Category: Rights at stake

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life The Netherlands

Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell Plc (No. 2)

Summary:
On 21 April 2026, the Dutch NGO Milieudefensie delivered summons to oil and gas giant Shell Plc, in its second collective legal action against the company following the first Milieudefensie case (decided on appeal in 2024). This second case, under Section 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), is brought on behalf of current and future generations of Dutch citizens after the corporate actor moved its seat from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom. Milieudefensie summoned Shell to appear at a hearing to be held at the District Court of Amsterdam on 29 July 2026.

In its 273-page summons, Milieudefensie covers issues of jurisdiction, the requirements for a collective suit under Section 3:305a DCC, the scientific evidence underpinning its case, the risk of reaching climate tipping points for Europe and for the Netherlands, international climate policy and the global 1.5-degree temperature target, the important role played by non-state actors and their corporate responsibilities to respect human rights, the inhibiting influence of the oil and gas industry, including Shell, on infrastructural carbon lock-ins, including through its historical undermining of climate science and strategies to delay climate action, as well as its lobbying against the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD or CS3D) of 13 June 2024.

Milieudefensie sets out the framework for assessing Shell’s responsibility under Sections 3:296 and 6:162 DCC, fleshing this out by invoking the societal duty of care under domestic law, as well as the doctrine of hazardous negligence, human rights law (particularly Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, the rights to life and respect for private and family life), international customary law, international soft law, and legal principles including the precautionary principle, the climate law principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), and the principle of intergenerational justice. In particular, the summons argues that

“[s]ince the Urgenda judgment, it has been widely recognised in court judgments that dangerous climate change leads to human rights violations. Not only the ECHR, but also the IACtHR and the ICJ have recently found this. Numerous (supreme) national courts have independently reached the same conclusion. Within Europe, for example, reference can be made to the case law of the [German] Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Court of Appeal in Brussels. Outside Europe, the situation is no different. For example, the Lahore High Court in Pakistan, the Supreme Court of Colombia, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, the District Court of Montana (United States) and the Supreme Court of India have all ruled that human rights can be relied on in order to be protected against the effects of climate change. In view of the above, there can be no misunderstanding that human rights (indirectly) have a horizontal effect when the unwritten duty-of-care standard is fleshed out. Nor can there be any debate about the fact that dangerous climate change leads to human rights violations and that human rights can be relied on for protection against dangerous climate change. The only question that remains is what assessment framework needs to be applied here. “

Milieudefensie argues that Shell bears a share of the responsibility to prevent dangerous climate change, discussing its level of knowledge and the foreseeability of harm by arguing that Shell has long known about the fact that fossil fuels cause climate change, with serious consequences for people and the environment, has known that it is making a substantial contribution to climate change and that it needs to take (precautionary) measures. It sets out Shell’s two-pillared obligations: first, a reduction obligation for Scope 1, 2 and 3 CO2 emissions, and second, an obligation not to develop new oil and gas fields.

Concerning the first pillar of obligations, Milieudefensie argues that “Shell must make an equitable contribution (a “fair share”) to preventing dangerous climate change and limiting global warming to 1.5°C by reducing its emissions.” In doing so, it invokes UN reports to argue that:

  • companies must demonstrate maximum ambition to achieve (net) zero CO2 emissions as quickly as possible, but by 2050 at the latest;
  • companies must set ambitious and credible interim targets for the short and medium term on the road to the above-mentioned goal of net zero CO2 emissions that represent a fair share of the global reduction target; and
  • the (interim) targets should cover all Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions and should aim for absolute CO2 emission reductions.  

It also submits that “Shell can be considered to be an influential Western company in several respects; it has both substantial emissions and large transition capabilities and a large historical responsibility. These are all relevant circumstances under the above-mentioned climate protocols (as evidenced by e.g. the reference to the CBDR principle and the need to take on a fair share of the global target) for asking Shell to take on an above-average responsibility and requiring it to reduce its emissions faster than the global average.”

As concerns the second pillar of obligations, Milieudefensie argues that Shell’s obligation not to pursue new fossil fuel projects is “based on the doctrine of hazardous negligence, human rights law, the legal principles discussed, soft law and other objective points of reference, is that Shell must cease the development and production of new oil and gas fields. After all, the carbon budget with a 50% probability of 1.5°C is already exceeded with the operation of the existing fossil-fuel infrastructure alone, and new oil and gas fields are therefore incompatible with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C by the end of this century. “

Milieudefensie concludes that Shell is breaching its societal duty of care under domestic law, and seeks the following provisionally enforceable remedies:

  • Emissions reductions, covering annual Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, as per the table below;
  • A prohibition of achieving these reductions through divestment, i.e. through transfer of shares or assets;
  • To prohibit Shell from making use of carbon credits for the purpose of achieving the emission reductions described;
  • To order Shell to achieve that the Shell Group ceases, continues to cease and does not start the production of new oil and gas from fields.

