Category: Standing/admissibility

Categories
2023 Biodiversity Children and young people Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Sea-level rise Separation of powers Standing/admissibility United States of America Victim status Vulnerability

Navahine F., a Minor v. Dept. of Transportation of Hawai’i et al.

Summary:
In January 2022, fourteen young people filed suit against the Department of Transportation of the US state of Hawai’i (HDOT), its Director, the state’s Governor, and the State itself. In Hawai’i Circuit Court, they alleged that the state’s transportation system violated the Hawai‘ian Constitution’s public trust doctrine and the right to a clean and healthful environment that it enshrines. The plaintiffs argued that the state and its authorities had “engaged in an ongoing pattern and practice of promoting, funding, and implementing transportation projects that lock in and escalate the use of fossil fuels, rather than projects that mitigate and reduce emissions”. Arguing that Hawai’i was the most carbon-dependent state in the nation, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They made a variety of arguments about the destruction of the Hawai’ian environment, coral reefs, native species of plants and marine life, and beaches; about their health and well-being, including about climate anxiety and about existing health conditions that are aggravated by the effects of climate change; about flooding and its impact on their ability to go to school; about water and food security, including impacts on traditional food sources, traditional and indigenous ways of life and culture; about wildfires; and about climate anxiety.

Claims made:
The plaintiffs note that Article XI, section 1 of the Hawai’i Constitution requires Defendants “[f]or the benefit of present and future generations,” to “conserve and protect Hawai’i’s natural beauty and all natural resources.” Article XI, section 1 further declares that “[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.” The Constitution also explicitly recognizes the right to a clean and healthful environment. Noting the special vulnerability of Hawai’i to climate-related ecological damage, including from sea-level rise, and the disproportionate harm to children and youth, including the lifetime exposure disparities concerning extreme events such as heat waves, wildfires, crop failures, droughts, and floods, they allege that the state of Hawai’i, through its Department of Transportation, has “systematically failed to exercise its statutory and constitutional authority and duty to implement Hawai’i’s climate change mitigation goals and to plan for and ensure construction and operation of a multimodal, electrified transportation system that reduces vehicle miles traveled and greenhouse gas emissions, and helps to eliminate Hawai’i’s dependence on imported fossil fuels”.

Ruling on Motion to Dismiss:
On 6 April 2023, the First Circuit Court rejected the respondent’s motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The state had argued that the public trust doctrine did not apply to the climate, “because climate is not air, water, land, minerals, energy resource or some other “localized” natural resource.” It had also argued that any efforts by the state would not have an impact on climate change given the scale of the problem.

The Court held in this regard that, in any event, the state as trustee had an obligation to keep its assets, i.e. its trust property, from falling into disrepair. It thereby rejected the argument that climate change was “too big a problem” and the idea that the state had no obligation to reasonably monitor and maintain its natural resources by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and planning alternatives to fossil-fuel heavy means of transportation. The Court also recognized that “the alleged harms are not hypothetical or only in the future. They are current, ongoing, and getting worse.”

On the argument that the applicants did not have a sufficient interest in the case, the Court held that the plaintiffs “stand to inherit a world with severe climate change and the resulting damage to our natural resources. This includes rising temperatures, sea level rise, coastal erosion, flooding, ocean warming and acidification with severe impacts on marine life, and more frequent and extreme droughts and storms. Destruction of the environment is a concrete interests (sic).”

Finding that arguments based on the political question doctrine were premature in this case, and citing case-law finding that this doctrine does not bar claim based on public trust duties, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the case.

Trial date set:
It was announced in August 2023 that trial dates for this case had been scheduled for 24 June-12 July 2024 at the Environmental Court of the First Circuit for Hawai’i. This would make this only the second-ever constitutional rights climate case to go to trial in the United States, after the Held and others v. Montana case. The case will be heard by First Circuit Judge John Tonaki.

Settlement Agreement:
On 20 June 2024, Hawai’i officials announced a groundbreaking Settlement Agreement with plaintiffs, marking a significant milestone. The Court approved the historic Navahine Agreement as fair and in the best interests of the youth plaintiffs. This landmark Agreement upholds children’s constitutional rights to a climate capable of sustaining life and mandates transformative changes in Hawai’i’s transportation system.

The Agreement emphasises HDOT’s responsibility to preserve Hawai’i’s public trust resources and ensure a clean and healthy environment for all residents. By 2045, HDOT is committed to achieving zero emissions across all modes of transportation, including ground, sea, and interisland air travel. The Agreement also includes numerous provisions for immediate and ongoing action by HDOT, such as establishing a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Plan, creating designated units and roles within HDOT, forming a youth council, improving transportation infrastructure budgeting processes, and making immediate, ambitious investments in clean transportation infrastructure. The Court will retain jurisdiction over the agreement until 2045 to oversee compliance with its terms.

