Category: Margin of appreciation

Summary:
In 2016, the Senior Women for Climate Protection Switzerland (German: ‘Verein KlimaSeniorinnen’), a Swiss organisation, brought proceedings concerning the alleged omissions of the Swiss federal government to adopt an adequate climate protection policy. They submitted that current domestic climate targets and measures are not sufficient to limit global warming to a safe level. This failure to prevent climate-related disasters, they argued, represents a failure to protect the rights under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the rights to life and respect for private and family life, respectively) of the organization’s members. In particular, they submitted evidence that their specific demographic (older women) is particularly impacted by heatwaves, citing health impacts and excess mortality risks. The respondent State, they argued, has failed to comply with its positive obligations to protect their rights, read in light of the environmental law principles of precaution and intergenerational equity.

The applicants also invoked two procedural rights under the Convention, namely the rights in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR (right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, respectively). In this regard they argued that the domestic courts failed to take their case seriously and provide an effective remedy to contest the violation of their rights.

These claims were rejected by the domestic instances at three levels of jurisdiction. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in its ruling, considered that the case represented an actio popularis, concerned questions better suited to the political arena, and did not raise an arguable claim of a rights violation. As a result, the applicants took their case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

This case was only the second climate change-related case to come to Strasbourg. Like the Duarte Agostinho case, this application raised novel questions before the Court, including the issue of victim status in climate cases, the standing of (environmental) NGOs to bring cases to the Court, and the extent of the State margin of appreciation in regard to environmental protection measures related to climate change, and the extent of the positive obligation to protect individuals from the risks to their life and health posed by climate change.

On 9 April 2024, in a historic ruling, the ECtHR declared this case admissible in part (for the association) and found that there had been violations of Articles 6(1) and 8 ECHR. In doing so, this case became the Court’s leading climate judgment, and a model for further climate-related cases in this system.

Third-party interventions:
There were an unusually large (for the ECtHR) number of third party interventions in this case: 23 in total, including eight States. The KlimaSeniorinnen association provided copies of all of the third-party interventions; these are available here. Some of the third-party interveners were also granted leave to intervene orally during the hearing before the Grand Chamber.

Grand Chamber hearing:
This was the first climate case heard by the European Court of Human Rights, followed immediately by the Carême v. France case. The Court has adjourned its examination of six other climate cases until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the three climate change cases before it, meaning that leading judgments clarifying the Convention obligations around cliamte change can be expected in these cases.

During the hearing, submissions were heard from the applicants, the respondent State, and two of the 23 total third-party interveners (the Government of Ireland & the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). A live summary of the hearing is available here.

General findings of the Court in its judgment of 9 April 2024:
The Court’s judgment is prefaced by a number of general findings that reflect its intended nature as a leading case. Noting the need to ensure effective protection of Convention rights without undermining the prohibition of actio popularis cases under the Convention system, the Court acknowledged that it had a role to play here, finding that “the current situation (…) involves compelling present‑day conditions, confirmed by scientific knowledge, which the Court cannot ignore in its role as a judicial body tasked with the enforcement of human rights.” At the same time, noting “the necessarily primary responsibility of the legislative and executive branches and the inherently collective nature of both the consequences and the challenges arising from the adverse effects of climate change”, it held that the issue of victim status here raised an issue of the separation of powers, requiring particular consideration. Noting the global and complex nature of climate change, it held that “the necessity of combating climate change involves various conflicts, the weighing‑up of which falls, as stated previously, within the democratic decision‑making processes, complemented by judicial oversight by the domestic courts and this Court.”

