Category: State concerned

Categories
Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fossil fuel extraction Just transition litigation Norway Participation rights Private and family life Right to life

Greenpeace Nordic and Nature & Youth v. Energy Ministry (North Sea Fields Case)

Summary:
This case originated in a challenge to a series of administrative decisions by the Norwegian government granting corporations leave to operate new petroleum (oil and gas) fields in the North Sea (in Breidablikk, Yggdrasil, and Tyrving). The challenge was brought by two NGOs, Greenpeace Nordic and Natural og Ungdom (Nature & Youth). The case was heard in civil court, and challenged the petroleum fields

Claims made:
The three petroleum fields in question were subject to impact assessments by the corporate licensees. However, these impact assessments did not include combustion emissions from the oil and gas produced. The contested issue in the case concerned whether there was a legal requirement to include combustion emissions in this impact assessment (as per Norwegian and EU law). It was not argued that the impact assessments contained deficiencies with regard to other matters. The plaintiffs argued that combustion emissions should have been subject to an impact assessment. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy argued that it was sufficient that combustion emissions were assessed at a more general level by the Ministry, and that there is no requirement for this to be included in the specific impact assessments.

Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the administrative decisions breached the government’s positive obligations under Articles 2, 8 and 14 ECHR. They also also argued that the decisions were flawed because they did not have due regard for the best interests of the child, in breach of Section 104 of the Norwegian Constitution and Articles 3 and 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In addition, they argued that the decisions were based on an incorrect assessment of the facts.

The plaintiffs applied for a temporary injunction.

Ruling of the Oslo District Court:
On 18 January 2024, the Oslo District Court found the approvals of all three oil and gas fields had been invalid and issued an injunction forbidding the state from granting any new permits concerning these fields. the Court held that the contested decisions were unlawful because they had failed to include combustion emissions in the impact assessments conducted in advance, in violation of domestic and EU law, and highlighted procedural problems in the approvals process, especially the lack of adequate public participation. However, anticipating a ruling from the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in its then-pending climate cases — including three involving Norway, namely Duarte Agostinho, Greenpeace Nordic and the Norwegian Grandparents case –, the District Court refused to rule on the issue of compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court also concluded that there was no legal obligation for children to be heard or for the best interests of the child to be investigated and assessed in connection with decisions to approve plans for the development and operation of petroleum activities. The decisions were therefore not in conflict with Section 104 of the Norwegian Constitution and Articles 3 and 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The government was ordered to compensate the plaintiffs for their legal costs.

Proceedings at the Appeals Court in Oslo:
On 16 May 2024, the Oslo Appeals Court split the case into two parts. The State’s appeal against the Oslo District Court’s ruling in the injunction case of 18 January 2024 was to be heard during the appeal hearing regarding the main case. However, the right to enforce the District Court’s temporary injunction was suspended to await the Court of Appeal’s ruling.

Case documents (in Norwegian):
The case documents are available via ClimateCaseChart.com.

Suggested citation:
Oslo District Court, Greenpeace Nordic and Nature & Youth v. Energy Ministry (The North Sea Fields Case), case no. 23-099330TVI-TOSL/05, 18 January 2024.

Oslo Court of Appeals, Greenpeace Nordic and Nature & Youth v. Energy Ministry (The North Sea Fields Case), case no. LB-2024-36810-2, 16 May 2024.

Last updated:
29 November 2024.

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Ireland Private and family life Right to life Vulnerability

Community Law and Mediation Centre and others v. Ireland

Summary:
In September 2024, an Irish NGO — the Community Law and Mediation Centre (CLM) — and three individual plaintiffs were granted leave to proceed with a climate case against the Irish government. The plaintiffs argued that the government’s Climate Action Plan 2024 (CAP24) violated legislative targets as set out in the Climate and Low Carbon Development Act 2015, did not comply with the country’s carbon budget, and violated the fundamental rights of the three individual plaintiffs — who are, respectively, a grandfather, a youth climate activist, and a toddler — as well as of the vulnerable groups represented by CLM and of future generations. The plaintiffs invoked the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as concretized in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, alongside constitutional rights under the Irish Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It also builds on the 2020 judgment of the Irish Supreme Court, in the Friends of the Irish Environment case. There, the Court quashed the first Irish mitigation plan because of its inadequate level of detail.

The CLM stated that:

Ireland’s emissions are not decreasing rapidly enough to stay within the confines of the State’s own legally binding 2025 and 2030 carbon budgets and successive Climate Action Plans have fallen short on implementation. Low income and marginalised groups, the groups CLM has represented since its establishment almost 50 years ago, stand to be disproportionately impacted by climate change but have least opportunity to protect or vindicate their rights. In taking this case, CLM seeks to serve as a vehicle for collective recourse for these communities and future generations.

