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2021 Belgium Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Private and family life Right to life

Belgian ‘Klimaatzaak’

Summary:

On 30 November 2023, a Court of Appeal in Brussels, Belgium, issued its judgment in the Urgenda-inspired “Klimaatzaak” (Dutch for “climate case”). Its judgment builds on a 17 June 2021 first-instance judgment, which held that Belgian climate policy was negligent and violated positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 2 and 8). While confirming this part of the judgment for three of the four domestic governments involved, the appeal court overturned the first instance’s finding that, in light of the separation of powers, it could not set greenhouse gas reduction targets. The appeal court set clear targets for domestic emissions reductions, ordering reductions of 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels).

First-instance judgment:

The applicants in this case alleged, among other things, that the four Belgian governments (i.e. the three regional governments and the federal state) had violated human rights law, and were obligated to reduce Belgium’s greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.

The case was delayed for almost three years because of proceedings contesting the language of the case, which was ultimately adjudicated in French.

On 17 June 2021, a court of first instance found that Belgian climate policy was negligent and violated positive obligations under human rights law. At stake were, among other things, violations of Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, in claims inspired by the Dutch Urgenda case. However, the court of first instance also held that, in light of the principle of separation of powers, it could not set greenhouse gas reduction targets for the Belgian governments.

The Brussels court of first instance not only declared the complaint of the applicant association, VZW Klimaatzaak, admissible, but also that of the 58,000 co-plaintiffs. Belgian law does not allow for an actio popularis, but the first-instance court recognized that all of the applicants faced a risk of material, physical or moral damage. In doing so, it referred to the risks to human and animal health and to the territorial integrity of the Belgian state, and especially of the Flemish region, which was particularly at risk of harms caused by sea level rises. The best available science, as reflected in existing diplomatic consensus, did not leave room for doubt about the existence of a real risk from dangerous climate change. This meant a serious risk that current and future generations would see their daily lives profoundly impacted (“profondément perturbées”). The fact that other Belgian citizens could bring a similar claim did not change this.

The judgment also stated that the federal state and the three regions are jointly and individually responsible for the risk of harm at stake, despite the complex structure of the Belgian state.

Lastly, the judgment stated that the four governments’ inadequate climate policy violated articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (which enshrine the right to life and the right to respect for private and family life, respectively).

However, the court did not order the injunction claimed by the applicants for concrete reduction targets. The applicants had requested an injunction to the effect that the Belgian state should reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 42% by 2025 and by 55% by 2030.

Judgment on appeal:

On appeal by the applicants, who challenged the first-instance judgment over the decision not to order concrete reductions targets, the case was reviewed by the Brussels Court of Appeal. Its judgment, which was issued on 30 November 2023, confirmed that the 2020 climate policy of three out of the four respondent domestic governments had violated Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. In its judgment, the court ordered the Belgian state, the Flemish Region and the Brussels-Capital Region to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions more quickly, namely by 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels). Meanwhile, it found that the Walloon region’s climate policy had progressed sufficiently to be in conformity with human rights law.

In its judgment, the court found that “in light of the prevailing consensus within the scientific community and the international political community, the three governments have violated Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Articles 1382 and 1383 of the old Civil Code because they had not sufficiently reduced greenhouse gas emissions in 2020” (our translation). This violation was still ongoing because these governments have “set insufficiently strict targets and have not taken sufficiently far-reaching measures to sufficiently limit emissions by 2030”. The court found that “a reduction of -55% in GHG emissions by 2030 constitutes a minimum threshold, below which Belgium cannot go under penalty of violating Article 2 of the ECHR” (in the original French: une diminution de -55 % des émissions de GES à l’horizon 2030 constitue ce seuil minimal, en deçà duquel la Belgique ne peut aller sous peine de ne pas respecter l’article 2 de la CEDH). In doing so, it draws on the European Climate Law, which codifies the goals set out in the European Green Deal for the EU to become climate-neutral by 2050.

While the applicants had requested a penalty payment of 1 million euros per month, the appeal court deferred its ruling on this issue to await, among other things, emissions figures from the 2022-2024 period.

Status of case:

After the November 2023 ruling, further proceedings — in cassation, and potentially before the European Court of Human Rights — are possible in this case, which is accordingly not yet final.

On 18 April 2024, the applicants communicated that Flanders had filed a cassation appeal. Flanders was the only one of the domestic governments involved to lodge an appeal in cassation. The federal and Brussels governments had decided against a further appeal.

Suggested citation:

Francophone first instance court of Brussels, 4th chamber, Klimaatzaak ASBL v. Belgium, no. 2015/4585/A, Judgment of 17 June 2021, available at https://prismic-io.s3.amazonaws.com/affaireclimat/18f9910f-cd55-4c3b-bc9b-9e0e393681a8_167-4-2021.pdf

Brussels Court of Appeal, Klimaatzaak ASBL v. Belgium, case 2021/AR/1589, Judgment of 30 November 2023.

Full text:

For background information on the case, see here.

For a summary (in Dutch) by Klimaatzaak, see here.

For the full first-instance judgment (in French), see here.

For the full second-instance judgment, click here.

Further reading:

For more on this case, see the blog post by Matthias Petel and Antoine De Spiegeleir in the Sabin Center’s Climate Law Blog, available here.

For a press release from the applicants concerning the second-instance judgment, click here.

Last updated:

7 September 2024

Categories
2021 Access to a remedy Children and young people Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Non-discrimination Norway Private and family life Right to life

Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway

Summary:
This case was the fourth climate change case brought to the European Court of Human Rights. It was brought by six young Norwegian climate activists aged between 20 and 27, along with two organisations, who alleged that their members’ lives, health and well-being are being directly affected by the escalating climate crisis. The six individual applicants also alleged that, as young people, some of whom belong to an Indigenous community, they are being disproportionately affected by the climate crisis.

The application concerns the Norwegian State’s decision to license continuing exploration for oil and gas in new areas of the Arctic (Barents Sea), and its intention to bring new fossil fuels to market after 2035. The applicants argued that the best available science shows that the emissions from known reserves of fossil fuels will already exceed the carbon budget that remains given the 1.5°C temperature target set in the Paris Agreement.

Citing the seriousness and urgency of the climate crisis, the applicants alleged that the respondent State had failed to take the precautionary measures of prevention and protection required under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the right to life and the right to respect for private and family life, respectively). They furthermore alleged a breach of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 ECHR. during the domestic court proceedings, as well as a violation of the right of access to an effective domestic remedy under Article 13 ECHR.

