Summary:
On 11 July 2022, a case was filed with the conciliation authority in the Swiss canton of Zug concerning the greenhouse gas emissions of the corporate cement giant Holcim AG, which is headquartered in Zug. The case was brought by four Indonesian nationals, who live on the Indonesian island of Pari and earn their livelihoods through fishing and tourism. They argued that rising sea levels and floods, which are all caused or aggravated by climate change, are threatening their livelihoods. The cement industry is a major emitter of greenhouse gases, currently emitting approximately 8% of yearly global CO2 emissions, and Holcim is the market leader in this sector (responsible for, historically, 0.42% of global industrial emissions since 1750). On this basis, the plaintiffs seek compensation from Holcim for the damage to their property and for future damages. They also seek adaptation measures to protect themselves against future impacts, and argue that Holcim should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 43% (compared to 2019 levels) by 2030, and 69% by 2040. This demands more rapid change than what is foreseen by the company’s own commitment to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. On 19 December 2025, the cantonal court of Zug declared the case admissible, paving the way for a future judgment on the merits.
Background and scope of the claim:
The claim concerns the greenhouse gas emissions produced by the cement industry, which are largely made up of direct emissions. The plaintiffs noted that 3/4 of Holcim’s emissions are direct emissions, as opposed to the largely indirect emissions created by the fossil fuel industry. The plaintiffs’ claim is based on references to climate attribution science, including reports by the IPCC, and the findings by the US Climate Accountability Institute that Holcim is responsible for 0.42% of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since 1750.
With the support of Swiss Church Aid HEKS/EPER, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and the Indonesian environmental organization WALHI, the plaintiffs invoke Swiss civil law, more specifically a violation of their personality rights under the Swiss Civil Code (Arts. 28 f.) and tort law under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 41 ff.), to argue that their human rights have been violated through the effects of the company’s emissions and that even more severe violations are forthcoming if Holcim does not reduce its emissions. They argue that the company should assume historical responsibility for its past emissions, but also future responsibility in the sense of rapidly reducing its greenhouse gas emissions.
Further developments and civil claim:
As required under Swiss procedural law, the case was brought as a request for arbitration. Arbitration proceedings in the case commenced in the fall of 2022. However, in October 2022, it became clear that the efforts at arbitration would not succeed in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. The case then progressed as a civil claim, with the four plaintiffs filing a lawsuit at the Zug Cantonal Court in February 2023 and applying for legal aid. They argued that Holcim must be ordered to reduce its emissions and provide compensation in order to ensure that their home island remains habitable and their livelihoods, community and culture are protected.
In particular, they argued that – due to violations of their personality rights caused by its CO2 emissions – the defendant is liable for the property damage suffered, as well as future property damage, in proportion to its share of 0.42% of global greenhouse gas emissions. They argued that Holcim has actively interfered with absolute legal interests such as the protection of life and limb, freedom, personality, property, and possessions, and will continue to do so. They also argue that there is an adequate causal link between the unlawful violation of personality rights on the one hand and the property damage on the other. This is because every ton of greenhouse gasses emitted has a long-term impact on the climate, as CO2 is broken down very slowly. They thus allege that the defendant corporation has a human rights-based duty of care to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It must ensure that the global average temperature increase on the Earth’s surface does not exceed pre-industrial temperatures by more than 1.5°C as a result of its emissions. However, the defendant is not doing enough to comply with this limit, which is why it must be obliged to reduce its CO2 emissions to the extent requested.
The plaintiffs accordingly sought injunctive relief in the form of emissions reductions under Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (protection of personality rights), as well as claiming reparation for damages already incurred, future damages and moral damages (satisfaction) under Swiss tort law (under the Swiss Code of Obligations).
The Cantonal Court of Zug held a hearing in the case on 3 September 2025 and issued its ruling on the admissibility on 19 December 2025.
Judgment on admissibility:
On 19 December 2025, the first division of the cantonal court of Zug issued its decision concerning the admissibility of the case.
