Category: European Convention on Human Rights

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Italy Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment

Giudizio Universale (The Last Judgment) (A Sud and Others v. Italy)

Summary:
On 5 June 2021, 203 plaintiffs (24 associations, 17 minors represented in court by their parents, and 162 adults) led by the environmental justice NGO A Sud filed a lawsuit with the Civil Court of Rome against the Italian State, represented by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The lawsuit is part of a campaign for awareness raising named “Giudizio Universale” (The Last Judgment).

The plaintiffs allege that the Italian State is fully aware of the climate emergency and the urgency of GHG emissions reduction, as demonstrated by official declarations and explicit acknowledgements by State representatives in recent years which produced environmental information as per Article 2(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Notwithstanding, the climate measures taken by the Italian State were insufficient. Limited emissions reductions had been achieved mainly due to the economic crisis and the following recessions, but it was projected that the State would not meet even modest reduction targets by 2030. These measures would not satisfy the climate obligations that the Italian State is required to observe and implement, originating from the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and specific EU Regulations. Therefore, the plaintiffs allege that the State infringed human rights, including the right to a stable and safe climate, which interfaces with the principles in Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union, and the rights recognized by Articles 2 (right to life), 8 (respect for private and family life), 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR. The plaintiffs allege that this gives rise to non-contractual liability of the State under Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code, and that responsibility may also be identified according to Article 2051 of the Civil Code as the State can be considered the guardian of the climate system.

The plaintiffs requested the judge to declare that the Italian State is responsible for failing to tackle the climate emergency and to order the State to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 92% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, applying the principle of equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Fair Share).

Hearings:
The first hearing was held on 14 December 2021 in the form of an exchange of written briefs. The Italian State requested the judge to declare the complaint inadmissible, or to dismiss it on the merits as completely ill-founded. Subsequent oral hearings were held on 21 June 2022 and 13 September 2023.

Decision:
On 26 February 2024 the Court declared the complaints inadmissible for absolute lack of jurisdiction. Notably, the Court considered it impossible to verify the adequacy of the measures taken by the State to achieve its climate targets, noting that it lacked the necessary information to examine choices of such complexity. The Court also rejected the existence of State emissions-reductions obligations under private law that can be claimed by individuals, and invoked the principle of the separation of powers. The plaintiffs declared that they would challenge this judgment on appeal.

Appeal proceedings:
In November 2024, it was reported that the applicants had appealed the Civil Court of Rome’s decision, citing the success of the KlimaSeniorinnen case at the European Court of Human Rights as bolstering its case.

Date filed:
5 June 2021

Jurisdiction:
Civil Court of Rome

Status of the case:
First instance judgment; appeal pending

Suggested case citation:
Complete first instance judgment citation: A Sud Ecologia e Cooperazione ODV et al. v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Tribunale di Roma, Seconda Sezione Civile, n. 39415/2021, 26 febbraio 2024 [A Sud Ecologia e Cooperazione ODV et al. v. Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Civil Court of Rome, Secon Civil Section, n. 39415/2021, 26 February 2024], case under appeal.

Further reading:
English language: a summary of the legal action was provided by the applicant NGO here.

Italian language: all the documents from the proceedings and a review of relevant literature can be found on this website hosting the Observatory on Italian climate change litigation, edited by the students in Comparative Climate Change Law at the University of Salento.

Last updated:
13 November 2024

Categories
2021 Belgium Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Private and family life Right to life

Belgian ‘Klimaatzaak’

Summary:

On 30 November 2023, a Court of Appeal in Brussels, Belgium, issued its judgment in the Urgenda-inspired “Klimaatzaak” (Dutch for “climate case”). Its judgment builds on a 17 June 2021 first-instance judgment, which held that Belgian climate policy was negligent and violated positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 2 and 8). While confirming this part of the judgment for three of the four domestic governments involved, the appeal court overturned the first instance’s finding that, in light of the separation of powers, it could not set greenhouse gas reduction targets. The appeal court set clear targets for domestic emissions reductions, ordering reductions of 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels).

First-instance judgment:

The applicants in this case alleged, among other things, that the four Belgian governments (i.e. the three regional governments and the federal state) had violated human rights law, and were obligated to reduce Belgium’s greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.

The case was delayed for almost three years because of proceedings contesting the language of the case, which was ultimately adjudicated in French.

On 17 June 2021, a court of first instance found that Belgian climate policy was negligent and violated positive obligations under human rights law. At stake were, among other things, violations of Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, in claims inspired by the Dutch Urgenda case. However, the court of first instance also held that, in light of the principle of separation of powers, it could not set greenhouse gas reduction targets for the Belgian governments.

