Category: New Zealand

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights New Zealand

Smith v. Fonterra

Summary:
This case was brought by Michael John Smith (Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Kahu), who is the climate change spokesperson for a Māori development platform known as the Iwi Chairs’ Forum, and who is also the applicant in the case of Smith v. Attorney-General. In the present case, he brought proceedings against seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand who are involved in agriculture and energy sectors (namely Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd , Genesis Energy Ltd, Dairy Holdings Ltd, New Zealand Steel Ltd, Z Energy Ltd, Channel Infrastructure NZ Ltd and BT Mining Ltd.). He claimed that the emissions caused by these corporate actors constituted a public nuisance, acts of negligence, and a breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change. The New Zealand courts have issued a series of decisions on this case.

On 6 March 2020, the High Court of New Zealand struck out the first two causes of action (public nuisance and acts of negligence), but allowed the third (reach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change) to proceed.

After, on 21 October 2021, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Smith’s appeal and upheld the cross appeal of the respondents, Mr Smith received leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on 31 March 2022. On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court unanimously allowed Mr Smith’s appeal, and reinstated his statement of claim, and referred the case back to the High Court to proceed to trial (for more detail on the Supreme Court’s judgment, see below). After a series of procedural decisions, a substantive hearing in the case by the High Court was scheduled for April 2027.

Current state of the proceedings:
On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court of New Zealand reinstated the two dismissed tort causes of action and remanded the case to the lower court (the High Court). It held that the public rights pleaded laid an appropriate foundation for a nuisance claim. It also held that it was premature, at this stage of the proceeding, to conclude that the common law was insufficient to address the tortious aspects of climate change. Determining whether the actions of respondents, seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand, amount to a ‘substantial and unreasonable interference’ to public rights is a fact inquiry to be analyzed according to policy factors and human rights obligations.

On remand, the interlocutory applications raised noteworthy cost questions. The sixth defendant, BT Mining, sought an order for security for costs and Mr. Smith applied for protected cost orders (PCO). Here, the court has a wide latitude of discretion. It dismisses BT Mining’s request citing, among other considerations, access to justice concerns. Regarding Mr. Smith however, the court relies on the Edwards factors: (1) whether an issue of significant general or public importance is raised; (2) whether the applicant’s stance is seriously arguable; (3) whether the applicant is genuinely impecunious; (4) the position of the respondent, including “any unjust advantage likely to accrue to it absent the order”; and (5) any reasonable alternatives to making the order.

Reluctant to grant, the court emphasized the exceptional nature of a PCO in these proceedings. Mr. Smith, however, draws on Munkara v Santos NA Barossa Pty Ltd (No 4), an Australian Federal Court decision that ordered nonparty funders, the Environmental Defense Office, to pay costs to Santos, an oil company who defeated claimants’ petition for injunctive relief in the construction of a pipeline, to remind the court of the significant chilling effect of potential costs exposure on charitable funders. The court draws a distinction between a third-party funder and a ‘pure funder’ to reason that it would be highly unlikely for a costs award to be made against one that did not seek to benefit financially from the litigation nor seek to control its course. Unsatisfactory, but absent disclosure of third-party donor(s), the court declines Mr. Smith’s PCO application in its entirety. The decision, however, is without prejudice, leaving the door open to re-application with third-party funder identification.

Suggested citation:
Smith v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2024] NZSC 5, [2024] 1 NZLR 134.

Last updated:
19 September 2025.

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Imminent risk Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Minority rights New Zealand Paris Agreement Right to life Separation of powers

Smith v. Attorney General

Summary:
This case was filed in 2022 and concerns the same plaintiff as the Smith v. Fonterra corporate responsibility case. The plaintiff in these cases is a Māori landowner and spokesperson on climate change for his tribe (iwi). He argued that the climate policy of the New Zealand government had failed to adequately protect the citizens of New Zealand, and especially Māori, against the impacts of climate change. Before the High Court, he submitted that “the Government has taken no or inadequate climate change mitigation measures since it had become aware of the causes and effects of climate change down to the present.” In July 2022, the High Court struck out all of the applicant’s claims. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal on all counts in December 2024.