The three-judge formation examined whether the conditions for admissibility under the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure had been met. This included examining whether there was a legitimate interest, whether the court had territorial and material jurisdiction, and whether a concrete, clear claim had been made.
Territorial jurisdiction:
First, the Court considered whether the case fell under the applicability of the Lugano Convention, finding that – given Holcim’s seat in Switzerland, and the plaintiffs’ seat abroad – the Convention applied, and Switzerland was the right forum for bringing the case (para. 2). Turning to the provisions of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA), the Court held that – given that both parties were making claims based on Swiss law – there had been a tacit or implied choice of law, and Swiss law was therefore applicable (Art. 132 PILA) (para. 2.2).
The Court noted that, in accordance with the Swiss theory of double relevance, the Court examines issues relating to its jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of the allegations, grounds for the action, and claims of the plaintiffs, without taking into account the objections of the defendant and without taking evidence (para. 2.4). The defendant’s objections are only examined at the time of the substantive examination of the case; objections raised by the opposing party in this regard are generally irrelevant in the context of the admissibility. However, the Court does determine, already at this stage, whether the claims made are in principle qualified to fall in the Court’s jurisdiction and whether the case is abusive. Given that it had not been alleged by the defendant that the allegations made were unqualified or abusive, the Court considered that they should provisionally be considered as true under the theory of double relevance.
Material jurisdiction:
The Court then determined whether the case fell in its material jurisdiction in the sense that it concerned an issue of civil (as opposed to public) law, which was contested between the applicants. It held that the distinction between civil and public law is fluid and dependent on the nature of the individual case (para. 3.3.). In doing so, it rejected the defendant’s argument that climate protection is to be provided only through public law mechanisms, which was in turn based on the position that the Paris Agreement does not create obligations for corporations and the Swiss legislator had not created specific GHG emissions reductions obligations for corporate actors. This case, the defendant argued, was part of an abusive worldwide campaign by NGOs to accelerate climate protection through litigation. Courts, it furthermore held, lacked the competence to order general emissions reductions targets.
The Court rejected these arguments, noting that the defendant was a private actor with no public authority and that the case was based on civil law (specifically the norms on protection of the personality, Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code, and the liability provisions under Art. 41 ff. of the Swiss Code of Obligations). It noted that Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code protect individuals from unlawful violations of personality rights by third parties: any legal entity, including individuals, whose personality is unlawfully infringed may sue anyone involved in the infringement; any private actor who participates in the violation of personality rights is liable to be sued (para. 3.6.2.1). In codifying this protection of the personality, the legislature deliberately refrained from defining the term “personality.” Instead, it formulated Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code as a general clause to enable the further development of the law and the adaptation of the term to changing times and values. The personality, as protected by these norms, is accordingly defined in a wide way, as the “totality of the individual”, and grants physical, psychological, and social areas of protection, as long as a certain minimum threshold of interference is reached.
The Court accordingly held that the adverse effects asserted by the plaintiffs affect the scope of protection of personality rights under Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code. If the plaintiffs’ statements were accepted as true, climate change has an impact on their physical integrity and personal freedom. Since greenhouse gas emissions from companies such as the defendant are undisputedly partly responsible for climate change, the plaintiffs can invoke the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 f. of the Swiss Civil Code for their claims against the defendant, thereby asserting personal claims under federal civil law (para. 3.6.2.2.).
As concerned the resulting rights and duties arising under civil law, the Court held that courts are not required to create new general climate protection goals in order to answer this question, but that it suffices to enforce existing legislation (para. 3.6.3.). This means that judicial rulings do not replace democratically legitimate climate policies, but complement them.
In making this finding, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that engaging with this case would undermine the separation of powers (para. 3.7.). Instead, citing Art. 29a of the Federal Constitution (guarantee of legal remedy), it noted that every person has the right to have their case heard by a judicial authority in legal disputes. Political questions can be excluded from access to court proceedings, but this applies only to cases of an ‘obvious’ political nature. And in this case, the competence of the civil courts had not been excluded through legislation. It held: “the courts, not the legislative or executive branches, are responsible for assessing alleged violations of the law” (para. 3.7.1.).
