Category: Climate-induced displacement

Categories
Adaptation African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights Business responsibility / corporate cases Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Disability and health-related inequality Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation Environmental racism Evidence Extreme poverty Farming Gender / women-led Human dignity Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Minority rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Participation rights Private and family life Prohibition of torture Renewable energy Right to a healthy environment Right to assembly and association Right to development and work Right to education Right to freedom of expression Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to property Right to subsistence/food Rights of nature Sea-level rise Self-determination Standing/admissibility Victim status Vulnerability

African Court on Human and People’s Rights Climate Advisory Opinion

Summary:
On 2 May 2025, a request for an advisory opinion on climate change was submitted to the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The request was submitted by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), in collaboration with the African Climate Platform, and other African Civil society Organizations including the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, Natural Justice and resilient40, and seeks clarification of States’ obligations in the context of climate change.

Submitted under article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights and Rule 82(1) of the Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, the request submits that “[a]cross the continent, Africans are suffering the consequences of climate change, whether from rising temperatures, unrelenting droughts, catastrophic floods, vanishing biodiversity, or threats to livelihoods. Climate change in Africa has had prior, current and will have future consequences that impact the enjoyment of numerous rights.”

The request sets out impacts, disaggregating them region-by-region and in terms of the groups of people most affected by climate change (mentioning women and girls, children, the elderly, Indigenous peoples, and environmental human rights defenders in particular).

The request then goes on to discuss several issues of law, beginning with issues of admissibility and jurisdiction and then relying on a wide range of rights and instruments, namely:

  • a) the Constitutive Act of the African Union
  • b) the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), especially articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 60 and 61
  • c) African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)
  • d) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)
  • e) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
  • f) The Revised African Convention on Conservation of Nature
  • g) Any other Relevant Instrument.

In doing so, PALU invites the Court to consider international climate change law, including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as well as the UN Conventions on Combatting Desertification and on Biological Diversity.

Rights invoked in more detail:
PALU submits that “a rights-based climate approach is needed to address the challenges posed by climate change” and that the human rights framework “provides a robust legal framework upon which the Court may rely to define States’ responsibilities and duties in the context of climate change […] because the Charter clearly provides for collective rights and the explicit protection of the right to a healthy environment.” PALU accordingly invites the Court to consider the following provisions of the Banjul Charter:

  • Articles 2 and 3 (equality and non-discrimination)
  • Article 4 (right to life and inviolability of the human person)
  • Article 5 (right to respect for dignity and prohibition of all forms of exploitation and degradation, including slavery and torture)
  • Article 8 (freedom of conscience and religion)
  • Article 9 (freedom of information and opinion)
  • Article 10 (freedom of association)
  • Article 11 (freedom of assembly)
  • Article 12 (freedom of movement, residence and asylum; prohibition of mass expulsion)
  • Article 14 (right to property)
  • Article 16 (right to health)
  • Article 17 (right to education)
  • Article 18 (protection of the family, prohibition of age and gender discrimination)
  • Article 19 (equality of peoples, prohibition of domination)
  • Article 20 (right of peoples to existence and self-determination)
  • Article 21 (right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources)
  • Article 22 (right of peoples to their economic, social and cultural development)
  • Article 23 (right of peoples to national and international peace and security)
  • Article 24 (right of all peoples to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development)
  • The request also discusses the implied rights to food and shelter.

Issues for determination:
PALU submits the following issues for determination by the Court (paraphrased):

(a) Whether the Court can be seized with the question of obligations concerning climate change under the Banjul Charter and other relevant instruments?

(b) Whether the Court can interpret and lay down applicable custom and treaty law regarding States’ obligations and duties in the context of climate change?

If these questions are resolved in the affirmative, the Court is invited to further determine:

(a) What, if any, are States’ human and peoples’ rights obligations to protect and safeguard the rights of individuals and peoples of the past (ancestral rights), and present and future generations?

(b) Whether States have positive obligations to protect vulnerable populations including environmental human rights defenders, indigenous communities, women, children, youth, future generations, the current generation, past generations, the elderly and people with disabilities from the impact of climate change in line with the relevant treaties?

(c) What human rights obligations do States have to facilitate a just, transparent, equitable and accountable transition in the context of climate change in Africa?

(d) What are the obligations of African States in implementing adaptation, resilience and mitigation measures in response to climate change?

(e) What, if any, are applicable human rights obligations of States to compensate for loss, damage and reparations?

(f) What responsibilities, if any, do African States have in relation to third parties, including international monopolies, multinational corporations and non-state actors operating on the continent, to ensure that international and regional treaties and laws on climate change are respected, protected, promoted and implemented?

(g) What, if any, is the nature of the obligations on African States to cooperate with other states especially historical emitters to limit global warming to below the 1.5°C threshold, to avert an existential climate crisis for present and future generations on the continent?

Further reading:
For more information on the advisory opinion request, see this post by Yusra Suedi.

Suggested citation:
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Request for an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in addressing the climate crisis, filed 2 May 2025 (pending).