In light of this, and before assessing the case, the Court set out a number of general considerations relating to climate‑change cases. This includes questions of causation, including the finding that despite indirect causal links, “the essence of the relevant State duties in the context of climate change relates to the reduction of the risks of harm for individuals”, meaning that it could not apply “a strict conditio sine qua non requirement” to matters of causation. This section also includes issues of proof and evidence, and references the “evolution of scientific knowledge, social and political attitudes and legal standards concerning the necessity of protecting the environment”. Here the Court established that “there are sufficiently reliable indications that anthropogenic climate change exists, that it poses a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights guaranteed under the Convention, that States are aware of it and capable of taking measures to effectively address it, that the relevant risks are projected to be lower if the rise in temperature is limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and if action is taken urgently, and that current global mitigation efforts are not sufficient to meet the latter target” (para. 436). And, importantly, it discarded the “drop in the bucket” argument made by the respondent State, stating that “The relevant test does not require it to be shown that “but for” the failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred. Rather, what is important, and sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State, is that reasonable measures which the domestic authorities failed to take could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm” (para. 444). It also stressed that there is no right to a healthy environment in the ECHR, but that it can and has nonetheless dealt with other environmental cases, reiterating its past approach that “the crucial element which must be present in determining whether, in the circumstances of a given case, an environmental harm has adversely affected one of the rights safeguarded by the Convention is the existence of a harmful effect on a person and not simply the general deterioration of the environment” (para. 446). It also noted that it is conscious of its subsidiary role and the direct democratic legitimation of national authorities to make decisions on climate policy, but that where State policy affects Convention rights, it has competence to intervene and “the Court’s competence in the context of climate-change litigation cannot, as a matter of principle, be excluded” (paras. 449-451).

The Court also set out the relevant principles for interpreting the ECHR, including the living instrument approach and the fact that while the Court “does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention” — including the Paris Agreement — it has consistently noted that it will interpret the Convention in harmony with other international law.

Admissibility:
On 9 April 2024, the Court declared this case admissible in part. Under Article 34 ECHR, it used this judgment as an opportunity to create new standards on victim status specific to climate-related cases. In doing so, it set out the general standards on victim status, noting that it did not admit actio popularis cases and that the ECHR “does not permit individuals or groups of individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention” (para. 460). It noted that the notion of victim status must be applied flexibly, and that it’s distinct from locus standi, i.e. representative actions.

The Court then issued general considerations on victim status and locus standi in climate cases, noting that “there is cogent scientific evidence demonstrating that climate change has already contributed to an increase in morbidity and mortality, especially among certain more vulnerable groups, that it actually creates such effects and that, in the absence of resolute action by States, it risks progressing to the point of being irreversible and disastrous” (para. 478).

It also held that (para. 479): the critical issues around climate change “arise from failures to act, or inadequate action”, meaning omissions in legislative or regulatory frameworks that require a special approach to victim status. Importantly, the Court also clarified that its findings on victim status in the context of complaints about omissions in climate policy “is without prejudice to the determination of victim status in circumstances where complaints by individuals concern alleged violations arising from a specific individual loss or damage already suffered by them” (para. 480), meaning that the special approach spelled out for mitigation cases need not preclude other types of claims. However, it held, in the context of climate change, “a potentially a huge number of persons could claim victim status under the Convention”, which “would not sit well with the exclusion of actio popularis from the Convention mechanism and the effective functioning of the right of individual application” (para. 483). The Court clarified the difficult situation in which it found itself, between “disrupting national constitutional principles and the separation of powers” and depriving individuals affected in their rights from “any judicial recourse before the Court”, noting the “distinct representational disadvantage” of those most affected (para. 484). It then, in para 487 of the judgment, spelled out the criteria for individual victim status in climate cases. These are:

• (a)  “a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change”, i.e. a significant level and severity of risk of adverse consequences; and
• (b) “a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm.”

Given that there is no actio popularis under the Convention, the Court held, “the threshold for fulfilling these criteria is especially high”, and will depend on specific vulnerabilities and local circumstances as well as including considerations relating to: “the nature and scope of the applicant’s Convention complaint, the actuality/remoteness and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on the applicant’s life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicant’s vulnerability” (para. 488).

