Category: State concerned

Categories
2019 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Gender / women-led Non-discrimination Pakistan Paris Agreement Private and family life Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to life Uncategorized Vulnerability

Maria Khan et al. v. Federation of Pakistan et al.

Summary
Five people identifying themselves as women filed a writ petition, under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, against the Federation of Pakistan, the Ministry of Climate Change, the Ministry of Energy, the Alternative Energy Development Board, and the Central Power Purchasing Agency. The petitioners alleged a violation of their fundamental rights, recognized by Articles 4 (inalienable rights), 9 (right to life), 14 (right to privacy) and 25 (equality of citizens, notably regardless of sex) of the Constitution of Pakistan, as the respondents infringed their right to a clean and healthy environment and a climate capable of sustaining human life (as recognized in the Leghari v. Pakistan case) by failing to take climate change mitigation measures, and specifically measures to develop renewable energy resources and transition to a low-carbon economy.

The petitioners highlighted that Pakistan had ratified the Paris Agreement and submitted its INDC, committing to a reduction of 20% of its 2030 projected GHG emissions, but then failed to engage in any renewable energy power project. This was seen to represent an abdication of the respondents’ responsibilities under the Public Trust Doctrine (namely their duty to act as trustees of the natural resources of the country), and a violation of the jurisprudence of the seized Court on environmental and climate justice.

Notably, the petitioners claimed that being women and mothers, they are particularly endangered by global warming and disadvantaged in the context of the climate crisis, as documented in scientific research and international reports. Therefore, the respondents have allegedly violated Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan in that climate change disproportionately affects the rights of the petitioners and more broadly of all Pakistani women.

The remedies demanded by the petitioners are: the declaration of the violation of the above-mentioned fundamental rights and of the breach of Pakistan’s commitments under the Paris Agreement; the declaration of a positive duty on the respondents to encourage and support the development of renewable energy projects to reduce GHG emissions and mitigate climate change impacts; the order to implement and enforce the Paris Agreement to the fullest extent possible and to create and implement an integrated policy towards climate resilient development.

Date of filing:
14 February 2019, Misc. Writ 8960/19

Date of last hearing:
21 January 2021

Jurisdiction:
High Court of Lahore, Pakistan

Documents:

  • Petition (in English, via Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Global Climate Litigation Database)
  • Order (in English, via Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Global Climate Litigation Database)

More information:
Independently of the above-summarized judicial proceeding, on 21 July 2022, the Government of Pakistan adopted the “Climate Change Gender Action Plan of the Government and People of Pakistan” (you can read it here).

Last Updated:
18 May 2023

Categories
2019 Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation India Paris Agreement Public trust doctrine Right to life

Riddhima Pandey v. Union of India and Others

Summary:

The petitioner, Riddhima Pandey, a 9-year old girl residing in the Indian State of Uttarakhand, approached the National Green Tribunal (a special tribunal exercising jurisdiction over environmental cases) in order to review the State and concerned authorities’ inaction on mitigation measures in the face of climate science, and the systemic failure to implement environmental laws (in a manner that addresses climate change). The petitioner based her claim on the ground that the States duty to take the concerned climate action arose out of the public trust doctrine, which the Supreme Court of India has previously held to be based in fundamental rights, directive principles and the preamble of the Indian Constitution. The application in this case was explicitly inspired by the petition in Juliana v. US where also, the child petitioners invoked the public trust doctrine to contest the US government’s inaction.

The petitioner prayed for the court to, among other things, direct the concerned governmental authorities to properly account for the climate related impacts of industrial and infrastructure projects while granting environmental clearances, account for climate impacts of every individual case of forest diversion and ensuring sufficient compensatory afforestation, direct the government to prepare a national greenhouse gas emissions inventory as well as a national carbon budget against which particular projects’ emissions impacts could be assessed.

Date of decision:

15 January 2019

Tribunal’s decision:

The National Green Tribunal dismissed the case, reasoning that there is no reason to presume that the existing environmental legislations and regulations already address climate change and require that climate related impacts be sufficiently accounted for during environmental impact assessments.

Status of the case:

Decided.