Last updated:
23 May 2025

Categories
Climate-induced displacement Colombia Domestic court Farming Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to subsistence/food Vulnerability

Mendoza Bohórquez and Librada Niño de Mendoza v. Colombia

Summary:
In 2021, this case was brought against several Colombian government agencies by two peasants from Saravena (Arauca), José Noé Mendoza Bohórquez and Ana Librada Niño de Mendoza. Previously, in 2015 and 2016, the plaintiffs had been displaced from their homes and crops by flooding of the Bojabá River. Several state entities denied the plaintiffs assistance as displaced persons because they were not listed in the Single Registry of Victims (RUV), which at the time included more than eight million people affected by violence in Colombia, because as environmentally displaced people they did not fall under the definition of victims of forced displacement in place at the time.

The plaintiffs filed a tutela action alleging the violation of their fundamental rights, including their rights to housing, food, life and personal safety. The court of first instance and the Superior Court of Bogotá found that the tutela action was inadmissible. However, in 2024, the Colombian Constitutional Court found that forced displacement due to a natural disaster should be considered to fall under the definition of internal forced displacement. It held that forced displacement in Colombia is not caused only by armed conflict, but also occurs due to environmental causes, such as flooding, volcanic eruptions or landslides. Having regard to the facts of the case — including the plaintiffs’ vulnerability, the fact that they were forced to abandon their home due to an environmental disaster, the devastation of their home and property, and the danger that it represented for their integrity and well-being (paras. 203-204) — the Court found that the plaintiffs’ rights were violated.

The Court found that the authorities had an obligation to apply a human rights-based approach and adopt structural measures in favor of persons affected by natural disasters. The Constitutional Court ordered Parliament to develop a regulatory framework to protect people displaced by environmental causes.

Notably, the ruling does not distinguish between displacement due to environmental causes and that due to climate change. Instead, it defines environment-induced displacement in para. 58 of its judgment as “forced internal displacement due to disasters, events associated with climate change and environmental degradation”.

Full text of the Constitutional Court ruling:

The full text of the ruling can be found here or downloaded below.

T-123-24Download

More information on the case:
For more information on the case, see this post by Zoé Briard in the blog of the UCLouvain’s Centre Charles De Visscher.

For reporting on the case (in Spanish), see El Pais.

Suggested citation:
Constitutional Court (Colombia), Mendoza Bohórquez and Librada Niño de Mendoza v. Colombia, 16 April 2024, Case T-123.

Last updated:
29 November 2024.

Categories
Adaptation Climate-induced displacement Domestic court Indigenous peoples' rights Kenya Loss & damage Non-discrimination Right to life Right to property

Legal Advice Centre T/A Kituo cha Sheria & Anor v. Attorney General and 7 Others (Iten ELC Petition No. 007 of 2022)

Summary:
In 2022, a case was filed in Kenya on behalf of members of indigenous Ilchamus and Tugen communities living on the shores of Lake Baringo. Due to flooding, Lake Baringo has doubled in size since 2010. The plaintiffs assert that, as residents of the area, they are victims of climate change-related flooding, which in turn has caused displacement, deaths and harm to property. The petitioners allege violations of their constitutional human rights as well as violations of the Kenyan government’s duties under the domestic Climate Change Act. Drawing on a 2021 government report that identified climate change as the main cause of flooding in the area, the plaintiffs seek to — in the words of their lead attorney, Omondi Owino, “enforce the climate change duties of public officials”.

The petitioners’ motion for the Supreme Court of Kenya to create a three-judge Environment and Land Court (ELC) panel to hear the case was allowed. A hearing in the case — which alleges that government officials “failed, refused, or neglected” to “anticipate, prevent, or minimize” the impacts of climate change — was held on 24 October 2023 at the ELC in Iten. Government lawyers have reportedly contested the claims and the plaintiffs’ claims for damages, arguing that Kenya’s contribution to global climate change is minimal.

Suggested citation:
Environment and Land Court (ELC) of Iten, Legal Advice Centre T/A Kituo cha Sheria & Anor v. Attorney General and 7 Others, Petition No. 007 of 2022.

Categories
2021 Climate-induced displacement Domestic court Human dignity Italy Non-refoulement Right to life

I.L. v. Italian Ministry of the Interior and Attorney General at the Court of Appeal of Ancona

Summary:

In the case of I.L. v. Italian Ministry of the Interior and the Attorney General at the Court of Appeal of Ancona, decided on 24 February 2021 by the Supreme Court of Cassation in Italy, a significant precedent was established in humanitarian asylum cases. The decision mandated that Italian trial judges should collectively assess situations of environmental, social, or climate degradation when evaluating eligibility for humanitarian protection, in addition to considering situations of armed conflict. The case involved a Nigerian citizen, I.L., who sought refuge in Italy, primarily due to armed paramilitary conflict in the Niger Delta region that was being exacerbated by environmental degradation, particularly numerous oil spills.

