Category: State concerned

Categories
Adaptation Australia Climate-induced displacement Human Rights Committee Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Private and family life Right to culture Right to life Sea-level rise Standing/admissibility Vulnerability

Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia (Torres Straits Islanders case)

Summary:
This petition against Australia was brought to the UN Human Rights Committee by a group of eight indigenous Torres Straits Islanders in 2019, in their own names and on behalf of their children. In their petition, they argued that the Australian government had violated their rights, as inhabitants of low-lying islands, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because of its inaction in addressing climate change (failure to mitigate emissions and to take adaptation measures).

Rights at stake:
The applicants in this case invoked a series of rights in the ICCPR, on behalf of themselves and their children, contesting the respondent State’s failure to adopt mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and cease the promotion of fossil fuels. To support this, they drew on Article 27 (the right to culture), Article 17 (the right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home), and Article 6 (the right to life) ICCPR. They argued that the indigenous peoples of the Torres Strait Islands, especially those who reside on low-lying islands, are among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. They considered that the Australian government must ensure both mitigation and adaptation measures in order to adequately protect their rights. Previously, the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA), a government body, had stated that “the effects of climate change threaten the islands themselves as well as marine and coastal ecosystems and resources, and therefore the life, livelihoods and unique culture of Torres Strait Islanders.”

Outcome:

On 21 July 2022, the Human Rights Committee adopted its Views in this case.

Observations of the State:

The Australian Government argued that the case was inadmissible, contesting the relevance of climate-related international agreements and its own ability to be held (legally or practically) responsible for climate-related harms. It also submitted that it was not possible to attribute climate change to the State party under international human rights law.

The HRC’s considerations on the admissibility:

On the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Government’s position was that it did not owe a duty of care for failing to regulate environmental harm, and that it was not required to provide a remedy where (including in the present case) it understood there to be no breach of ICCPR rights. This question was accordingly reserved to the examination of the merits.

Concerning mitigation measures, the HRC noted that Australia is and has been a major greenhouse gas emitter, and ranks high on economic and development indices. As a result, it found that the alleged (in)actions fell under its jurisdiction under articles 1 or 2 of the Optional Protocol.

Concerning the imminence of the risk concerned, and accordingly the issue of victim status / standing, the Committee found that the authors of this Communication, “as members of peoples who are the longstanding inhabitants of traditional lands consisting of small, low-lying islands that presumably offer scant opportunities for safe internal relocation – are highly exposed to adverse climate change impacts”. Given the uncontested dependence of their lives and cultures on natural resources and phenomena, and their inability to finance adaptation measures on their own, the authors were considered to be “extremely vulnerable to intensely experiencing severely disruptive climate change impacts”. Given the authors’ allegations of serious ongoing adverse impacts, the HRC declared their claims under articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27 of the ICCPR admissible.

Merits:

Article 6

The Committee recalled that the right to life cannot be interpreted restrictively, and that it requires States to adopt protective measures (i.e. that it entails positive obligations). It recalled its own General Comment No. 36, issued in 2018, in establishing that the right to life also extends to reasonably foreseeable threats to life, including adverse climate change impacts and environmental degradation.

The Committee rejected Australia’s allegation that the interpretation of the ICCPR contained in this General Comment was not compatible with the rules of treaty interpretation under general international law. It then went on to recall its own earlier Teitiota v. New Zealand case (on climate-induced displacement), ultimately finding that the authors were not currently facing health impacts or real and reasonably foreseeable risks of being exposed harms to their right to life. The Committee also noted that the right-to-life claim being made largely related to the authors’ ability to maintain their culture, which falls under article 27 ICCPR.

Regarding the authors’ submission that, absent urgent action, their islands will become uninhabitable within 10 to 15 years, the Committee noted the adaptation and mitigation measures currently planned or being taken, and found that the time frame of 10 to 15 years could allow for additional protective measures or relocation programmes. As a result, it found that there had been no violation of the right to life in this case.

Article 17

The authors claimed that climate change already affects their private, family and home life, given that they may be forced to abandon their homes. The Committee considered that the authors’ dependence on marine and terrestrial resources and ecosystems is a component of their traditional indigenous way of life, falling under the scope of Article 17 ICCPR.

Considering the adaptation measures and related plans in place, the Committee noted the existence of unexplained delays in seawall construction and the lack of explanation concerning the loss of marine resources, crops and fruit trees. It noted the ongoing inundation of villages and ancestral burial lands; the withering of traditional gardens through salinification; the decline of nutritionally and culturally important marine species; coral bleaching and ocean acidification; and the authors’ anxiety and distress. The Committee also noted the importance of community lands for the authors’ most important cultural ceremonies. It accordingly found that:

“that when climate change impacts – including environmental degradation on traditional [indigenous] lands (…) – have direct repercussions on the right to one’s home, and the adverse consequences of those impacts are serious because of their intensity or duration and the physical or mental harm that they cause, then the degradation of the environment may adversely affect the well-being of individuals and constitute foreseeable and serious violations of private and family life and the home.”

Finding that Australia had failed to discharge its positive obligation to implement adequate adaptation measures to protect the authors’ home, private life and family, the HRC found a violation of the authors’ rights under article 17 ICCPR.

Article 27

Article 27 ICCPR recognizes the right of members of minority indigenous groups to the enjoyment of culture, and protects the survival and continued development of their cultural identity. Interpreted in the light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, this right enshrines the inalienable right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their traditional territories and natural resources. Here, the authors argued that their ability to maintain their culture has already been impaired due to climate change impacts, which have eroded their traditional lands and natural resources, for which there is no substitute on mainland Australia. The Committee found that these climate impacts represent a threat that was reasonably foreseeable by the State party, as the authors’ community had been raising the issue since the 1990s. While noting existing seawall construction projects, it considered that the delay in initiating these projects indicated an inadequate response by the State party to the threat in question. It found that the failure to adopt timely and adequate adaptation measures “to protect the authors’ collective ability to maintain their traditional way of life, to transmit to their children and future generations their culture and traditions and use of land and sea resources discloses a violation of the State party’s positive obligation to protect the authors’ right to enjoy their minority culture.” Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 27 ICCPR.

As a result of its findings concerning Articles 17 and 27 ICCPR, the HRC considered it not necessary to examine the authors’ remaining claims under article 24 (1) ICCPR.