This Settlement Agreement sets a precedent as the first of its kind, where government defendants collaborate with youth plaintiffs to address constitutional climate concerns. It commits to the systemic decarbonization of Hawai’i’s transportation sector, aiming to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and lessen dependence on fossil fuels.

Further information:
For the ruling of the First Circuit Court, see here. For the text of Settlement Agreement, see here.

Suggested citation:
First Circuit Court of the State of Hawai’i, Navahine F., a Minor v. Dept. of Transportation et al., Civ. No. 1CCV-22-0000631, ruling of 6 April 2023.

Last updated:
24 June 2024

Categories
2023 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Margin of appreciation Paris Agreement Separation of powers Spain Standing/admissibility Victim status

Greenpeace Spain et al. v. Spain

Summary:
In 2020, three environmental NGOs (Greenpeace, Ecologistas en Acción and Oxfam Intermón) challenged the level of ambition of the Spanish government’s domestic greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets in what has been described as the first-ever Spanish climate case. At the material time, the Spanish ambition was to reduce emissions by 23% by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels); the three NGOs argued that this target should have been more ambitious, at 55%. In the absence of any response to the challenge by the Government, in September 2020, the three NGOs filed an administrative appeal to the Spanish Supreme Court. In 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, with the plaintiffs announcing their intention to seize the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Claims made:
These proceedings challenged delays in the adoption of the National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (‘Plan Nacional Integrado de Energía y Clima’ or PNIEC), as required under European Union law (by 31 December 2019, see EU Regulation 2018/1999), as well as its low level of amibition. The Spanish government missed this deadline, only transmitting its PNIEC to the European Commission on 31 March 2020. In their pleadings, the applicants argued that the Spanish state must take more ambitious measures in order to guarantee respect for human and environmental rights for present and future generations.

Ruling:
On 24 July 2023, the case was decided by the Spanish Supreme Court, which rejected the appeal in full. The Court noted the formal nature of the complaints about delays in the adoption of the plan, and emphasized the short time frame for the adoption of the PNIEC imposed by EU law, as well as the complexity of decision-making within multi-level governance frameworks, which meant that the plan could not be considered void as a whole.

As concerns the level of amibition of the plan, the Supreme Court noted the need to decide this case under Spanish law, and not the case-law from other jurisdictions that had been cited by the applicants; it also noted the need to respect the concrete legal obligations that Spain had assumed under the Paris Agreement, as well as the need to balance climate action with the interests of a sustainable economy.

The Court held that the State had a wide margin of discretion in this context, and that the case was asking it to exceed its role by not only declareing an acceptable emissions target, but accordingly by imposing far-reaching changes to Spain’s economic policy. It noted that while the targets under the Paris Agreement were minimum targets (“at least”), as were those under EU law, the Spanish legislator had chosen to adhere to these minima, and not to exceed them.

On the fundamental rights claim, the Court referred to EU law on locus standi, especially the Armando Carvalho case. It emphasized the need to prevent voiding the criterion of direct and individual concern. Accordingly, it found that the alleged infringement of human rights by the PNIEC was not sufficient in itself to render these claims admissible. The decision to adhere to the minima set out under EU law could not be considered arbitrary, but instead constituted a legitimate exercise of the Spanish government’s constitutional powers.

Further proceedings:
After the ruling was issued, Lorena Ruiz-Huerta, counsel for the plaintiff organizations, announced their intention to take this case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in order to “force the State to protect the human rights that are seriously threatened by climate change”.

Suggested citation:
Spanish Supreme Court, Greenpeace Spain et al. v. Spain, no. 1079/2023, 24 July 2023, ECLI:ES:TS:2023:3556.

Further information:
For the Supreme Court’s ruling (in Spanish), see here.

The applicants’ pleadings (in Spanish) are available via ClimateCaseChart.com.

Last updated:
4 August 2023

Categories
2023 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Standing/admissibility Victim status

Citizens’ Committee on the Kobe Coal-Fired Power Plant v. Kobe Steel Ltd., et al.

Summary:
On 20 March 2023, a first-instance court in Japan heard a civil case concerning the construction and operation of new coal-fired power plants brought by the citizens of Kobe. Two weeks previously, on 9 March 2023, the Japanese Supreme Court refused to hear its first-ever administrative climate case concerning the same set of facts, giving no substantive reasons for doing so. In the civil case, which was filed in 2018, 40 citizens of Kobe brought suit against three corporations involved in the construction and operation of the plants. They argued that these plants would impact themtheir personal rights and right to a peaceful life both through air pollution and through their contribution to the climate change.