The Brussels court of first instance not only declared the complaint of the applicant association, VZW Klimaatzaak, admissible, but also that of the 58,000 co-plaintiffs. Belgian law does not allow for an actio popularis, but the first-instance court recognized that all of the applicants faced a risk of material, physical or moral damage. In doing so, it referred to the risks to human and animal health and to the territorial integrity of the Belgian state, and especially of the Flemish region, which was particularly at risk of harms caused by sea level rises. The best available science, as reflected in existing diplomatic consensus, did not leave room for doubt about the existence of a real risk from dangerous climate change. This meant a serious risk that current and future generations would see their daily lives profoundly impacted (“profondément perturbées”). The fact that other Belgian citizens could bring a similar claim did not change this.

The judgment also stated that the federal state and the three regions are jointly and individually responsible for the risk of harm at stake, despite the complex structure of the Belgian state.

Lastly, the judgment stated that the four governments’ inadequate climate policy violated articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (which enshrine the right to life and the right to respect for private and family life, respectively).

However, the court did not order the injunction claimed by the applicants for concrete reduction targets. The applicants had requested an injunction to the effect that the Belgian state should reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 42% by 2025 and by 55% by 2030.

Judgment on appeal:

On appeal by the applicants, who challenged the first-instance judgment over the decision not to order concrete reductions targets, the case was reviewed by the Brussels Court of Appeal. Its judgment, which was issued on 30 November 2023, confirmed that the 2020 climate policy of three out of the four respondent domestic governments had violated Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. In its judgment, the court ordered the Belgian state, the Flemish Region and the Brussels-Capital Region to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions more quickly, namely by 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels). Meanwhile, it found that the Walloon region’s climate policy had progressed sufficiently to be in conformity with human rights law.

In its judgment, the court found that “in light of the prevailing consensus within the scientific community and the international political community, the three governments have violated Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Articles 1382 and 1383 of the old Civil Code because they had not sufficiently reduced greenhouse gas emissions in 2020” (our translation). This violation was still ongoing because these governments have “set insufficiently strict targets and have not taken sufficiently far-reaching measures to sufficiently limit emissions by 2030”. The court found that “a reduction of -55% in GHG emissions by 2030 constitutes a minimum threshold, below which Belgium cannot go under penalty of violating Article 2 of the ECHR” (in the original French: une diminution de -55 % des émissions de GES à l’horizon 2030 constitue ce seuil minimal, en deçà duquel la Belgique ne peut aller sous peine de ne pas respecter l’article 2 de la CEDH). In doing so, it draws on the European Climate Law, which codifies the goals set out in the European Green Deal for the EU to become climate-neutral by 2050.

While the applicants had requested a penalty payment of 1 million euros per month, the appeal court deferred its ruling on this issue to await, among other things, emissions figures from the 2022-2024 period.

Status of case:

After the November 2023 ruling, further proceedings — in cassation, and potentially before the European Court of Human Rights — are possible in this case, which is accordingly not yet final.

On 18 April 2024, the applicants communicated that Flanders had filed a cassation appeal. Flanders was the only one of the domestic governments involved to lodge an appeal in cassation. The federal and Brussels governments had decided against a further appeal.

Suggested citation:

Francophone first instance court of Brussels, 4th chamber, Klimaatzaak ASBL v. Belgium, no. 2015/4585/A, Judgment of 17 June 2021, available at https://prismic-io.s3.amazonaws.com/affaireclimat/18f9910f-cd55-4c3b-bc9b-9e0e393681a8_167-4-2021.pdf

Brussels Court of Appeal, Klimaatzaak ASBL v. Belgium, case 2021/AR/1589, Judgment of 30 November 2023.

Full text:

For background information on the case, see here.

For a summary (in Dutch) by Klimaatzaak, see here.

For the full first-instance judgment (in French), see here.

For the full second-instance judgment, click here.

Further reading:

For more on this case, see the blog post by Matthias Petel and Antoine De Spiegeleir in the Sabin Center’s Climate Law Blog, available here.

For a press release from the applicants concerning the second-instance judgment, click here.

Last updated:

7 September 2024

Categories
2021 Access to a remedy Children and young people Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Non-discrimination Norway Private and family life Right to life

Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway

Summary:
This case was the fourth climate change case brought to the European Court of Human Rights. It was brought by six young Norwegian climate activists aged between 20 and 27, along with two organisations, who alleged that their members’ lives, health and well-being are being directly affected by the escalating climate crisis. The six individual applicants also alleged that, as young people, some of whom belong to an Indigenous community, they are being disproportionately affected by the climate crisis.

The application concerns the Norwegian State’s decision to license continuing exploration for oil and gas in new areas of the Arctic (Barents Sea), and its intention to bring new fossil fuels to market after 2035. The applicants argued that the best available science shows that the emissions from known reserves of fossil fuels will already exceed the carbon budget that remains given the 1.5°C temperature target set in the Paris Agreement.