Remedies:

Under Article 2 (3) (a) ICCPR, the HRC noted that the State was required to make full reparation to the authors, which meant providing adequate compensation; engaging in meaningful consultations with their communities to conduct needs assessments; continuing its adaptation measures and monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of existing measures; and taking steps to prevent similar violations in the future. The Committee requested the State to provide it with information about the measures taken in this regard within 180 days.

Separate opinions:

Several HRC members appended individual opinions to the Views. These include:

  • The individual opinion by Committee Member Duncan Laki Muhumuza, arguing that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life);
  • The individual opinion by Committee Member Gentian Zyberi, concurring but arguing that the Committee had focused too heavily on adaptation measures, and should instead have more clearly linked the right under Article 27 ICCPR to mitigation measures;
  • The joint opinion by Committee Members Arif Bulkan, Marcia V. J. Kran and Vasilka Sancin (partially dissenting), who argued that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life). They argued in particular that the “real and foreseeable risk” standard employed by the majority interpreted Article 6 too restrictively, and was inappropriate here as it had been borrowed from the dissimilar context of its refugee cases (Teitiota v. New Zealand, the HRC’s first climate-induced displacement case).

Full decision:

The HRC’s Views are available here.

Further reading:

  • Maria Antonia Tigre, ‘U.N. Human Rights Committee finds that Australia is violating human rights obligations towards Torres Strait Islanders for climate inaction’, available here.
  • Verena Kahl, ‘Rising Before Sinking: The UN Human Rights Committee’s landmark decision in Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia,’ Verfassungsblog, 3 October 2022, available here.
  • Nicole Barrett and Aishani Gupta, ‘Why Did the UN Human Rights Committee Refuse Broader Protections for Climate Change Victims?’, Opinio Juris blog, 5 October 2022, available here.
  • Christina Voigt, ‘UNHRC is Turning up the Heat: Human Rights Violations Due to Inadequate Adaptation Action to Climate Change’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 26 September 2022, available here.
  • Monica Feria-Tinta, ‘Torres Strait Islanders: United Nations Human Rights Committee Delivers Ground-Breaking Decision on Climate Change Impacts on Human Rights’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 27 September 2022, available here.

Suggested citation:

UN Human Rights Committee, Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia, Communication No. 3624/2019, 22 September 2022, UN Doc. CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019.

Categories
Adaptation Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Sea-level rise Switzerland

Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (aka Asmania et al. v. Holcim)

Summary:
On 11 July 2022, a case was filed with the conciliation authority in the Swiss canton of Zug concerning the greenhouse gas emissions of the corporate cement giant Holcim AG, which is headquartered in Zug. The case was brought by four Indonesian nationals, who live on the Indonesian island of Pari and earn their livelihoods through fishing and tourism. They argued that rising sea levels and floods, which are all caused or aggravated by climate change, are threatening their livelihoods. The cement industry is a major emitter of greenhouse gases, currently emitting approximately 8% of yearly global CO2 emissions, and Holcim is the market leader in this sector (responsible for, historically, 0.42% of global industrial emissions since 1750). On this basis, the plaintiffs seek compensation from Holcim for the damage to their property and for future damages. They also seek adaptation measures to protect themselves against future impacts, and argue that Holcim should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 43% (compared to 2019 levels) by 2030, and 69% by 2040. This demands more rapid change than what is foreseen by the company’s own commitment to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. On 19 December 2025, the cantonal court of Zug declared the case admissible, paving the way for a future judgment on the merits.

Background and scope of the claim:
The claim concerns the greenhouse gas emissions produced by the cement industry, which are largely made up of direct emissions. The plaintiffs noted that 3/4 of Holcim’s emissions are direct emissions, as opposed to the largely indirect emissions created by the fossil fuel industry. The plaintiffs’ claim is based on references to climate attribution science, including reports by the IPCC, and the findings by the US Climate Accountability Institute that Holcim is responsible for 0.42% of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since 1750.

With the support of Swiss Church Aid HEKS/EPER, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and the Indonesian environmental organization WALHI, the plaintiffs invoke Swiss civil law, more specifically a violation of their personality rights under the Swiss Civil Code (Arts. 28 f.) and tort law under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 41 ff.), to argue that their human rights have been violated through the effects of the company’s emissions and that even more severe violations are forthcoming if Holcim does not reduce its emissions. They argue that the company should assume historical responsibility for its past emissions, but also future responsibility in the sense of rapidly reducing its greenhouse gas emissions.

Further developments and civil claim:
As required under Swiss procedural law, the case was brought as a request for arbitration. Arbitration proceedings in the case commenced in the fall of 2022. However, in October 2022, it became clear that the efforts at arbitration would not succeed in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. The case then progressed as a civil claim, with the four plaintiffs filing a lawsuit at the Zug Cantonal Court in February 2023 and applying for legal aid. They argued that Holcim must be ordered to reduce its emissions and provide compensation in order to ensure that their home island remains habitable and their livelihoods, community and culture are protected.

In particular, they argued that – due to violations of their personality rights caused by its CO2 emissions – the defendant is liable for the property damage suffered, as well as future property damage, in proportion to its share of 0.42% of global greenhouse gas emissions. They argued that Holcim has actively interfered with absolute legal interests such as the protection of life and limb, freedom, personality, property, and possessions, and will continue to do so. They also argue that there is an adequate causal link between the unlawful violation of personality rights on the one hand and the property damage on the other. This is because every ton of greenhouse gasses emitted has a long-term impact on the climate, as CO2 is broken down very slowly. They thus allege that the defendant corporation has a human rights-based duty of care to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It must ensure that the global average temperature increase on the Earth’s surface does not exceed pre-industrial temperatures by more than 1.5°C as a result of its emissions. However, the defendant is not doing enough to comply with this limit, which is why it must be obliged to reduce its CO2 emissions to the extent requested.

The plaintiffs accordingly sought injunctive relief in the form of emissions reductions under Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (protection of personality rights), as well as claiming reparation for damages already incurred, future damages and moral damages (satisfaction) under Swiss tort law (under the Swiss Code of Obligations).

The Cantonal Court of Zug held a hearing in the case on 3 September 2025 and issued its ruling on the admissibility on 19 December 2025.

Judgment on admissibility:
On 19 December 2025, the first division of the cantonal court of Zug issued its decision concerning the admissibility of the case.

The three-judge formation examined whether the conditions for admissibility under the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure had been met. This included examining whether there was a legitimate interest, whether the court had territorial and material jurisdiction, and whether a concrete, clear claim had been made.