As Grace Nishikawa and Masako Ichihara have explained on the Sabin Center’s Climate Law Blog, ‘personal rights’ are established through case-law and frequently enter into play in environmental cases. They protect personal well-being, including the rights to life, bodily integrity, health, and a peaceful life (the last of which the authors compare to the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights). The plaintiffs in this case invoked these personal rights, arguing that the coal plants would aggravate climate change, leading to extreme heat and rainfall events that would directly affect them. In their submissions, they made arguments based on international and comparative law, mentioning carbon budgets, the Paris Agreement, the Dutch Urgenda case, and the Glasgow Climate Pact.

In its first-instance judgment, the Kobe District Court accepted that greenhouse emissions, including those from the plant, contribute to climate change and can violate personal rights. However, it found the risk of harm to the individual plaintiffs to be too uncertain, and rejected their claim, noting the difficulty of causally attributing responsibility for damage related to climate change.

Concerning the alleged violation of the right to a peaceful life, which the plaintiffs argued contains a right to a healthy and peaceful life, the Court likewise rejected this claim, for the same reasons, finding that fears about climate change were not concrete enough to constitute human rights violation. The Court also noted that there was no legally recognized right stable climate in Japan.

Concerning the additional air pollution complaint, the Court found that this was not serious enough to constitute a concrete danger to the plaintiffs’ rights. It also did not engage with the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction halting the operation of the coal plants.

Appeal:
Climate Case Chart reports that an appeal in this case was filed on 4 January 2023.

Further reading:
The above draws on the following two key sources:

The original case documents (in Japanese) are available via Climate Case Chart.

Suggested citation:
Kobe District Court, Citizens’ Committee on the Kobe Coal-Fired Power Plant v. Kobe Steel Ltd., et al., Judgment of 20 March 2023.

Last updated:
20 July 2023

Categories
2023 Canada Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Public trust doctrine Right to life Standing/admissibility Vulnerability

Mathur et al. v. HM the Queen in Right of Ontario

Summary:
On 25 November 2019, seven Canadian young people and the NGO Ecojustice brought a case against the State of Ontario, arguing that it had failed to take adequate action to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions and contesting the State’s “dangerously inadequate GHG reduction target” as set out under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act of 2018. Under this legislation, Ontario aims to reduce GHG emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. To contest the adequacy of this target, and the previous repeal of the more ambitious Climate Change Act (with its target of 45% reductions by 2030), the applicants invoked sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom (the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right to equal protection under the law). Arguing that they have a serious and genuine interest in this case, which also impacts all Ontario youth and future generations, they noted that climate change will cause heat-related fatalities, harms to human health, increased fire activity and the spread of disease, increased flooding and other extreme weather events, harmful algal blooms and exposure to contaminants, harms to Indigenous peoples, and psychological harms and mental distress.

Claims made:
Noting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the leading role of developed countries under the Paris Agreement, the applicants argued that Ontario’s current emissions reductions target compromises their right to life, liberty and security of the person “in a serious and pervasive manner that does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice”. They furthermore submitted that the target violated the right to liberty of Ontario’s youth and future generations, because it impacted their ability to make choices about their futures. They invoked the principle of “societal preservation” and human dignity, and argued for the recognition of a right to a stable climate system. Concerning the right to equal protection under the law, they argued that youth and future generations are in a uniquely vulnerable situation given their age and exclusion from political participation and the fact that they will be disproportionately impacted by climate change.

Relief sought:
Among other things, the applicants sought the invalidation of the existing emissions reductions targets and the rules for setting such targets, a declaration that it violates unwritten constitutional principles about avoiding harm, a recognition of the right to a stable climate system, and an order that Ontario must set out a science based GHG reduction target consistent with its share of global emissions.

Decision on admissibility:
On 12 November 2020, the Superior Court of Justice for Ontario rejected a motion from the government to dismiss the case. The government had invoked the absence of a right to a stable climate from the Charter, the plaintiffs’ alleged lack standing to represent future generations, and the absence of sufficient evidence or a reasonable cause of action.

Hearing:
A hearing in this case was heard from 12-14 September 2022.