Domestic proceedings and the reasoning of the Norwegian Supreme Court:
This case is a follow-up from domestic proceedings that were concluded by a judgment in favor of the State issued by the Norwegian Supreme Court on 22 December 2020. In 2016, the two applicant organizations brought a case against the State’s decision to grant 10 licenses in the Barents Sea (in what is known as “the 23rd licensing round” on the Norwegian continental shelf). On 22 December 2020, the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled that this decision did not violate the right to a healthy environment under Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution. It also found no violation of the ECHR. While it did find that climate impacts should have been assessed, it held that this could be remedied at the development stage (after the licenses in question had been issued). The Supreme Court’s judgment followed rulings from Oslo City Court and the Borgarting Court of Appeal, both of which held that the disputed licensing decision was valid.

In its ruling, the Norwegian Supreme Court considered that there had been no violation of the ECHR in this case because that Convention only applies to “direct and immediate” environmental harms. Although the Supreme Court considered Articles 2 and 8 ECHR and referred to the pending Duarte Agostinho case in its oral ruling, it considered that the case-law as it stood at the time of decision had not been contravened.

Regarding Article 2 ECHR, the Supreme Court held that this only applies to real and immediate risks of loss of life. The question before the Supreme Court, it argued, was the issue of a sufficient link between the domestic administrative decisions and the risk of a loss of life. It considered that it was not clear whether the decisions would in fact lead to emissions, and the threat concerned was in the future.

Regarding Article 8 ECHR, the Court held that this did not cover every harm to the environment, that an impact had to be “direct and immediate” also here, and that efforts by the Committee of Ministers to add a separate right to a healthy environment to the ECHR had failed. The Supreme Court also considered that the Dutch Urgenda judgment was not comparable to the case at hand, because that case concerned already-established climate targets, and not the possible invalidity of an administrative decision.

Given these considerations, the Norwegian Supreme Court held, by a majority of eleven to four, that the disputed licensing decision granting was valid. A minority of four judges dissented, arguing that – although they agreed with the majority’s conclusions on Article 112 of the Constitution and Articles 2 and 8 ECHR – the production licenses awarded in the 23rd licensing round were invalid because of procedural errors in the impact assessment. 

Submissions before the ECtHR in greater detail:
The applicants argued that there is a real and serious risk to their lives and well-being, and to their ability to enjoy their private life, family life and home. They submitted that the Norwegian State had failed to adopt the necessary and appropriate measures to address this risk, and that it had failed to describe and assess the total climate effects, including exported emissions, of continued and expanded extraction of oil and gas from the Arctic, thereby also violating the applicants’ rights.

The six individual applicants submitted that they have experienced climate anxiety, emotional distress and great worry about the
current and imminent risks of serious climate harms, and the impact on their lives, life choices, and the lives of future generations. They referred to mental health literature, which increasingly draws attention to such concerns, described in the application as “pre-traumatic stress.”

The applicants noted that, under current climate policies, the average temperature in Norway is expected to rise by more than 5.5 degrees Celsius by 2100. There had already been an increase in extreme rainfall events, flooding and landslides. Future impacts will include increased risk of drought and forest fire-inducing thunderstorms, changes to flood systems, sea level rise and ocean acidification.

The applicants noted that there is a significant difference between planned fossil fuel extraction and Norwegian climate goals. The applicants submitted that State representatives stated before the Norwegian Supreme Court that Norway will continue to produce and export petroleum as long as there are buyers. They noted that Norway is the 7th largest exporter of emissions in the world, and the 3rd largest per capita, behind Qatar and Kuwait. There is no system in place to declare, assess, calculate, or reduce exported emissions from fossil fuels extraction projects, nor the exported emissions from oil and gas extraction overall.

On victim status, the applicants alleged that the licensing of fossil fuels extraction is too complex for individuals and young people to challenge alone. The organizations in question are not only better suited to challenge such decisions, but they also claim to represent future generations.

The applicants alleged that Articles 2 and 8 ECHR had been violated because of the presence of a real, immediate and serious risk to these rights, of which the State had actual or putative knowledge and regarding which it failed to adopt reasonable and appropriate preventative measures. They invoked the principle of prevention, and argued that the State must adopt a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life. They argued that an unequal burden has been placed on younger generations, and those unborn. The applicants argued that the threats against their rights are ongoing since temperature increase cannot be reversed and the authorities must act immediately to prevent the harms in question.

Under Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy), the applicants argued that the Norwegian courts did not assess the merits of the Convention claims in full and based on ECtHR case law.

Under Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination, they argued that there were disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, citing the factors of young age and the fact that two of the individual applicants were members of the indigenous Sami minority, whose traditions, land and resources are negatively impacted. Due to their age, the young applicants, they submitted, had no opportunity to participate in the relevant decision-making while at the same time having to shoulder a heavier burden concerning the long-term consequences of the acts and omissions in question.

Interim developments:
The 10 disputed licenses were returned and relinquished by the companies concerned given that no potentially profitable gas discoveries were made. On 11 March 2022 Norway re-licensed the area covered by one of the disputed licenses (no. 855) under the so-called APA system for mature areas. The original license had covered the drilling of two wells, one of which had discovered an oil column but was ultimately considered have limited economic potential. The new production license for the area, no. 1170, is valid until 11 March 2030. It allowed the discovery of two significant gas deposits adjacent to and geologically part of Wisting, the largest undeveloped oil discovery on the Norwegian continental shelf. The two wells were plugged and abandoned after evaluation, but their discovery remains valid and open to development.

In 2019, the Ministry awarded twelve new petroleum production licenses to eleven companies in the 24th licensing round. In 2021, the Ministry awarded four new petroleum production licenses in the 25th licensing round. In addition, the Government also granted licenses under the system of Awards in Predefined Areas (“APA”), which relate to the mature areas of the Norwegian continental shelf.

On 8 April 2022 the Government approved the recommendation of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of a report that states that “The Norwegian petroleum industry will be further developed” and “[t]he licensing system will remain unchanged. Permits will continue to be granted to explore for oil and gas in new areas.” This same report indicates that licensees must “assess the climate impacts of production and combustion emissions when considering all new plans for development and operation (PDOs), and highlight the assessments in decisions related to those plans”. The Ministry also indicated that it would follow up to the Norwegian Supreme Court’s judgment in this case by “conducting an assessment of the climate impacts of production and combustion emissions when considering all new development plans (PDOs). The scope of the assessment will be adapted to the scale of the resources in the individual development.”

Judgment of the ECtHR of 28 October 2025:
On 28 October 2025, the Second Section of the ECtHR issued its unanimous judgment in this case, examining the applicants’ claim that the 2016 decision granting 10 petroleum production licenses was contrary to Norway’s obligation to mitigate climate change, which was adversely affecting the lives, living conditions and health of the individual applicants and other persons whose interests were represented by the applicant organizations. The Court, in doing so, engaged in an extensive comparative exercise. It noted the 2024/2025 climate-related advisory opinions issued by the ITLOS, IACtHR and ICJ, summarizing their findings as well as noting environmental treaties (the Aarhus Convention and Espoo Convention) and the (R (Finch) v Surrey County Council judgment of the UK Supreme Court.