Territorial jurisdiction:
First, the Court considered whether the case fell under the applicability of the Lugano Convention, finding that – given Holcim’s seat in Switzerland, and the plaintiffs’ seat abroad – the Convention applied, and Switzerland was the right forum for bringing the case (para. 2). Turning to the provisions of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA), the Court held that – given that both parties were making claims based on Swiss law – there had been a tacit or implied choice of law, and Swiss law was therefore applicable (Art. 132 PILA) (para. 2.2).

The Court noted that, in accordance with the Swiss theory of double relevance, the Court examines issues relating to its jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of the allegations, grounds for the action, and claims of the plaintiffs, without taking into account the objections of the defendant and without taking evidence (para. 2.4). The defendant’s objections are only examined at the time of the substantive examination of the case; objections raised by the opposing party in this regard are generally irrelevant in the context of the admissibility. However, the Court does determine, already at this stage, whether the claims made are in principle qualified to fall in the Court’s jurisdiction and whether the case is abusive. Given that it had not been alleged by the defendant that the allegations made were unqualified or abusive, the Court considered that they should provisionally be considered as true under the theory of double relevance.

Material jurisdiction:
The Court then determined whether the case fell in its material jurisdiction in the sense that it concerned an issue of civil (as opposed to public) law, which was contested between the applicants. It held that the distinction between civil and public law is fluid and dependent on the nature of the individual case (para. 3.3.). In doing so, it rejected the defendant’s argument that climate protection is to be provided only through public law mechanisms, which was in turn based on the position that the Paris Agreement does not create obligations for corporations and the Swiss legislator had not created specific GHG emissions reductions obligations for corporate actors. This case, the defendant argued, was part of an abusive worldwide campaign by NGOs to accelerate climate protection through litigation. Courts, it furthermore held, lacked the competence to order general emissions reductions targets.

The Court rejected these arguments, noting that the defendant was a private actor with no public authority and that the case was based on civil law (specifically the norms on protection of the personality, Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code, and the liability provisions under Art. 41 ff. of the Swiss Code of Obligations). It noted that Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code protect individuals from unlawful violations of personality rights by third parties: any legal entity, including individuals, whose personality is unlawfully infringed may sue anyone involved in the infringement; any private actor who participates in the violation of personality rights is liable to be sued (para. 3.6.2.1). In codifying this protection of the personality, the legislature deliberately refrained from defining the term “personality.” Instead, it formulated Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code as a general clause to enable the further development of the law and the adaptation of the term to changing times and values. The personality, as protected by these norms, is accordingly defined in a wide way, as the “totality of the individual”, and grants physical, psychological, and social areas of protection, as long as a certain minimum threshold of interference is reached.

The Court accordingly held that the adverse effects asserted by the plaintiffs affect the scope of protection of personality rights under Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code. If the plaintiffs’ statements were accepted as true, climate change has an impact on their physical integrity and personal freedom. Since greenhouse gas emissions from companies such as the defendant are undisputedly partly responsible for climate change, the plaintiffs can invoke the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 f. of the Swiss Civil Code for their claims against the defendant, thereby asserting personal claims under federal civil law (para. 3.6.2.2.).

As concerned the resulting rights and duties arising under civil law, the Court held that courts are not required to create new general climate protection goals in order to answer this question, but that it suffices to enforce existing legislation (para. 3.6.3.). This means that judicial rulings do not replace democratically legitimate climate policies, but complement them.

In making this finding, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that engaging with this case would undermine the separation of powers (para. 3.7.). Instead, citing Art. 29a of the Federal Constitution (guarantee of legal remedy), it noted that every person has the right to have their case heard by a judicial authority in legal disputes. Political questions can be excluded from access to court proceedings, but this applies only to cases of an ‘obvious’ political nature. And in this case, the competence of the civil courts had not been excluded through legislation. It held: “the courts, not the legislative or executive branches, are responsible for assessing alleged violations of the law” (para. 3.7.1.).

Examining the multilayered normative frameworks applicable to climate change, the Court noted that it had not yet been established under Swiss law that fundamental or human rights to life or private- and family life could have a horizontal direct effect among private actors. However, it could not exclude “that this could happen for the first time in the context of a climate case” (para. 3.7.2.). Particularly when interpreting open legal norms of private law (such as the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code), fundamental rights may be taken into consideration. Reiterating past findings from the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Court held that these provisions of the Swiss Civil Code are a civil law iteration of Article 8 ECHR. Noting the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, it noted that the ECHR provides only a subsidiary minimum standard, meaning that domestic law could also provide more stringent protection. Accordingly, it held, indirect horizontal effect of the human right to respect for private and family life was possible, particularly when courts are called to examine legal questions that have not yet been answered to date. Court decisions accordingly act as signposts for the application of legislation, and can feed political debates and give impulses for political change.

The Court then engaged with the defendant’s argument, based on the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, that the state’s duty of climate protection under Article 8 ECHR gives rise to very limitedly justiciable rights, and that the enactment of climate protection measures is a matter for democratic decision-making and not for the judiciary, because climate change raises complex scientific, political, economic, and other issues. The defendant had also called for the strict victim status requirements imposed in KlimaSeniorinnen to be transposed to disputes between private individuals, given their lack of a duty to protect.

The Court distinguished the case before it from KlimaSeniorinnen, noting that KlimaSeniorinnen was about general climate policy goals and the present case was about concrete impacts on individuals (para. 3.8). This meant that the defendant could not derive “any beneficial arguments from the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment for the present civil proceedings”.  Parliamentary discussions that criticized the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment likewise had no salience for these proceedings, and were irrelevant. Neither was foreign case-law cited by the defendant relevant for the court’s consideration of the case (para. 3.9.). Summarizing cases from courts in the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and Germany,  the Court held that these foreign courts have predominantly deemed private-law climate cases admissible and examined them in terms of substantive law. The defendant was therefore unable to derive anything in its favor from this foreign case law (para. 3.9.3.). As a result, the Court held, the case before it was a civil law one.

Whether a sufficiently concrete, clear claim had been made:
The Court then examined whether the plaintiffs have a legal interest in bringing the action. It held that, at the admissibility stage, this did not have to be conclusively proven; it sufficed if, on the balance of probabilities, the interest appeared to exist. Furthermore, the insignificance of the asserted claim (minima non curat praetor) does not lead to the loss of legal interest, unless there is an abuse of rights (para. 4.1.).