Status of case:
Pending

More information:

Last updated:
29 November 2024

Categories
Adaptation Disability and health-related inequality Domestic court Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation Human dignity Paris Agreement Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to subsistence/food South Korea Vulnerability

Senior Citizens v. Korea

Summary:
In June 2024, a group of 123 older South Korean citizens brought suit against their government before South Korea’s National Human Rights Commission, arguing that the government’s greenhouse gas mitigation plans had violated their human dignity and their right to life. Their case concerns both mitigation and adaptation action. In terms of mitigation, they sought enhancement of the country’s 2030 national greenhouse gas reduction targets and an ambitious next nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. In terms of adaptation, they sought a risk assessment of impacts on human rights, including the rights to life, food, health, and housing, and emphasized the State’s fundamental obligation to protect these rights. This assessment should entail, they argued, “a factual survey and epidemiological investigation into the risks the climate crisis poses to the human rights of vulnerable social groups, including older persons”, and lead to more ambitious adaptation measures.

Petition:
The full text of the petition as filed can be found below.

Senior_Citizens_v_Korea_petitionDownload

Status of case:
Pending before South Korea’s National Human Rights Commission

Last updated:
29 November 2024

Categories
Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Private and family life Public trust doctrine Right to culture Right to health Right to life Sea-level rise United States of America Vulnerability

Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska II

Summary:
On 22 May 2024, a group of young people supported by the NGO ‘Our Children’s Trust’ filed suit against the U.S. State of Alaska arguing that statutory requirements to develop and advance the Alaska Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project violate their public trust rights as well as their rights to substantive due process, life, liberty and property, and the right to protected natural resources for “current and future generations” under the Alaskan Constitution. They argue that this project will cause “existential harms to the lives, health, safety, and cultural traditions and identities of Alaska’s youth, and substantially limit their access to the vital natural resources upon which they depend.”

The case follows on an earlier case against Alaska, Sagoonick et al. v. Alaska I, which was rejected in 2022 by a divided Alaskan Supreme Court.

Claims made:
The case challenges legislation creating the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation, a state agency created to pursue building a new LNG pipeline. 

According to the plaintiffs, Alaska is “already in a state of climate disruption” and the contested project “would ensure continuing and substantially elevated levels of climate pollution for decades, locking in increasing and worsening harms to Youth Plaintiffs”. They argue that the youth plaintiffs are “uniquely vulnerable to climate change injuries and face disproportionate harms”. Arguing that climate pollution is already causing dangerous climate disruption in Alaska, injuring the plaintiffs in this case, they cite the following climate-related impacts:

  • temperature increase, heatwaves, and other heat-related changes;
  • thawing permafrost;
  • changing precipitation patterns, extreme weather events and droughts;
  • loss of sea, river, and lake ice;
  • ocean acidification;
  • melting glaciers and sea level rise; and
  • increasingly frequent and severe wildfires and smoke.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the contested provisions of State law violate their public trust rights to equal access to public trust resources and to sustained yield of public trust resources free from substantial impairment. They argued that the state of Alaska has a duty under the public trust doctrine to ensure “the continuing availability of public trust resources for present and future generations”.

In addition, they sought a declaration that they have a fundamental right to a climate system that sustains human life, liberty, and dignity under the Alaskan Constitution, which is being violated by the contested statutory provisions.

The youth plaintiffs also petitioned the court to enjoin the defendants from taking further actions to advance or develop the Alaska LNG Project. They sought costs and expenses as well as “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.”

Recent developments:
In October 2024, it was reported that the state of Alaska had asked the Court to dismiss the case.

2024.05.22.AK+LNG+ComplaintDownload

Last updated:
14 November 2024

Categories
2022 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Indigenous peoples' rights Public trust doctrine Uncategorized United States of America

Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska I

Summary:
In 2017, sixteen children and young people — including some who were members of Alaskan Indigenous peoples — filed suit against the U.S. State of Alaska arguing by the state’s climate and energy policy violated their constitutional rights. Because the policy in question authorized and facilitated activities producing greenhouse gas emissions, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their due process rights to life, liberty, and property under the Alaskan Constitution, as well as their right to a stable climate system. The argued that the state government and relevant agencies had, “knowingly and with deliberate indifference”, created a dangerous situation for them, in violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs also made an equal protection claim and alleged a violation of Alaska’s public trust doctrine.

The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief. They sought a declaration that the state had a constitutional duty to protect their constitutional rights, as well as a duty under the public trust doctrine to protect Alaska’s waters, atmosphere, land, fish, wildlife, and other public trust resources. They sought a declaration that the state’s climate and energy policy had violated their rights and placed them “in a position of danger with deliberate indifference to their safety” and had “materially caused, contributed to, and/or exacerbated climate change and discriminated against Youth Plaintiffs as members of a protected class, and with respect to their fundamental rights”. They sought an order for the state to prepare a complete and accurate accounting of Alaska’s GHG emissions and an enforceable state climate recovery plan.