After these considerations, the Court turned to the scope of the case before it. It held that the scope of the case as defined by the domestic proceedings was narrow, given that it concerned “an allegedly faulty decision-making process in one specific round of licensing of petroleum exploration, which would precede petroleum production” (para. 282). Contrasting the case with the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Grand Chamber judgment, the Court held that Greenpeace Nordic “concerns the State’s procedural, rather than substantive, obligations, and is moreover limited to ten exploration licences”, while nevertheless raising “the issue of an alleged failure of the State to effectively protect individuals from the serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 282). The Court also decided to examine the case only under Article 8 ECHR, the right to respect for private and family life, and not to examine the complaint made under Article 2 ECHR, the right to life (paras. 283-284).

The Court then examined the victim status and locus standi of the applicants under Article 34 ECHR, applying the criteria developed in the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Grand Chamber judgment. On individual victim status, the Court applied the high-threshold, two-step KlimaSeniorinnen test that requires (a) a high intensity of exposure and (b) a pressing need to ensure individual protection of the applicants. For the NGOs, it applied the KlimaSeniorinnen representative standing test that requires associations to be (a) lawfully established in the jurisdiction, (b) dedicated to the defense of climate rights, and (c) genuinely qualified and representative. The Court combined the assessment of these two tests with the merits of its examination of Article 8 ECHR, and ultimately found that the individual applicants, including the youth and Indigenous applicants, had not satisfied the individual victim status test. However, it did find that the legal persons had standing to bring a representative application.

The Court’s reasoning in this regard first examined whether there was a “sufficiently close link” between the disputed 2016 licensing decision and the risk of climate-related impacts on ECHR rights. It held that:

294. “The Court observes that while exploration will not always, and certainly not automatically or unconditionally, be followed by extraction, in Norway, it is both a legal and a practical precondition for it. (…) [P]etroleum would not be extracted but for the opening of an area for extraction, and the granting of production licences. The fact that other events and permits are also necessary before extraction can take place does not break that chain of causation. When considering causation for the purposes of attributing responsibility for adverse effects arising from climate change, the Court has not required it to be shown that “but for” a failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred (…). The Court further observes that the link between petroleum exploration and its future production is inherent. (…) The Supreme Court itself observed that the SEA had to include all stages of the petroleum production, from exploration to development, extraction, transport, exploitation and termination (…). In these circumstances, it is clear that the petroleum project in question was of such a nature as to entail potential risks of extraction.”

The Court went on to find that the relinquishment of the 10 licenses “does not break the required causal nexus for the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention”, emphasizing the preventive function of the right of access to information and observing that “the Convention guarantees a right for affected individuals to be informed about the environmental effects of a planned activity” which means that “[t]he procedural nature of the right to information and the preventive function of that right make the applicability of the provisions in question independent of the later materialisation of the risk” (para. 295). The Court also noted that the previously licensed areas could be automatically re-licensed for exploration under the APA system, meaning that “even a relinquished licence maps out an opened area for future discoveries” (para. 296). The Court went on to hold that

297.  Having established the link between exploration licensing and extraction, the Court also notes that oil and gas extraction is the most important source of GHG emissions of Norway (…), and that the burning of fossil fuels, including oil and gas, is among the main causes of climate change (…).

This meant that there was a sufficiently close link between the disputed licensing procedure and serious adverse effects of climate change on the lives, health, well-being and quality of life of individuals (para. 299).

Examining this with regard to individual victim status, the Court held that “no grievances about the personal situation of the six individual applicants were examined in the disputed judicial review of the 23rd licensing round” (para. 301). Nevertheless, it noted that “the crux of these applicants’ complaint concerns the adverse effects of climate change which they, as young people, are suffering as a result of the respondent State’s allegedly inadequate action on climate change, particularly as a result of the authorisation of further petroleum production.” It considered these to be localized claims, focused on the specific situation prevailing in Norway and noting the climate impacts in that country, including ocean warming, rising air temperatures, seasonal effects and forest and fish stock degradation (para. 302). However, it found that the individual applicants (applicants nos. 2‑7) did not fulfil the criteria for victim status under Article 34 ECHR. Albeit noting the Indigenous rights implications of the case – the fact that that three of the six individual applicants identify as members of the Sámi people – it held that “[w]hile the Court fully appreciates that climate change poses a threat to the traditional Sámi way of life and culture (…), it cannot conclude that the hardships that the situation complained about may be causing the three applicants personally are of “high intensity”” (para. 303). Neither had arguments about the mental health impacts of climate change been adequately substantiated. However, the Court did note “the seriousness of conditions such as climate anxiety or climate grief” (para. 304), but found that it lacked evidence to examine this in light of ECHR rights. Likewise, it lacked medical evidence indicating “any particular morbidity or any other serious adverse effect on their health or well-being that had been created by climate change and would go beyond the effects which any young person living in Norway and having a degree of awareness about climate change might experience” (para. 305). On this basis, it rejected the individual victim status of the applicants.

On representative locus standi, the Court applied the three-step KlimaSeniorinnen test, finding that the two NGOs concerned, Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth, met all three criteria of that test. They enjoyed standing in the domestic courts and “act in the interest of the general public and of future generations – and, in the case of Young Friends of the Earth, also in the interest of its members – with the aim of ensuring effective climate protection”, meaning that they take “legal action to address the effects of climate change in the interests of its members and/or other persons affected by specific climate change impacts” (para. 309). As a result, the Court was satisfied that these two organizations represented “a collective means of defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State” (para. 310).

Under Article 8 ECHR, the Court began its merits analysis by setting out the nature of the State’s positive obligation in the specific context of climate risk. It reiterated that Article 8 protects individuals against serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life, and that the Contracting State must ‘do its part’ to ensure effective protection against such risks through an adequate legal and administrative framework. The Court underlined that this obligation is not purely theoretical: States are required to organize their decision-making in a way that meaningfully addresses climate-related risks that may interfere with the enjoyment of Convention rights (para. 314).

At the same time, the Court accepted that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the specific measures they adopt to discharge their climate-related obligations under Article 8, including how they balance climate protection against other competing interests.