More information:
The full text of the summons (translated into English by Milieudefensie) is available below. For more information on the case, see here.

Summons Milieudefensie v. Shell (No. 2)Download

Suggested citation:
District Court of Amsterdam, Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell Plc (No. 2), summons issued 21 April 2026.

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Japan Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Right to pursue happiness

Call4 et al. v. Japan

Summary:
On 18 December 2025 and 4 April 2026, two lawsuits were filed in Japan against the Japanese government’s inaction on climate change. The first suit was filed with the Tokyo District Court on behalf of 452 plaintiffs from all over Japan, including victims of heatstroke, individuals who work in primary industries such as agriculture and fisheries, and children. The second suit, again with the Tokyo District Court, was filed on behalf of 454 additional plaintiffs.

The (in total) 906 plaintiffs in these twin cases summarize their claims as follows:

First, they challenge the legality of the government’s emissions reductions targets, given their inconsistency with the 1.5-degree warming target set out by the Paris Agreement. They challenge the reduction targets set out in the most recent Japanese NDC and the country’s 7th Global Warming Countermeasures Plan, both dated February 2025. Under these instruments, the government’s current targets aim for a 39% emissions reduction by 2030, a 52% reduction by 2035, and a 67% reduction by 2040 compared to 2019 levels, which the plaintiffs argue is incompatible with IPCC science, the 1.5-degree target, and Japan’s obligations as a highly developed nation.

Second, the plaintiffs argue that the government’s failure to enact effective legislation to achieve the 1.5-degree target is unconstitutional. They submit that “currently in Japan, there are no laws that set greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2030 or 2035, nor are there any legally binding emission standards.” They argue that “[t]he right to live peacefully in a stable climate without fear of harm to one’s life, health, or property is a human right that should be guaranteed by the Constitution”, as well as invoking the constitutionally guaranteed right to live peacefully.

In doing so, the plaintiffs draw on IPCC reports and explicitly refer to climate litigation in domestic and international jurisdictions, including the ICJ’s climate advisory opinion.

More information:
More information on the case, as well as case documents, are available here.

The applicants’ submissions in both cases (in Japanese) are available for download below.

Filing in the first caseDownload
Filing in the second caseDownload

Suggested citation:
Tokyo District Court, Call4 et al. v. Japan, filings of 18 December 2025 and 4 April 2026 (pending).

Categories
2026 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to life Separation of powers United States of America

Kaarina Dunn et al. v. Public Service Comission of Wisconsin, et al.

Summary:
On 23 April 2026, a court in the US state of Wisconsin ruled in a youth climate case against the Wisconsin Public Service Commission and the Wisconsin State legislature. The case was filed by fifteen young people ranging in age from 8-17. The youth plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of statues governing the approval of fossil fuel-fired power plants because those statutes limit the ability of the first respondent, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, to consider air quality impacts of when issuing permits for such plants. In doing so, they had invoked their rights, under the Wisconsin state constitution, to liberty and to life, as well as the rights to a stable climate system and to access, enjoy and use navigable waters (both of which they considered inherent within the constitution). They also alleged a violation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.

According to the Plaintiffs, climate change has rendered them unable to enjoy Wisconsin’s natural resources, like its rivers and lakes, as well as prevented them from engaging in recreational activities, like swimming and skiing. Some are deprived of their Indigenous cultural traditions, while others have experienced asthma and contracted Lyme disease.

The judge tasked with resolving this case, Judge Julie Genovese, ruled that “[w]hile the court is sympathetic to the youths and admires their willingness to access the courts in their quest to protect the planet, I conclude that the case must be dismissed because environmental policy is a nonjusticiable political question”. The judge discussed Wisconsin’s political question doctrine, which “dictates that courts will not decide questions that require the court to determine what the best or wisest public policy would be”, and “also embodies a practical component, recognizing that matters of economic and social policy are not reasonably “susceptible to judicial management or resolution.””