Alaska Superior Court Judgment:
On 30 October 2018, the Alaska Superior Court rejected the case, arguing that it was indistinguishable from previous climate cases based on the public trust doctrine and that it concerned political questions which were not justiciable. The plaintiffs appealed.

Alaska Supreme Court Judgment:
In 2022, on appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case (see full text of the judgment below). The Court found that the applicants’ claims concerned non-justiciable political questions and found that it could not make “the legislative policy judgments necessary to grant the requested injunctive relief.”

Judge Maassen, dissenting, argued that he was “no longer convinced that nothing can be gained by clarifying Alaskans’ constitutional rights and the State’s corresponding duties in the context of climate change”, and that the public trust doctrine under the Alaskan Constitution provided a right to a livable climate.

Additional developments:
A follow-up case, Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska II, was filed in 2022.

Sagoonick IDownload

Suggested citation:
Supreme Court of Alaska, Sagoonick et al. v. State of Alaska I, 28 January 2022, No. 3AN-17-09910 CI.

Last updated:
14 November 2024

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Minority rights New Zealand Paris Agreement Right to life Separation of powers

Smith v. Attorney General

Summary:
This case was filed in 2022 and concerns the same plaintiff as the Smith v. Fonterra corporate responsibility case. The plaintiff in these cases is a Māori landowner and spokesperson on climate change for his tribe (iwi). He argued that the climate policy of the New Zealand government had failed to adequately protect the citizens of New Zealand, and especially Māori, against the impacts of climate change. Before the High Court, he submitted that “the Government has taken no or inadequate climate change mitigation measures since it had become aware of the causes and effects of climate change down to the present.” In July 2022, the High Court struck out all of the applicant’s claims. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal on all counts in December 2024.

Claims made:
The plaintiff’s case is based on three main arguments (expanded from the original submissions, which concerned only the first argument of the three). First, the plaintiff argues that the government breached its common law duty of care to “take all necessary steps to reduce NZ emissions and to actively protect the plaintiff and his descendants from the adverse effects of climate change”, as derived from its authority over the territory of New Zealand, the government’s duty of care, and its responsibility to Māori. Secondly, he alleged a breach of the rights enshrined in sections 8 and 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), concerning deprivation of life and the denial of the right to practise culture. Here the plaintiff argued that the Crown had “failed to put in place an effective legislative and administrative framework properly designed to provide effective mitigation against the climate change risk in accordance with the best available science and New Zealand’s international and domestic legal obligations.” He invoked the protection of his own life, those of his tribe and clan, and those of future generations. Thirdly, he argued that the government had violated the Tiriti o Waitangi | the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document, and the consequent fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff and those he represents.

Finding of the High Court:
In July 2022, the High Court struck out all three claims. First, it found that the plaintiff’s arguments about the common law duty of care were not based on recognized legal obligations or case-law. It was also considered too far-reaching: “any relief, if it were available, would be an ineffective and piecemeal way to deal with climate change issues. Every person in New Zealand would be entitled to sue the Government under the novel duty.” It noted too that “the courts have neither the technical capacity nor the political mandate to co-ordinate in an integrated way to mitigate the effects of climate change”.

On the second argument, the Court found that the right to life claim was untenable because the plaintiff had not demonstrated a “‘real and identifiable’ risk to the life of a specified individual or even a class of individuals. It is a general threat that may eventuate as a result of the effects of climate change to all New Zealanders.” In addition, the Court was not convinced that it was possible to draw analogies to Dutch law, and specifically the Urgenda case invoked by the plaintiff, meaning that “[t]he decision in Urgenda must be treated with caution”.

Furthermore, on the minority rights claim, the Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged specific breaches of that right, which only entailed positive obligations under exceptional circumstances. It also held that the plaintiff’s case was “based on a claim that an existing legislative and policy framework is inadequate to protect Māori. There is no allegation of opposition or coercion targeting Māori that fits within that exceptional category here.” Accordingly, this part of the case was also declared inadmissible.

Finally, concerning the Tiriti o Waitangi, the Court found that this claim was so broad, and climate change was so complex, that “any fiduciary obligations arising from the Crown would be owed to the public in general. This alone makes the claim untenable”. To be contemplated, such a claim would depend on an underlying duty — here, the duty of care invoked by the applicant — which had already been rejected above, making this claim untenable. In addition, the Court held, “a claim that such a duty is owed to only a subsection of New Zealanders, Māori, as opposed to the public in general, is a further reason that it cannot be tenable”.

Judgment of the Court of Appeal:
On 19 December 2024, the Court of Appeal issued its ruling in this case, rejecting the applicant’s appeal on all counts.