Claim:

The applicant claimed that the lower courts committed a prejudicial error by not taking into account the environmental disaster situation in the Niger Delta as a basis for humanitarian protection. He argued that the trial judge’s decision violated Legislative Decree No. 286/1998, known as the Consolidated Immigration Act, by failing to extend humanitarian protection based on the environmental disaster in his home region. The central issue at hand was to ascertain whether individuals facing a real threat to their right to life in their country of origin, due to adverse social, environmental, and climate circumstances rather than armed conflict, should be granted humanitarian protection.

Decision:

The Supreme Court of Cassation accepted the applicant’s appeal and remanded the case back to the Court of Ancona. The Court found that the applicant’s two grounds for appeal were well-founded. It recognized the existence of severe environmental instability in the Niger Delta, resulting from indiscriminate exploitation by oil companies and ethnic-political conflicts. The trial judge’s failure to consider the environmental context and widespread insecurity when assessing humanitarian protection eligibility was seen as an error.

The Court’s decision drew on international legal precedent, including the Teitiota decision from the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which recognized that environmental degradation could hinder the right to life when a state is unable or unwilling to ensure ‘access to essential natural resources, such as arable land and drinking water’. The Court’s key findings and instructions are as follows:

  1. When assessing humanitarian protection, the evaluation of widespread dangerous conditions in the applicant’s country of origin should consider specific risks to the right to life and dignified existence arising from environmental degradation, climate change, or unsustainable development of the area.
  2. Danger to an individual’s life can depend on socio-environmental conditions, not solely armed conflict. Such socio-environmental factors include human action that seriously jeopardizes an individual’s survival and that of their relatives.
  3. Trial judges are instructed to establish an ‘essential level’ below which decent living conditions are not present and the fundamental right to life is not ensured. The judge must then verify the effective assurance of this minimum threshold, which should encompass both armed conflict and other circumstances that pose a serious risk to the individual and their family’s survival, such as social, environmental, or climatic degradation or unsustainable exploitation of natural resources.
  4. The Court determined that if the situation in the country of origin does not allow for a minimum guarantee of the right to life, humanitarian protection should be granted. Importantly, this assessment now includes environmental and climatic factors influencing an individual’s decision to leave their home.

Links:

The case documents are accessible via Climate Case Chart: Click here.

Status of the case:

Judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation – Second Civil Section 

Suggested citation:

I.L. v. Italian Ministry of the Interior and Attorney General at the Court of Appeal of Ancona, Supreme Court of Cassation, N. 5022/2021, 24 February 2021.

Last updated:

03 November 2023.

Categories
Adaptation Biodiversity Children and young people Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Emissions reductions/mitigation Evidence Gender / women-led Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Inter-American Human Rights System Loss & damage Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Rights of nature Vulnerability

Climate Advisory Opinion of the IACtHR (OC 32/2025)

Summary:
On 3 July 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) issued its long-awaited advisory opinion on climate change, at the request of the governments of Chile and Colombia.

Advisory opinion request:
On 9 January 2023, Colombia and Chile jointly filed a request for an advisory opinion on the climate emergency and human rights to the IACtHR. The two governments requested clarification of the scope of States’ obligations, both in their individual and collective dimensions, in responding to the climate emergency within the framework of international human rights law, taking into account the different effects that climate change has on people in different regions and on different population groups, nature and human survival. The governments asked the Court to answer a series of questions grouped into six thematic areas, namely on:

A. The scope of States’ obligations to protect and prevent, including regarding their obligations to mitigate, adapt, regulate and monitor, and their response to loss and damage;

B. States’ obligations to protect the right to life given the existing climate science, and taking into account the right of access to information and transparency of information, including under the Escazú Agreement;

C. States’ obligations with respect to the rights of children and new generations, given especially the vulnerability of children;

D. On the State’s obligations concerning consultative and judicial procedures, taking into account the limited remaining carbon budget;

E. The protective and preventative obligations concerning environmental and land rights defenders, as well as women, indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities; and

F. Shared and differentiated obligations and responsibilities in terms of the rights of States, the obligation of cooperation and given the impacts on human mobility (migration and forced displacement of people).

Extended summary of the request:
In their request to the IACtHR, the two governments submitted that they are already dealing with the consequences of the climate emergency, including the proliferation of droughts, floods, landslides and fires. These, they submitted, underscore the need for a response based on the principles of equity, justice, cooperation and sustainability, as well as human rights. The two governments noted that climate change is already putting humans and future generations at risk, but that its effects are not being experienced uniformly across the international community. Instead, given their geography, climatic conditions, socioeconomic conditions and infrastructure, they are particularly being felt in the most vulnerable communities, including several countries in the Americas. They emphasized that these effects are not proportionate to these countries’ and communities’ contribution to climate change.