Examining the multilayered normative frameworks applicable to climate change, the Court noted that it had not yet been established under Swiss law that fundamental or human rights to life or private- and family life could have a horizontal direct effect among private actors. However, it could not exclude “that this could happen for the first time in the context of a climate case” (para. 3.7.2.). Particularly when interpreting open legal norms of private law (such as the protection of personality rights under Art. 28 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code), fundamental rights may be taken into consideration. Reiterating past findings from the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Court held that these provisions of the Swiss Civil Code are a civil law iteration of Article 8 ECHR. Noting the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, it noted that the ECHR provides only a subsidiary minimum standard, meaning that domestic law could also provide more stringent protection. Accordingly, it held, indirect horizontal effect of the human right to respect for private and family life was possible, particularly when courts are called to examine legal questions that have not yet been answered to date. Court decisions accordingly act as signposts for the application of legislation, and can feed political debates and give impulses for political change.
The Court then engaged with the defendant’s argument, based on the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, that the state’s duty of climate protection under Article 8 ECHR gives rise to very limitedly justiciable rights, and that the enactment of climate protection measures is a matter for democratic decision-making and not for the judiciary, because climate change raises complex scientific, political, economic, and other issues. The defendant had also called for the strict victim status requirements imposed in KlimaSeniorinnen to be transposed to disputes between private individuals, given their lack of a duty to protect.
The Court distinguished the case before it from KlimaSeniorinnen, noting that KlimaSeniorinnen was about general climate policy goals and the present case was about concrete impacts on individuals (para. 3.8). This meant that the defendant could not derive “any beneficial arguments from the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment for the present civil proceedings”. Parliamentary discussions that criticized the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment likewise had no salience for these proceedings, and were irrelevant. Neither was foreign case-law cited by the defendant relevant for the court’s consideration of the case (para. 3.9.). Summarizing cases from courts in the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and Germany, the Court held that these foreign courts have predominantly deemed private-law climate cases admissible and examined them in terms of substantive law. The defendant was therefore unable to derive anything in its favor from this foreign case law (para. 3.9.3.). As a result, the Court held, the case before it was a civil law one.
Whether a sufficiently concrete, clear claim had been made:
The Court then examined whether the plaintiffs have a legal interest in bringing the action. It held that, at the admissibility stage, this did not have to be conclusively proven; it sufficed if, on the balance of probabilities, the interest appeared to exist. Furthermore, the insignificance of the asserted claim (minima non curat praetor) does not lead to the loss of legal interest, unless there is an abuse of rights (para. 4.1.).
The plaintiffs argued that their interest legal protection is personal, practical, and current. Climate change poses an existential threat to small islands and low-lying coasts such as the island of Pari. It affects the livelihoods, health, well-being, food security, access to drinking water, and cultural values of the island’s inhabitants. Sea level rise damages settlements and destroys coastal infrastructure, leading to the loss of economic assets and biodiversity in traditional agricultural ecosystems, as well as a decline in fishing and tourism. The increasing uninhabitability of the island is forcing residents to leave their homes. What those affected have experienced firsthand is confirmed by scientific studies, including IPCC-reviewed science. They had also alleged a number of individualized impacts. They were accordingly affected by Holcim’s activities, notwithstanding the concurrent responsibility of other Carbon Majors.