On the claim concerning the right to life, the court considered six questions: 
           a)  whether that right includes a right to a life with dignity;
           b)  whether the widespread nature of (climate) effects preclude the applicability of the right to life;
           c)  whether the risks from climate change are sufficiently proximate;
           d)  whether the right to life can impose positive duties on the State;
           e)  whether it is tenable that New Zealand’s regulatory framework breached the right to life; and
           f)  whether reporting orders are tenably available.

On the first question, it found that it was not clearly untenable that the right to life includes a right to a minimum baseline as to the quality of life and is therefore applicable to the potential impacts of climate change.  This, it held, is consistent with international jurisprudence. Throughout, it extensively engaged with international jurisprudence (Billy, Teitiota) and soft-law materials (the HRC’s General comment No 36).

On the second question, the Court found that it was not clearly untenable on the grounds that the alleged risk to life potentially affects a large group or all of the population.   

On the third question, again referring to international climate jurisprudence on equivalent rights, and particularly engaging with the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, the Court found that this would be a matter of (scientific) evidence for trial, and that it could accordingly not strike this out at this stage. 

On the fourth question, the Court found – given the context of the climate emergency and the case-law from around the world responding to this challenge — it was not clearly untenable that NZBORA’s right to life requires the government to take protective measures against foreseeable threats to life. 

On the fifth question, on the challenge to the efficacy of the legislative framework responding to climate change, the Court found that it could not second-guess parliamentary policy choices, striking out this claim while referring to the possibility of judicial review of concrete actions taken under the legislative framework.

On the sixth question, it found that the court’s institutional role did not encompass an ongoing monitoring role of the measures the Crown is implementing in response to climate change.

On the right to culture, the court found that it was not clearly untenable that climate change could give rise to a positive obligation to protect against a denial of the right to culture under s20 of NZBORA where a substantial interference amounting to a denial of the right occurs. However, here too the court found that the pleaded deficiencies of the domestic legal framework reflect policy choices that are for Parliament and that it could not review.

As concerns the claim of a breach of te Tiriti, the court found that this was clearly untenable because the domestic legislative framework gives effect to the Crown’s obligations under the Treaty and allows for decisions consistent with Treaty principles.

As concerns the claim that the Crown owes fiduciary duties to Mr Smith, his whānau, Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Kahu, the court found that the claimed fiduciary duty was not comparable to specific fiduciary duties arising between the government and certain Māori due to particular dealings between them.  As a result, the pleaded claim was inconsistent with the nature of fiduciary duties because the response to climate change required a balancing of interests and the government could not act purely in the interests of the pleaded beneficiaries. 

As concerned the claim that there was a novel common law duty in place, relying on the common law public trust doctrine, this doctrine stemmed from the context of access to seashores and navigable waters and was thus too far removed from the extensive duty pleaded in relation to climate change.  The court found that the boundaries of the public trust doctrine are imprecise and fluid, raising a host of conceptual problems in imposing fiduciary or trust-like obligations on the government, and that the doctrine could in any case be displaced by legislation; domestic law did not leave room for its application.

Status of the case:
Appeal to the Court of Appeal rejected 19 December 2024.

Further reading:
The text of the High Court ruling is available here.

The text of the Court of Appeal ruling is available here.

Suggested citation:
High Court of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2022] NZHC 1693.

Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2024] NZCA 692.

Categories
Climate activists and human rights defenders Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Finland Indigenous peoples' rights Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to water Rights of nature Vulnerability

Finnish Association for Nature Conservation and others v. Finland

Summary:

In August 2024, a coalition of six Finnish environmental and human rights organizations, including the Finnish Sámi Youth, filed a lawsuit against the Finnish government at the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland. The lawsuit accuses the government, led by Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, of failing to meet the commitments outlined in Finland’s 2022 Climate Act, which aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2035. The plaintiffs argue that the government’s insufficient actions, particularly in the areas of forestry, agriculture, and transportation, threaten both environmental sustainability and the rights of the Sámi people, who are disproportionately affected by climate change.

The case builds on an earlier ruling by the Supreme Administrative Court, which dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim on procedural grounds, and a recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Klimaseniorinnen case, where the Strasbourg Court found that Switzerland’s failure to adequately address climate change constituted a violation of human rights.

Claim:

The plaintiffs claim that the Finnish government’s inadequate climate policies are not only a breach of the nation’s own laws but also a violation of human rights. Specifically, they argue that the government is failing to protect the Sámi people’s rights to maintain their culture, livelihood, and environment. They demand that the government implement stronger measures to meet its climate targets, thus safeguarding both the environment and the rights of the Sámi as an indigenous people.

Significance:

The significance of this case is multifaceted. Firstly, it represents a critical intersection between environmental law and human rights, specifically the rights of indigenous peoples, highlighting how climate change disproportionately affects vulnerable populations. Secondly, this case is notable for invoking international legal standards, such as those set by the ECHR, in a national context. The outcome could therefore have implications beyond Finland, contributing to the growing body of climate litigation worldwide that seeks to hold governments accountable for their environmental commitments. Finally, the case highlights the increasingly active role of civil society in enforcing climate laws and protecting the rights of vulnerable populations in the face of global climate change.