That margin of appreciation is nevertheless framed and limited by what could be described as three considerations of particular weight. First, in any such balancing, climate protection must be afforded ‘considerable weight,’ reflecting both the severity and the irreversibility of climate harm. Second, greenhouse gas emissions are cumulative and transboundary, meaning that the harmful effects of present-day decisions will manifest and intensify over time and are not confined to national borders. Third, despite longstanding scientific warnings, States collectively have not yet acted sufficiently to avoid dangerous climate change risk, and there remains only a ‘rapidly closing window of opportunity’ to secure a liveable future. In the Court’s view, those elements reinforce the urgency and seriousness of climate mitigation as a human rights concern (paras. 315-316).

The Court then specified how Article 8 operates in procedural terms. It recalled that, in environmental cases, its analysis often centers on whether the domestic decision-making process provided adequate procedural safeguards, rather than on substituting its own assessment for that of national authorities. In the climate context, this procedural obligation see itself in a requirement that States, before authorising an activity which could significantly contribute to climate change and thereby threaten the protected interests under Article 8, carry out an environmental impact assessment that is adequate, timely and comprehensive. The assessment must be conducted in good faith, rely on the best available science, and be sufficiently concrete and detailed to inform the authorities’ decision at a stage when all options (including refusing the project) are genuinely open (para. 318).

This assessment must, at a minimum, allow identification and, so far as possible, quantification of expected greenhouse gas emissions arising from the proposed activity; evaluate the compatibility of that activity with the State’s domestic and international climate obligations; and address not only direct operational emissions but also downstream emissions (scope 3) that would result from the eventual use of the extracted petroleum, including where that combustion would take place outside the State’s territory. The Court also stressed that meaningful public participation is an integral part of this procedural duty. Individuals and communities affected by the climate risks associated with a project must have access to relevant information and a genuine opportunity to express their views early enough in the process to influence the outcome (paras. 319–320). Crucially, the Court held that

319.  In the context of petroleum production projects, the environmental impact assessment must include, at a minimum, a quantification of the GHG emissions anticipated to be produced (including the combustion emissions both within the country and abroad; compare, mutatis mutandis, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, § 550). Moreover, at the level of the public authorities, there must be an assessment of whether the activity is compatible with their obligations under national and international law to take effective measures against the adverse effects of climate change. Lastly, informed public consultation must take place at a time when all options are still open and when pollution can realistically be prevented at source.

The Court situated these procedural requirements within broader developments in international law, noting the converging obligations articulated in recent advisory opinions by international courts and tribunals such as the 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinion; the 2025 EFTA Advisory Opinion; the 2024 Advisory Opinion of the ITLOS; and the IACtHR Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 (paras. 320–324).

Against that normative structure, the Court turned to the Norwegian system. It noted that petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf proceed in three administrative stages: first, the opening of an area for petroleum activities, following a strategic environmental assessment and parliamentary involvement; second, the granting of exploration licenses (the stage at issue in the present case); and third, the approval of a Plan for Development and Operation (PDO), which is required before any extraction can begin (para. 326).

The applicant organizations had argued that Norway failed to comply with Article 8 because, prior to awarding the exploration licenses in 2016, the authorities did not conduct a sufficiently comprehensive climate impact assessment. In particular, they submitted that there had been no assessment, at that stage, of the total climate effects of future extraction, including exported combustion emissions, no evaluation of the project’s compatibility with the remaining carbon budget aligned with the 1.5°C temperature goal, and an overall approach that prioritized economic projections over climate constraints. They also challenged the position taken by the Norwegian Supreme Court, namely that any deficiencies could simply be addressed later at the PDO stage, arguing that deferring climate assessment to the PDO stage was contrary to EEA and international law and, in practice, ineffective (paras. 328-329).

The ECtHR accepted an important part of the applicants’ arguments at the factual level. It observed that the domestic procedures leading to the 2016 licensing decision were ‘not fully comprehensive,’ in that the strategic environmental assessment did not include all stages of the petroleum project, particularly the downstream combustion emissions. It noted that the Norwegian Supreme Court acknowledged this omission but considered that it could be remedied at the later PDO stage (para. 330).

However, the Court did not consider those gaps, taken alone, to amount to a breach of Article 8. Instead, it asked whether, looking at the process ‘as a whole,’ Norway had put in place procedural guarantees capable of ensuring that no petroleum extraction project would proceed without a sufficiently rigorous climate assessment and an opportunity for effective public challenge. The Court based its reasoning on three following elements.

First, it attached weight to the legal position, confirmed by the Norwegian Supreme Court, that the granting of an exploration license does not create any automatic entitlement to extract petroleum. Under Norwegian law, extraction cannot commence without approval of a PDO by the competent ministry. The authorities therefore retain both the power and, under Article 112 of the Constitution, the duty to refuse a PDO if climate or environmental considerations so require (para. 331).

Second, at the PDO stage, Norwegian law requires an environmental impact assessment and public consultation. This assessment must address the climate impacts of both production and combustion emissions and be reviewed by the authorities in light of Norway’s domestic and international climate commitments. The Court also noted the Government’s formal undertaking, following the domestic litigation, to ensure that all future PDOs include such assessments and that their results are explicitly reflected in the approval decisions. These commitments, in the Court’s view, confirmed that downstream emissions and compatibility with climate targets would be examined before any extraction could begin (paras. 332–334).

Third, the Court observed that affected individuals and organisations have access to environmental information and opportunities to participate in the PDO-stage decision-making, which is subject to administrative and judicial oversight before any extraction begins. Because the PDO stage precedes production, the Court considered that meaningful preventive control remains possible at that point (paras. 333–334).

The Court further observed that, under Norwegian law interpreted in light of EEA environmental requirements, impact assessments at the PDO stage must take account of cumulative and transboundary climate effects, including downstream or ‘exported’ emissions from the eventual combustion of petroleum. It considered that this mechanism, assessed together with the wider procedural safeguards of the Norwegian system, adequately addressed the applicants’ concern that such emissions had been overlooked at the earlier licensing stage. On that basis, the Court concluded that, although the environmental impact assessment at the licensing stage was incomplete, the Norwegian system, assessed in its entirety, still satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8. In light of this, the Court unanimously found that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (paras. 336-337).

Thus, the decisive point for the Court was that there are effective safeguards built into the approval process for actual extraction: extraction cannot begin without a PDO; the PDO must be preceded by a climate-focused assessment and public participation; the authorities are under a duty to refuse the PDO if climate considerations so require; and those decisions remain open to challenge. The Court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Norwegian authorities, no indication that the PDO stage is structurally incapable of correcting earlier deficiencies, and no indication that those safeguards are purely theoretical or illusory. It therefore held that Norway had remained within its margin of appreciation in structuring climate-related assessment across multiple stages, and that the deferral of a full climate assessment to the PDO stage, while not ideal from the applicants’ perspective, did not in itself breach Article 8 as long as the PDO stage functions in the manner described above.