2023 Judgment:
On 14 April 2023, the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario delivered its judgment in the case. The Court found that, although the policies in question were justiciable given that the applicants had challenged specific state acts and legislation, the applicants had not established a violation of their rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In her judgment, Justice Vermette noted that the issue of establishing Ontario’s “fair share” of the remaining carbon budget was not a justiciable issue, and “should be determined in another forum” (para. 109). Justice Vermette did consider it “indisputable that, as a result of climate change, the Applicants and Ontarians in general are experiencing an increased risk of death and an increased risk to the security of the person” (para. 120). However, she disagreed with the applicants’ characterization of the emissions reductions target as “authorizing, incentivizing, facilitating and creating the very level of dangerous GHG that will lead to the catastrophic consequences of climate change for Ontarians”, finding that “the target does not authorize or incentivize GHG” (para. 122).

While the target was not legally meaningless, and justiciable under the Charter, Justice Vermette found (contrary to the arguments of the applicants) that the question at issue was whether the Charter imposed positive obligations. Leaving this question open, albeit acknowledging that “the Applicants make a compelling case that climate change and the existential threat that it poses to human life and security of the person present special circumstances that could justify the imposition of positive obligations under section 7 of the Charter”, Justice Vermette found that any putative deprivation of Charter rights at stake was not contrary to “the principles of fundamental justice”, i.e. neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate. This test applies because the relevant right in the Charter, i.e. its Article 7, stipulates that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

Concerning the equality claim under Article 15 of the Charter, Justice Vermette found that Ontario’s climate policy did not distinguish based on age, but made a temporal distinction, and that accordingly there was no violation of that provision either.

Proceedings on Appeal:
An appeal by the applicants was heard by the Ontario Court of Appeal — the highest court in the state of Ontario — in January 2024. On 17 October 2024, this court unanimously ruled that the case should be referred back to the previous instance, the Superior Court of Justice for Ontario, for a new hearing, finding that the case raised important issues and that the lower court judge’s analysis was flawed on key points. The Court of Appeal ordered a new hearing in the case before the Superior Court of Justice.

The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously found that the previous instance had erred in framing this case as seeking to impose new positive obligations on the State of Ontario (para. 5). Instead, it found that through state law, specifically the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act of 2018, the government of Ontario had “voluntarily assumed a positive statutory obligation to combat climate change”. The ruling also invited the applicants to broaden the scope of their case by incorporating arguments made by amicus curiae and to adduce further evidence.

In doing so, the Court found that:

[6]          The interveners raised relevant, important issues that were not determined by the application judge, either because they were not raised before her or did not affect her analysis, or because she declined to address them since they were not pleaded in the notice of application. They included whether the Target breached the Charter rights of Indigenous peoples in Ontario and their s. 35 rights under the Constitution Act, 1982; the integration of the public trust doctrine; the application of international law, including international environmental law, in the interpretation of Charter rights; the application of the best interests of the child principle; and the recognition and impact of certain unwritten constitutional principles, including societal preservation and ecological sustainability.

Further reading:

  • The original application is available in full from Climate Case Chart, as is the admissibility order.
  • The 2023 judgment in the case is available here.
  • A comment on the judgment in this case, as well as its context, is available from Christie A. MacLeod, Annafaye Dunbar, and Rosemarie Sarrazin (Miller Thomson) here.
  • The 2024 ruling of the Ontario Court of Appeal can be found here.

Suggested citation:
Superior Court of Justice for Ontario, Mathur v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 2316, 14 April 2023.

Ontario Court of Appeal, Mathur v. Ontario, 2024 ONCA 762, 17 October 2024.

Last updated:
13 November 2024.

Categories
Access to a remedy Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Gender / women-led Imminent risk Non-discrimination Private and family life Right to life Standing/admissibility The United Kingdom Victim status

Plan B. Earth and Others v. the United Kingdom

Summary:

On 11 July 2022, an application against the United Kingdom was filed before the European Court of Human Rights by the NGO Plan B. Earth and four individual applicants. The applicants argued that the United Kingdom’s government violated their rights under Articles 2, 8 and 14 of the ECHR by failing to take practical and effective measures to tackle the threat of anthropogenic climate change. They also submitted that they had suffered violations of their procedural rights under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR because they had been denied a full hearing of their case.

Citing the UK Government’s acknowledgment of the fact that climate change is a serious threat to humanity, the applicant NGO submitted that its membership included those “who are exposed to disproportionate and discriminatory impacts and risks, whether by virtue of age, gender, mental health or membership of racially marginalised communities, or because their family life is inextricably linked to communities on the frontline of the crisis.” The applicants also cited the State’s positive obligation to safeguard the right to life, and argued that the Paris Agreement, and its temperature goal of 1,5 degrees Celsius, are relevant in determining the scope of these positive obligations. They argued that practical and effective measures are required to ensure climate mitigation, adaptation, finance flows and loss and damage, and that the respondent State has failed in all four regards.