As to the standing of associations, the Court generally reiterated its previous Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others judgment, which had allowed representative standing for an organisation. It noted that recourse to collective bodies like associations can make defense of one’s interests more accessible in certain circumstances, including the context of climate change, noting that this general principle was also reflected in the Aarhus Convention. The Court then set out some general principles on organizations’ victim status versus their standing as representatives of victims. In light of the former, it reiterated past case-law finding that “an association cannot rely on health considerations or nuisances and problems associated with climate change which can only be encountered by natural persons”. But it also recognized that understandings of the importance of litigation by associations had evolved, and that climate cases are complex and demanding and affect many individuals (para. 498). In addition, “the special feature of climate change as a common concern of humankind and the necessity of promoting intergenerational burden-sharing in this context (…), speak in favour of recognising the standing of associations before the Court in climate-change cases” (para. 499). However, this should not mean allowing an actio popularis: a test for associations’ standing is required. To design its test, the Court had regard to the Aarhus Convention while also noting key difference between its approach and that under Aarhus.

The test it devised for associations looks as follows (§ 502): associations will have locus standi to bring climate cases about impacts on human lives and health where they:

• (a) have been lawfully established in the relevant jurisdiction, or have standing to act there;
• (b) pursue, under their statutory objectives, a dedicated purpose of defending the human rights of their members or other affected individuals in the jurisdiction concerned, and
• (c) are genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of affected individuals in the jurisdiction who are subject to specific threats on their lives, health or well-being from climate change.

The Court also noted that it would consider additional factors, like the purpose for which the association was established, its non-profit character, the nature and extent of its activities, its membership and representativeness, its principles and transparency of governance and whether standing is in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

There was no need, however, to show that those on whose behalf the case has been brought would themselves have met the climate-specific victim-status requirements for individuals as set out earlier in the judgment.

Because the Court joined its actual analysis of the victim status requirement to the merits of the case, this is discussed in the following section.

Merits:
In setting out general principles on the applicability of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life), the Court noted past cases where the right was applicable to situations where there is a threat to life, but “where the person concerned did not die”. Although noting the evidence on vulnerable populations, the Court reiterated that the appropriate test here is one of whether there is a “real and imminent” risk to life, meaning that the risk must be serious, genuine, sufficiently ascertainable and in physical proximity. It then tailored this last aspect to the nature of climate change, stating that it would suffice to show “an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant”. This means that, provided an applicant has victim status, “a serious risk of a significant decline in a person’s life expectancy owing to climate change ought also to trigger the applicability of Article 2.”

As for Article 8 ECHR, the Court stated generally that it was necessary to show an “actual interference” with the right, meaning that there needs to be “a direct and immediate link between the alleged environmental harm and the applicant’s private or family life or home”, and a certain level of severity. Drawing on its past environmental case-law, the Court went on to establish that “Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 519).

The Court then considered the applicability of Art. 8 ECHR to the case before it. As concerned the applicant association, it found that it met the criteria for standing by associations as set out earlier in the judgment, describing the KlimaSeniorinnen association as “a vehicle of collective recourse aimed at defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State”. The complaints pursued by the association on behalf of its members, it held, fall within the scope of Article 8. The association accordingly had locus standi, and Article 8 was declared applicable to its complaint.

On applicants 2-5 (the individual applicants), the Court held that the threshold for meeting its two criteria (high-intensity exposure and a pressing need to ensure protection) was high. It was not enough to show that they were particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The crucial paragraph of the judgment here is para. 533: “while it may be accepted that heatwaves affected the applicants’ quality of life, it is not apparent from the available materials that they were exposed to the adverse effects of climate change, or were at risk of being exposed at any relevant point in the future, with a degree of intensity giving rise to a pressing need to ensure their individual protection (…). It cannot be said that the applicants suffered from any critical medical condition whose possible aggravation linked to heatwaves could not be alleviated by the adaptation measures available in Switzerland or by means of reasonable measures of personal adaptation”. Their complaint was accordingly declared inadmissible.