The plaintiffs argued that their interest legal protection is personal, practical, and current. Climate change poses an existential threat to small islands and low-lying coasts such as the island of Pari. It affects the livelihoods, health, well-being, food security, access to drinking water, and cultural values of the island’s inhabitants. Sea level rise damages settlements and destroys coastal infrastructure, leading to the loss of economic assets and biodiversity in traditional agricultural ecosystems, as well as a decline in fishing and tourism. The increasing uninhabitability of the island is forcing residents to leave their homes. What those affected have experienced firsthand is confirmed by scientific studies, including IPCC-reviewed science. They had also alleged a number of individualized impacts. They were accordingly affected by Holcim’s activities, notwithstanding the concurrent responsibility of other Carbon Majors.

Citing KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court held that IPCC-reviewed science was the relevant standard for determining any scientific questions related to these claims (para. 5.3.1.). It held that it was undisputed that climate change was having an impact on the world’s population. Engaging with the defendant’s argument that the case was an abstract public interest case, not an individualized claim, it held that the IPCC had noted that up to 3.6 billion people around the world are strongly at risk of impacts from climate change. This meant that the Court could not exclude that the case also had relevance for the interests of third parties. However, it held, “the personal affectedness of the plaintiffs goes beyond the general affectedness of persons who have not (yet) suffered damages from concrete events or have been exposed to an enhanced risk” (para. 5.5.3.). The affectedness of the plaintiffs had to be distinguished from that of the KlimaSeniorinnen applicants. While those applicants had benefitted from access to adaptation measures and their future risk of impact had not been demonstrated, the plaintiffs in this case “had no possibility to halt rising sea levels with reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their need for protection as accordingly more urgent (para. 5.5.4.). This reality likewise distinguished the plaintiffs in this case from those in similar German cases against BMW or Mercedes-Benz. The case was accordingly not to be characterized as an unacceptable actio popularis. In this regard, the Court cited the environmental case-law of the ECtHR concerning the garbage collection crisis in Campania, where the widespread nature of the issue likewise did not render the case an actio popularis.

The Court noted that the defendant was a major greenhouse gas emitter, a “Carbon Major”, and that it would be possible, through case-law, to create threshold criteria to distinguish the responsibility of such carbon major companies from smaller emitters (para. 5.5.6.). This meant that the case could not be rejected on the basis that it would lead to “litigation against everyone”. Climate change required action from both state and private actors if ecosystems, biodiversity, and the foundations of human life, health and welfare were to be protected. Noting the uncertainties involved in calculating probabilities of warming, the Court noted that it was possible that even under existing efforts, climate neutrality may not be achieved. Given the consequences of climate change, the long time during which greenhouse gasses remained in the atmosphere and the unavoidability of further warming and the resulting harms, it was not possible to wait until a universally agreed solution came to exist.

The Court also rejected the claim by the defendant that its contribution to climate change and sea level rise was marginal. The Court held that this does not relieve Holcim of its individual responsibility to contribute to the fight against climate change wherever possible. If the defendant’s line of argument were followed, national climate protection measures would also have to be denied legitimacy, as no country can stop climate change on its own. Neither were the plaintiffs required to bring a case against all emitters at once. In order to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, there is a budget of around 500 gigatons of CO2 remaining. This can only be achieved through immediate and drastic reductions in emissions. The plaintiffs’ interest in the injunction is therefore urgent and current, even if the desired climate neutrality is still a long way off (para. 5.8.). Neither were alternative avenues for achieving the desired protection evident (5.10.).

Quantifiability of emissions reductions:
Holcim argued that the plaintiffs’ claims around the reductions of its CO2 emissions were insufficiently clear and concrete, and that it had not been defined which emissions fell under their understanding of scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. Likewise, it held, there were no binding legal obligations to conduct corporate climate reporting. Scientific standards in this regard were continually evolving, with the plaintiffs using current-day standards that were sure to change in the future. The plaintiffs, by contrast, argued that there was a domestic law obligation to report on greenhouse gas emissions under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 964b (4)).

The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it was unclear what fell under scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, noting that this terminology was used in Holcim’s own climate strategy. It also noted that Holcim had conducted reporting about its CO2 emissions, and that this was a sufficient basis for implementing an eventual judgment in the case.

The Court also rejected Holcim’s argument that the case and any eventual emissions reductions or damages obligations should be limited to itself as a parent company, and not extend to its subsidiaries. Here, the Court held that the parent company participates in the emissions of its subsidiaries, because it creates a climate strategy that encompasses and binds them. In any case, it held, Swiss tort law’s moral damages provisions also apply to a company’s subsidiaries.

Conclusion:
Finding that the claim fell within its jurisdiction and was sufficiently specific, the Court held that the case was admissible. It did not decide on the award of costs for the proceedings to date, reserving this issue to a decision on the merits.

Further information:
For more information, see the dossier compiled by the supporting NGOs in 2022 here, and at the time of the hearing in September 2025 below.

CallForClimateJustice_Dossier_Media_EN_2025Download

The full text of the judgment (German) is available here:

Entscheid+des+Kantonsgerichts+Zug+vom+17.12.2025+A1+2023+9Download

Suggested citation:
Cantonal Court of Zug, Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (Asmania et al. v. Holcim), case A1 2023 9, judgment (admissibility) of 19 December 2025.

Last updated:
22 December 2025

Categories
2021 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Indigenous peoples' rights Non-discrimination Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise United States of America

Aji P. and Others v. the State of Washington

Summary:
This case was brought by 13 young people aged between 8 and 18 who sued the US State of Washington, its Governor, and various other state agencies, arguing that the state had “injured and continue[d] to injure them by creating, operating, and maintaining a fossil fuel-based energy and transportation system that [the State] knew would result in greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, dangerous climate change, and resulting widespread harm.” In doing so, they invoked their “fundamental and inalienable constitutional rights to life, liberty, property, equal protection, and a healthful and pleasant environment, which includes a stable climate system that sustains human life and liberty.” They also invoked the impacts on indigenous peoples’ rights. The plaintiffs requested the judiciary to “[o]rder [the state] to develop and submit to the Court . . . an enforceable state climate recovery plan”.

A number of amici filed briefs in the case. For example, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Quinault Indian Nation, and Suquamish Tribe argued that local tribes were already seeing impacts on their traditional lands and abutting marine waters. The Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW-US) noted the well-documented impacts of climate change on human and constitutional rights. The League of Women Voters of Washington argued that access to judicial action was particularly important for minors who did not enjoy access to the right to vote. And a group of environmental NGOs submitted that “the right to a healthful and pleasant environment underlies our continued ability to claim our explicitly-guaranteed rights to life and liberty.”