Victim status:

As concerns the applicants’ victim status, they argued that they were “victims” of the alleged Convention violations. They referred to domestic rules that increase the cost risk by £5,000 for each additional claimant in environmental cases; this rule serves to deter class actions, and therefore prevents applicants from sharing the cost and other risks involved in litigation. They noted that the first applicants’ members include individuals exposed to disproportionate and discriminatory impacts and risks as concerns their age, gender, membership of racially marginalised communities, family life inextricably linked with communities in the Global South, and mental health, and those who are at the intersection of such increased risks. They also noted that, given the high risk of overwhelming and irreversible interference with the applicants’ rights, denying them victim status would render their Convention rights theoretical and illusory.

Status of case:

The ECtHR declared the application inadmissible, holding that the applicants were not sufficiently affected by the alleged breach of the Convention or its Protocols to claim to be victims of a violation within the meaning of Art. 34 of the Convention. This decision was taken by a Committee judicial formation, as the result of a written procedure without a public decision.

According to Plan B Earth’s press release following the decision, the panel was composed of three judges, among which the UK Judge Tim Eicke.

Response of litigants:

In response to the judgment, the litigants expressed disappointment over the ECtHR’s disengagement with their claims and the colonial, racial and class-based inequalities at the heart of the case, with Marina Xochitl Tricks arguing for example that “[t]he white working class, diaspora communities in the UK, and colonised communities globally know that the reality we live is one of injustice. (…) [I]t is time for us to stop pretending that justice will come from the colonial classist courts and start building up our own Peoples’ Tribunals. Our people back home are being killed, dispossessed and disappeared everyday at the hands of global capital, that sows violence and disorder in our communities. We know that those networks extend into the banks and establishment here in the City of London.”

Date of decision:

13 December 2022 (according to the ECtHR’s press release).

More information:

  • For the full text of the application form, click here.
  • For a press release from Plan B Earth on the filing, click here.
  • For the full claim before the High Court of Justice, click here.
  • For the Court of Appeals’ judgment, click here.

Suggested citation:
European Court of Human Rights, Plan B. Earth and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 35057/22, Decision of 13 December 2022.

Last updated:
15 March 2023.


Categories
Adaptation Australia Climate-induced displacement Human Rights Committee Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Private and family life Right to culture Right to life Sea-level rise Standing/admissibility Vulnerability

Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia (Torres Straits Islanders case)

Summary:
This petition against Australia was brought to the UN Human Rights Committee by a group of eight indigenous Torres Straits Islanders in 2019, in their own names and on behalf of their children. In their petition, they argued that the Australian government had violated their rights, as inhabitants of low-lying islands, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because of its inaction in addressing climate change (failure to mitigate emissions and to take adaptation measures).

Rights at stake:
The applicants in this case invoked a series of rights in the ICCPR, on behalf of themselves and their children, contesting the respondent State’s failure to adopt mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and cease the promotion of fossil fuels. To support this, they drew on Article 27 (the right to culture), Article 17 (the right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home), and Article 6 (the right to life) ICCPR. They argued that the indigenous peoples of the Torres Strait Islands, especially those who reside on low-lying islands, are among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. They considered that the Australian government must ensure both mitigation and adaptation measures in order to adequately protect their rights. Previously, the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA), a government body, had stated that “the effects of climate change threaten the islands themselves as well as marine and coastal ecosystems and resources, and therefore the life, livelihoods and unique culture of Torres Strait Islanders.”

Outcome:

On 21 July 2022, the Human Rights Committee adopted its Views in this case.

Observations of the State:

The Australian Government argued that the case was inadmissible, contesting the relevance of climate-related international agreements and its own ability to be held (legally or practically) responsible for climate-related harms. It also submitted that it was not possible to attribute climate change to the State party under international human rights law.

The HRC’s considerations on the admissibility:

On the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Government’s position was that it did not owe a duty of care for failing to regulate environmental harm, and that it was not required to provide a remedy where (including in the present case) it understood there to be no breach of ICCPR rights. This question was accordingly reserved to the examination of the merits.

Concerning mitigation measures, the HRC noted that Australia is and has been a major greenhouse gas emitter, and ranks high on economic and development indices. As a result, it found that the alleged (in)actions fell under its jurisdiction under articles 1 or 2 of the Optional Protocol.

