing so, they submitted that:
As farmers and as associations defending the interests of farmers, the Petitioners and Petitioner Associations are particularly affected by climate change, which infringes their fundamental rights. It affects their harvests and jeopardizes the viability of their farms. Climate disruption has been encouraged by the Authority’s climate inaction. This serious negligence on the part of the Authority now justifies the filing of the present petition (translated from the original French).
Response by DETEC: On 20 September 2024, DETEC rejected the petitioners’ request, finding that the alleged omissions did not impact the individual petitioners more intensely than other segments of the population, meaning that they lacked an interest worthy of protection, as well as standing. The same result was reached concerning the five petitioning associations (which are Uniterre, Kleinbauern-Vereinigung, Biogenève, Schweizer Bergheimat and Les jardins de cocagne).
The request to DETEC was made pursuant to Art. 25a of the Swiss Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), requesting that the government (and more specifically DETEC) should refrain from the alleged unlawful acts impacting the petitioners’ human and constitutional rights and livelihoods. Art. 25a APA provides that:
In other words, Art. 25a APA allows persons whose rights or obligations are impacted by ‘real acts’ of the federal authorities to seek a (subsequently legally contestable) ruling concerning the situation. This approach has been used by climate litigants to contest policy lacunae given that constitutionality review of existing federal legislation is not possible under Swiss Constitutional law. A similar request was the starting point of the landmark KlimaSeniorinnen case that was ultimately decided upon by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2024.
However, and much like the KlimaSeniorinnen association and its members, the present petitioners did not succeed with their request to DETEC. On 20 September 2024, DETEC rejected their request. Uniterre, one of the petitioning associations, argued that DETEC had thereby ignored the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, which established that there were access to justice issues for climate applicants in Switzerland by finding a violation of the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).
DETEC’s reasoning did note the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment. First, it argued that the ECtHR had not considered recent developments in Swiss climate policy, emphasizing that Switzerland had a “long history of climate policy” and had only “barely” missed its 2020 national emissions reductions target. DETEC also noted the domestic findings in the KlimaSeniorinnen case, where Swiss courts had left open the question of whether the applicant association in that case had standing. It did not, in doing so, mention the later ruling of the ECtHR, which found that the conduct of these domestic proceedings and particularly the domestic instances’ treatment of the association’s standing claim had violated fair trial rights. Instead, it relied only on the reasoning of the domestic instances in KlimaSeniorinnen to find that the plaintiffs in the present case did not have a sufficient interest to seek legal protection given that they had failed to demonstrate “how they are more affected by the material acts of which DETEC is accused than the rest of the agricultural world, or other economic sectors that may be impacted by global warming (forestry, fishing, etc.), or other groups of people (children, pregnant women, the elderly, etc.). Nor do the individual Claimants establish for each of them that a particular level and severity of damage is likely to be caused by climate change.” (translated from the original French). DETEC found that “what is at stake in the application is the protection of the community as a whole, and not just of individuals, so that it is akin to a form of actio popularis [meaning] that the individual applicants are pursuing public interests that cannot justify victim status.”
Concerning the standing of associations, DETEC noted that the Swiss federal executive had “rejected the extension of associations’ right of appeal to include climate issues, as set out by the European Court of Human Rights [in KlimaSeniorinnen]”. It also noted that the associations did not pursue the specific goal of defending the fundamental rights of their members or other affected individuals in Switzerland, and that alleging that they did do so would be impossible because the associations in question “were all created before the global awareness of the threat of anthropogenic global warming, and therefore before the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992.”
Overall, DETEC found that while it could not rule out “that the State’s material acts (actions or omissions) in the field of climate change are in principle capable of producing sufficient effects on the Petitioners to affect the right to protection of private and family life, the right to protection of the home guaranteed by art. 13 para. 1 Cst. as well as the guarantee of property (art. 26 Cst.) and economic freedom (art. 27 Cst.) [and] that Switzerland can, in a global context, have an influence on global warming, the fact remains that it is too small to have a decisive influence in this area, in the sense that there is no direct causal link between the actions or omissions of Switzerland and the effects of global warming, the latter being marked above all by the major industrial powers” (translated from the original French). This meant that “Switzerland’s material actions, while morally and politically relevant, have only a marginal effect on global climate change”.
Case before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal: On 23 October 2024, the plaintiffs challenged the DETEC decision before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal. They invoked four main grounds for appeal, namely that:
By ignoring the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen ruling, the decision violates federal law, the principle of the separation of powers and the binding force of judgments of the ECtHR (art. 46 ECHR). In particular, the applicants argue that the federal executive has undermined judicial oversight “by arrogating to itself the right to emancipate itself from judicial control”.
DETEC’s actions and omissions are contrary to law, as is clear from the KlimaSeniorinnen ruling.
The (individual) appellants have standing to bring an action, contesting DETEC’s arguments about the limited impact of Swiss emissions on a global scale and arguing that there is no right to “l’égalité dans l’illégalité”. They emphasized the economic losses and health impacts facing the appellants, with impacts on several fundamental rights, and argued that the refusal to recognize the affectedness of the applicants represented a denial of access to justice and a violation of the right to a fair trial as enshrined in domestic law and Article 6 ECHR.
The appellant associations have standing as parties, and DETEC’s refusal to follow the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (KlimaSeniorinnen) in this regard had violated fair trial and access to justice entitlements enshrined, among others, in Art. 6 ECHR. The ECtHR had not required associations’ statutes to explicitly mention fundamental rights protection. Furthermore, the statutes and aims of the five associations all related to protecting smallholder, sustainable and/or biological farming, with one association (Uniterre) explicitly pursuing the protection of the human rights of peasants and other rural workers as recognized in the 2018 UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants (UNDROP).
The plaintiffs sought orders to the effect that:
An expert study should be commissioned concerning the contribution of climate change to worsening drought in Switzerland and reducing agricultural productivity;
The government should be ordered to take every measure needed to avoid negative climate impacts and contribution to chronic drought on Swiss territory, abstain from actions causing corresponding impacts, and take every measure capable of reducing or eliminating the impacts of climate change, chronic drought, and the rights violations complained of.
A violation of the right to life (Art. 10 of the Swiss Constitution/Art. 2 ECHR), the right to private life (Art. 13 of the Swiss Constitution/Art. 8 ECHR), the right to property (Art. 26 of the Swiss Constitution, Switzerland not having ratified the first additional protocol to the ECHR that enshrines this right), and the right to economic liberty (Art. 27 of the Swiss Constitution) had taken place.
A violation of the climate objectives and environmental protection requirements enshrined in domestic legislation had taken place, insufficient measures had been taken to ensure respect for the Paris Agreement, and overall the sum of the action taken with a direct or indirect impact on the climate had been insufficient.
Status of the case: Pending before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal.
Case documents: The full text of the initial request as submitted to the Swiss Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication (DETEC) is available below, as made available by Advocat.e.s pour le Climat (in French).
More information on the case is available via SwissInfo.
See also the comment by Charlotte E. Blattner, Robert Finger & Karin Ingold in Nature.
Suggested citation: Swiss Federal Administrative Court, Uniterre et al. v. Swiss Department of the Environment (Swiss Farmers Case), case filed 23 October 2024 (pending).