On 8 February 2021, the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington held that it “firmly believe[d] that the right to a stable environment should be fundamental.” It also recognized “the extreme harm that greenhouse gas emissions inflict on the environment and its future stability.” However, it held that “it would be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for the court to resolve the Youths’ claims.” It accordingly dismissed the claim.

On 6 October 2021, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington denied the petition for review in this case. González, C.J. (dissenting) noted that the plaintiffs “asked this court to recognize a fundamental right to a healthful and pleasant environment that may be inconsistent with our State’s maintenance of a fossil-fuel-based energy and transportation system that it knows will result in greenhouse gas emissions. These greenhouse gases hasten a rise in the earth’s temperature. This temperature change foreshadows the potential collapse of our environment. In its place is an unstable climate system, conceivably unable to sustain human life and continued enjoyment of ordered liberty under law. Today, we have an opportunity to consider whether these are the sorts of harms that are remediable under Washington’s law and constitution. We should have granted review to decide that question”.

Suggested citation:
Court of Appeals of the State of Washington (USA), Aji P. v. State, 16 Wash. App. 2d 177, 480 P.3d 438, 16 Wn. App. 2d 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

Last updated:
5 July 2022

Categories
Imminent risk Indigenous peoples' rights International Court of Justice Paris Agreement Sea-level rise Vanuatu Vulnerability

ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change

Summary:
On 29 March 2023, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify States’ international obligations concerning climate change. This resolution, Res. A/77/L.58, was prepared on the initiative of the Government of Vanuatu, and was adopted by consensus by the UNGA. This request led to the largest (in terms of participants) proceedings before the ICJ to date, with 97 States and 11 international organisations making written or oral submissions. On 23 July 2025, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion, which was immediately received as a historic and landmark contribution to clarifying the international obligations of States regarding climate change.

Background:
In September 2021, during the UN General Assembly’s annual meeting, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu, Hon. Bob Loughman Weibur, announced that the country would build a coalition of States to seek an advisory opinion on climate change from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The initiative received support from a large number of co-sponsoring states.

The proposal aims to contest “environmental devastation and large-scale violations of human rights for the most vulnerable”. Under the slogan of “bringing the world’s biggest problem to the world’s highest court”, this initative was originally spearheaded by a group of students from the University of the South Pacific. By July 2022, the alliance behind the initative included over 1500 civil society organisations in 130 countries. It also received the endorsement of the Organisation of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (OACPS).

In July 2022, Vanuatu’s Minister of Climate Change, Hon. Silas Bule Melve, clarified the country’s ambitions for the advisory opinion. He stated that “[t]his is not a court case, and we do not seek to assign blame. But we do seek a credible way to bolster climate ambition moving forward to save the Paris Agreement and our blue planet”. The Republic’s legal team in this endeavor is led by Julian Aguon and Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh of the Pacific law firm Blue Ocean Law.

This approach follows an earlier initiative from 2012, by Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, which did not manage to rally a majority of General Assembly members in suport of presenting a question concerning climate change to the ICJ.

Question put to the ICJ:
The resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 29 March 2023. It decided, in accordance with Article 96 UN Charter, to request the ICJ, pursuant to Article 65 of its Statute, to render an advisory opinion on the following question:

“Having particular regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the duty of due diligence, the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of prevention of significant harm to the environment and the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment,

(a) What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations;

(b) What are the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment, with respect to:

(i) States, including, in particular, small island developing States, which due to their geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or specially affected by or are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change?

(ii) Peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change?”

Interim developments:
On 25 April 2023, the President of the ICJ made an Order organizing the proceedings and fixing time limits for written submissions by States and international organisations in this case.

In June 2023, the Court authorized the European Union, the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law and the International Union for Conservation of Nature to participate in the proceedings.

On 26 November 2024, preceding its oral hearings in these proceedings, the Court held an expert hearing with a group of past and present authors of the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), aiming “to enhance the Court’s understanding of the key scientific findings which the IPCC has delivered through its periodic assessment reports covering the scientific basis, impacts and future risks of climate change, and options for adaptation and mitigation.”

Oral hearings:
From December 2-13 2024, the ICJ held oral hearings in these proceedings. The proceedings included involvement from 97 states and 11 international organizations, making them the ICJ’s most extensive to date, and for some States marking their first-ever involvement with the Court.

The written comments received by the Court (91 written statements as well as and 62 comments on those same statements) were made available online during the course of the proceedings alongside verbatim reports of the oral interventions made and a video livestream.

The written and oral proceedings covered a wide range of topics, from the meaning of CBDR-RC and equity, to the recognition of the human right to a healthy environment, to the interplay between international climate law and other areas of international law (e.g. its relationship with human rights frameworks), with some States arguing that the former represented a lex specialis to the latter that precluded further-reaching obligations under human rights law.

Several judges also asked questions during the oral proceedings, to which the participants were given leave to reply.

Advisory opinion of 23 July 2025:

In its advisory opinion, which can be read in full below, the ICJ was concerned with identifying the most directly relevant applicable law concerning the international obligations of States in the context of climate change. As this was not a contentious case, it did not apply the law to the context of a specific State.

The opinion covered a broad range of aspects: from asserting the role of climate science for the law, to confirming non-refoulement obligations and the ITLOS findings on greenhouse gas emissions as marine pollution, to holding that sea-level rise does not deprive countries of marine or land territory or their statehood. The below sets out core aspects of the opinion in a non-exhaustive way.

First, importantly, the Court did not accept the lex specialis argument made by some states to try to insulate climate change from all obligations except for those enshrined in the climate treaties (and particularly the Paris Agreement). The Court found that the relevant international instruments complement each other, and that it could not find any actual inconsistencies between the climate treaties and other relevant rules of international law. This meant that the Court considered various areas of law applicable, and found that States have obligations under the climate treaties but also under customary law, environmental treaties, and human rights law. In doing so, the Court held that the international law enshrines binding obligations also for states that terminate their membership in the Paris Agreement.

The ICJ’s opinion extensively examines the obligations contained in the international climate law framework. In doing so, it considered the temperature target that States must try to stay below. The Court interpreted the Paris Agreement based on COP decisions (which, it held, represent “subsequent agreements” under the VCLT) and in doing so recognized the 1,5 degree warming threshold as States’ primary goal, over the 2 degree warming threshold also enshrined in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. Moving to mitigation, the Court held that that Paris Agreement requires States to set out a nationally determined contribution (NDC) based on stringent standard of due diligence. Rejecting the argument that these could not be subjected to any substantive review, it held that NDCs must satisfy certain standards under the Paris Agreement and that the NDCs of all States must, when taken together as a group, be capable of realizing the objectives of the Agreement as set out in article 2 (the 1,5 degree temperature goal).