Concerning the imminence of the risk concerned, and accordingly the issue of victim status / standing, the Committee found that the authors of this Communication, “as members of peoples who are the longstanding inhabitants of traditional lands consisting of small, low-lying islands that presumably offer scant opportunities for safe internal relocation – are highly exposed to adverse climate change impacts”. Given the uncontested dependence of their lives and cultures on natural resources and phenomena, and their inability to finance adaptation measures on their own, the authors were considered to be “extremely vulnerable to intensely experiencing severely disruptive climate change impacts”. Given the authors’ allegations of serious ongoing adverse impacts, the HRC declared their claims under articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27 of the ICCPR admissible.

Merits:

Article 6

The Committee recalled that the right to life cannot be interpreted restrictively, and that it requires States to adopt protective measures (i.e. that it entails positive obligations). It recalled its own General Comment No. 36, issued in 2018, in establishing that the right to life also extends to reasonably foreseeable threats to life, including adverse climate change impacts and environmental degradation.

The Committee rejected Australia’s allegation that the interpretation of the ICCPR contained in this General Comment was not compatible with the rules of treaty interpretation under general international law. It then went on to recall its own earlier Teitiota v. New Zealand case (on climate-induced displacement), ultimately finding that the authors were not currently facing health impacts or real and reasonably foreseeable risks of being exposed harms to their right to life. The Committee also noted that the right-to-life claim being made largely related to the authors’ ability to maintain their culture, which falls under article 27 ICCPR.

Regarding the authors’ submission that, absent urgent action, their islands will become uninhabitable within 10 to 15 years, the Committee noted the adaptation and mitigation measures currently planned or being taken, and found that the time frame of 10 to 15 years could allow for additional protective measures or relocation programmes. As a result, it found that there had been no violation of the right to life in this case.

Article 17

The authors claimed that climate change already affects their private, family and home life, given that they may be forced to abandon their homes. The Committee considered that the authors’ dependence on marine and terrestrial resources and ecosystems is a component of their traditional indigenous way of life, falling under the scope of Article 17 ICCPR.

Considering the adaptation measures and related plans in place, the Committee noted the existence of unexplained delays in seawall construction and the lack of explanation concerning the loss of marine resources, crops and fruit trees. It noted the ongoing inundation of villages and ancestral burial lands; the withering of traditional gardens through salinification; the decline of nutritionally and culturally important marine species; coral bleaching and ocean acidification; and the authors’ anxiety and distress. The Committee also noted the importance of community lands for the authors’ most important cultural ceremonies. It accordingly found that:

“that when climate change impacts – including environmental degradation on traditional [indigenous] lands (…) – have direct repercussions on the right to one’s home, and the adverse consequences of those impacts are serious because of their intensity or duration and the physical or mental harm that they cause, then the degradation of the environment may adversely affect the well-being of individuals and constitute foreseeable and serious violations of private and family life and the home.”

Finding that Australia had failed to discharge its positive obligation to implement adequate adaptation measures to protect the authors’ home, private life and family, the HRC found a violation of the authors’ rights under article 17 ICCPR.

Article 27

Article 27 ICCPR recognizes the right of members of minority indigenous groups to the enjoyment of culture, and protects the survival and continued development of their cultural identity. Interpreted in the light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, this right enshrines the inalienable right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their traditional territories and natural resources. Here, the authors argued that their ability to maintain their culture has already been impaired due to climate change impacts, which have eroded their traditional lands and natural resources, for which there is no substitute on mainland Australia. The Committee found that these climate impacts represent a threat that was reasonably foreseeable by the State party, as the authors’ community had been raising the issue since the 1990s. While noting existing seawall construction projects, it considered that the delay in initiating these projects indicated an inadequate response by the State party to the threat in question. It found that the failure to adopt timely and adequate adaptation measures “to protect the authors’ collective ability to maintain their traditional way of life, to transmit to their children and future generations their culture and traditions and use of land and sea resources discloses a violation of the State party’s positive obligation to protect the authors’ right to enjoy their minority culture.” Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 27 ICCPR.

As a result of its findings concerning Articles 17 and 27 ICCPR, the HRC considered it not necessary to examine the authors’ remaining claims under article 24 (1) ICCPR.

Remedies:

Under Article 2 (3) (a) ICCPR, the HRC noted that the State was required to make full reparation to the authors, which meant providing adequate compensation; engaging in meaningful consultations with their communities to conduct needs assessments; continuing its adaptation measures and monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of existing measures; and taking steps to prevent similar violations in the future. The Committee requested the State to provide it with information about the measures taken in this regard within 180 days.