Citing KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court held that IPCC-reviewed science was the relevant standard for determining any scientific questions related to these claims (para. 5.3.1.). It held that it was undisputed that climate change was having an impact on the world’s population. Engaging with the defendant’s argument that the case was an abstract public interest case, not an individualized claim, it held that the IPCC had noted that up to 3.6 billion people around the world are strongly at risk of impacts from climate change. This meant that the Court could not exclude that the case also had relevance for the interests of third parties. However, it held, “the personal affectedness of the plaintiffs goes beyond the general affectedness of persons who have not (yet) suffered damages from concrete events or have been exposed to an enhanced risk” (para. 5.5.3.). The affectedness of the plaintiffs had to be distinguished from that of the KlimaSeniorinnen applicants. While those applicants had benefitted from access to adaptation measures and their future risk of impact had not been demonstrated, the plaintiffs in this case “had no possibility to halt rising sea levels with reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their need for protection as accordingly more urgent (para. 5.5.4.). This reality likewise distinguished the plaintiffs in this case from those in similar German cases against BMW or Mercedes-Benz. The case was accordingly not to be characterized as an unacceptable actio popularis. In this regard, the Court cited the environmental case-law of the ECtHR concerning the garbage collection crisis in Campania, where the widespread nature of the issue likewise did not render the case an actio popularis.
The Court noted that the defendant was a major greenhouse gas emitter, a “Carbon Major”, and that it would be possible, through case-law, to create threshold criteria to distinguish the responsibility of such carbon major companies from smaller emitters (para. 5.5.6.). This meant that the case could not be rejected on the basis that it would lead to “litigation against everyone”. Climate change required action from both state and private actors if ecosystems, biodiversity, and the foundations of human life, health and welfare were to be protected. Noting the uncertainties involved in calculating probabilities of warming, the Court noted that it was possible that even under existing efforts, climate neutrality may not be achieved. Given the consequences of climate change, the long time during which greenhouse gasses remained in the atmosphere and the unavoidability of further warming and the resulting harms, it was not possible to wait until a universally agreed solution came to exist.
The Court also rejected the claim by the defendant that its contribution to climate change and sea level rise was marginal. The Court held that this does not relieve Holcim of its individual responsibility to contribute to the fight against climate change wherever possible. If the defendant’s line of argument were followed, national climate protection measures would also have to be denied legitimacy, as no country can stop climate change on its own. Neither were the plaintiffs required to bring a case against all emitters at once. In order to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, there is a budget of around 500 gigatons of CO2 remaining. This can only be achieved through immediate and drastic reductions in emissions. The plaintiffs’ interest in the injunction is therefore urgent and current, even if the desired climate neutrality is still a long way off (para. 5.8.). Neither were alternative avenues for achieving the desired protection evident (5.10.).
Quantifiability of emissions reductions:
Holcim argued that the plaintiffs’ claims around the reductions of its CO2 emissions were insufficiently clear and concrete, and that it had not been defined which emissions fell under their understanding of scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. Likewise, it held, there were no binding legal obligations to conduct corporate climate reporting. Scientific standards in this regard were continually evolving, with the plaintiffs using current-day standards that were sure to change in the future. The plaintiffs, by contrast, argued that there was a domestic law obligation to report on greenhouse gas emissions under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 964b (4)).
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it was unclear what fell under scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, noting that this terminology was used in Holcim’s own climate strategy. It also noted that Holcim had conducted reporting about its CO2 emissions, and that this was a sufficient basis for implementing an eventual judgment in the case.
The Court also rejected Holcim’s argument that the case and any eventual emissions reductions or damages obligations should be limited to itself as a parent company, and not extend to its subsidiaries. Here, the Court held that the parent company participates in the emissions of its subsidiaries, because it creates a climate strategy that encompasses and binds them. In any case, it held, Swiss tort law’s moral damages provisions also apply to a company’s subsidiaries.
Conclusion:
Finding that the claim fell within its jurisdiction and was sufficiently specific, the Court held that the case was admissible. It did not decide on the award of costs for the proceedings to date, reserving this issue to a decision on the merits.
Further information:
For more information, see the dossier compiled by the supporting NGOs in 2022 here, and at the time of the hearing in September 2025 below.
The full text of the judgment (German) is available here:
Suggested citation:
Cantonal Court of Zug, Edy Mulyono and three others v. Holcim AG (Asmania et al. v. Holcim), case A1 2023 9, judgment (admissibility) of 19 December 2025.
Last updated:
22 December 2025