Concerning the complaint under Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination), the Court considered that it was not necessary to examine whether this provision was applicable as concerned the individual applicants because this complaint was in any event inadmissible given the failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Citing its own subsidiarity and the exhaustion rule in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Court noted that “the individual applicants did not avail themselves of any domestic remedy in their own name” (para. 350). It held that “while the applicants complained before the Court that not invalidating the 2016 licensing decision constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of the individual applicants’ age and of ethnic status, no such complaint had been made, even in substance, in the course of the domestic judicial review proceedings, and, in particular, before the Supreme Court” (para. 351). As a result, the applicants had not afforded the domestic courts with the requisite opportunity to examine or remedy this complaint, and it was declared inadmissible.

As concerned Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy), the Court held that the domestic courts “duly engaged” with the applicant organizations’ arguments and duly examined their claims, in line with the requirements of Article 13, and that their review powers were not limited in the sense of precluding them from examining the applicants’ complaints. The fact that the domestic courts ultimately held that the omission to conduct a prior assessment did not invalidate the licensing decision, as that could be rectified at the next PDO stage, and did not mean that their examination of the issues had been superficial (para. 363). The ECtHR also noted that the Norwegian Supreme Court devoted a separate section of its judgment to whether ECHR rights were engaged. The fact that the Supreme Court’s conclusion could be called into question in the light of the Court’s findings in this case did “not mean that the assessment was insufficient or that it was not diligently undertaken” (para. 354). The ECtHR itself noted that the approach taken in this case represented “a significant development in Convention case-law”, based on the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment. It ultimately declared the Article 13 complaint manifestly ill-founded in light of this reasoning.

Date filed:
15 June 2021

Date communicated:
6 January 2022 (press release).

Date of judgment:
28 October 2025

Adjudicating Body:
European Court of Human Rights

Status of case:
Decided by a Chamber formation of the ECtHR on 28 October 2025.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway, no. 34068/21, Judgment of 28 October 2025.

Case documents:
Link to the text of the application: click here.
The full text of the judgment is available below.

CASE OF GREENPEACE NORDIC AND OTHERS v. NORWAYDownload

Last updated:
28 October 2025

Categories
2021 Brazil Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment

Thalita Silva e Silva and Others v. Minister of Environment et al.

Summary:
This case was brought before the 14th Federal Civil Court of Sao Paulo by six youths as a popular action against the Brazilian Government, challenging Brazil’s updated ‘nationally determined contribution’ (NDC). These were submitted on 8 December 2020 pursuant to its obligation under Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement. The petitioners argue that the NDC is regressive in comparison to its previous NDC, as it alters the baseline relative to which its emissions reductions targets for the years 2025 and 2030 were to be calculated. Both the initial and the updated NDC provided for a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 37% by 2025, and 45% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels, but the estimated emissions for the base year 2005 was increased from 2.1 to 2.8 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent pursuant to an update in Brazil’s national GHG inventory report.

The petitioners contended that this regression in the updated NDC constituted a violation of Article 225 of the Constitution of Brazil, which provides for the right to an ecologically balanced environment. They further argued that there was a new GHG inventory report which estimated the 2005 emissions levels to amount to 2.4 billion tonnes rather than 2.8 billion tonnes as per the previous inventory report, and since this new report was published before the updated NDC was communicated, the updated NDC stands to be quashed in any case. The respondents contested the courts’ jurisdiction on the ground that the claim concerned an act of the Brazilian government at the international level. They also contended that the NDC in question met the criteria of progression and highest possible ambition.  

Date of decision:

28 May 2021

Admissibility:

The Federal Civil Court of Sao Paulo found that it was competent to adjudicate the case as per Article 109, Item III of the Constitution of Brazil which provides federal courts the competence to hear cases based on a treaty between the Union and other States or international bodies.

Merits:

The Federal Civil Court of Sao Paulo summarily dismissed the plaintiffs’ request for injunction on the count that the updated NDC maintains the emissions reduction targets specified in the previous NDC, and that the change in the estimated emissions during the base year in different national inventory reports was normal and expected in light of improvements in scientific understanding and techniques. It also highlighted that the Paris Agreement requires parties to periodically update their national inventories and inferred from this requirement that the targets in NDCs are to be understood in relation to the inventory available at the time of communicating them. The Court also considered the updated NDC to be ambitious as it contained a carbon neutrality commitment.

Status of the case:

The petitioners have appealed against the decision of the Federal Civil Court.

Suggested case citation:

Federal Civil Court of Sao Paulo, Thalita Silva e Silva & Ors. v. Minister of Environment & Ors., Ação Popular nº 5008035-37.2021.4.03.6100, decision of 28 May 2021.

Case documents:

Petition (in Portuguese)

Decision of the Federal Civil Court of Sao Paulo (in Portuguese)

Categories
Australia Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk

Sharma and Others v. Minister for the Environment

Summary:

In Sharma and Others v. Minister for the Environment, issued on 27 May 2021 by the Federal Court of Australia, a group of children and their litigation representative, Sister Marie Brigid Arthur, argued that the Australian Minister for the Environment owes them and other Australian children a duty of care in approving coal mining projects because of the risk of future climate change related harms, and sought an injunction against the project. Given the evidence of climate harms, the judge concluded that the Minister does have a duty of care towards children, but rejected the application for an injunction.

On 15 March 2022, the Government won its appeal against the judgment in this case. While the Full Federal Court upheld the primary judge’s factual findings, it unanimously (although based on several different strands of reasoning) overturned the ruling on the Ministry’s duty of care when exercising her statutory functions under the EPBC Act.

Date:

27 May 2021 (appeal judgment: 15 March 2022)

Merits:

The case concerned a decision by the Minister to approve the extraction of coal from a coal mine. The judge considered the available evidence about the degree of risk and the magnitude of the risk of harm alleged by the applicants, as well as the foreseeability and likelihood of that harm arising and being caused or contributed to by coal-related CO2 emissions. The judge concluded that the Minister does have a duty of care towards children.

The judgment recognizes that “the risk of harm to the Children from climatic hazards brought about by increased global average surface temperatures, is on a continuum in which both the degree of risk and the magnitude of the potential harm will increase exponentially if the Earth moves beyond a global average surface temperature of 2°C, towards 3°C and then to 4°C above the pre-industrial level.”

At issue was the question of whether the emissions from the mine would be within the remaining carbon budget to be respected in order to keep warming below 2 degrees Celsius. On this, and putting the onus of compliance with this budget on the respondent Minister, the Judge held that he did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that this would not be the case. He noted that:

“The Minister called no evidence. The Minister essentially contended that the Court should infer that the 100 Mt of CO2 would likely be emitted in accordance with the Paris Agreement. There is no sufficient basis for that inference. The Minister relied upon little else than speculation, in circumstances where the evidence showed that at least one of the potential consumers of the coal is not a signatory to the Paris Agreement.”