Ruling in the case:

In January 2025, it was reported that the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland had turned down the complaint, emphasizing the need for more time to conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of current policies and the impossibility of ex ante assessments.

Links:

The related documents are accessible here, here, here, and here.

Suggested case citation:

Finnish Association for Nature Conservation and others v Finland (pending, Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, 2024).

Last updated:
12 February 2025

Categories
2024 Domestic court Germany Rights of nature

German Rights of Nature Case (8 O 1373/21)

Summary:

On 2 August 2024, in the context of a case about compensation for the purchase of a BMW-brand vehicle during the so-called “diesel scandal”/”Dieselgate”, a judge at the Erfurt Regional Court in Germany, Dr. Martin Borowsky, made an innovative finding: he found that rights of nature can already be derived from the law currently in force, namely the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, meaning that nature is not an object, but a subject with its own right to protection. The relevant parts of his extensive holding on this matter, based on his involvement during the drafting of the Charter and translated from the original German by this database, are replicated below in full.

Finding of the court (paras. 29-40 of the judgment):

[N]ature’s own rights, which arise from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, reinforce protection [in the context of the ‘diesel scandal’]. These rights of nature are – as in numerous other legal systems, such as in South America – to be taken into account ex officio and independently of any corresponding submission by the parties or an explicit reference to them.

As European Union law is relevant in the diesel cases, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is also applicable (Art. 51 (1)). The rights in the Charter, in particular Art. 2 and Art. 3 (1) in conjunction with Art. 37, establish inherent rights of nature, which also require consideration in the present case. These fundamental rights are by their nature applicable to nature or individual ecosystems — i.e. ecological persons. It can be left open whether in the present case nature as such or individual ecosystems (particularly) damaged by exhaust gases require protection. The Charter gives rise to the comprehensive right of ecological persons to have their existence, preservation and regeneration of their life cycles, structure, functions and development processes respected and protected.

The fact that the [EU’s] convention on fundamental rights [a “body composed of representatives of the Heads of State and Government and of the President of the Commission as well as of members of the European Parliament and national parliaments” formed to draft the EU’s fundamental rights charter], which met in 2000, had not yet taken these rights into account does not prevent such rights from being recognized. As is well known, originalism is not a decisive interpretative approach in Europe. Moreover, the convention on fundamental rights was certainly open to ecological issues and concerns.

In particular, the Charter – like the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights – is a living instrument that can be used to respond appropriately to new threats. The recognition of specific rights of ecological persons through the interpretation and application of existing Union law is necessary due to the importance and urgency of the ecological challenges – climate change, species extinction and global pollution – and in view of the threat of irreversible damage.

Granting legal subjectivity to ecological persons, as was recently done by the Spanish legislator for the Mar Menor saltwater lagoon, is in line with the Charter’s view of humanity. Its preamble emphasizes the responsibility and duties towards fellow human beings as well as towards the human community and future generations. According to Art. 37 of the Charter, a high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the Union’s policies and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. The recognition of nature’s own rights serves this essential objective of the Union.

The open term “person”, which is frequently used in the Charter, includes nature or ecosystems such as rivers and forests as additional legal subjects alongside humans. In the first title of the Charter, containing fundamental rights, the term “person” (“personne”) is used in the original German text, as in numerous other language versions, rather than the term “Mensch”. The English “everyone” can be equated with this. Since fundamental rights such as the right to life in Art. 2 of the Charter do not apply to legal persons, the overriding value, the added value of the term “person” lies in respecting and protecting ecological persons in addition to human beings.

Moreover, there is no apparent reason why legal persons – or in future artificial intelligence – should be comprehensively protected under fundamental rights, but not ecological persons. Ultimately, this only creates an “equality of arms”.

The guarantee of human dignity in Art. 1 of the Charter does not preclude the recognition of the rights of nature; on the contrary, it requires this step. The recognition of nature’s own rights helps to ensure that people can continue to lead a free and self-determined life in dignity in the future.

Furthermore, the fact that Art. 2 and other Charter rights are borrowed from the ECHR and that this Convention – to date – does not recognize any inherent rights of nature does not stand in the way of the above. Art. 52 para. 3 sentence 2 of the EU Charter expressly allows European Union law to grant more extensive protection than the ECHR.

Finally, Art. 53 of the Charter requires comparative law to be taken into account in its interpretation. In numerous legal systems, particularly in the Global South, but also in the USA and New Zealand, the rights of nature are recognized and enforced under constitutional law, legislation or by judges. The European legal system is not immune to this increasing global trend.

Against this background, it seems justified from the point of view of legal doctrine to give nature’s own rights the force of law in Europe too. The example of Colombian or Peruvian courts can be followed here, which – even without relevant legislation – have derived such rights from an overall view of their legal systems.