The governments, in their request, emphasized the relevance of the right to a healthy environment, as well as other interrelated substantive and procedural rights (affecting life, human survival and future generations). They reviewed the existing scientific evidence concerning the impacts and progression of climate change from the IPCC, and noted the vulnerability of the Andean region. The two governments referred to the 2017 Advisory Opinion of the IACtHR, which recognized the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous and individual right, and referred to the negative effects of climate change. However, they argued, there is a need to further clarify the human rights impacts of climate change, and corresponding obligations. In this regard, they raised the existence also of collective rights for the protection of nature under international human rights and environmental law, and cited the need to protect fundamental biomes like the Amazon and to understand States’ shared but differentiated responsibilities in a way that copes with loss and damage. The two governments invited the Court to set out clear standards against the background of litigation and related developments.

Consultation procedure:
In accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR (Art. 73(3)), all interested parties (individuals and organizations) are invited to present a written opinion on the issues covered in the advisory opinion request. The President of the Court has established 18 August 2023 as the deadline for doing so. More information is available here.

Advisory opinion of 3 July 2025:
On 3 July 2025, following an oral hearing, the IACtHR issued its advisory opinion in these proceedings (in Spanish, with the text in English to follow). In a 234-page opinion, the Court addressed the questions raised by the governments of Chile and Colombia in their request.

The advisory opinion covers a wide range of relevant issues and obligations, and provides in-depth clarifications of the legal issues raised. It covers, in short:

  • The procedure, competence of the Court and admissibility of the request, as well as a number of other preliminary considerations, including about the (scientific and other) sources used by the Court and the scope of the opinion.
  • The facts of the climate emergency, including its causes, differential contributions of different actors, and its impacts on natural systems, humans, vulnerable territories and ecosystems, as well as the need for urgent action, the possibilities and need for mitigation, the need for adaptation, and the seriousness of climate impacts.
  • The complexity of required responses, including discussions of resilience and sustainable development as a vehicle for protection of both human rights and the environment.
  • The international legal framework around climate change, applicable norms and frameworks, including international investment law, human rights, international environmental law and climate change treaties. The Court also reviewed the case-law of other adjudicators in the context of climate change.
  • The obligations of States in the context of the climate emergency, including the scope of human rights obligations to respect rights, protect rights (including a reinforced due diligence obligation), and the obligation to take measures to ensure progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights. This includes discussion of various substantive rights, including particularly the right to a healthy environment but also the rights to life, physical integrity, health, private and family life, property and home, freedom of movement and residence, water and food, work and social security, culture and education. The advisory opinion also includes consideration of procedural rights and the link between these rights and democracy, the right to science and recognition of local knowledge, the right of access to information (and combatting disinformation), the right to political participation and access to justice as well as protection of environmental defenders and equality and non-discrimination norms. In this latter regard, the opinion considers the differential protection owed to children and youth, to Indigenous and tribal peoples, Afrodescendant communities, peasants and those involved in fisheries. It also considers the differential effect of climate change and the implications for fight against poverty.

Opinion of the Court:
Appended to the Court’s extensive consideration of the relevant issues and obligations is its concrete opinion, which reads as follows (translation from the original Spanish, to be replaced with the English-language translation by the Court once available):

THE COURT DECIDES
Unanimously, that:

It is competent to issue the present Advisory Opinion, in the terms of paragraphs 14 to 23.

AND IS OF THE OPINION
Unanimously, that:

  1. According to the best available science, the current situation constitutes a climate emergency due to the accelerated increase in global temperature, produced by diverse activities of anthropogenic origin, undertaken unequally by the States of the international community, which incrementally affect and seriously threaten humanity and, especially, the most vulnerable people. This climate emergency can only be adequately addressed through urgent and effective actions for mitigation, adaptation and progress towards sustainable development, articulated with a human rights perspective, and under the prism of resilience, in the terms of paragraphs 183 and 205 to 216.

    Unanimously, that:
  2. By virtue of the general obligation to respect rights, States have the obligations indicated in paragraphs 219 to 223.

    Unanimously, that:
  3. Under the general obligation to ensure rights, States have an obligation to act in accordance with a standard of enhanced due diligence to counteract the human causes of climate change and protect people under their jurisdiction from climate impacts, in particular those who are most vulnerable, in the terms of paragraphs 225 to 237.

    By six votes in favor and one against, that:
  4. By virtue of the general obligation to ensure the progressive development of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, States must allocate the maximum available resources to protect persons and groups who, because they are in situations of vulnerability, are exposed to the most severe impacts of climate change, in the terms of paragraphs 238 to 243.
    Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg dissents.

    Unanimously, that:
  5. By virtue of the general obligation to adopt domestic law provisions, States must integrate into their domestic legal framework the necessary regulations to ensure the respect, guarantee and progressive development of human rights in the context of the climate emergency, in the terms of paragraphs 244 to 246.

    Unanimously, that:
  6. By virtue of the obligation to cooperate, the States are obliged to cooperate in good faith to advance in the respect, guarantee and progressive development of human rights threatened or affected by the climate emergency, in the terms of paragraphs 247 to 265.