Suggested case citation:

National Green Tribunal (New Delhi, India), Ridhima Pandey v. Union of India and Others, Application No. 187/2017, judgment of 15 January 2019)

Case documents:

For the petition filed before the National Green Tribunal on 25 March 2017, click here.

For the order of the National Green Tribunal on 15 January 2019, click here.

Categories
2018 Biodiversity Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Margin of appreciation Nepal Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to subsistence/food

Padam Bahadur Shrestha v. Office of Prime Minister and Others

Summary:
The petitioner, Padam Bahadur Shrestha, had applied to the concerned authorities in Nepal to enact a separate law on climate change in August 2018, but did not receive a response. He thus filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Nepal alleging that the situation in Nepal is marked by absence of a special climate change legislation, inadequacies in existing environmental legislation in addressing climate change, and poor implementation of the State’s climate change policy. He argued that this suffices to establish a violation of the right to life, right to live in a healthy and clean environment, right to health care and right to food found in Articles 16, 30, 35, and 36 of the Nepali Constitution.

Date of decision:

25 December 2018

Court’s decision:

The Supreme Court of Nepal found that an amendment to the existing laws and introduction of a new consolidated law that addresses climate change was necessary and issued detailed directions on what features the new law must contain. It based this order on the reasons that such would facilitate Nepal’s compliance with its obligations under international law, including the Paris Agreement and that climate mitigation and adaptation directly concern fundamental rights including the right to life, right to have nutritious food and the right to a clean environment. It further held that although the Environmental Protection Act of 1997 addressed environmental protection along the dimension of climate change, its provisions were inadequate regarding climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Status of the case:

Decided.

Suggested case citation:

The Supreme Court of Nepal, Padam Bahadur Shreshta v Office of the Prime Minister and Others, NKP, Part 61, Vol. 3, judgment of 25 December 2018.

Case documents:

For the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nepal (in Nepali), click here.

For an unofficial English translation of the judgment (authored by Hardik Subedi), click here.

Categories
2018 Colombia Domestic court

DeJusticia (Rodríguez Peña and others) v. Colombia

Summary:
On 5 April 2018, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice ordered the protection of the Colombian Amazon from deforestation, ruling in favor of a group of 25 children and young people who had, with the support of advocacy organisation Dejusticia, contested the Colombian government’s failure to protect their rights to life, health and to a healthy environment with a tutela action. In its ruling, the Supreme Court also recognized the Amazon rainforest as a subject of rights.

Facts:
The applicants in this case were 25 children and young people, aged between 7 and 25 years. They submitted that, in their lifetimes, the average temperature in Colombia is expected to increase by between 1.6°C and 2.14°C. They invoked the Paris Agreement and domestic law no. 1753 of 2015, which, they argued, require the government to reduce deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions, including a reduction to net zero of the rate of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon by 2020. Citing ongoing deforestation and the failure to reduce deforestation, they detailed the projected effects of that deforestation for local ecosystems and the wider environment.

Admissibility:
The District Court that previously examined this case had found that a tutela action was not appropriate to this action because of the collective nature of the issue at hand. However, the Supreme Court found that a tutela can be filed where there is a connection between the violation of collective and individual rights if the person filing the tutela is directly affected, the violation of rights at stake is not hypothetical but clearly demonstrated, and the action sought is oriented towards restoring individual rights, and not collective ones.

Key findings:
The Supreme Court found that the fundamental rights to life, health, the minimum subsistence, freedom, and human dignity are connected to and dependent on the environment and healthy ecosystems. It held that the ongoing and increasing deterioration of the natural environment has severe impacts on current and future life and on fundamental rights. It also cited the decreasing ability to exercise the fundamental rights to water, clean air, and a healthy environment.

The Court noted that imminent dangers, such as rising temperatures, polar thawing, species extinction, and meteorological events and natural disasters had been clearly demonstrated. It considered that ecosystems are currently being exposed to existential threats that will lead to the exhaustion of natural resources, increasing difficulties for human subsistence and the pollution and change of the environment. It held that humanity is principally responsible for this scenario, because its hegemonic position on the planet has led to the adoption of an anthropocentric and self-centred model, with characteristic features that are detrimental to environmental stability (“la humanidad es la principal responsable de este escenario, su posición hegemónica planetaria llevo a la adoptación de un modelo antropocéntrico y egoísta, cuyos rasgos característicos son nocivos para la estabilidad ambiental“). These characteristics are i) excessive demographic growth; ii) an expedited approach to development guided by consumerism and existing political-economic systems; and iii) the excessive exploitation of natural resources.