Suggested citation:
Regional Court Erfurt, 8th Civil Chamber, judgment of 2 August 2024, file number 8 O 1373/21, ECLI:DE:LGERFUR:2024:0802.8O1373.21.00.

Last updated:
29 August 2024.

Categories
Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Extreme poverty Germany Just transition litigation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to health Right to life

“Zukunftsklage” (Greenpeace and ors. v. Germany) – Neubauer II / Steinmetz III

Summary:
On 26 June 2024, it was announced that five German environmental organisations, together with a large number of individual plaintiffs, would be preparing a total of three new constitutional complaints against the Federal Government’s inadequate climate policy and the gutting of the Climate Protection Act (KSG) for the event that Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier were to sign pending amendments of the Act into law.

The five organisations — Germanwatch, Greenpeace, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH), Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) and Solarenergie-Förderverein Deutschland (SFV) — will each lead a complaint together with plaintiffs affected by climate change in different areas of their lives. Some of these plaintiffs were parties to the groundbreaking Neubauer case before the Federal Constitutional Court, including Luisa Neubauer, Sophie Backsen, Hannes Backsen, and Lüke Recktenwald.

The applicants argue that, even though the Neubauer case elevated climate action to the level of constitutional protection, insufficient action has taken place since then. Drawing on the intertemporal constitutional freedoms recognized in Neubauer, the interests of intergenerational justice, impacts on life and health, and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in KlimaSeniorinnen, wherein it found a violation of the right to respect for private and family life in Art. 8 ECHR, the plaintiffs argue that the requisite climate action is being delayed further into the future, increasingly endangering the future enjoyment of rights. This particularly affects the transport sector, where “extreme cuts and measures” will be required to meet reductions targets.

The plaintiffs note that the German Council of Climate Experts has made it clear that Germany is unlikely to achieve its climate targets for 2030, and that according to data from the Federal Environment Agency, the target of net zero by 2045 will also be missed by a considerable margin given current plans. This is in part due to abolition of funding programs as a result of the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Climate and Transformation Fund in November 2023.

Focusing particularly on an amendment to the German Climate Protection Act (KSG), passed by the German Bundestag on 26 April 2024, the plaintiffs note that this move (i) abolishes binding sector targets; (ii) eliminates the requirement for corrective action to catch up on missed targets; and means that (iii) post-2030 compliance with emission targets will only be considered in detail from 2029 and only planned and implemented from 2030. Overall, these legislative changes show that the legislator has not understood the constitutional limits to the overall concept of climate protection.

Since the 2021 Neubauer judgment, the plaintiffs argue, the German CO2 budget has been unnecessarily used up, while feasible and proportionate measures have not been taken. For example, the introduction of a speed limit on German freeways and in cities would have saved considerable amounts of CO2 and thus protected opportunities for freedom. The plaintiffs also cite failure to plan for green mobility options in rural areas. While immediate action in the transport sector would make it possible to transition gradually, the current plans require an “emergency stop” that will severely limit the freedoms of especially poorer segments of the population.

This cannot be countered by the fact that regulations exist at EU level. The applicants argue that EU climate protection law as a whole, and for the transport sector in particular, does not guarantee the necessary protection of fundamental rights because it does not contain any binding interim targets after 2030 and does not specify a comprehensible budget up to 2050. And, the plaintiffs note, German legislators are currently not even complying with the requirements of EU law, as established by the German Council of Climate Experts, among others.

Relief sought:
In their announcement, the plaintiffs set out three motions for relief.

  1. The German Climate Protection Act (KSG) still allows too many emissions given that the German emissions budget is empty if measured by the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement and the European Court of Human Rights, and almost empty if measured against the 1.75°C threshold set by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2021. The law is not ambitious enough, the permitted quantity targets jeopardize human rights instead of securing them. This must be changed to comply with the state’s existing duty to protect.
  2. The recent amendment to the KSG is unconstitutional. By weakening the required measures to reach Germany’s goals, the amendment violates the intertemporal freedoms recognized in Neubauer. The amendment must be repealed and the old law must apply unchanged.
  3. The failure to take climate protection measures in the transport sector already violates intertemporal civil liberties, making disproportionate measures unavoidable later in time. People in rural areas are particularly affected by such restrictions on freedom, putting socially disadvantaged groups at a disadvantage.

Cases under the “Zukunftsklage” umbrella:

A first case under this umbrella was filed in July 2024. Known as “Steinmetz, et al. v. Germany III“, this case was brought by an NGO, Deutsche Umwelthilfe, and 11 individual plaintiffs aged between 14 and 27. They allege that current reforms are insufficient and that they violate the principle of intergenerational freedom developed in the Neubauer ruling. Drawing extensively on the European Court of Human Rights’ KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, they also argue that current mitigation plans in Germany infringe their rights to life and physical integrity, drawing on Article 8 ECHR.