    By four votes in favor and three against, that:
  7. The recognition of Nature and its components as subjects of rights constitutes a normative development that makes it possible to reinforce the protection of the integrity and functionality of ecosystems in the long term, providing effective legal tools in the face of the triple planetary crisis and facilitating the prevention of existential damage before it becomes irreversible. This conception represents a contemporary manifestation of the principle of interdependence between human rights and the environment, and reflects a growing trend at the international level aimed at strengthening the protection of ecological systems against present and future threats, in accordance with paragraphs 279 to 286.
    Judge Nancy Hernández López, Judge Humberto Sierra Porto and Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg dissenting.

    By four votes in favor and three against, that:
  8. By virtue of the principle of effectiveness, the imperative prohibition of anthropogenic conducts that may irreversibly affect the interdependence and vital balance of the common ecosystem that makes the life of the species possible constitutes a norm of jus cogens, in accordance with paragraphs 287 to 294.
    Judge Nancy Hernández López, Judge Humberto Sierra Porto and Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg dissenting.

    By a vote of five in favor and two partially against, that:
  9. The right to a healthy climate, understood as a component of the right to a healthy environment, protects in its collective dimension the present and future humanity, as well as Nature, in the terms of paragraphs 298 to 316.
    Judge Nancy Hernández López and Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg dissenting in part.

    By six votes in favor and one partially against, that:
  10. By virtue of the right to a healthy climate, States must protect the global climate system and prevent human rights violations derived from its alteration. Therefore, they must mitigate GHG emissions, which implies (i) adopting regulations on the matter that define a mitigation goal and a mitigation strategy based on human rights, as well as regulating the behavior of companies, in the terms of paragraphs 323 to 351; (ii) adopting mitigation supervision and control measures, in the terms of paragraphs 352 to 357, and (iii) determining the climate impact of projects and activities when appropriate, in the terms of paragraphs 358 to 363.
    Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg dissenting in part.

    Unanimously, that:
  11. By virtue of the right to a healthy environment, States must (i) protect nature and its components from the impacts of climate change, and (ii) establish a strategy to move towards sustainable development, in the terms of paragraphs 364 to 376.

    By six votes in favor and one partially against, that:
  12. By virtue of the rights to life, personal integrity, health, private and family life, property and housing, freedom of residence and movement, water and food, work and social security, culture and education, as well as all other substantive rights threatened by climate impacts, States have an enforceability obligation, States have an immediately enforceable obligation to define and update, as ambitiously as possible, their national adaptation goal and plan, in the terms of paragraphs 384 to 391, as well as the duty to act with enhanced due diligence in compliance with the specific duties set forth in paragraphs 400 to 457.
    Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg dissenting in part.

    Unanimously, that:
  13. By virtue of the democratic principle, the States must strengthen the democratic rule of law as an essential framework for the protection of human rights, the effectiveness of public action, and open and inclusive citizen participation, also ensuring the full exercise of procedural rights, in the terms of paragraphs 460 to 469.

    By six votes in favor and one partially against, that:
  14. By virtue of the human right to science and the recognition of local, traditional and indigenous knowledge, protected by Articles 26 of the Convention and 14.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador, all persons have the right to access the benefits of measures based on the best available science and on the recognition of local, traditional or indigenous knowledge, in the terms of paragraphs 471 to 487.
    Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg dissenting in part.

    Unanimously, that:
  15. Under the right of access to information, States have obligations regarding (i) production of climate information, in the terms of paragraphs 501 to 518; (ii) disclosure of information relevant to the protection of human rights in the face of climate change, in the terms of paragraphs 519 to 523, and (iii) to adopt measures against disinformation, in the terms of paragraphs 524 to 527.

    Unanimously, that:
  16. Under the right to political participation, States must guarantee processes that ensure the meaningful participation of people under their jurisdiction in decision-making and policies related to climate change, as well as ensure prior consultation of indigenous and tribal peoples, where appropriate, in the terms of paragraphs 530 to 539.

    By four votes in favor and three partially against, that:
  17. By virtue of the right of access to justice, the States must ensure central aspects regarding (i) provision of sufficient means for the administration of justice in this context, (ii) application of the pro actione principle; (iii) celerity and reasonable time in judicial proceedings; (iv) adequate provisions regarding standing, (v) evidence and (vi) reparation, as well as (vii) application of inter-American standards; in the terms of paragraphs 542 to 560.
    Judge Nancy Hernández López, Judge Humberto Sierra Porto and Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg dissenting in part.

    Unanimously, that:
  18. By virtue of the right to defend human rights, States have a special duty to protect environmental defenders that translates into specific obligations, among others, to protect them, investigate and, if necessary, punish attacks, threats or intimidations they suffer, and to counteract the “criminalization” of the defense of the environment, in the terms of paragraphs 566 to 567, and 575 to 587.

    Unanimously, that:
  19. States should adopt measures aimed at addressing the way in which the climate emergency exacerbates inequality and has a differentiated impact on people living in multidimensional poverty, in the terms of paragraphs 626 and 627.