The Court invoked the concept of social justice, and held that the protection of fundamental rights not only involves the individual, but also the “other.” This includes people in other nations as well as animal and plant species and future generations. In particular, it held that the environmental rights of future generations are based on the (i) ethical duty of intra-species solidarity and (ii) the intrinsic value of nature. Regarding the environmental rights of future generations, the Court discussed future violations by present-day omission, and the need to limit present generations’ freedom of action to ensure care and stewardship for natural resources and the future world.

Citing various international human rights and climate change instruments, the Court considered that the conservation of the Amazon is a national and global obligation, calling it the main environmental axis of the planet and the “lung of the world” (p. 30 of the judgment). It considered that the disputed policies lead to deforestation in the Amazon, causing short, medium, and long term imminent and serious damage to the applicants in the tutela action and to all inhabitants of Colombia, both present and future, because it leads to rampant carbon dioxide emissions and threatens native flora and fauna.

Invoking the principles of precaution, intergenerational equity, and solidarity, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no doubt that there is a risk of damage, given that the increase in GHG emissions resulting from deforestation in the Amazon rainforest would lead to estimated increases in Colombia’s temperature of up to 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100.

The principle of solidarity meant that the Colombian State had a duty and shared responsibility to stop the causes of the greenhouse gas emissions caused by deforestation in the Amazon. This required the adoption of immediate mitigation measures to protect the right to a healthy environment.

Leaving a concrete response to the relevant authorities, the Supreme Court highlighted the urgent need to adopt mitigation and corrective measures to combat illegal agriculture and mining; establish an active state presence post-conflict; prevent and mitigate fires, deforestation, and the expansion of agriculture in the region; address the consequences of large constructing projects, property titling and mining concessions; address the expansion of large-scale farming; preserve this important ecosystem; redress the lack of scientific calculations concerning the release of tons of carbon through burning and the loss of biomass; and confront climate change related to the destruction of the Amazon.

Noting that the State had to date failed to take effective measures in this regard, the Court went on to declare that the Colombian Amazon was a subject of rights, and was per se entitled to protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration.

Remedies:
The Supreme Court held that the Colombian government had four months to present an action plan to reduce deforestation in the Amazon region.

Within five months, the Government was furthermore ordered to formulate an intergenerational pact for the life of the Colombian Amazon, with the active participation of the plaintiffs, affected communities, scientific organizations, environmental research groups, and interested population in general. This was to include measures aimed at reducing deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions.

It also ordered all municipalities in the Colombian Amazon, within the five months, to update and implement Land Management Plans, including action plans to reduce deforestation to zero where appropriate.

Within forty-eight hours, the Government was ordered to intensify deforestation mitigation measures.

Forum:
Supreme Court of Colombia

Date of decision:
5 April 2018

See also:
The original submission of DeJusticia (in Spanish) is available here.

The Supreme Court’s judgment (in Spanish) is available here and for download below.

STC4360-2018-2018-00319-011Download

Suggested citation:
Supreme Court of Colombia, DeJusticia (Rodríguez Peña and others) v. Colombia, Judgment of 5 April 2018, STC4360-2018, No. 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01, Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona (reporting judge).

Categories
2018 Adaptation Domestic court Farming Human dignity Pakistan Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to life

Leghari v. Pakistan

Summary:
In Leghari v. Pakistan, Asghar Leghari, whose family owns a farm in the Punjab province of Pakistan, claimed that his fundamental rights, including the right to life, the right to a healthy environment and human dignity, had been violated by the failure to take action against climate change, which was already impacting Pakistan in the form of floods and other climactic changes. The High Court of Lahore granted his claims in 2015, finding that the government had failed to implement its own Climate Change Policy and the corresponding implementation framework. The Court created a Climate Change Commission to monitor the government’s response.