Complaint form in the Steinmetz III caseDownload

Last updated:
29 November 2024

Categories
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Children and young people Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Emissions reductions/mitigation Estonia European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Extraterritorial obligations Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Non-discrimination Norway Paris Agreement Poland Portugal Private and family life Prohibition of torture Right to life Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia Spain Standing/admissibility Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands The United Kingdom Turkey Ukraine Victim status

Duarte Agostinho et al. v. Austria et al. (“Portuguese Children’s Case”)

Summary:
This case was brought by a group of six young people, acting together as the ‘Youth for Climate Justice’, against 33 Council of Europe Member States. Theirs was the first climate case to come before the ECtHR. In their application, the six applicants, aged between 8 and 21 at the time, argued that the 33 respondent States failed to comply with their positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, read in the light of the commitments made under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. They claimed that their right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) was being threatened by the effects of climate change in their home State of Portugal, including through the harms caused by forest fires. Moreover, they claimed that their right to respect for their private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR was being threatened by heatwaves that forced them to spend more time indoors. They also noted their anxiety about their uncertain future, and the fact that, as young people, they stand to experience the worst effects of climate change. They accordingly alleged a violation of Article 14 ECHR (non-discrimination), given the particular impacts of climate change on their generation. According to the applicants, the absence of adequate measures to limit global emissions constitutes, in itself, a breach of the obligations incumbent on States.

This was the first climate application brought before the European Court of Human Rights, and it was brought with the support of the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN). The issues raised here were novel in the Strasbourg context. In addition, in communicating the case, the Court also proprio motu raised an issue under Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case inadmissible on jurisdiction and non-exhaustion grounds.

Domestic proceedings:
None: this case was brought directly to the ECtHR. The applicants submitted that, given the complexity of the case and their limited financial means, as well as the limited prospects of success before domestic instances, requiring them to exhaust the domestic remedies in each of the 33 respondent States would impose an excessive and disproportionate burden on them.

Relinquishment:
On 29 June 2022, the 7-judge Chamber to which the case had originally been allocated relinquished jurisdiction over it in favour of the Court’s 17-judge Grand Chamber. Relinquishment is possible where a case either (a) raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or its Protocols, or (b) might lead to a result inconsistent with the Court’s case-law (Rule 72, paras 1-2 of the Rules of Court).

During the course of the proceedings, the complaint against Ukraine was withdrawn by the applicants. The Russian Federation ceased to be a Council of Europe Member State during the course of the proceedings, but this was not an obstacle to considering the application as concerns anything taking place before the end of its membership (on 16 September 2022).

In February 2023, the Court announced that it would hold a public Grand Chamber hearing in this case, along with two other climate cases pending before it (Carême v. France and KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v. Switzerland). It announced that it would adjourn the remaining climate cases pending before it in the meantime. The oral stage in these three cases was staggered: Carême and KlimaSeniorinnen were heard on 29 March 2023, while the hearing in Duarte Agostinho was heard by the same composition of the Grand Chamber on 27 September 2023.

Grand Chamber hearing:
A hearing in this case was held on 27 September 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here.

During the hearing, the respondent States pooled their submissions to a large extent, with additional arguments from the Netherlands, Portugal, and Turkiye. Third-party interveners also received leave to appear during the oral hearing, namely the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, the EU’s European Commission, and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). The substance of the hearing focused largely on admissibility issues, namely victim status, the (non-)exhaustion of domestic remedies and the extraterritoriality of Convention obligations. The judges also asked a number of questions to the parties before retiring to consider the admissibility and merits of the case.

Admissibility:
From the blog post on the case by Ayyoub (Hazhar) Jamali available on our blog

After months of anticipation, the ECtHR delivered its judgment on 9 April 2024. The Court found the case inadmissible on two key grounds. Firstly, it ruled out jurisdiction regarding non-territorial states, narrowing the scope of accountability in this complex legal landscape to applicants’ home states. Secondly, it dismissed the application against Portugal due to a lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The Court acknowledged its jurisdiction concerning Portugal but denied it concerning other non-territorial states. It recognized that under Article 1 of the Convention, jurisdiction primarily pertains to territorial boundaries, implying that individuals can only claim Convention violations against the territorial state where they reside. However, the Court reiterated that the Convention’s reach can extend beyond national borders in two main forms: when a state exercises effective control over an area (spatial concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdiction ratione loci), and when there is state agent authority or control over individuals (personal concept of jurisdiction, or jurisdiction ratione personae) (para 170). In the present case, as neither of these two criteria appeared applicable, the Court denied jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘special features’ for establishing the respondent states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants within the specific context of climate change. It emphasized that determining whether the ECHR applies extraterritorially requires examining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, indicating that the state concerned is exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the applicants. This primarily involves exploring the nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent state.