The judge concluded that:

“by substituting this court’s judgment for the legislature, the court
would be showing a lack of respect for the legislative and executive branches. Plaintiffs do not like these policy decisions. (…) Because Plaintiffs think it is technologically and economically feasible for Wisconsin to be carbon free by 2050, they conclude that by invalidating the statutes and thus their limitations, the PSC will decide to stop approving fossil fuel-fired plants, and Plaintiffs’ carbon free goal will be achieved. While the court may agree with Plaintiffs’ policy preferences, it would show a blatant lack of respect for our elected officials and the agency defendants to substitute my judgment for theirs, and strike the limitations imposed by the legislature and executed by the PSC. Accordingly, because the court concludes that the legislature’s policy decisions represent a nonjusticiable political question, this case must be dismissed.”

Further developments:
On 28 May 2026, the applicants filed an appeal with the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. On 27 July 2026 they filed their opening brief on the appellate proceedings.

On 12 October 2026, the plaintiffs filed a petition asking the Wisconsin Supreme Court to take the case directly, which would bypass the Court of Appeals. They motivated their petition with the urgency, importance and time-sensitivity of the questions of state constitutional law raised by the case, and the fact that a delay means that the state will continue to approve new fossil fuel projects that violate their constitutional rights. The case will continue before the Court of Appeals until such time as the Supreme Court decides to take the case, if it does so.

Full text of the April 2026 judgment:
The full text of the judgment is available for download below.

Decision Wisconsin 2026Download

Submission on behalf of the state:
The submission made on behalf of the state government can be downloaded below.

Filing Legislature’s attorney Ryan WalshDownload
Categories
Belgium Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Farming Fossil fuel extraction Private and family life Right to life

Falys et al. v. TotalEnergies (‘The Farmer Case’)

Summary:

In March 2024, Hugues Falys, a farmer located in Belgium, filed a legal action at the Commercial Court of Tournai (Belgium) against TotalEnergies. He was joined by Ligue des Droits Humains, Greenpeace Belgium and FIAN Belgium.

The objective of the legal action is to claim compensation for damages suffered by Falys as a result of climate breakdown, and to force TotalEnergies to move away from fossil fuels. The plaintiffs argue that Falys’s farm in Lessines (BE) has suffered a number of extreme weather events, including heatwaves and droughts, resulting in major financial losses, extra workload, stress and worry.

The civil liability action is based on articles 1382 and 1383 of the former Belgian Civil Code. In their submissions to the court, the plaintiffs have put forward human rights arguments as one line of interpretation of the relevant provisions, inter alia referring the ECtHR’s judgment in KlimaSeniorinnen multiple times.

Relevant developments:

On March 18 2026, the Commercial Court of Tournai found the action to be admissible, thereby recognising that carbon majors can be held accountable in Belgium for causing climate change even if their headquarters is in another state. With regards to the merits of the case, the Court postponed its judgment to 9 September 2026 to await the decision in a similar case against TotalEnergies in France.

See also:

Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. Total.

Links:

For the main conclusions of the plaintiffs (in French), see here.

For an unofficial translation of the main conclusions of the plaintiffs (in English), see here.

For the Court’s admissibility judgment of 18 March 2026 (in French), see here.

Last updated:

20 March 2026.

Categories
Deforestation Domestic court New Zealand Paris Agreement Participation rights Participation rights

ELI and Lawyers for Climate Action NZ v. Minister of Climate Change

Summary:
On 10 June 2025, a climate case was filed in the Wellington High Court in Aotearoa New Zealand by the organizations Lawyers for Climate Action NZ and the Environmental Law Initiative (ELI). The case challenges decisions relating to the country’s first (2021-2025) and second emissions reduction plans (2026-2030), including the second plan’s offsetting-led approach, which prioritizes reforestation measures over emissions reductions.

Regarding the first emissions reductions plan, the plaintiffs challenge the ex post cancellation of various projects and actions set out in that plan by the current Government. They argue that domestic legislation, and particularly the Climate Change Response Act, “imposes guardrails on government’s ability to change and cancel climate policies on the fly.” They also challenge the absence of adequate public consultation concerning the changes.

Regarding the second emissions reductions plan, they allege that the Minister of Climate Change is under a legal duty to ensure that emissions budgets are met, which in turn requires the preparation and publication of emissions reductions plans setting out policies and strategies for meeting the emissions budget. The second emissions reduction plan has a wide uncertainty margin, and projects that New Zealand won’t achieve its 2035 target, meaning that according to the plaintiffs it is inadequate, unlawful and too limited in its modeling, as well as taking “an unrealistic and inadequate approach to risk management, relying on a ‘wait and see’ approach it calls ‘Adaptive Management'”. The plaintiffs further challenge the offsetting-led approach of the second emissions reductions plan, and more specifically the decision to prioritize reforestation measures over emissions reductions. They argue that this plan “proceeds on a fundamental error of fact – that forestry offsets and reductions are fungible, when that’s not the case”, and that it does not suffice to comply with the country’s obligations under the Paris Agreement. 