Arguments by the applicant:
The applicant submitted that the domestic National Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework for its implementation had not been implemented. Absent strategies to transition to heat resilient crops or to conserve water, he argued, he would not be able to sustain his livelihood as a farmer. He submitted that this inaction had violated his fundamental rights, in particular, Article 9 (right to life, including the right to a healthy and clean environment) and Article 14 (human dignity) of the Constitution, along with the constitutional principles of social and economic justice. In doing so, he also invoked the principles of public trust, sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the principle of intergenerational equity. The most immediate and serious threat to Pakistan, he argued, concerned water, food and energy security.

Findings:
The High Court of Lahore granted Mr. Leghari’s claims on 4 September 2015, finding that “the delay and lethargy of the State in implementing the Framework offend the fundamental rights of the citizens.” It ordered the government to nominate “climate change focal persons” to help ensure the implementation of the domestic legal Framework and to identify action points. To monitor the government’s progress, it also created a Climate Change Commission made up of government representatives, NGOs, and technical experts. A supplemental decision of 14 September 2015 nominated 21 Commission members and granted this body various powers. On 25 January 2018, the Court considered a report from the Climate Change Committee finding that, until January 2017, 66% of the Framework for Implementation Climate Change Policy’s priority actions had been implemented. The Court accordingly dissolved the Climate Change Commission, creating a Standing Committee on Climate Change in its place.

In the 2018 judgment, the Court considered the need for environmental, climate and water justice, and the need for both mitigation and, in the specific case of Pakistan, adaptation measures in response to climate change. It noted that “we have to move on. The existing environmental jurisprudence has to be fashioned to meet the needs of something more urgent and overpowering i.e., Climate Change.” (para. 12). It held, too, that “[f]rom Environmental Justice, which was largely localized and limited to our own ecosystems and biodiversity, we have moved on to Climate Justice.” (para. 20).

Further reading:
Birsha Ohdedar, ‘Climate Change Litigation in India and Pakistan: Analyzing Opportunities and Challenges’, in Ivano Alogna, Christine Bakker, and Jean-Pierre Gauci (eds), Climate Change Litigation: Global Perspectives (Brill | Nijhoff 2021), 103-123,  https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004447615_006.

Ivan Mark Ladores, ‘In the Name of Climate Change: How Leghari v Federation of Pakistan is Instrumental to the Pursuit of the Right to Life in the Philippines’, 5(2) Groningen Journal of International Law (2017), https://doi.org/10.21827/5a6af9f49574a.

Emily Barritt and Boitumelo Sediti, ‘The Symbolic Value of Leghari v Federation of Pakistan: Climate Change Adjudication in the Global South’ 30(2) King’s Law Journal (2019) 203-210, 10.1080/09615768.2019.1648370.

Suggested citation:
Lahore High Court, Asghar Leghari v. Pakistan, Case W.P. No. 25501/2015, Judgment of 25 January 2018.

Categories
2014 Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate-induced displacement Domestic court New Zealand Sea-level rise

AD (Tuvalu) v. New Zealand

Summary:
A family from Tuvalu appealed the decision to deport them from New Zealand, arguing that they would be at risk of suffering the adverse impacts of climate change — including the adverse effects of natural disasters — and socio-economic deprivation. Unlike in the domestic proceedings in the Teitiota case (domestically known as the AF (Kiribati) case), which made its way before the UN Human Rights Committee after leave to stay was refused, the applicants in this case received leave to remain in New Zealand on the basis of the exceptional circumstances of their case, which were understood to raise humanitarian concerns. The domestic court, the Auckland Immigration and Protection Tribunal, considered the family’s integration, the fact that they were “well-loved and integral members of a family”, and the best interests of their two children, aged three and five years old at the material time. Having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Tribunal considered that the children’s young age made them more vulnerable to natural disasters and the adverse impact of climate change, and that it would be in their best interests to remain living with their parents in New Zealand. Concerning climate change and environmental degradation as a humanitarian issue, the Tribunal noted that it was “widely accepted that the impacts of climate change can adversely affect the enjoyment of basic human rights” and that “Tuvalu, as a country comprising low-lying topical islands (…) is particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. Environmental degradation caused or exacerbated by climate change was already a feature of life in Tuvalu”. Considering these factors on a cumulative basis, and finding that there was no adverse public interest in this case, the Tribunal found that “there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature, which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellants to be removed from New Zealand.”