Separate opinions:

Several HRC members appended individual opinions to the Views. These include:

  • The individual opinion by Committee Member Duncan Laki Muhumuza, arguing that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life);
  • The individual opinion by Committee Member Gentian Zyberi, concurring but arguing that the Committee had focused too heavily on adaptation measures, and should instead have more clearly linked the right under Article 27 ICCPR to mitigation measures;
  • The joint opinion by Committee Members Arif Bulkan, Marcia V. J. Kran and Vasilka Sancin (partially dissenting), who argued that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life). They argued in particular that the “real and foreseeable risk” standard employed by the majority interpreted Article 6 too restrictively, and was inappropriate here as it had been borrowed from the dissimilar context of its refugee cases (Teitiota v. New Zealand, the HRC’s first climate-induced displacement case).

Full decision:

The HRC’s Views are available here.

Further reading:

  • Maria Antonia Tigre, ‘U.N. Human Rights Committee finds that Australia is violating human rights obligations towards Torres Strait Islanders for climate inaction’, available here.
  • Verena Kahl, ‘Rising Before Sinking: The UN Human Rights Committee’s landmark decision in Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia,’ Verfassungsblog, 3 October 2022, available here.
  • Nicole Barrett and Aishani Gupta, ‘Why Did the UN Human Rights Committee Refuse Broader Protections for Climate Change Victims?’, Opinio Juris blog, 5 October 2022, available here.
  • Christina Voigt, ‘UNHRC is Turning up the Heat: Human Rights Violations Due to Inadequate Adaptation Action to Climate Change’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 26 September 2022, available here.
  • Monica Feria-Tinta, ‘Torres Strait Islanders: United Nations Human Rights Committee Delivers Ground-Breaking Decision on Climate Change Impacts on Human Rights’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 27 September 2022, available here.

Suggested citation:

UN Human Rights Committee, Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia, Communication No. 3624/2019, 22 September 2022, UN Doc. CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019.

Categories
2021 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Extraterritorial obligations Standing/admissibility The United Kingdom

Okpabi and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell and Others

Summary:
In October and December 2015, the Ogale and Bille Nigerian communities filed parallel complaints against the UK company Royal Dutch Shell plc (Shell) and its Nigerian subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in the UK High Court. The claimants sought a remedy for the extensive oil pollution caused by Shell arguing that it had affected their livelihoods and the environment. They claimed that Shell had failed to prevent oil spills and did not conduct proper clean-up. The plaintiffs argued that Shell had not seriously prevented contamination of agricultural land and waterways. They argued that Shell, as the parent company, owed them duty of care because it exercised significant control over the material aspects of SPDC’s operations and was responsible for them.

In January 2017, the High Court held that the claimants could not sue Shell in English Courts. The Court held that there was not sufficient evidence that Shell exercised a high degree of oversight, control or direction over SPDC. It therefore had no legal responsibility as a parent company for pollution by its Nigerian subsidiary. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision in February 2018. The Court held that the parent company did not hold a duty of care towards the affected communities. In May 2020 the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the UK Supreme Court, arguing that the parent company Shell owed them a common law duty of care in respect to the extensive environmental harmed caused by their business operations in Nigeria. On 12 February 2021, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ruled that the case could proceed in the UK Courts. The decision determined that there is an arguable case that Shell is legally responsible for the pollution caused by the activities of its subsidiary to the Ogale and Bille communities.

Date of decision:
12 February 2021

Admissibility:
The UK Supreme Court ruled that UK courts have jurisdiction over the case, due to the fact that the parent company may owe the plaintiffs a duty of care and therefore the action against Shell constitutes a triable issue.

Merits:
TBD

Remedies:
TDB

Suggested citation:
UK Supreme Court, Okpabi and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell and Others, UKSC 2018/0068, Judgment of 12 February 2021, [2021] UKSC 3.

See also:
The similar (on the facts) case of Milieudefensie and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC (before the Dutch courts).

For the full judgment, click here.

To watch a webcast of the hearing, click here.

Categories
2020 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation France Standing/admissibility

Les Amis de la Terre, Survie v. Total SA

Summary:

Total S.A. is a French energy company with oil projects in Uganda and Tanzania. According to the French “loi de vigilance”, companies with a certain size that meet certain criteria must develop a “plan de vigilance” documenting how they and the companies in their supply chain respect human rights and the environment in their business activities. The applicants claim that Total’s environmental plan (part of the “plan de vigilance”) is not suitable for achieving the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. In addition to better respect for human rights, the NGOs have demanded that Total take more effective measures to protect the environment. The first instance court, the Nanterre Civil Court of Justice, found that it had no jurisdiction over the case and that it fell instead within the jurisdiction of the commercial courts. The applicant NGOs appealed. The Court of Appeal of Versailles confirmed the judgment of the first instance, and the NGOs are now considering filing an appeal before the French Supreme Court.