Suggested citation:
Wellington High Court, ELI and Lawyers for Climate Action NZ v. Minister of Climate Change, filed 10 June 2025 (pending).

Further information:
More information is available on ELI’s dedicated website.

The statement of claim is available for download below.

2025-06-10+ERP2+Statement+of+claimDownload

Last updated:
13 March 2026.

Categories
2026 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Non-discrimination Right to health Right to life Standing/admissibility Sweden Uncategorized

Aurora v. Sweden (Aurora Case II)

Summary

On 6 February 2026, the youth-led association Aurora launched a climate lawsuit before the Nacka District Court against the government of Sweden alleging a violation of their rights to life, health and well-being as well as the prohibition of discrimination (based on age). The case is a follow-up to Anton Folley and Others v. Sweden (Aurora Case). That case was a class action suit brought by over 600 young individuals (supported by Aurora), which the Supreme Court of Sweden dismissed as inadmissible on the ground that the plaintiffs did not meet the high threshold for individual victim status articulated by the European Court of Human Rights in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland judgment.

Relying upon the criteria for ‘victim status’ and the standing of associations to litigate climate cases laid down in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, Aurora argues that this fresh case is admissible and that the district court may proceed to examining the substantive claims.

Claims:

The substantive claims in Aurora II are largely the same as the claims which were made in the Aurora case, with the new petition drawing upon more recent climate jurisprudence, including the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change to support its case. In the petition, Aurora identifies a lack of measures or intermediate emission reduction targets envisaged for the period after 2030, and problematizes Sweden’s emissions debt (i.e. the exceedance of its national fair share of the global carbon budget) as failures to exercise due diligence in the discharge of positive obligation to protect individuals who Aurora represents from serious threats to the enjoyment of their rights. The petition also invokes the findings of the IPCC to argue that children and youth, who Aurora represents (majority born between 1998 and 2026), are at a particular risk from climate change, in order to demonstrate the disparate impact of Sweden’s failure to effectively contribute towards climate mitigation. The petition requests the court to handle the case with urgency, to declare violations of Articles 2, 8 and 14 and an order the government to pay legal costs incurred by the plaintiffs.

Response from the State

In June 2026, the Swedish government responded to the case. It agreed that the Aurora case should be heard on its merits, but argued that Sweden action on climate change is already sufficient to protect human rights. This means that the case will now move to examination by the district court, which will determine whether Sweden’s overall climate efforts are sufficient to protect human rights from the effects of the climate crisis.

The State’s submissions (in Swedish) can be downloaded below.

Statens svaromålDownload

Links

  • For the petition (in Swedish) filed by Aurora, see here.
  • For the press release by Aurora announcing the case, see here.

Status

Pending

Suggested citation

Nacka District Court, Aurora v. Sweden, filed on 6 February 2026 (pending).

Last updated

2 July 2026.

Categories
2026 Blog Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Margin of appreciation Private and family life The Netherlands

Bonaire Climate Case: Creative or Questionable Interpretation of International Climate Law?

Pranav Ganesan, PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich

The Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (Bonaire) judgment of the Hague District Court has stolen the limelight as the new posterchild for strategic climate litigation. The plaintiff in this case, Greenpeace Netherlands, argued that the Dutch government failed in its duty to protect the residents of Bonaire, an island in the Caribbean which formally attained the status of a special municipality of the Netherlands in 2010. Although it is a special municipality (bijzondere gemeente), it is just as much a part of the Netherlands as any other province in the European Netherlands. The Dutch government owes obligations under international human rights law, including those arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), towards residents of the municipality. That international human rights law requires states to undertake climate mitigation measures and adaptation measures, as informed by international climate change law where relevant, has been affirmatively held in two advisory opinions from international courts and the European Court of Human Rights. And the proposition that the Dutch government’s duty of care towards its population essentially includes obligations under the ECHR was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in material respects, the Hague District Court’s reasoning was so heavily based on international law.[1] In terms of the scope of state conduct implicated in this case, it outdoes the Urgenda case,which only concerned contributions to the mitigation of climate change. The Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiff that the Dutch government had violated Article 8 ECHR as well as the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR), the former due to inadequate mitigation measures, inadequate implementation of those measures, delays in adopting an adaptation plan for Bonaire and late provision of procedural safeguards to the residents of Bonaire. In this blog, I provide a quick analysis of the District Court’s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement in the section on mitigation measures. Readers interested in learning about the adaptation component and how the court addressed discrimination claim are welcome to read this blogpost by Wewerinke-Singh.