On the claims under Article 2, the Court held that it was not necessary to analyze this further, noting that its analysis would “have regard to the principles developed also under Article 2, which to a very large extent are similar to those under Article 8 (…) and which, when seen together, provide a useful basis for defining the overall approach to be applied in the climate-change context under both provisions.”

The Court then recapitulated more general principles now on the merits proper. It held that the Article 2 and 8 positive obligations are generally quite similar, requiring the State:

• (a)  to put in place an adequate legislative and administrative framework and govern the licensing, setting-up, operation, security and supervision of the activity;
• (b) to apply that framework effectively in practice;
• (c) to remain within their margin of appreciation;
• (d) to exercise due diligence and consider all competing interests;
• (f) to provide access to essential information enabling individuals to assess risks to their health and lives;

Noting also that “the scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in the particular circumstances will depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation”.

In reviewing the domestic decision-making process, the Court has particular regard to the following considerations:

• (a) Its subsidiary role;
• (b) The need to consider all of the procedural aspects;
• (c) The presence of appropriate investigations and studies;
• (d) The public’s access to the conclusions of the relevant studies; and
• (e) Whether or not the individuals concerned had an opportunity to protect their interests in the environmental decision-making process, i.e. participate effectively.

Turning to States’ positive obligations relation to climate, it first considered the State margin of appreciation. Having regard to the scientific evidence, the Court considered it justified to give climate protection considerable weight against competing considerations.

Regarding the margin of appreciation it distinguished between the scope of the margin as regards (i) the State’s commitment combating climate change and setting objectives in this respect, and (ii) the choice of means designed to achieve those objectives. The margin is more narrow with regard to the former. For the latter aspect, i.e. the choice of means, States have a wide margin of appreciation.

As to the content of States’ positive obligations under Article 8, this is primarily a regulatory obligation. This means that, in line with their international commitments, States need to put in place regulations and measures to prevent climate change. The global aims in the Paris Agreement are not enough; and “must inform the formulation of domestic policies, it is obvious that the said aims cannot of themselves suffice as a criterion for any assessment of Convention compliance of individual Contracting Parties to the Convention in this area. This is because “each individual State is called upon to define its own adequate pathway for reaching carbon neutrality, depending on the sources and levels of emissions and all other relevant factors within its jurisdiction.”

This means that Article 8 ECHR “requires that each Contracting State undertake measures for the substantial and progressive reduction of their respective GHG emission levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within, in principle, the next three decades” (ca. 2050). To avoid a disproportionate burden on future generations, this means immediate action needs to be taken and adequate intermediate reduction goals must be set for the interim period. The Court spelled out that this must be part of a binding regulatory framework at the national level, followed by adequate implementation, and that “the relevant targets and timelines must form an integral part of the domestic regulatory framework, as a basis for general and sectoral mitigation measures.”

In para. 550, the Court set out the criteria it would use to decide whether a State has remained within its margin of appreciation, namely whether the authorities had due regard to the need to:

• “(a) adopt general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality and the overall remaining carbon budget for the same time frame, or another equivalent method of quantification of future GHG emissions, in line with the overarching goal for national and/or global climate-change mitigation commitments;
• (b) set out intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways (by sector or other relevant methodologies) that are deemed capable, in principle, of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant time frames undertaken in national policies;
• (c) provide evidence showing whether they have duly complied, or are in the process of complying, with the relevant GHG reduction targets (…);
• (d) keep the relevant GHG reduction targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and
• (e) act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures.”

These mitigation measures, it added, must be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, taking into account particular protection needs.

The Court also set out procedural safeguards, namely

• (a) The publicity of relevant information; and
• (b) The availability of procedures to take into account the views of the public, and in particular the interests of those affected.