The Court also examined the adaptation obligations under the Paris Agreement. It held that States have legally binding obligations to take adaptation planning actions. The fulfilment of these adaptation obligations is to be assessed against a standard of due diligence. That means that it is incumbent on States parties to the Paris Agreement to take measures that can enhance adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability to climate-related impacts.

Turning to obligations under customary international law, including the prohibition of significant transboundary environmental harm (the ‘no harm’ rule), the Court held that this obligation applied to the context of climate change, and was not restricted to territorially limited, local situations. The Court recognized that the standard of due diligence for preventing significant harm to the climate system is stringent. This meant that States are expected to display a heightened degree of vigilance and that preventive measures are required. Customary international law, the Court held, also enshrines a duty for States to cooperate with each other. In addition, the Court flagged principles of sustainable development, CBDR-RC, equity, intergenerational equity, precautionary principle as applicable guiding principles.

On human rights law, the Court held that a wide range of human rights were at risk in the context of climate change. Concerning the applicability of human rights obligations, it held that these were not displaced by the climate treaties as a lex specialis. Instead, it held that “the core human rights treaties, including the ICESCR [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and the ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], and the human rights recognized under customary international law form part of the most directly relevant applicable law” (para. 145). It went on to find that international human rights law must inform States’ obligations under other sources of obligations, including the climate treaties and customary international law, and vice versa, in the interest of a harmonized interpretation (para. 404). The Court also recognized the importance of the right to a healthy environment, which it described as “inherent in the enjoyment of other human rights” (para. 393). It also indicated that human rights norms could potentially apply extraterritorially.

The Court also made various findings concerning reparations, although not aimed directly ad human rights law or individual redress. It held that the main mitigation obligations set forth in the climate change treaties apply erga omnes and applied the customary rules on reparations (ARSIWA). Notably, it also emphasized the existence of production-side obligations (“[f]ailure of a State to take appropriate action to protect the climate system from GHG emissions — including through fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies — may constitute an internationally wrongful act which is attributable to that State” (para. 427).

Full text of the advisory opinion:

187-20250723-adv-01-00-enDownload

Further reading:

Suggested citation:
International Court of Justice, advisory opinion regarding the obligations of States in respect of climate change, 23 July 2025, no. 187.

Last updated:
3 October 2025.

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to life Right to property South Korea

Woodpecker et al. v. South Korea (‘Baby Climate Litigation’)

Summary:
In June 2022, a climate case was filed in South Korea by sixty-two babies and children under the age of 11, including a 20-week-old fetus nicknamed “Woodpecker”, who was born after the proceedings were launched. The claimants submitted that the State was violating the rights of future generations by failing to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. At the time of filing, this was the fourth climate case challenging the constitutionality of the Korean climate policy, as contained in the country’s 2021 Carbon Neutrality Act (2021). In this case, the claimants argue that the mitigation measures set out in this Act (envisioning a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 as compared with 2018 levels) violates their constitutional rights to life, equality, property, and to live in a healthy and pleasant environment. To do so, they extensively discuss IPCC reports and successful domestic climate litigation in other jurisdictions (particularly the Urgenda and Neubauer judgments).

More specifically, the plaintiffs contested Article 3(1) of the 2022 Enforcement Decree of the 2021 domestic Carbon Neutrality Act, arguing that this provision was unconstitutional because it violated:

  • their right to life, pursuit of happiness and general freedom of action (Article 10 of the South Korean Constitution, ‘Guarantee of Human Dignity and Fundamental Rights’);
  • their right to equality (Article 11 of the Constitution);
  • their right to property (Article 23 of the Constitution);
  • thir right to live in a healthy and pleasant environment (Article 35 of the Constitution); and
  • the state’s obligation to prevent disasters and protect the people from the risk of environmental disasters (Article 34(6) and Article 35(2) of the Constitution).

According to the Guardian, this was the first climate case in which a foetus was listed as a claimant. Together, the four cases reportedly represent the first findings of their kind in Asia (i.e. the first time that a court has find that inadequate mitigation action violates fundamental rights).

Relevant developments:
On 12 June 2023, it was announced that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea had decided to submit an opinion to South Korea’s Constitutional Court to oppose the country’s Carbon Neutrality Act (2021), which it considered to be unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of future generations because it sets out a greenhouse gas emissions reductions target that was too low. The Act sets out a 40% emissions reductions target by 2030 as compared to 2018 levels. This, the Commission found, did not respect the constitutional principle of equality, because it passed the burden of greenhouse gas emissions on to future generations.

Consolidation with three other cases:
The South Korean Constitutional Court decided to consolidate its first four climate cases (Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea, Woodpecker et al. v. South Korea (Baby Climate Litigation) (the present case), Climate Crisis Emergency Action v. South Korea (a.k.a. Byung-In Kim et al. v. South Korea) and Min-A Park v. South Korea). Public hearings in the cases were held on 23 April 2024 and 21 May 2024.

These cases all alleged that the government’s inadequate greenhouse gas reduction targets violated citizens’ fundamental rights, particularly those of future generations. Together, the four cases comprised over 250 plaintiffs, including civil society, youth and children. The Constitutional Court issued a joint ruling in these cases on 29 August 2024.

Judgment of the constitutional court:
On 29 August 2024, the South Korean Constitutional Court found a violation of constitutional rights in this case and three related cases. In an unanimous ruling, hailed as “the first decision of its kind in Asia“, the court found that the government’s response to the climate crisis was inadequate and threatened constitutional rights, noting that the country lacked legally binding long-term emissions reductions targets for the post-2031 period, which violated the constitutional rights of future generations by shifting an excessive reductions burden to the future. The court gave government and legislature 18 months (until 28 February 2026) to introduce the relevant targets.

In particular, the Court ruled that Article 8(1) of the South Korean Carbon Neutrality Basic Act was unconstitutional. Previously, the government had pledged a 40% reduction of its GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 2018 levels, but had failed to set any targets since. The Constitutional Court held that this “does not have the minimum character necessary as a protective measure corresponding to the dangerous situation of the climate crisis”, citing the “principle of non-underprotection”, which means that the State must take appropriate measures to effectively protect the constitutional rights of its citizens.