There are areas in the judgment where the District Court’s assessment of the compatibility of the Dutch Climate law framework with international climate law is questionable. The first glaring issue is that the court made a finding of non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement based on the absence of ‘absolute emissions reduction targets’ in the Dutch Climate Act of 2019 (para 11.13.1). The problem identified by the court was that the targets were expressed as goals that the government would ‘strive to achieve.’ However, this does not mean that the targets are not absolute. The difference between absolute and relative emissions reductions targets being whether they are expressed as percentage reductions in comparison to the emissions during a fixed baseline year, as opposed to reductions from a business as usual scenario in case of relative targets (Winkler et al 2014, 636). The use of the expression ‘strive to achieve’ means that the nature of the obligation to achieve the target is one of conduct rather than result, reflecting the nature of the obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures in pursuance of NDCs communicated under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement (ICJ Advisory Opinion, paras 251-253). Another connected example is the court’s declaration that ‘UN standards’ require emission reduction targets to be expressed as percentage reductions to be achieved by the target date, in comparison to 2019 levels as opposed to the 1990 baseline (para 11.13.2). Moreover, strictly speaking, Article 12(8) of the UNFCCC does not require the EU to provide information about each member state’s national carbon budget like the court suggests (para 11.15.3). The court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions might be technically imprecise, but it is undoubtedly bold, being based on the need for exemplary efforts from a developed country like the Netherlands, and reflecting the appropriate sense of urgency in light of the results of the First Global Stocktake (para 11.9.4). Through its interpretive moves, the court effectively hardened ‘soft’ obligations (i.e. normative expectations) sourced from the Paris Agreement and COP decisions (on hard and soft obligations in the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, 2016).

A final noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the rather detailed response to how the notion of ‘equity’ in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Articles 2(1) and 4(1) of the Paris Agreement is to be applied in reviewing states’ mitigation commitments. Equity is an elusive concept, with debates on what an equitable distribution of the global emissions reduction burden entails having remained unsettled since the inception of international negotiations on the topic of climate mitigation (Oliver Herrera et al, 2025). The court provided the (un)acceptability of a ‘grandfathering approach’ as an example of one such debate (para 11.13.5). But it did not go so far as to hold that the grandfathering approach is legally impermissible because it is inequitable per se, or that an equal per capita emissions approach is the minimum standard under international law. Rather, it assessed the Netherlands’ policy negatively on account of its failure to justify why its current policy, which is based on the controversial grandfathering principle and falls short of the ambition required by the equal per capita emissions approach, is equitable in accordance with Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(1). It thus did not use equity to dictate the outcome of what exactly the Dutch government’s fair share of the global carbon emissions ought to be. At same time, it did not use the underlying controversy as a reason to entirely avoid reviewing the substance of the Dutch climate mitigation policy. This is underscored by its remedial findings, wherein the court declared that the Netherlands’ current mitigation commitments were inequitable, thereby leading to a breach of Article 8 (para 12.1), but dismissed Greenpeace’s request ordering the adoption of specific emissions reduction targets by the government, or at least a carbon budget reflecting the ‘equal per capita emissions approach’ (paras 8.1 (IV)-(VI), 11.55 and 11.58).

Overall, the Bonaire judgment shows how climate litigation can lead to precarious precedents. On the one hand, the way the Court engaged with the concept of equity provided an assessment of Dutch mitigation ambition which was notably pragmatic and might serve as inspiration for other courts when asked to answer the fair share question. On the other hand, the judgment risks signaling to states that legal texts—which negotiators toiled to craft in ‘constructively ambiguous’ terms—may be stretched by domestic courts to uncomfortable extents. Ultimately, the appellate court’s scrutiny of this case (should the Dutch government file an appeal) will reveal how this judgment will be remembered: whether it will be hailed for its boldness or criticized for its questionable interpretation of international treaties.

[1] André Nollkaemper commented: ‘Today’s judgment of the District Court of The Hague fully lives up to the reputation of Dutch courts as strongly international law-minded. […] The conclusion is firmly anchored in international law. With 29 references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, 64 references to the European Court’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, 64 to the UNFCCC, 62 to the Paris Agreement, and 12 to COP decisions, this surely ranks high on the list of climate change cases that are most shaped by international law.’