Applying these principles to the case before it, the Court held that it could “take into account the overall situation in the respondent State”, including relevant information that came to light after the domestic proceedings, but that here, given an ongoing domestic legislative process, its assessment was limited to examining the domestic legislation as it stood on the date of the (internal) adoption of the judgment, which was 14 February 2024.

The Court noted that the currently existing 2011 CO₂ Act (in force since 2013) required that emissions reductions of 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. However, as far back as August 2009, the Swiss Federal Council had found that the scientific evidence under a 2-2.4°C warming limit required a reduction in global emissions of at least 50-85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Industrialised countries (like Switzerland) had to reduce their emissions by 25-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. for the higher 1.5°C limit, emissions would have to decline continuously, and the pathway 20% by 2020 pathway was insufficient to achieve that objective.

As the Government acknowledged, domestic assessments found that even the reduction target for 2020 had been missed. Between 2013 and 2020, Switzerland reduced its emissions by around 11% compared with 1990 levels, indicating the insufficiency of the authorities’ past action to take the necessary measures to address climate change.

A proposed revision of the CO2 Act for 2020-2030 proposed an overall reduction of 50% of emissions, including a domestic reduction of 30% by 2030 and measures to be taken abroad (“external emissions”). This proposal was rejected in a popular referendum in June 2021. Here the Court held that, “irrespective of the way in which the legislative process is organised from the domestic constitutional point of view”, there was a legislative lacuna, pointing to a failure on the part of the respondent State to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 to devise a regulatory framework setting the requisite objectives and goals.

Reflecting the updated Swiss NDC, the Climate Act was enacted, and envisages the principle of a net‑zero emissions target by 2050, but several lacunae remain, and “the Court has difficulty accepting that the mere legislative commitment to adopt the concrete measures “in good time” (…) satisfies the State’s duty”, especially because “the introduction of that new legislation is not sufficient to remedy the shortcomings identified in the legal framework applicable so far.”

Currently, the Swiss goal used more emissions than even a globally equal “per capita emissions” approach would entitle it to use.

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that there was no established methodology to determine a country’s carbon budget, and noted that an NDC under the Paris Agreement was not an appropriate substitute. The Court approved of the reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Neubauer, where it rejected the argument that it was impossible to determine the national carbon budget by emphasizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

Thus, “while acknowledging that the measures and methods determining the details of the State’s climate policy fall within its wide margin of appreciation, in the absence of any domestic measure attempting to quantify the respondent State’s remaining carbon budget, the Court has difficulty accepting that the State could be regarded as complying effectively with its regulatory obligation under Article 8” (para. 572). This meant that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (by a majority of 16-1).

On the issue of Article 6 ECHR, concerning the right of access to a court, the Court held that the issue of victim status should again be joined to the merits, and the Court again dove in with general principles, finding that it did not per se need to tailor these principles to the nature of climate change cases.

Examining these principles in the case before it, the Court held that “it cannot be said that the individual applicants’ claim was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise lacking in foundation in terms of the relevant domestic law (…). The Court is unable to agree with the finding of the FSC that the individual applicants’ claim could not be considered arguable for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention” (para. 618). It went on to find that interests defended by the association meant that the “dispute” raised by it had a direct and sufficient link to its members’ rights. Finding that Article 6 (1) applied to the complaint of the applicant association, the Court also considered it to have victim status.

For the individual applicants, however, the Court found that the dispute they had brought concerning the failure to effectively implement mitigation measures was not directly decisive for their specific rights. They had not shown that there was a sufficiently imminent and certain effect on their individual rights, and this part of their complaint was inadmissible.

For the association, among other things, the Court rejected the domestic courts’ findings that there was still some time to prevent global warming from reaching the critical limit, and noted that they “did not engage seriously or at all with the action brought by the applicant association.” There had accordingly been a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR, with the Court emphasizing “the key role which domestic courts have played and will play in climate-change litigation”.

The applicants also complained that they had not had access to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. Here the Court noted that Article 6 is a lex specialis to Article 13, the latter being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6, so there was no separate issue in its regard.