Simultaneously, the Court held that the government’s target for 2030 did not infringe constitutional rights.

See also:
Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea.

Last updated:
29 August 2024.

Categories
2022 Austria Belgium Cyprus Denmark European Court of Human Rights France Germany Greece Luxembourg Private and family life Right to life Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands The United Kingdom

Soubeste and 4 other applications v. Austria and 11 other States

Summary:
On 21 June 2022, it was reported that an application had been filed at the European Court of Human Rights concerning membership in the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994 (ECT), which entered into force in 1998. The case was brought by five young people, aged between 17 and 31, who allege that the 12 respondent States’ membership of the ECT stymies climate action, thereby violating their rights under Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life) ECHR.

It was further reported that the 12 respondent States in this case are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Britain. In these States, corporate actors in the fossil fuel sector can bring legal action against the respective governments for losses of profits due to energy-related measures, thereby raising the costs of the green energy transition or making it illusory. The applicants argue that their Convention rights have been violated as a result.

In this regard, the IPCC pointed out in Chapter 14 of Working Group III report in the Sixth Assessment Cycle in 2022 (available here) that “bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, include provisions for using a system of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) designed to protect the interests of investors in energy projects from national policies that could lead their assets to be stranded. Numerous scholars have pointed to ISDS being able to be used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed at phasing out the use of their assets”. It also noted that “international investment agreements may lead to ‘regulatory chill’, which may lead to countries refraining from or delaying the adoption of mitigation policies, such as phasing out fossil fuels”.

Status of case:

The case was initially adjourned until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the climate change cases pending before it (see the ECtHR’s press release here).

On 24 July 2024, it was reported that the applicants had withdrawn their application after the European Union agreed to leave the ECT and the governments of France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom initiated the procedures to terminate their membership in the treaty.

Suggested case citation:

European Court of Human Rights, Soubeste and 4 other applications v. Austria and 11 other States (nos. 31925/22, 31932/22, 31938/22, 31943/22, and 31947/22), application filed on 21 June 2022 (not yet communicated).

Last updated:

15 March 2023

Categories
2022 Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court Germany Right to assembly and association

Fridays for Future v. Augsburg

Summary:

In the City of Augsburg, Germany, the movement Fridays for Future Augsburg set up a climate camp (“Klima-Camp”) next to the city’s town hall in July 2020. The Camp was then disbanded by the city. The activists filed a complaint invoking their right to assembly guaranteed by Art. 8 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz; GG). The city disputed a violation of Art. 8 GG with the argument that the camp primarly had the character of an “event, fun and entertainment” and that it focused on activities such as painting banners and organizing various workshop rather than expressing opinions. Hence it was argued that the camp did not constitute an assembly protected by Art. 8 GG.

Both the lower Administrative Court as well as the Higher Administrative Court of Bavaria (BayVGH) came to the contrary conclusion. The BayVGH argued that diverse forms of communal activities are protected by Art. 8 GG and so the aforementioned activities performed by the climate camp fall under the scope of the right to assembly, although they may be non-verbal.

The city criticised the court for refraining from making a more general statement on the legality of a permanent protest camp, as the court only considered the time frame of 1-10 July 2020, which was the subject of the dispute. Nevertheless, the city of Augsburg decided not to appeal the decision of the BayVGH.

Although described as a “thorn in the city’s eye“, the camp was still standing in 2023, and was the subject of separate criminal proceedings taken against various participants.

Date of decision:
8 March 2022

Status of case:
The City of Augsburg decided not to appeal to the Federal Administrative Court, but rather to impose stricter conditions for the permanent assembly.

Suggested case citation:
Higher Administrative Court of Bavaria, Fridays for Future Augsburg v. City of Augsburg, Decision of the tenth Senate of 8 March 2022 – Au 8 K 20.1179

Case documents:

20220308_decisionDownload

Date last updated:
4 January 2024

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Germany Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to a healthy environment Right to life

Luca Salis et al. v. Sachsen-Anhalt

Summary:
This constitutional complaint was brought by three young people against the German State (“Bundesland”) of Sachsen-Anhalt in the wake of the Neubauer v. Germany judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. It is one of ten separate constitutional complaints and one subsidiary popular complaint supported by the NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe against ten Bundesländer. They contest the State’s failure to chart a course towards greenhouse gas emissions reductions by adopting legislation on climate protection. The state abandoned efforts to adopt such a law after an initiative in this regard failed in 2013, relying on the Paris Agreement and the German Constitution. Like in the eleven related cases, the plaintiffs here argue that the Bundesländer share responsibility for protecting their lives and civil liberties, along with those of future generations, within their respective spheres of competence. According to the plaintiffs, the lack of legislation on climate action on the state level violates the German Constitution and the reductions regime under the Paris Agreement. They also submit that they have a fundamental right to defend themselves against future rights impacts caused by the lack of climate measures.

On 18 January 2022, the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed all eleven complaints for lack of adequate prospects of success. In alignment with its argumentation in Neubauer v. Germany, the First Senate recognized that the burden of CO2 emissions reductions must not be unilaterally offloaded onto future generations. However, the First Senate stated the individual legislators of the Bundesländer have not been been given an overall reduction target to comply with, even at the expense of freedom protected by fundamental rights. Thus, according to the First Senate’s decision, a violation of the obligations to protect the complainants from the dangers of climate change cannot be established. As regards to the Bundesländer, the First Senate clarified that they still have a responsibility to protect the climate, particularly by virtue of Article 20a of the German Constitution.

Rights invoked:
The applicants invoked violations of freedoms guaranteed under the domestic Constitution, especially those in Art. 2(2) of the German Constitution (right to life and physical integrity and freedom of the person), in combination with Article 20a of the Constitution (protection of the natural foundations of life and of animals). They invoked these rights in their ‘intertemporal dimension’, i.e. taking on the framing of the Neubauer case, which considered that failure to act now on climate change means excessively impacting future freedoms.

Date of decision:

18 January 2022

Suggested citation:
German Bundesverfassungsgericht, Luca Salis et al. v. Sachsen-Anhalt, Decision of the First Senate of 18 January 2022 – 1 BvR 1565/21 et al.