Type of proceedings:
Domestic

Status of case:
Final

Decision in this case:
The decision of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal in this case can be downloaded below.

Decision in AD (Tuvalu)Download

Suggested citation:
New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal at Auckland, AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 501370-371, Decision of 4 June 2014.

Further information:
For more on this case and an analysis, see Jane McAdam, ‘The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement’, 3(1) Migration Studies (2015), 131–142.

Last updated:
17 August 2023.

Categories
Canada Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples' rights Inter-American Human Rights System Right to culture Right to health Right to property Right to subsistence/food

Arctic Athabaskan Council v. Canada

Summary:
This case, brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Athabaskan people living in Canada, concerned alleged rights violations relating to Arctic warming and melting caused by Canadian black carbon emissions. The case alleged that Canada, by failing to regulate black carbon emissions, had violated various human rights of the Athabaskan people, including their rights to health, subsistence, property, and culture.

The complaint:
The applicants in this case allege that Canada’s emissions of black carbon, which is a component of sooty fine-particle pollution and stems largely from diesel emissions and the burning of biomass, is particularly harmful to their rights and way of life because it is emitted in or near the Arctic.

The applicants submit that the warming effect of black carbon on the global climate is second only to carbon dioxide. In the Arctic, black carbon warms in two ways: it absorbs sunlight in the air, and it reduces the reflectivity of ice and snow-covered surfaces, accelerating their rate of melting.

In particular, the applicants cite their right to culture, particularly their ability to transmit their cultural knowledge to future generations, because “Arctic warming and melting has made the weather, the hunt, and the behaviors and occurrence of fish and wildlife so erratic that elders no longer feel confident in teaching younger people traditional ways.”

The also argue that warming and melting has affected the integrity of the land, compromising their right to property. This includes floods, forest fires, melting permafrost, erosion-related harms and landslides, as well as the destruction of cultural and historic sites and increased difficulty in accessing resources. The Athabaskans also invoke their right to means of subsistence, citing difficulties in accessing traditional food sources and adverse effects on biodiversity. Lastly, they cite their right to health, arguing that the loss of traditional foods has adversely affected the Athabaskan way of life. Melting permafrost is affecting water quality, and the loss of traditional food sources is forcing the people to rely on purchased food, leading to increases in the prevalence of chronic diseases.

Before the Commission, the applicants allege that the Canadian state’s acts and omissions represent an ongoing violation of their human rights, and that there are no domestic remedies suitable for addressing these violations. They argue that Canada has failed to take action to reduce black carbon emissions, and that such action could substantially remedy the Arctic warming and melting that are causing the violations at stake. They accordingly request the Commission to investigate and confirm the alleged harms; set forth the facts and applicable law, declaring a violation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and recommend steps to limit black carbon emissions and protect Arctic Athabaskan culture and resources from Arctic warming and melting.

Forum:
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights

Date filed:
23 April 2013

Status of case:
Pending

Suggested citation:
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Arctic Athabaskan Peoples v. Canada, petition submitted on 23 April 2013, case pending.

Further information:
For more on this petition, see

The full text of the petition has been made available here by EarthJustice here: https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/AAC_PETITION_13-04-23a.pdf

For a summary of the petition, provided by EarthJustice, click here: https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/legal_docs/summary-of-inuit-petition-to-inter-american-council-on-human-rights.pdf

Further reading:
Agnieszka Szpak, ‘Arctic Athabaskan Council’s Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Climate Change—Business as Usual or a Breakthrough?’ 162 Climatic Change (2020) 1575–1593.

Categories
2006 Biodiversity Emissions reductions/mitigation Extraterritorial obligations Freedom of movement Indigenous peoples' rights Inter-American Human Rights System Private and family life Right to culture Right to health Right to property Right to subsistence/food United States of America

Sheila Watt-Cloutier et al. v. the United States of America

Summary:
Filed in 2005 by members of the Inuit people living in Canada, this application concerned the climate change-related responsibility of the United States of America. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights refused to examine the case on the grounds that the information provided was insufficient.