Remedies:
The individual applicants had made requests for just satisfaction for damage under Article 41 ECHR, but the organisation did not, so no award was made. The Court did award costs and expenses to the amount of EUR 80,000.

The applicants had also made an Art. 46 claim for a general measures order. Here the Court noted that it is primarily for the State to choose, under the supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used domestically to discharge its obligation to comply with the Court’s judgment, as long as the means are compatible with the conclusions and spirit of that judgment. The Court went on to hold that, “having regard to the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, the Court is unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the present judgment.” It noted the State’s broad margin of appreciation choose the means to discharge its Convention obligations, and found that the State was thus better placed than the Court to decide which specific measures to take.

Separate opinions:
A separate opinion by Judge Eicke is annexed to this judgment. He disagreed with the majority in several points, especially victim status and the merits of Art. 8. He presented his view as a disagreement of a “fundamental nature” that “goes to the very heart of the role of the Court within the Convention system and, more generally, the role of a court in the context of the unique and unprecedented challenges posed to humanity” because the majority had exceeded “the permissible limits of evolutive interpretation”.

According to Judge Eicke, the majority judgment creates a new right to “effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects on their life, health, well‑being and quality of life arising from the harmful effects and risks caused by climate change”. While acknowledging the seriousness of the threat of climate change, and noting “(a) the absolute need for urgent action and (b) the sheer complexity of the challenges climate change (and the other aspects of the “triple planetary crisis”) pose (geo-)politically, practically, logistically as well as legal,” he argues that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances (Article 2(2) Paris Agreement) is “difficult to reconcile (if not wholly inconsistent) with the Court’s primary role of ensuring observance of a common minimum standard of protection applicable equally to all Contracting Parties”.

On victim status, Eicke argues that “there was, in fact, no dispute and no uncertainty about the “victim” status of the individual applicants in relation to the Article 6 § 1 complaint in this case; and therefore no need to join that question to the merits”. He sets out and adheres to the previously established case-law on victim status, refusing to join the majority in creating a new approach tailored to climate cases and arguing that exceptions should only be possible where individual applications document victim status are not “ever” likely to be possible. He argues that the judgment creates an actio popularis.

Under Articles 2 and 8, Eicke argues that while it would have been possible to find a procedural violation of Articles 2 or 8, “the substantive violation of Article 8 which the majority seeks to construct from this starting premise has no basis either in the text of the Convention nor in any of the Court’s case-law.” He considers that “the Court would already have achieved much if it had focussed on a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and, at a push, a procedural violation of Article 8 relating in particular to (…) the right of access to court and of access to information”. He accuses the majority of trying “to run before it could walk”, and “giving (false) hope that litigation and the courts can provide “the answer” without there being, in effect, any prospect of litigation (especially before this Court) accelerating the taking of the necessary measures towards the fight against anthropogenic climate change”, and mentions the risk that this judgment will distract from other efforts to tackle climate change.

Implementation measures taken:

N/A

Date of decision:
It was announced on 26 March 2024 that the Grand Chamber would issue its judgment in this case, along with the two other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber, in a hearing to be held on 9 April 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The judgment and a summary were made available on the Court’s HUDOC database immediately after the hearing.

Type of Forum:
Regional

Status of case:
This case was communicated to the respondent State, Switzerland, on 17 March 2021. On 26 April 2022, a Chamber of the Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, held a public hearing in this case on 29 March 2023. A webcast of the hearing is available here. On 9 April 2024, the Court issued its judgment in the case.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, no. 53600/20, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 9 April 2024.

Links:

• The Court’s HUDOC database: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-209313
• More information on the case in English: https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/english/.
• All documents on the case: https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/dokumente/, including the application to the Court.

Webcast of the hearing:
To watch a webcast recording of the public hearing in this case, which was held before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 29 March 2023, click here (available in French and English).

Last updated:
9 April 2024