Related proceedings:
For the other related cases see:

Lemme et al. v. Bayern

Emma Johanna Kiehm et al. v. Brandenburg

Alena Hochstadt et al. v. Hessen

Otis Hoffman et al. v. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Leonie Frank et al. v. Saarland

Tristan Runge et al. v. Sachsen

Jannis Krüssmann et al. Nordrhein-Westfalen (NWR)

Cosima Rade et al. v. Baden-Württemberg

Matteo Feind et al. v. Niedersachsen

Links:

For the decision in German, see here.

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Germany Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Self-determination

Marlene Lemme et al. v. Bayern

Summary:
This case is one of ten separate constitutional complaints and one subsidiary popular complaint supported by the NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe against ten German States (“Bundesländer”). It was brought by ten youth plaintiffs concerning the codification of the adjusted climate goals brought about in response to the Neubauer v. Germany judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. According to the applicants, in their constitutional claim, the German States (“Bundesländer”) share responsibility for protecting their lives and civil liberties, along with those of future generations, within their spheres of competence. They argue that the lack of legislation on climate action on the state level violates the German Constitution and the reductions regime under the Paris Agreement, and that they have a fundamental right to defend themselvse against future rights impacts caused by the lack of climate measures.

The Bavarian Climate Protection Act (Bayerisches Klimaschutzgesetz) aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030. It also aims to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, and requires Bavaria to offset emissions after 2030. This has been implemented through a climate protection program. According to the plaintiffs, the lack of a deadline of adaptation strategy, and the failure to provide differentiated targets or instruments for implementation of compliance, mean that the Bavarian law falls short of the Federal requirements on climate protection measures.

On 18 January 2022, the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed all eleven complaints for lack of adequate prospects of success. In alignment with its argumentation in Neubauer v. Germany, the First Senate recognized that the burden of CO2 emissions reductions must not be unilaterally offloaded onto future generations. However, the First Senate stated the individual legislators of the Bundesländer have not been been given an overall reduction target to comply with, even at the expense of freedom protected by fundamental rights. Thus, according to the First Senate’s decision, a violation of the obligations to protect the complainants from the dangers of climate change cannot be established. As regards to the Bundesländer, the First Senate clarified that they still have a responsibility to protect the climate, particularly by virtue of Article 20a of the German Constitution.

Rights invoked:
The applicants invoked violations of various freedoms guaranteed under the domestic Constitution, especially those in Art. 2(1) of the German Constitution (right to free development of one’s personality), in combination with Article 20a of the Constitution (protection of the natural foundations of life and of animals). They invoked these rights in their ‘intertemporal dimension’, i.e. taking on the framing of the Neubauer case, which considered that failure to act now on climate change means excessively impacting future freedoms.

Date of decision:
18 January 2022

Related proceedings:
In addition to the constitutional proceedings, a subsidiary popular complaint has been brought by the same group of applicants to contend that the Bavarian Climate Protection Act (Bayerisches Klimaschutzgesetz), along with the wider regulatory context, is in violation of constitutional rights.

Suggested citation:
German Bundesverfassungsgericht, Marlene Lemme and Nine Other v. Bavaria, constitutional complaint of 30 June 2021.

For the other related cases see:

Luca Salis et al. v. Sachsen-Anhalt

Emma Johanna Kiehm et al. v. Brandenburg

Alena Hochstadt et al. v. Hessen

Otis Hoffman et al. v. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Leonie Frank et al. v. Saarland

Tristan Runge et al. v. Sachsen

Jannis Krüssmann et al. Nordrhein-Westfalen (NWR)

Cosima Rade et al. v. Baden-Württemberg

Matteo Feind et al. v. Niedersachsen

Categories
2022 Children and young people Deciding Body Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Germany Keywords Paris Agreement Right to life Rights at stake State concerned Year

Matteo Feind et al. v. Niedersachsen

Summary:
This case is one of ten separate constitutional complaints and one subsidiary popular complaint supported by the NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe against ten German States (“Bundesländer”). It was brought by five young people against the German State of Niedersachsen in the wake of the Neubauer v. Germany judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. They contest the State’s failure to chart a course towards greenhouse gas emissions reductions by adopting legislation on climate protection. Like in the eleven related cases, the plaintiffs here argue that the Bundesländer share responsibility for protecting their lives and civil liberties, along with those of future generations, within their respective spheres of competence. According to the plaintiffs, the lack of legislation on climate action on the state level violates the German Constitution and the reductions regime under the Paris Agreement. They also submit that they have a fundamental right to defend themselves against future rights impacts caused by the lack of climate measures.

According to the plaintiffs, Niedersachsen’s Climate Protection Act goals for the years 2030 (reduction by 55%) and 2050 (climate neutrality), are insufficient. The plaintiffs argue that Niedersachsen’s climate neutrality goal for 2050 violated federal law, where climate neutrality was stipulated for 2045.

On 18 January 2022, the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed all eleven complaints for lack of adequate prospects of success. In alignment with its argumentation in Neubauer v. Germany, the First Senate recognized that the burden of CO2 emissions reductions must not be unilaterally offloaded onto future generations. However, the First Senate stated the individual legislators of the Bundesländer have not been been given an overall reduction target to comply with, even at the expense of freedom protected by fundamental rights. Thus, according to the First Senate’s decision, a violation of the obligations to protect the complainants from the dangers of climate change cannot be established. As regards to the Bundesländer, the First Senate clarified that they still have a responsibility to protect the climate, particularly by virtue of Article 20a of the German Constitution.

Rights invoked:
The applicants invoked violations of freedoms guaranteed under the domestic Constitution, especially those in Art. 2(2) of the German Constitution (right to life and physical integrity and freedom of the person), in combination with Article 20a of the Constitution (protection of the natural foundations of life and of animals). They invoked these rights in their ‘intertemporal dimension’, i.e. taking on the framing of the Neubauer case, which considered that failure to act now on climate change means excessively impacting future freedoms.

Date of decision:

18 January 2022

Suggested citation:
German Bundesverfassungsgericht, Matteo Feind et al. v. Niedersachsen, Decision of the First Senate of 18 January 2022 – 1 BvR 1565/21 et al.

Related proceedings:
For the other related cases see:

Luca Salis et al. v. Sachsen-Anhalt

Lemme et al. v. Bayern

Emma Johanna Kiehm et al. v. Brandenburg

Alena Hochstadt et al. v. Hessen

Otis Hoffman et al. v. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Leonie Frank et al. v. Saarland

Tristan Runge et al. v. Sachsen

Jannis Krüssmann et al. Nordrhein-Westfalen (NWR)

Cosima Rade et al. v. Baden-Württemberg

Links:

For the decision in German, see here.