Categories
2025 Austria Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Farming Fossil fuel extraction Private and family life Right to life Right to property Uncategorized

Fliegenschnee and Others v. Austria

Summary:
Fliegenschnee and Others v. Austria concerns an application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by three Austrian nationals (Peter Fliegenschnee, Klara Kornelia Butz and Monika Jasansksy) and the environmental organisation Global 2000. After the Austrian authorities refused to issue a phased ban on the sale of fossil fuels from 2025 (2040 for aviation), which the applicants had requested under the Austrian Trade Act to mitigate the effects of climate change, the applicants turned to the ECtHR. They argued that the State’s inaction leaves them exposed to increasingly severe climate impacts such as heatwaves, drought, and environmental degradation. The association applicant, recognised under Austrian law as an environmental organisation, also asserted that it represented the interests of the general public, which it claimed were harmed by the State’s failure to act. On 11 December 2025, the ECtHR published a decision declaring the application inadmissible for lack of victim status, standing and substantiation.

Claim:
The applicants contest a finding from the Austrian Constitutional Court, made in July 2023, which recognized the state’s duty to actively take effective measures to protect life and health as well as to protect private life and property, but accorded the government a wide margin of discretion and found that fundamental and human rights do not allow for claims to a specific measure (here the applicants petitioned the domestic courts to order legislators to set binding expiry dates for the permissibility of the sale of fossil fuels in 2040). Rather, the domestic court found that the legislature must be allowed to choose between the various available measures to meet the State’s protective obligations.

Before the ECtHR, the applicants argued that Austria’s refusal to introduce a fossil-fuel ban violated Article 2 (right to life) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), because climate change poses real and foreseeable risks to their health, safety, and living conditions. They contended that by declining to adopt effective mitigation measures despite having the capacity to do so, the State breached its positive obligations under the Convention. The environmental association added that this refusal also harmed the public interest, which it is entitled to represent, because ineffective climate action endangers society as a whole. One applicant, a farmer, claimed an additional violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, arguing that drought linked to climate change threatened her crops and thus her right to property.

Domestic decisions:
Domestically, the Minister held that the requested fossil-fuel ban fell outside the Minister’s statutory authority and that such sweeping climate-policy decisions must be taken at the legislative or governmental level. The refusal was upheld by domestic courts

On 25 April 2022 the Vienna Regional Administrative Court upheld the Federal Minister’s decision, confirming that she lacked the competence to order the requested measure and holding that the applicants did not have an individual right to such a measure. On 10 June 2022, the applicants lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which rejected their complaint on 27 June 2023 (E 1517/2022-14), confirming that neither EU law, nor the ECHR, nor Austria’s Trade Act granted the applicants a right to an ordinance banning fossil fuels.

Decision of the European Court of Human Rights:
The applicants brought their case to the ECtHR, asserting that Austria’s inaction amounts to a breach of its human-rights obligations under the ECHR. On 11 December 2025, the ECtHR published its unanimous decision in this case, which was taken on 18 November 2025 by the Fourth Section of the Court. The decision declared the case inadmissible on grounds of victim status.

The Court held, regarding the applicants’ complaints under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, that there needed to be “a serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to life” in order for Article 2 to apply and for individual applicants to meet the especially strict victim status criteria for climate change mitigation cases (KlimaSeniorinnen, § 488). Considering it “questionable” whether Article 2 applied here, the Court examined the case under Article 8 ECHR alone.

For the individual applicants, the Court noted that they had not provided details about whether and how they had been personally affected, nor evidence to substantiate their alleged health vulnerabilities. They had thus not met the KlimaSeniorinnen victim status test, and their claims were declared inadmissible. The Court did not accept the argument from the 28-year-old second applicant that her health was endangered because of her young age and her thus lengthy exposure to the effects of climate change in the future, nor arguments linked to the first applicant’s heart condition.

As concerned the fourth applicant, an environmental association incorporated under Austrian law, the Court found that (applying the KlimaSeniorinnen test for representative standing of associations) “in principle, this recognition under Austrian domestic law is sufficient to show that the fourth applicant is lawfully established within that jurisdiction and has standing to act there, and that it pursues a dedicated purpose, based on its statutes, for the protection of the environment”. However, the Court doubted whether it met the final criteria of that test, which require associations who bring representative climate claims to have “a dedicated purpose in the defence of human rights in the context of the protection of the environment” and to represent affected individuals in that jurisdiction. The Court held that this was “unclear as no detailed information on its membership nor its statutes have been submitted”. It left this issue open, however, as the case would have in any case been inadmissible for the following reasons.