Claims made:
The plaintiff’s case is based on three main arguments (expanded from the original submissions, which concerned only the first argument of the three). First, the plaintiff argues that the government breached its common law duty of care to “take all necessary steps to reduce NZ emissions and to actively protect the plaintiff and his descendants from the adverse effects of climate change”, as derived from its authority over the territory of New Zealand, the government’s duty of care, and its responsibility to Māori. Secondly, he alleged a breach of the rights enshrined in sections 8 and 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), concerning deprivation of life and the denial of the right to practise culture. Here the plaintiff argued that the Crown had “failed to put in place an effective legislative and administrative framework properly designed to provide effective mitigation against the climate change risk in accordance with the best available science and New Zealand’s international and domestic legal obligations.” He invoked the protection of his own life, those of his tribe and clan, and those of future generations. Thirdly, he argued that the government had violated the Tiriti o Waitangi | the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document, and the consequent fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff and those he represents.

Finding of the High Court:
In July 2022, the High Court struck out all three claims. First, it found that the plaintiff’s arguments about the common law duty of care were not based on recognized legal obligations or case-law. It was also considered too far-reaching: “any relief, if it were available, would be an ineffective and piecemeal way to deal with climate change issues. Every person in New Zealand would be entitled to sue the Government under the novel duty.” It noted too that “the courts have neither the technical capacity nor the political mandate to co-ordinate in an integrated way to mitigate the effects of climate change”.

On the second argument, the Court found that the right to life claim was untenable because the plaintiff had not demonstrated a “‘real and identifiable’ risk to the life of a specified individual or even a class of individuals. It is a general threat that may eventuate as a result of the effects of climate change to all New Zealanders.” In addition, the Court was not convinced that it was possible to draw analogies to Dutch law, and specifically the Urgenda case invoked by the plaintiff, meaning that “[t]he decision in Urgenda must be treated with caution”.

Furthermore, on the minority rights claim, the Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged specific breaches of that right, which only entailed positive obligations under exceptional circumstances. It also held that the plaintiff’s case was “based on a claim that an existing legislative and policy framework is inadequate to protect Māori. There is no allegation of opposition or coercion targeting Māori that fits within that exceptional category here.” Accordingly, this part of the case was also declared inadmissible.

Finally, concerning the Tiriti o Waitangi, the Court found that this claim was so broad, and climate change was so complex, that “any fiduciary obligations arising from the Crown would be owed to the public in general. This alone makes the claim untenable”. To be contemplated, such a claim would depend on an underlying duty — here, the duty of care invoked by the applicant — which had already been rejected above, making this claim untenable. In addition, the Court held, “a claim that such a duty is owed to only a subsection of New Zealanders, Māori, as opposed to the public in general, is a further reason that it cannot be tenable”.

Judgment of the Court of Appeal:
On 19 December 2024, the Court of Appeal issued its ruling in this case, rejecting the applicant’s appeal on all counts.

On the claim concerning the right to life, the court considered six questions: 
           a)  whether that right includes a right to a life with dignity;
           b)  whether the widespread nature of (climate) effects preclude the applicability of the right to life;
           c)  whether the risks from climate change are sufficiently proximate;
           d)  whether the right to life can impose positive duties on the State;
           e)  whether it is tenable that New Zealand’s regulatory framework breached the right to life; and
           f)  whether reporting orders are tenably available.

On the first question, it found that it was not clearly untenable that the right to life includes a right to a minimum baseline as to the quality of life and is therefore applicable to the potential impacts of climate change.  This, it held, is consistent with international jurisprudence. Throughout, it extensively engaged with international jurisprudence (Billy, Teitiota) and soft-law materials (the HRC’s General comment No 36).

On the second question, the Court found that it was not clearly untenable on the grounds that the alleged risk to life potentially affects a large group or all of the population.   

On the third question, again referring to international climate jurisprudence on equivalent rights, and particularly engaging with the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, the Court found that this would be a matter of (scientific) evidence for trial, and that it could accordingly not strike this out at this stage. 

On the fourth question, the Court found – given the context of the climate emergency and the case-law from around the world responding to this challenge — it was not clearly untenable that NZBORA’s right to life requires the government to take protective measures against foreseeable threats to life. 

On the fifth question, on the challenge to the efficacy of the legislative framework responding to climate change, the Court found that it could not second-guess parliamentary policy choices, striking out this claim while referring to the possibility of judicial review of concrete actions taken under the legislative framework.