Admissibility:
The Court confirmed the judgment of the first instance court, which had decided that the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the commercial court. 

Date of filing:
16 March 2020

Date of decision:
10 December 2020

Suggested citation:
Court of Appeal of Versailles, Les Amis de la Terre, Survie v. Total SA, case no. RG20/01692, decision of 10 December 2020.

Full judgment:
The full judgment is available here.

Categories
2020 Canada Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Non-discrimination Public trust doctrine Right to life Standing/admissibility

Cecilia La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen

Facts of the case:

Plaintiffs comprising of 15 children and youths from various parts of Canada sued the Government and Attorney General of Canada alleging violations of the right to life and right to equality under Sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the constitutional and common law duty to protect the integrity of common natural resources in public trust. According to the plaintiffs, the impugned conduct of the respondents consisted in: continuing to cause, contribute to and allow a level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions incompatible with a Stable Climate System (defined as a climate capable of sustaining human life and liberties); adopting GHG emission targets that are inconsistent with the best available science about what is necessary to avoid dangerous climate change and restore a Stable Climate System; failing to meet the Defendants’ own GHG emission targets; and actively participating in and supporting the development, expansion and operation of industries and activities involving fossil fuels that emit a level of GHGs incompatible with a Stable Climate System.

The defendants, while accepting the plaintiffs’ concerns about the seriousness of climate change and its potential impacts, filed a motion to strike their claim alleging that their claim is not justiciable.

Date of decision:

27 October 2020

Admissibility:

On 27 October 2020 the Federal Court in Ottawa granted the defendants’ motion. The Court answered the question of justiciability of the claims of Charter violations for the reason that the impugned conduct is of undue breadth and diffuse nature, and that the remedies sought by the plaintiffs were inappropriate. The Court also found that it had no constitutional obligation to intervene on the matter as there is room for disagreement between reasonable people on how climate change should be addressed. On the issue of justiciability of the public trust doctrine invoked by the plaintiffs, the Court found that the question of existence of the doctrine is a legal question which courts can resolve. However, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ claim did not disclose a reasonable prospect of success for the purposes of its admissibility.

Merits:

NA

Status of the case:

The plaintiffs have appealed against the Federal Court’s order before the Federal Court of Appeal.

Suggested case citation:

Federal Court of Ottawa, Cecilia La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen, T-1750-19, judgment of 27 October 2020, 2020 FC 1008

Case documents:

For the complaint filed by the plaintiffs on 25 October 2019, click here.

For the Government’s statement of defence notified on 7 February 2020, click here.

For the plaintiff’s reply to the Government’s motion to strike, filed on 31 August 2020, click here.

For the Federal Court of Ottawa’s order dated 27 October 2020, click here.

For the Memorandum of Appeal filed by the plaintiffs on 5 March 2021, click here.

Further reading:

Camille Cameron, Riley Weyman, ‘Recent Youth-Led and Rights-Based Climate Change Litigation in Canada: Reconciling Justiciability, Charter Claims and Procedural Choices,’ 34(1) Journal of Environmental Law (2021), Pages 195–207. Available here.

Categories
2020 Austria Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Keywords Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Rights at stake Standing/admissibility State concerned Year

Greenpeace et al. v. Austria (The Zoubek Case)

Summary:
On 20 February 2020, Greenpeace Austria and other applicants called on the Austrian Constitutional Court to invalidate the preferential tax treatment of aviation companies over rail transportation companies in two Austrian tax laws. They claim that this preferential treatment would lead to an unjustified favoring of passenger air traffic and a disadvantage for less climate-damaging means of transport (e.g. railroads). Furthermore, the value-added tax exemption for cross-border flights and the kerosene exemption for domestic flights lead to higher prices for rail than for air travel and thus, contribute to climate change. Against this background, the applicants alleged that their rights under Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were violated, since the Austrian State has not fulfilled its duty to protect its citizens from the consequences of climate change.

On 30 September 2020, the Constitutional Court dismissed the application as inadmissible because it considered that the plaintiffs were not covered by the challenged legislation, which does not apply to rail transport, but only to air transport.

One of the applicants, who suffers from multiple sclerosis and Uhthoff’s syndrome, took this case to the European Court of Human Rights. He alleges a violation of his rights under, among others, Article 8 ECHR. The case, Müllner v. Austria, was filed at the ECtHR on 25 March 2021.

Date of decision:
30 September 2020

Status of case:
Dismissed

Suggested citation:
Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof, Greenpeace et al. v. Austria, Decision of 30 September 2020 – G 144-145/2020-13, V 332/2020-13.

Links:
For the decision of the Constitutional Court, see here.

For the application, see here.