  • Article 8 ECHR does not grant a right to the measure sought, namely a ban on the sale of fossil fuels. The Court here considered it “inherent in the principle of subsidiarity and the wide margin of appreciation accorded to States with respect to the choice of means to achieve their climate change goals (…) that Article 8 cannot be read to guarantee a right to a particular mitigation measure by a specific State body under a certain sectoral law of an applicant’s choice” (para. 33).
  • Secondly, the Court considered that the applicants had insufficiently substantiated how Austria had failed to devise an adequate regulatory framework. Despite government admissions that current measures would not allow Austria to comply with its own GHG emissions reduction targets by 2030, the Court considered this argumentation insufficient as a base for its assessment, and noted that no domestic remedies had been used other than requesting a measure from the Federal Ministry. The applicants had also not alleged a lack of appropriate remedies.

The Court also engaged with the third applicant’s complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the right to property. As a farmer, she argued that her property had been endangered because of droughts caused by climate change. Here, the Court noted that “it has so far not applied Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the context of climate change and that its applicability does not follow from the current case-law” (para. 37). The Court held that “even if Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were applicable in the context of climate change”, the third applicant would have lacked victim status.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Fliegenschnee and Others v Austria App no 40054/23, decision of 18 November 2025.

Case documents:

  • The decision of the Court is available here.
  • The Court’s press release (summary) is available here.
Categories
2019 Domestic court Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Kenya Participation rights

Amu Power Company Ltd v Save Lamu & Others

Summary:
This case concerns a coal-fired power plant project conceived as part of the Kenyan development blueprint: Kenya Vision 2030. The Kenyan government determined that the 1050 MW power plant would be set up in Kwasasi (near Lamu Port). Amu Power Company Ltd. (Amu Power) won the bid for the project. Subsequently on 7 September 2016, the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) granted Amu Power the requisite license based on the Environmental & Social Impact Assessment study (ESIA) commissioned by the latter. Immediately thereafter, environmental groups and local community representatives challenged the license before the National Environment Tribunal (NET), naming both NEMA and Amu Power as the respondent parties.

On 26 June 2019, the NET delivered a decision wherein found fundamental deficiencies in public participation and noted the witness for Amu Power’s admission of the failure to consider climate impacts of the project in the ESIA study. It thus found the NEMA to have violated its statutory duty to ensure project’s compliance with the Environmental Management and Coordination Act 2009 read together with the Environmental Impact Assessment & Audit Regulations (EIA Regulations) and therefore cancelled the license.

Further, it recommended that Amu Power conduct a fresh ESIA study, including consideration of the Climate Change Act 2016 and compliance with all statutory requirements, should it wish to pursue the construction and operation of the project.

Amu Power challenged this decision by way of an appeal before the High Court of Malindi. On 25 October 2025, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the NET’s 2019 decision ordering a cancellation of the license.

Claims:
The objectors contended that the operation of the plant would negatively impact the area’s air quality, contribute to climate change to such an extent that its operation would be contrary to Kenya’s National Climate Change Action Plan and Climate Change Act No. 11 of 2016, as well as Nationally Determined Contribution submitted to the UNFCCC which focuses on renewable energy rather than fossil fuels. Further, they argued the effluent discharge from the plant would impact marine biodiversity, potentially increasing seawater temperature by 9°C, which could infringe upon the rights of Lamu residents dependent on fishing, thus interfering with their their cultural rights and traditional way of life a set out in Article 44 and 43 of the Constitution. These contentions were meant to contextualize the crux of the case brought by the objectors, which concerned administrative failure. The objectors invoked the lack of effective public participation, inadequacies in the ESIA study, especially as it related to the plant’s impacts on human health, mitigation of environmental impacts and the failure to consider impacts on climate change, as grounds for cancellation of the license. 

Amu Power argued that the project would displace a much higher amount of carbon dioxide than what could be generated by it, as electricity would be available to users at the lowest rates, also alluded to the added benefits revolving around climate change adaptation measures. It noted that the ESIA study sufficiently addresses the impacts of thermal effluents on the marine environment and local air pollution by also considering the appropriate the mitigation measures. Regarding climate change, Amu Power submitted that the Paris Agreement came into force on 4th November 2016 after the ESIA study had been concluded and the licence was issued. Lastly, Amu Power argued that the NET placed undue emphasis on procedural rather than the substance, i.e. the spirit behind public participation; and that in any case the flaws in the process were not significant enough to deprive the public participation process of its efficacy.