    By four votes in favor and three partially against, that:
  20. States have specific obligations in situations of special vulnerability such as those faced by (i) children, and (ii) indigenous peoples, tribes, Afro-descendants, and peasant and fishing communities, (iii) people who suffer differentiated impacts in the context of climate disasters, in the terms of paragraphs 599 to 602, and 604; 606 to 613, and 614 to 618. Likewise, States must adopt measures to protect persons who do not belong to the traditionally protected categories but who are in a situation of vulnerability for dynamic or contextual reasons, in the terms of paragraphs 628 and 629.
    Judge Nancy Hernández López, Judge Humberto Sierra Porto and Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg partially dissent.

    Judge Nancy Hernández López, Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto and Judge Patricia Pérez Goldberg delivered their partially dissenting opinions. Judge
    Rodrigo Mudrovitsch, Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, Judge Ricardo C. Pérez Manrique and Judge Verónica Gómez announced concurring opinions.

Further information:

  • A summary of the advisory opinion (in Spanish) is available here.
  • A discussion of the advisory opinion by Patricia Tarre Moser and Juan Auz on Estudia Derechos Humanos (in Spanish) is available here.
  • The text of the advisory opinion request is available here (in the official Spanish version as filed with the Court) and it has also been translated to English, French and Portuguese by the Court’s Secretariat.
  • For a comment on the request by Juan Auz and Thalia Viveros-Uehara, see ‘Another Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency? The Added Value of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 2 March 2023, available here.
  • For a comment on the request from Maria Antonia Tigre, see ‘A Request for an Advisory Opinion at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Initial Reactions’, Climate Law Blog, 17 February 2023, available here.

Suggested citation:
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights, OC 32/2025, 3 July 2025.

Last updated:
4 July 2025.

Categories
Adaptation Australia Climate-induced displacement Human Rights Committee Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Private and family life Right to culture Right to life Sea-level rise Standing/admissibility Vulnerability

Billy et al. v. Australia (Torres Straits Islanders case)

Summary:
This petition against Australia was brought to the UN Human Rights Committee by a group of eight indigenous Torres Straits Islanders in 2019, in their own names and on behalf of their children. In their petition, they argued that the Australian government had violated their rights, as inhabitants of low-lying islands, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because of its inaction in addressing climate change (failure to mitigate emissions and to take adaptation measures).

Rights at stake:
The applicants in this case invoked a series of rights in the ICCPR, on behalf of themselves and their children, contesting the respondent State’s failure to adopt mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and cease the promotion of fossil fuels. To support this, they drew on Article 27 (the right to culture), Article 17 (the right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home), and Article 6 (the right to life) ICCPR. They argued that the indigenous peoples of the Torres Strait Islands, especially those who reside on low-lying islands, are among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. They considered that the Australian government must ensure both mitigation and adaptation measures in order to adequately protect their rights. Previously, the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA), a government body, had stated that “the effects of climate change threaten the islands themselves as well as marine and coastal ecosystems and resources, and therefore the life, livelihoods and unique culture of Torres Strait Islanders.”

Outcome:

On 21 July 2022, the Human Rights Committee adopted its Views in this case.

Observations of the State:

The Australian Government argued that the case was inadmissible, contesting the relevance of climate-related international agreements and its own ability to be held (legally or practically) responsible for climate-related harms. It also submitted that it was not possible to attribute climate change to the State party under international human rights law.

The HRC’s considerations on the admissibility:

On the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Government’s position was that it did not owe a duty of care for failing to regulate environmental harm, and that it was not required to provide a remedy where (including in the present case) it understood there to be no breach of ICCPR rights. This question was accordingly reserved to the examination of the merits.

Concerning mitigation measures, the HRC noted that Australia is and has been a major greenhouse gas emitter, and ranks high on economic and development indices. As a result, it found that the alleged (in)actions fell under its jurisdiction under articles 1 or 2 of the Optional Protocol.

Concerning the imminence of the risk concerned, and accordingly the issue of victim status / standing, the Committee found that the authors of this Communication, “as members of peoples who are the longstanding inhabitants of traditional lands consisting of small, low-lying islands that presumably offer scant opportunities for safe internal relocation – are highly exposed to adverse climate change impacts”. Given the uncontested dependence of their lives and cultures on natural resources and phenomena, and their inability to finance adaptation measures on their own, the authors were considered to be “extremely vulnerable to intensely experiencing severely disruptive climate change impacts”. Given the authors’ allegations of serious ongoing adverse impacts, the HRC declared their claims under articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27 of the ICCPR admissible.

Merits:

Article 6

The Committee recalled that the right to life cannot be interpreted restrictively, and that it requires States to adopt protective measures (i.e. that it entails positive obligations). It recalled its own General Comment No. 36, issued in 2018, in establishing that the right to life also extends to reasonably foreseeable threats to life, including adverse climate change impacts and environmental degradation.

The Committee rejected Australia’s allegation that the interpretation of the ICCPR contained in this General Comment was not compatible with the rules of treaty interpretation under general international law. It then went on to recall its own earlier Teitiota v. New Zealand case (on climate-induced displacement), ultimately finding that the authors were not currently facing health impacts or real and reasonably foreseeable risks of being exposed harms to their right to life. The Committee also noted that the right-to-life claim being made largely related to the authors’ ability to maintain their culture, which falls under article 27 ICCPR.