On the sixth question, it found that the court’s institutional role did not encompass an ongoing monitoring role of the measures the Crown is implementing in response to climate change.

On the right to culture, the court found that it was not clearly untenable that climate change could give rise to a positive obligation to protect against a denial of the right to culture under s20 of NZBORA where a substantial interference amounting to a denial of the right occurs. However, here too the court found that the pleaded deficiencies of the domestic legal framework reflect policy choices that are for Parliament and that it could not review.

As concerns the claim of a breach of te Tiriti, the court found that this was clearly untenable because the domestic legislative framework gives effect to the Crown’s obligations under the Treaty and allows for decisions consistent with Treaty principles.

As concerns the claim that the Crown owes fiduciary duties to Mr Smith, his whānau, Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Kahu, the court found that the claimed fiduciary duty was not comparable to specific fiduciary duties arising between the government and certain Māori due to particular dealings between them.  As a result, the pleaded claim was inconsistent with the nature of fiduciary duties because the response to climate change required a balancing of interests and the government could not act purely in the interests of the pleaded beneficiaries. 

As concerned the claim that there was a novel common law duty in place, relying on the common law public trust doctrine, this doctrine stemmed from the context of access to seashores and navigable waters and was thus too far removed from the extensive duty pleaded in relation to climate change.  The court found that the boundaries of the public trust doctrine are imprecise and fluid, raising a host of conceptual problems in imposing fiduciary or trust-like obligations on the government, and that the doctrine could in any case be displaced by legislation; domestic law did not leave room for its application.

Status of the case:
Appeal to the Court of Appeal rejected 19 December 2024.

Further reading:
The text of the High Court ruling is available here.

The text of the Court of Appeal ruling is available here.

Suggested citation:
High Court of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2022] NZHC 1693.

Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Smith v. Attorney General, [2024] NZCA 692.

Categories
2022 Class action Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples rights New Zealand Right to life Self-determination

Smith v. Attorney-General

Summary:

In March 2022, a prominent Māori landowner and advocate for tribal climate concerns took a significant step by bringing a case before the High Court of New Zealand. The central argument of the case was that the government had violated fundamental human rights, particularly the right to life and minority rights, due to its inadequate response to climate change. The plaintiff’s core contention was that successive governments had consistently failed to address the severe consequences of climate change, with a particular emphasis on its disproportionate impact on the Māori community.

Initially, the case centred on a single cause of action, which involved the government’s breach of duty to take all necessary steps to reduce New Zealand emissions and actively protect the plaintiff and his descendants from the adverse effects of climate change. Later, following a court order issued by Justice Johnston in May 2020, the plaintiff expanded the case to include two additional distinct causes of action. These additional claims were based on alleged violations of the rights to life and the rights of minorities as outlined in sections 8 and 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the government’s failure to act in accordance with its obligations as stipulated in the Treaty of Waitangi (one of New Zealand’s founding documents, agreed in 1840 between the British Crown and Māori leaders). The Court eventually dismissed all three claims.

Claim:

The plaintiff’s claim was multi-faceted, asserting that the government’s actions, or lack thereof, constituted violations of human rights, particularly the right to life and minority rights, with a focus on the Māori population. The claim included allegations concerning the breach of duty, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the Treaty of Waitangi.

Decision:

On July 15, 2022, the Court rendered a decision in favour of the government, dismissing all three claims presented by the plaintiff. The Court found the plaintiff’s common law duty of care claim untenable, reasoning that it failed to define specific legal obligations and exceeded the boundaries of incremental development of new duties. Moreover, the Court asserted that the creation of an effective remedy, such as court-monitored monitoring, would necessitate an institutional expertise, democratic participation, and accountability beyond the capabilities of the court process alone.

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s assertion regarding the right to life, deeming it untenable due to the absence of substantial evidence indicating a ‘real and identifiable’ threat to individuals or groups. Instead, the Court viewed climate change as a general threat impacting all New Zealanders due to its broad-reaching consequences. The Court further noted that the plaintiff’s argument concerning the breach of minority rights lacked merit since the relevant regulations primarily prohibited the Crown from infringing upon minority rights rather than imposing positive duties.

Additionally, the Court clarified that claims based on the Treaty and fiduciary obligations were not valid, as they hinged on the same general duty initially put forth in the first cause of action, which the Court had already rejected as unsound. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s contention that this duty was owed exclusively to the Māori population, rather than the wider public, further undermined its validity.