Remedies:

The Judge rejected the applicant’s request for an injunction, considering that the duty of care had not yet been breached, and that it was appropriate to await the outcome of the Minister’s decision-making process.

In a follow-up judgment, issued on 8 July 2021, the Judge ordered the Minister to pay the claimants’ costs, and held that the Minister has a duty to take reasonable care, in the exercise of her powers, to avoid causing personal injury or death to Australian children arising from carbon dioxide emissions.

Appeal:

The appeal by the Ministry of Environment challenged the primary judge’s finding of a duty of care as well as specific factual findings regarding global warming and the approved project’s contribution to that.

The Full Court upheld in full the factual basis of the case as established by the primary judge. With regards to the legal grounds, it concluded however that no duty of care for human safety should be imposed upon the Minister when exercising her power under the EPBC Act.

While each of the three judges emphasized different legal aspects, their reasoning essentially centered around the following arguments: Determining the point of breach of such a duty of care would prompt core policy questions unsuited to being answered by the judiciary. A common law duty of care would be inconsistent with the Minister’s statutory powers under the EPBC Act. There is no sufficient link between the Minister’s exercise of power and the potential harm inflicted on the children. Finally, the lack of control over the risk of harm, the absence of foreseeability of a causal injury, and indeterminacy were cited to argue against the imposition of the duty.  

Measures taken as a result of the judgment:

On 15 September 2021, the Minister granted approval for the proposed mine expansion.

Status of case:

Overturned on appeal (special leave application possible until 12 April 2022)

Suggested case citation:

Federal Court of Australia, Sharma by her litigation representative Sister Marie Brigid Arthur v. Minister for the Environment [2021] FCA 560, 27 May 2021, Bromberg J.

Federal Court of Australia, Minister for the Environment v Sharma [2022] FCAFC 35, 15 March 2022, Allsop CJ, Beach and Wheelahan JJ

Links:

For the full judgment of 27 May 2021, see here.

For the follow-up judgment of 8 July 2021, see here.

For the judgment on appeal (15 March 2022), see here.

Categories
2021 Deciding Body Domestic court European Convention on Human Rights Imminent risk Keywords Paris Agreement Right to assembly and association Right to freedom of expression Rights at stake State concerned Switzerland Year

Credit Suisse Climate Activists Trial (Lausanne)

Summary:
On 22 November 2018, a group of 20 to 30 climate activists from the collective “BreakFree Suisse”, among them the 12 complainants, occupied the entry halls of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse in Lausanne to demonstrate against the bank’s investment in fossil fuels. The protest aimed to draw attention to this issue by condemning the participation of the Swiss tennis player Roger Federer in the advertising campaign of this bank. To do so, the activists were dressed in sports clothes and staged a tennis match. While some activists complied with the police request to leave the premises, others had to be dragged out by the police.

The activists argued that they had been in a “justifiable state of emergency” (rechtfertigender Notstand) due to climate change and that their protest was therefore lawful.

On 13 January 2020, the Tribunal de police de l’arrondissement de Lausanne (“Police Court of the district of Lausanne”) ruled in favor of the protesters. The judge found that climate change posed an imminent threat and that the protest was therefore a necessary and proportionate means to achieve the activists’ intended goal.

On 22 September 2020, this decision was overruled by the Tribunal Cantonal du Vaud (“Vaud Cantonal Tribunal”). The Court argued that the activists could have protested the bank by using other means, such as political or legal instruments. It further found that climate change is an imminent threat and that measures must be taken to address it. However, the Tribunal Cantonal du Vaud doubted that the protest could have led to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, it also noted that the Swiss government is aware of the issue and has already taken necessary measures, such as ratifying the Paris Agreement. Finally, the Court held that it is not yet too late to take the necessary protective measures to combat climate change.

On 26 May 2021, the Swiss Bundesgericht (“Swiss Federal Supreme Court”) mainly upheld the Tribunal Cantonal du Vaud’s decision. It argued further that climate change may be considered an imminent threat and that the activists did not intend to protect a specific legal interest, but rather collective interests, namely the environment, health, or the well-being of the population, and thus, the protest was not lawful.

In a similar case in Geneva, a climate activist from the same collective was on trial after putting red handprints all over the front of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse.

Rights invoked:
The complainants invoked their rights to freedom of expression (Article 10 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) and assembly and association (Article 11 ECHR).

The Swiss Bundesgericht argued that the complainants are not entitled to invoke Articles 10 and 11 ECHR in this context because they had no right to enter private property to take their actions. The freedom of assembly does not include the right to gather on private property without the owner’s consent. Consequently, the claimants could not rely on Articles 10 and 11 ECHR.

Date of decision:
26 May 2021

Suggested case citation:
Swiss Bundesgericht, 12 climate protesters v. ministère public central du canton de Vaud, 6B_1295/2020, Judgment of 26 May 2021.


Links:
For the judgment of the Swiss Bundesgericht (in French), see here.

For the judgment of the Tribunal Cantonal du Vaud (in French), see here.

For the judgment of the Tribunal de police de l’arrondissement de Lausanne (in French), see here.  

Categories
2021 Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation The Netherlands

Milieudefensie and others v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC

Summary:

This case was brought as a class action tort suit by a group of NGOs, as well as more than 17,000 individuals represented by Milieudefensie. The applicants claimed that Royal Dutch Shell had an obligation to reduce its carbon emissions relative to 2019 levels by 2030 across its entire energy portfolio. It represents a groundbreaking advance in the context of business responsibility for human rights impacts. A Dutch district court issued a historic decision, ordering Shell to sharply reduce its CO2 emissions, aligning with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Shell appealed the judgment. The appeals court has ruled in favour of Shell, overturning the previous order requiring the company to slash its carbon emissions by 45% by 2030.

Date:

15 November 2024

Facts:

The court extensively discussed the science on climate change and its impacts, reductions targets, and the existing international instruments at length. It reiterated the reduction goals set out in the Paris Agreement.

Admissibility:

The court described the case as a public interest action. These are allowed under Dutch law, and the court noted that the common interest of preventing dangerous climate change by reducing CO2 emissions can be protected in a class action. It discussed at length whether the cases shared a ‘similar interest’, which is a requirement under the Dutch Civil Code. This requirement entails that the interests in question must be suitable for bundling into a class action so as to safeguard an the legal protection of the stakeholders.

In determining whether the individual applicants had locus standi, the court held that they had no separate interest beyond that represented by Milieudefensie before the court, and wrote off the individual claims.