Regarding the authors’ submission that, absent urgent action, their islands will become uninhabitable within 10 to 15 years, the Committee noted the adaptation and mitigation measures currently planned or being taken, and found that the time frame of 10 to 15 years could allow for additional protective measures or relocation programmes. As a result, it found that there had been no violation of the right to life in this case.

Article 17

The authors claimed that climate change already affects their private, family and home life, given that they may be forced to abandon their homes. The Committee considered that the authors’ dependence on marine and terrestrial resources and ecosystems is a component of their traditional indigenous way of life, falling under the scope of Article 17 ICCPR.

Considering the adaptation measures and related plans in place, the Committee noted the existence of unexplained delays in seawall construction and the lack of explanation concerning the loss of marine resources, crops and fruit trees. It noted the ongoing inundation of villages and ancestral burial lands; the withering of traditional gardens through salinification; the decline of nutritionally and culturally important marine species; coral bleaching and ocean acidification; and the authors’ anxiety and distress. The Committee also noted the importance of community lands for the authors’ most important cultural ceremonies. It accordingly found that:

“that when climate change impacts – including environmental degradation on traditional [indigenous] lands (…) – have direct repercussions on the right to one’s home, and the adverse consequences of those impacts are serious because of their intensity or duration and the physical or mental harm that they cause, then the degradation of the environment may adversely affect the well-being of individuals and constitute foreseeable and serious violations of private and family life and the home.”

Finding that Australia had failed to discharge its positive obligation to implement adequate adaptation measures to protect the authors’ home, private life and family, the HRC found a violation of the authors’ rights under article 17 ICCPR.

Article 27

Article 27 ICCPR recognizes the right of members of minority indigenous groups to the enjoyment of culture, and protects the survival and continued development of their cultural identity. Interpreted in the light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, this right enshrines the inalienable right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their traditional territories and natural resources. Here, the authors argued that their ability to maintain their culture has already been impaired due to climate change impacts, which have eroded their traditional lands and natural resources, for which there is no substitute on mainland Australia. The Committee found that these climate impacts represent a threat that was reasonably foreseeable by the State party, as the authors’ community had been raising the issue since the 1990s. While noting existing seawall construction projects, it considered that the delay in initiating these projects indicated an inadequate response by the State party to the threat in question. It found that the failure to adopt timely and adequate adaptation measures “to protect the authors’ collective ability to maintain their traditional way of life, to transmit to their children and future generations their culture and traditions and use of land and sea resources discloses a violation of the State party’s positive obligation to protect the authors’ right to enjoy their minority culture.” Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 27 ICCPR.

As a result of its findings concerning Articles 17 and 27 ICCPR, the HRC considered it not necessary to examine the authors’ remaining claims under article 24 (1) ICCPR.

Remedies:

Under Article 2 (3) (a) ICCPR, the HRC noted that the State was required to make full reparation to the authors, which meant providing adequate compensation; engaging in meaningful consultations with their communities to conduct needs assessments; continuing its adaptation measures and monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of existing measures; and taking steps to prevent similar violations in the future. The Committee requested the State to provide it with information about the measures taken in this regard within 180 days.

Separate opinions:

Several HRC members appended individual opinions to the Views. These include:

  • The individual opinion by Committee Member Duncan Laki Muhumuza, arguing that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life);
  • The individual opinion by Committee Member Gentian Zyberi, concurring but arguing that the Committee had focused too heavily on adaptation measures, and should instead have more clearly linked the right under Article 27 ICCPR to mitigation measures;
  • The joint opinion by Committee Members Arif Bulkan, Marcia V. J. Kran and Vasilka Sancin (partially dissenting), who argued that there had been a violation of Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life). They argued in particular that the “real and foreseeable risk” standard employed by the majority interpreted Article 6 too restrictively, and was inappropriate here as it had been borrowed from the dissimilar context of its refugee cases (Teitiota v. New Zealand, the HRC’s first climate-induced displacement case).

Full decision:

The HRC’s Views are available here.

Further reading:

  • Maria Antonia Tigre, ‘U.N. Human Rights Committee finds that Australia is violating human rights obligations towards Torres Strait Islanders for climate inaction’, available here.
  • Verena Kahl, ‘Rising Before Sinking: The UN Human Rights Committee’s landmark decision in Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia,’ Verfassungsblog, 3 October 2022, available here.
  • Nicole Barrett and Aishani Gupta, ‘Why Did the UN Human Rights Committee Refuse Broader Protections for Climate Change Victims?’, Opinio Juris blog, 5 October 2022, available here.
  • Christina Voigt, ‘UNHRC is Turning up the Heat: Human Rights Violations Due to Inadequate Adaptation Action to Climate Change’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 26 September 2022, available here.
  • Monica Feria-Tinta, ‘Torres Strait Islanders: United Nations Human Rights Committee Delivers Ground-Breaking Decision on Climate Change Impacts on Human Rights’, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 27 September 2022, available here.