More information on the petition:
In this petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Sheila Watt-Cloutier, an Inuk woman and Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference living in Canada, sought relief from human rights violations related to climate change caused by the acts and omissions of the United States. Ms. Watt-Cloutier, on behalf of herself, 62 other individuals, and all of the Inuit of the arctic regions of the United States of America and Canada, sought relief against the effects of climate change, which — it was argued — have the potential to affect every aspect of the life of the Inuit people, including the quality of the permafrost, land and water, biodiversity and food sources, and cultural rights. The petitioners relied on the United States’ obligations under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and other instruments that shape these obligations under the Declaration, including the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

This case was extraterritorially framed: it was brought by Inuit people living in Canada, but against the United States of America for its climate change-related human rights impacts. The petitioners argued that the acts and omissions by the United States had violated the Inuit’s rights to the benefits of culture, to property, to the preservation of health, life, physical integrity, security, and a means of subsistence, and to residence, movement, and inviolability of the home under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international instruments.

Outcome:
On 16 November 2006, the Commission refused to consider the petition because it considered that it had provided insufficient information. Specifically, it found that the petition did not “enable us [the Commission] to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a violation of rights protected by the American Declaration”.

The Commission held a hearing in 2007 concerning the case, however it did not revisit its decision not to examine the complaints made.

Forum:
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights

Date filed:
7 December 2005

Suggested citation:
IACHR, Sheila Watt-Cloutier et al. v. USA, petition rejected on 7 December 2005

Full text of the petition:
The text of the petition is available at climatecasechart.com. Click here to access it.

The video of the 2007 hearing is available here.

Further information:
For more on this petition, see:

Agnieszka Szpak, ‘Arctic Athabaskan Council’s petition to the Inter-American Commission on human rights and climate change—business as usual or a breakthrough?’ 162 Climatic Change (2020) 1575–1593.

Categories
Access to a remedy Indigenous peoples' rights Inter-American Human Rights System Nicaragua Right to property

Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua

Summary:
The Awas Tingni community, an indigenous community of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, had no real property title deed to its ancestral lands. The community contested a concession to a corporation to carry out road construction work and logging exploitation in the forest where the community was located. The community requested that no further steps be taken to grant the concession without the consent of the community. Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the community argued that the State did not ensure access to an effective remedy, nor obtain the community’s consent before granting the concession on the community’s land. Moreover, it contended that the state had not demarcated the communal lands of the Community.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the Nicaraguan State had violated the American Convention on Human Rights, specifically the right to judicial protection under Art. 25 in connection with Art. 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, as well as the right to property under Art. 21 in connection with Art. 1(1) and 2 of the Convention.

Date of judgment:
31 August 2001

Rights invoked:
Art. 1 (obligation to Respect Rights), Art. 2 (domestic Legal Effects), Art. 21 (right to property) and Art. 25 (right to judicial protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights

Merits:
Regarding art. 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court held that the State had not adopted adequate domestic measures for delimination, demarcation and titling of the community’s land. Moreover, the State had failed to process the remedy filed by the community within a reasonable time. Therefore the Court held that Nicaragua had violated art. 25. The Court also ruled that the State had not effectively delimited and demarcated the limit of the territory regarding which the community had property rights. As a consequence, the community did not know with certainty how far their property extended geographically. The Court determined that Nicaragua had violated art. 21 of the Convention (right to property).

Remedies:
The State was required to adopt, in its domestic law, pursuant to art. 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, legislative, administrative and any other measures necessary to create an effective mechanism for delimination, demarcation and titling of the property of indigenous communities. Moreover the State was requires to carry out the delimination, demarcation and the titling of the corresponding lands of the members of the community. The Court also noted that its judgment constituted a form of reparation. In addition, the State was required to invest, as a form of reparation for immaterial damages, in works or services of collective interests to the benefit of the community, as well as being required to pay the community 30’000 dollars for costs and expenses regarding the proceedings.

Separate opinions:
See the dissenting opinion of Judge Montiel Argüello regarding the violation of Arts. 21 and 25.

Suggested case citation:
IACtHR, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001