Judgment of the High Court of Malindi:
In its 2019 judgment, the High Court of Malindi re-affirmed the NET’s findings that the license was issued based on a fundamentally flawed public participation process. The Court emphasized the significance of these findings on the basis of the constitutional significance accorded to public participation. Article 10(1) of the Constitution provides those national values and principles of governance, which includes ‘participation of the people’ bind all State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons when applying or interpreting the Constitution, enacting or interpreting any law, or making or implementing public policy decisions. Article 69(1)(d) requires the State to encourage public participation in the management, protection and conservation of the environment.

It further added that the findings regarding inadequate public participation are of over-arching significance, in that even if the NET had erred in assessing the ESIA’s consideration of mitigation measures concerning the treatment of effluents and climate change, as unsatisfactory, “the project and the study remain condemned due to insufficient public participation” (para. 179).

Links:

  • For the full judgment National Environmental Tribunal, see here.
  • For full judgment of the High Court of Malindi on the appeal by Amu Power against the judgment of the National Environmental Tribunal, see here.

Suggested case citation:
Environment and Land Court at Malindi, Amu Power Company Ltd v Save Lamu & Others, ELCA No. 6 of 2019, 16 October 2019, Hon. Justice Mwangi Njoroge.

Last updated:
30 October 2025.

Categories
Access to a remedy Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Emissions reductions/mitigation Fair trial Fossil fuel extraction Human dignity Imminent risk Inter-American Human Rights System Non-discrimination Private and family life Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to health Right to life Right to property United States of America

Our Children’s Trust with 15 Juliana Plaintiffs v. The United States of America

Summary:
On 23 September 2025, the NGO Our Children’s Trust announced that it had filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging climate-related violations of human rights by the government of the United States of America on behalf of a group of youth. This petition follows the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on climate change, which was issued on 29 May 2025, as well as drawing on the climate advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The petitioners were formerly plaintiffs in the Juliana proceedings brought before US domestic courts on the basis of the public trust doctrine, among others.

Before the Inter-American Commission, the petitioners allege that the United States has known for decades that CO2 emissions cause climate change and that a transition away from fossil fuels is needed to protect human rights. They argue that, as the world’s largest emitter, the United States has played a leading role in causing climate change, and that its greenhouse gas emissions — and the resulting climate change — violate the human rights of children and youth, who are disproportionately impacted by its effects.

They claim before the Commission that the United States has failed to comply with its international obligations to guarantee the petitioners’ human rights, that it has a duty to prevent harm to the global climate system to guarantee those rights, that it brached its obligation to act with due diligence ot guarantee their rights and prevent harm to the climate system, that if violated its obligation to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions,a form of pollution, and that the United States’s deliberate emissions of greenhouse gasses violate the substantive rights of the petitioners as per the American Declaration, including the rights to life and health, the particular protections for children, equality and non-discrimination, the rights to home, property and private and family life, the right to culture, the right to dignity, and the right to a healthy climate.

They also invoke their procedural rights, namely the rights to access to justice and an effective remedy, alleging that the United States Department of Justice has deployed “extraordinary tactics” to silence the petitioners, and that the domestic courts failed to consider the merits of their claims.

In their request for relief, the petitioners inter alia request the Commission to:

  • order precautionary measures to prevent further irreparable harm;
  • join the admissibility and merits of the petition, in accordance with Article 37(4) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, given the serious and urgent nature of the case and the ongoing violations of Petitioners’ fundamental rights;
  • conduct an on-site country visit, including a visit with the Petitioners, and hold fact-finding hearings;
  • establish violations of Articles I (life), II (equality), V (private and family life), VI (family), VII (special protections for children), IX (inviolability of the home), XI (health), XIII (cultural life), XVIII (access to justice and effective remedies), XXIII (property), and XXIV (prompt and effective remedy) of the American Declaration and the rights to dignity (Preamble) and to a healthy climate; and
  • issue a country report with recommendations to the United States to remedy confirmed violations of international law, taking into account the clarifications of existing law set forth by the IACtHR and the ICJ in their in Advisory Opinions on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights and the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change.

Full text of the petition:

The full text of the petition can be found below.

_2025.09.23+Juliana-IACHR+PetitionDownload

Suggested citation:

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Our Children’s Trust with 15 Juliana Plaintiffs v. The United States of America, petition filed on 23 September 2025.