Merits:

Relying on domestic law, human rights law, and soft law instruments, the domestic court interpreted the unwritten standard of care contained in Dutch domestic tort law.

Book 6, Section 162 of the Dutch Civil Code proscribes acts that conflict with what is generally accepted according to unwritten law. The court held that this standard of care also applies to Royal Dutch Shell. Applying this standard, the court held that Shell was obliged to reduce its CO2 emissions by net 45% at end 2030, relative to 2019. This reduction obligation relates to Shell’s entire energy portfolio and all of its aggregate emissions. This is an obligation of result for the activities of the Shell group itself, and a best-efforts obligation with respect to its business relations and end-users. Because Shell has the ability to influence these relations, it is expected to use its influence to bring about emissions reductions.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision:

The appeals court acknowledged that while Shell has ‘an obligation toward citizens to limits its CO2 emissions,’ it was not legally required to reduce emissions by a specific percentage such as the 45% set in the original ruling. The court cited an absence of an agreed-upon standard within climate science about the exact amount of emission reduction required for individual companies. Moreover, the court emphasised that ensuring human rights protection, including protection from climate change, is primarily up to the government. The court noted that Shell was already working to curb emissions in its production processes and argued that even if Shell halted its fuel sales, other companies might simply fill the gap to meet ongoing demand for fossil fuels, effectively resulting in no reduction in overall emissions.

Next step:

It is expected that the applicants will appeal the case to the Dutch Supreme Court.

Separate opinions:

None

Measures taken as a result of the judgment:

Pending

Status of case:

Decided

Suggested case citation:

The Hague Court of Appeal, Milieudefensie and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Others, case number 200.302.332/01, Judgment of 12 November 2024.

Links:

For full judgments by the District Court and Appeals Court (in English), see here and here.

Categories
Access to a remedy Austria Disability and health-related inequality Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Fair trial Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Victim status Vulnerability

Müllner v. Austria

Summary:
On 25 March 2021, an application was filed before the European Court of Human Rights concerning the impact of climate change (specifically, temperature increases) on an applicant suffering from temperature-sensitive multiple sclerosis and Uhthoff’s syndrome. The applicant alleged a violation of his rights under Article 8 ECHR by the failure by the Austrian government to set effective greenhouse gas emissions reduction measures.

The applicant alleged in particular that, at temperatures above 25 degrees Celsius, he is no longer able to walk, and that above 30 degrees Celsius, he loses complete control over his muscular movement. He alleged that, by failing to sufficiently reduce its emissions to meet the goals set out in the Paris Agreement, the respondent State had not only made it impossible to meet the 1,5 degree Celsius warming target set out therein, but had even actively taken measures to exacerbate the climate crisis, including through subsidies and incentives. The applicant also alleged that the domestic State’s legal system systemically impeded him from challenging the climate policies at stake, and the government’s inaction in this regard. This, he submitted, reflects a systemic deficit in the domestic legal system, making it impossible to challenge inaction by the State.

The applicant invoked the right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 ECHR, and subsidiarily the right to life in Article 2 ECHR, as well as the rights to access to a remedy and fair trial in Articles 13 and 6 ECHR.

The case was initially adjourned pending the outcome of Grand Chamber proceedings in three other climate cases, in which the Court issued its rulings on 9 April 2024 (KlimaSeniorinnen, Duarte Agostinho and Carême). On 1 July 2024, it was announced that the Court had communicated the case to the Austrian government. The Court also granted the case priority under Article 41 of the Rules of Court, meaning that it will receive expedited treatment.

Status of case:
The case was communicated to the Austrian government on 1 July 2024 as per the Court’s press release below.

In communicating the case, the Court asked the following questions of the parties:

1.  Is the application admissible? In particular:

a.  Has the applicant exhausted all effective domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in respect of each of his complaints lodged with the Court under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention (see Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, § 215, 9 April 2024, and Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], no. 21881/20, §§ 138-145, 27 November 2023)?

b.  Can the applicant claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, §§ 460-472, 478-488, 527-535, 9 April 2024)?

c.  Was Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head applicable to the proceedings in the present case (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, §§ 594-625)?

2.  To the extent that the complaints are admissible, has there been a violation of Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention? In particular:

a.  Has there been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life or home, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention?

Did the respondent State fail to comply with its positive obligations to effectively protect the applicant’s respect for his private and family life, including his home (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, §§ 538-574)?

b.  Did the applicant have access to a court for the determination of his civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, §§ 626-640)?

Did the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied Articles 139 and 140 of the Federal Constitution involve excessive formalism (see Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 80-86, 96-99, 5 April 2018, and Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, nos. 55997/14 and 3 others, §§ 111-117, 31 March 2020)?

c.  Did the applicant have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his Convention complaints, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Müllner v. Austria, application no. 18859/21, filed on 25 March 2021, communicated on 1 July 2024.

Links:
For the last-instance domestic judgment in this case, see here: https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_Beschluss_G_144_2020_vom_30._September_2020.pdf

For the full text of the application to the Court, see here: https://www.michaelakroemer.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/rechtsanwaeltin-michaela-kroemer-klimaklage-petition.pdf

For more information on the case from Fridays for Future Austria, see here.

For a statement from the applicant’s lawyer, Michaela Kroemer, see here.

Last updated:
1 July 2024.

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Guyana Right to a healthy environment

Thomas & De Freitas v. Guyana

Summary:
On 21 May 2021, two Guayanese citizens filed a case in the domestic courts of Guayana, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by Guyana’s approval of oil exploration licences to a joint venture involving ExxonMobil and other corporations. They invoked the government’s duty to protect their right to a healthy environment, as well as the right of future generations to the same.

The case documents are not yet available. However, the case has been reported widely. For more information, see:

Background information:
The Human Rights Committee had previously voiced concerns about the oil exploitation licenses granted by the Guayanese government. In its 2020 List of Issues, it asked the Government to provide information on “concerns that large scale oil extraction significantly increases greenhouse gas emissions, causes ocean acidification and
rising sea-levels, and adversely affects the most vulnerable groups in the State party, including the Amerindian and fishery-dependent communities and individuals living in poverty’.

Categories
2021 Brazil Deforestation Domestic court Individual responsibility Right to a healthy environment

Ministério Público Federal v. de Rezende

Summary:
This case concerns the responsibility of an individual (a farmer in the Amazonia region of Brazil) for deforestation and thus for climate change, including human rights impacts.

The Ministério Público Federal (MPF) had brought a tort case against the farmer, Dauro Parreiras de Rezende, for causing the deforestation of 2,488.56 hectares of Amazon rainforest between 2011 and 2018. This had allegedly violated the right to a healthy environment as enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution. On 16 April 2021, a Federal Environmental and Agrarian Court granted an injunction ordering the removal of cattle from the land in question.