The Court acknowledged that states have ultimate control over public and private activities within their territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions. It noted their international-law commitments, particularly those outlined in the Paris Agreement, which states have incorporated into their domestic laws and policy documents, as well as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement (para 192). Furthermore, the Court recognized the complex and multi-layered causal relationship between activities within a state’s territory that produce greenhouse gas emissions and their adverse impacts on the rights and well-being of individuals residing outside its borders (para 193). It emphasised that while climate change is a global phenomenon, each state bears responsibility for addressing it. However, the Court concluded that these considerations alone cannot justify creating a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation or expanding existing ones (para 195). It emphasised that the ECHR protection system is primarily based on principles of territorial jurisdiction and subsidiarity.

The Court further denied the applicants’ claim that bringing a case against Portugal alone would be ineffective and that they had no other means of holding the respondent states accountable for the impact of climate change on their Convention rights. It distinguished between jurisdiction and responsibility, which constitutes a separate matter to be examined in relation to the merit of the complaint (para 202).

The Court further rejected the applicants’ claim concerning the reach of the Convention outside of national boundaries by their reliance on a test of ‘control over the applicants’ Convention interests’. It reasoned that, according to its established case-law, extraterritorial jurisdiction as conceived under Article 1 ECHR requires control over the person him- or herself rather than the person’s interests as such (para 204-206). It highlighted that, except for specific cases under Article 2 concerning intentional deprivation of life by state agents, there is no precedent for a criterion like ‘control over Convention interests’ as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction (paragraph 205). Consequently, the Court argued that adopting such an extension would represent a significant departure from established principles under Article 1.

The Court stated that otherwise, and given the multilateral dimension of climate change, almost anyone adversely affected by climate change anywhere in the world could be brought within the jurisdiction of any Contracting Party for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR in relation to that Party’s actions or omissions to tackle climate change. It also rejected the suggestion that such an extension of jurisdiction could be limited to the Convention’s legal space. It reasoned that, given the nature of climate change, including its causes and effects, an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction by reference to that criterion would be artificial and difficult to justify (para 206).

Moreover, the Court acknowledged the significance of developments in international law, particularly with regards to the interpretations provided by bodies such as the Inter-American Court and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It recognised the relevance of these interpretations in shaping the understanding of jurisdiction within the context of human rights treaties. However, the Court noted that these bodies had adopted distinct notions of jurisdiction, which had not been recognised in its own case-law. While the Court considered the insights provided by these international instruments and bodies, it concluded that they did not provide sufficient grounds for extending the extraterritorial jurisdiction of respondent states under the Convention, particularly as proposed by the applicants (para 209-210). Therefore, while remaining attentive to legal developments and global responses to issues such as climate change, the Court found no basis within the Convention for expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction as advocated by the applicants.

In conclusion, the Court found no grounds in the Convention for extending the respondent states’ extraterritorial jurisdiction through judicial interpretation.

Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
Regarding Portugal, the applicants’ home state, there was no extraterritoriality issue. Here the Court examined whether effective remedies existed within the Portuguese legal system that the applicants were required to use under the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule. Despite the applicants’ argument that broad constitutional provisions alone could not provide effective and certain remedies, the Court disagreed, highlighting various remedies available in Portugal. These included, for example, constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment, actio popularis claims for environmental protection, etc (para 217-223). The Court emphasised the importance of affording domestic courts the opportunity to address issues before having recourse to international remedies. Consequently, the complaint against Portugal was found inadmissible. The Court also rejected the suggestion that it should rule on the issue of climate change before domestic courts had the opportunity to do so, reaffirming the principle of subsidiarity and the role of domestic jurisdictions in adjudicating such matters (para 228).

Victim Status
The Court found it challenging to determine whether the applicants met the criteria for victim status as set out on the same day in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment against Switzerland. The lack of clarity is attributed, in part, to the applicants’ failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court found that, in any event, the application was inadmissible for the reasons previously outlined. Therefore, the Court declined to examine further whether the applicants could claim victim status (para 229-230).

Date:
9 April 2024

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
Communicated by the Court on 30 November 2020. Relinquished to the Grand Chamber on 29 June 2022. Grand Chamber hearing held on 27 September 2023. Decision announced at a Grand Chamber hearing held on 9 April 2024, along with rulings in the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other Member States, no. 39371/20, decision (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:
For more information on this case, see the following links.

  • For more background on the case and profiles on the applicants, click here: https://youth4climatejustice.org/. 
  • For all of the case documents, including the submissions from the respondent States and the third-party interveners, see here.
  • For analyses of the Grand Chamber hearing, see this post on our own blog by Viktoriya Gurash, or this post on Verfassungsblog by Corina Heri.
  • For the judgment, click here.
  • For the Court’s Q&A on the three climate cases, click here.

Last updated:
9 April 2024