Suggested citation:

UN Human Rights Committee, Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia, Communication No. 3624/2019, 22 September 2022, UN Doc. CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019.

Categories
Children and young people Climate-induced displacement Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Pakistan Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment

Ali v. Pakistan

Summary:
This 2016 petition was brought against Pakistan in the name of a seven-year-old girl from Karachi, and challenges actions and inactions on the part of the federal and provincial government relating to climate change. The case is still pending.

Facts and claims made:
The petition, which is available on Climate Case Chart, was filed directly with the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Islamabad, and it alleges violations of constitutional rights, of the public trust doctrine, and of environmental rights. It challenges the environmental harms that are expected to result from the policy of burning coal to obtain electricity. The application challenges a plan to develop coal fields, which would massively increase Pakistani coal production and would displace local residents and degrade the local environment. The plan is linked to investments stemming from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which supports coal field development and new coal-fired power plants in Pakistan.

Suggested case citation:
The Supreme Court of Pakistan, Ali v. Pakistan, petition filed on 1 April 2016

Categories
2019 Climate-induced displacement Human Rights Committee New Zealand Non-refoulement Prohibition of torture Right to life

Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand

Summary:

The applicant submitted that New Zealand had violated his right to life under the ICCPR by removing him to Kiribati, an island state where, he submitted, the situation was becoming increasingly unstable and precarious due to sea level rise caused by global warming. The HRC accepted the claim that sea level rise and climate change-related harms can trigger non-refoulement obligations, but found that there is still time to take measures to protect the population of Kiribati.

Admissibility:

Concerning the imminence of the risk faced, the Committee noted that the author was not alleging a hypothetical future harm, but a real predicament caused by a lack of potable water and employment possibilities, and a threat of serious violence caused by land disputes. The author had sufficiently demonstrated, for the purpose of admissibility, the existence of a real risk of harm to his right to life, given the impact of climate change and associated sea level rise on the habitability of Kiribati and on the security situation on the islands.

Merits:

The HRC found that environmental degradation can compromise the effective enjoyment of the right to life, and if severe it can violate that right. The Committee accepted the author’s claim that sea level rise is likely to render Kiribati uninhabitable. Without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving States may expose individuals to a violation of articles 6 or 7 ICCPR, thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations of sending States. However, it noted that the time frame of 10 to 15 years, as suggested by the author, could allow for intervening acts by Kiribati, with the assistance of the international community, to take affirmative measures to protect and, where necessary, relocate its population.

Remedies ordered:

None

Separate opinions:

Yes

Implementation measures taken:

N/A

Date:

24 October 2019

Status of case:

final

Suggested case citation:

Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, No. 2728/2016, Communication of 24 October 2019.

Full text:

For the full-text of the decision in the case, click here.

Further reading:

Adaena Sinclair-Blakemore, ‘Teitiota v New Zealand: A Step Forward in the Protection of Climate Refugees under International Human Rights Law?’ Oxford Human Rights Hub, 28th January 2020, available here.

Keywords:

climate refugees, affectedness, non-refoulement

    Categories
    2014 Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate-induced displacement Domestic court New Zealand Sea-level rise

    AD (Tuvalu) v. New Zealand

    Summary:
    A family from Tuvalu appealed the decision to deport them from New Zealand, arguing that they would be at risk of suffering the adverse impacts of climate change — including the adverse effects of natural disasters — and socio-economic deprivation. Unlike in the domestic proceedings in the Teitiota case (domestically known as the AF (Kiribati) case), which made its way before the UN Human Rights Committee after leave to stay was refused, the applicants in this case received leave to remain in New Zealand on the basis of the exceptional circumstances of their case, which were understood to raise humanitarian concerns. The domestic court, the Auckland Immigration and Protection Tribunal, considered the family’s integration, the fact that they were “well-loved and integral members of a family”, and the best interests of their two children, aged three and five years old at the material time. Having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Tribunal considered that the children’s young age made them more vulnerable to natural disasters and the adverse impact of climate change, and that it would be in their best interests to remain living with their parents in New Zealand. Concerning climate change and environmental degradation as a humanitarian issue, the Tribunal noted that it was “widely accepted that the impacts of climate change can adversely affect the enjoyment of basic human rights” and that “Tuvalu, as a country comprising low-lying topical islands (…) is particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. Environmental degradation caused or exacerbated by climate change was already a feature of life in Tuvalu”. Considering these factors on a cumulative basis, and finding that there was no adverse public interest in this case, the Tribunal found that “there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature, which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellants to be removed from New Zealand.”

    Type of proceedings:
    Domestic

    Status of case:
    Final

    Decision in this case:
    The decision of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal in this case can be downloaded below.

    Decision in AD (Tuvalu)Download

    Suggested citation:
    New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal at Auckland, AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 501370-371, Decision of 4 June 2014.

    Further information:
    For more on this case and an analysis, see Jane McAdam, ‘The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement’, 3(1) Migration Studies (2015), 131–142.

    Last updated:
    17 August 2023.