Climate Case Chart reports that MPF is seeking up to R$ 85.4 million (ca. $17 million USD) in damages for the climate damage itself, i.e., the value of the emissions related to the deforestation in question, human rights violations due to collective pain and suffering, other environmental damages, and compensation for the farmer’s illegal profits due to the deforestation.

More information:

For more detail and the text (in Portuguese) of the petition and judgment, visit Climate Case Chart.

For a newspaper report on the case (in Portuguese), see here.

Suggested case citation:
Federal Environmental and Agrarian Court, Ministério Público Federal v. de Rezende, petition filed on 7 April 2021

Federal Environmental and Agrarian Court, Ministério Público Federal v. de Rezende, preliminary decision issued on 16 April 2021

Categories
2022 Adaptation Czechia Deforestation Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Evidence Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Separation of powers Standing/admissibility Victim status

Klimatická žaloba ČR, z.s. and Others v. Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Transport, Czech Republic

Summary:

On 21 April 2021, the plaintiffs in this case (Klimatická žaloba ČR, an NGO established for the purpose of climate litigation; the Municipality of Svatý Jan pod Skalou; the Czech Ornithological Society; and four individuals) initiated a civil action against unlawful interference, naming four ministries of the Czech government and the Czech government (cabinet) as defendants. They contested failures to provide adequate and necessary mitigation and adaptation measures to protect against the adverse effects of climate change. They also alleged that the Czech government’s failures to adequately address climate change had violated the rights to life, health, a healthy environment, and other rights guaranteed by the Czech constitution, the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and the European Convention on Human Rights. They alleged that this interference was constituted by their failure to implement concrete measures for the mitigation of climate change, based on international law (in particular, the Paris Agreement), EU law, and Article 35 of the Czech Charter on Fundamental Rights (Charter), which provides for the right to a favourable environment.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Czech government failed to respect their rights by ensuring sufficient emissions reductions to meet the Paris Agreement’s targets. They also sought an order setting the Czech carbon budget at 800 Mt CO2 from January 2021 until the end of the century.

The plaintiffs were initially successful before the Municipal Court of Prague, whose judgment was subsequently annulled by the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic. On 5 February 2025, the plaintiffs filed a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic alleging violations of several rights under the Charter and Articles 2, 8 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  

Procedural History 

The first instance the plaintiffs approached was the Municipal Court in Prague. On 15 June 2022, the Municipal Court rendered a judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, declaring that each of the four ministries had unlawfully interfered with the applicants’ right to a favourable environment under of Article 35 of the Charter, on the grounds that they had not undertaken measures for the state to achieve a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. It held that the claims against the cabinet as inadmissible as it did not constitute an ‘administrative authority’ against whom claims of unlawful interference could be brought under the Czech Code of Administrative Justice. 

Both the parties appealed against this judgment. The defendant ministries (appellants) argued that the Municipal Court exceeded its competence in breach of the separation of powers doctrine and interpreted EU and international law incorrectly. The plaintiffs (cross-appellants) argued that the Municipal Court erred in declining the cabinet’s capacity to be sued and ought to have prescribed a more ambitious mitigation target than the 55% target for the Czech government to achieve. On 20 February 2023, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) overruled the Municipal Court’s decision on account of the separation of powers doctrine and found that it incorrectly interpreted the EU climate target (entailing 55% emission reduction by 2030) as EU law does not prescribe a specific mandatory emissions reduction target for the Czech Republic alone. Since this was a cassation appeal, the SAC remanded the case to the Municipal Court. Following a remand and a subsequent dismissal by the Municipal Court, the plaintiffs’ final appeal to the SAC was unsuccessful.

Claims

The plaintiffs thus filed a complaint before the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, seeking an annulment of the SAC and Municipal Court decisions on account of violations of their rights under Articles 6, 10, 11, 26, 31, 35 and 36 of the Charter and Articles 2, 6 and 8 of the ECHR. 

In support of their arguments, the plaintiffs relied on climate jurisprudence from the Netherlands, France, Germany, Ireland, Nepal, Colombia, and most importantly, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which emphasize the judiciary’s role in reviewing the state’s mitigation policy based on human rights law. They also placed heavy reliance on the interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR laid down in the case of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v. Switzerland to challenge the lack of a national carbon budget for the Czech Republic, a climate neutrality target, and binding intermediate emission reduction targets. Furthermore, they problematized the SAC’s use of European Climate Law (which provides for a framework for emissions reduction targets to be achieved by EU member states collectively) as a shield against the plaintiffs’ human rights claims against the Czech Republic. 

Judgment

On 22 October 2025, the Constitutional Court issued its ruling wherein it dismissed the plaintiffs’ requests by emphasizing on the form of action they used to bring the claim before the Municipal Court (and SAC). Under the Code of Administrative Justice, the administrative authorities in question could only be regarded as having produced an unlawful interference by failing to implement their statutory duties. The Court found the plaintiffs had not proven how the ministries could adopt the requested measures within their existing legal authorizations. It also held that neither the Constitution nor the ECHR specifically obligate the four named ministries to adopt the measures requested by the applicants. 

Regarding the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, the Constitutional Court held that while the ECtHR is an international court which assesses the actions of the state as a whole, its own role was limited to examining the conduct of the named defendant ministries. Finally, it held that the administrative courts did not violate the plaintiffs’ right of access to the court (Article 36 of the Charter, and Article 6 of the ECHR) as it found the courts to have examined each of their submissions and ruled on the entire subject matter of the proceedings. 

Status: 

The Constitutional Court ruling is final and cannot be appealed.

On 2 February 2026, the NGO Klimatická žaloba ČR submitted an application to the ECtHR alleging violations of Articles 8, 6 and 13 of the ECHR. 

Links:

The ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic can be found here.

The Municipal Court of Prague Judgment from 15 June 2022 (finding in favour of the plaintiffs) can be found here (Czech) and here (unofficial English translation). 

The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic (SAC), annulling the Municipal Court of Prague Judgment from 15 June 2022, dated 20 February 2023 can be found here (Czech).

The Municipal Court of Prague Judgment from 25 October 2023 (upon remand of the case from the SAC) can be found here.

The second decision of the SAC dated 26 November 2024 (dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal) can be found here.

All other case related documents can be found on the website of the NGO Klimatická žaloba. 

Suggested citation: 

Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Klimatická žaloba ČR, z.s. and Others v. Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Transport, Czech Republic, Pl. ÚS 6/25, 22 October 2025, Judge Veronika Křesťanová (judge rapporteur).

Last updated:
12 March 2026.