Links:

The case documents are accessible via Climate Case Chart: Click here.

Status of the case:

Judgment

Suggested citation:

Michael John Smith v. The Attorney-General, [2022] NZHC 1693 (15 July 2022), The High Court of New Zealand.

Last updated:

20 October 2023.

Categories
2019 Climate-induced displacement Human Rights Committee New Zealand Non-refoulement Prohibition of torture Right to life

Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand

Summary:

The applicant submitted that New Zealand had violated his right to life under the ICCPR by removing him to Kiribati, an island state where, he submitted, the situation was becoming increasingly unstable and precarious due to sea level rise caused by global warming. The HRC accepted the claim that sea level rise and climate change-related harms can trigger non-refoulement obligations, but found that there is still time to take measures to protect the population of Kiribati.

Admissibility:

Concerning the imminence of the risk faced, the Committee noted that the author was not alleging a hypothetical future harm, but a real predicament caused by a lack of potable water and employment possibilities, and a threat of serious violence caused by land disputes. The author had sufficiently demonstrated, for the purpose of admissibility, the existence of a real risk of harm to his right to life, given the impact of climate change and associated sea level rise on the habitability of Kiribati and on the security situation on the islands.

Merits:

The HRC found that environmental degradation can compromise the effective enjoyment of the right to life, and if severe it can violate that right. The Committee accepted the author’s claim that sea level rise is likely to render Kiribati uninhabitable. Without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving States may expose individuals to a violation of articles 6 or 7 ICCPR, thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations of sending States. However, it noted that the time frame of 10 to 15 years, as suggested by the author, could allow for intervening acts by Kiribati, with the assistance of the international community, to take affirmative measures to protect and, where necessary, relocate its population.

Remedies ordered:

None

Separate opinions:

Yes

Implementation measures taken:

N/A

Date:

24 October 2019

Status of case:

final

Suggested case citation:

Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, No. 2728/2016, Communication of 24 October 2019.

Full text:

For the full-text of the decision in the case, click here.

Further reading:

Adaena Sinclair-Blakemore, ‘Teitiota v New Zealand: A Step Forward in the Protection of Climate Refugees under International Human Rights Law?’ Oxford Human Rights Hub, 28th January 2020, available here.

Keywords:

climate refugees, affectedness, non-refoulement

    Categories
    2014 Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate-induced displacement Domestic court New Zealand Sea-level rise

    AD (Tuvalu) v. New Zealand

    Summary:
    A family from Tuvalu appealed the decision to deport them from New Zealand, arguing that they would be at risk of suffering the adverse impacts of climate change — including the adverse effects of natural disasters — and socio-economic deprivation. Unlike in the domestic proceedings in the Teitiota case (domestically known as the AF (Kiribati) case), which made its way before the UN Human Rights Committee after leave to stay was refused, the applicants in this case received leave to remain in New Zealand on the basis of the exceptional circumstances of their case, which were understood to raise humanitarian concerns. The domestic court, the Auckland Immigration and Protection Tribunal, considered the family’s integration, the fact that they were “well-loved and integral members of a family”, and the best interests of their two children, aged three and five years old at the material time. Having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Tribunal considered that the children’s young age made them more vulnerable to natural disasters and the adverse impact of climate change, and that it would be in their best interests to remain living with their parents in New Zealand. Concerning climate change and environmental degradation as a humanitarian issue, the Tribunal noted that it was “widely accepted that the impacts of climate change can adversely affect the enjoyment of basic human rights” and that “Tuvalu, as a country comprising low-lying topical islands (…) is particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. Environmental degradation caused or exacerbated by climate change was already a feature of life in Tuvalu”. Considering these factors on a cumulative basis, and finding that there was no adverse public interest in this case, the Tribunal found that “there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature, which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellants to be removed from New Zealand.”

    Type of proceedings:
    Domestic

    Status of case:
    Final

    Decision in this case:
    The decision of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal in this case can be downloaded below.

    Decision in AD (Tuvalu)Download

    Suggested citation:
    New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal at Auckland, AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 501370-371, Decision of 4 June 2014.

    Further information:
    For more on this case and an analysis, see Jane McAdam, ‘The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement’, 3(1) Migration Studies (2015), 131–142.

    Last updated:
    17 August 2023.