Citing the seriousness and urgency of the climate crisis, the applicants alleged that the respondent State had failed to take the precautionary measures of prevention and protection required under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the right to life and the right to respect for private and family life, respectively). They furthermore alleged a breach of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 ECHR. during the domestic court proceedings, as well as a violation of the right of access to an effective domestic remedy under Article 13 ECHR.

Domestic proceedings and the reasoning of the Norwegian Supreme Court:
This case is a follow-up from domestic proceedings that were concluded by a judgment in favor of the State issued by the Norwegian Supreme Court on 22 December 2020. In 2016, the two applicant organizations brought a case against the State’s decision to grant 10 licenses in the Barents Sea (in what is known as “the 23rd licensing round” on the Norwegian continental shelf). On 22 December 2020, the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled that this decision did not violate the right to a healthy environment under Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution. It also found no violation of the ECHR. While it did find that climate impacts should have been assessed, it held that this could be remedied at the development stage (after the licenses in question had been issued). The Supreme Court’s judgment followed rulings from Oslo City Court and the Borgarting Court of Appeal, both of which held that the disputed licensing decision was valid.

In its ruling, the Norwegian Supreme Court considered that there had been no violation of the ECHR in this case because that Convention only applies to “direct and immediate” environmental harms. Although the Supreme Court considered Articles 2 and 8 ECHR and referred to the pending Duarte Agostinho case in its oral ruling, it considered that the case-law as it stood at the time of decision had not been contravened.

Regarding Article 2 ECHR, the Supreme Court held that this only applies to real and immediate risks of loss of life. The question before the Supreme Court, it argued, was the issue of a sufficient link between the domestic administrative decisions and the risk of a loss of life. It considered that it was not clear whether the decisions would in fact lead to emissions, and the threat concerned was in the future.

Regarding Article 8 ECHR, the Court held that this did not cover every harm to the environment, that an impact had to be “direct and immediate” also here, and that efforts by the Committee of Ministers to add a separate right to a healthy environment to the ECHR had failed. The Supreme Court also considered that the Dutch Urgenda judgment was not comparable to the case at hand, because that case concerned already-established climate targets, and not the possible invalidity of an administrative decision.

Given these considerations, the Norwegian Supreme Court held, by a majority of eleven to four, that the disputed licensing decision granting was valid. A minority of four judges dissented, arguing that – although they agreed with the majority’s conclusions on Article 112 of the Constitution and Articles 2 and 8 ECHR – the production licenses awarded in the 23rd licensing round were invalid because of procedural errors in the impact assessment. 

Submissions before the ECtHR in greater detail:
The applicants argued that there is a real and serious risk to their lives and well-being, and to their ability to enjoy their private life, family life and home. They submitted that the Norwegian State had failed to adopt the necessary and appropriate measures to address this risk, and that it had failed to describe and assess the total climate effects, including exported emissions, of continued and expanded extraction of oil and gas from the Arctic, thereby also violating the applicants’ rights.

The six individual applicants submitted that they have experienced climate anxiety, emotional distress and great worry about the
current and imminent risks of serious climate harms, and the impact on their lives, life choices, and the lives of future generations. They referred to mental health literature, which increasingly draws attention to such concerns, described in the application as “pre-traumatic stress.”

The applicants noted that, under current climate policies, the average temperature in Norway is expected to rise by more than 5.5 degrees Celsius by 2100. There had already been an increase in extreme rainfall events, flooding and landslides. Future impacts will include increased risk of drought and forest fire-inducing thunderstorms, changes to flood systems, sea level rise and ocean acidification.

The applicants noted that there is a significant difference between planned fossil fuel extraction and Norwegian climate goals. The applicants submitted that State representatives stated before the Norwegian Supreme Court that Norway will continue to produce and export petroleum as long as there are buyers. They noted that Norway is the 7th largest exporter of emissions in the world, and the 3rd largest per capita, behind Qatar and Kuwait. There is no system in place to declare, assess, calculate, or reduce exported emissions from fossil fuels extraction projects, nor the exported emissions from oil and gas extraction overall.

On victim status, the applicants alleged that the licensing of fossil fuels extraction is too complex for individuals and young people to challenge alone. The organizations in question are not only better suited to challenge such decisions, but they also claim to represent future generations.

The applicants alleged that Articles 2 and 8 ECHR had been violated because of the presence of a real, immediate and serious risk to these rights, of which the State had actual or putative knowledge and regarding which it failed to adopt reasonable and appropriate preventative measures. They invoked the principle of prevention, and argued that the State must adopt a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life. They argued that an unequal burden has been placed on younger generations, and those unborn. The applicants argued that the threats against their rights are ongoing since temperature increase cannot be reversed and the authorities must act immediately to prevent the harms in question.

Under Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy), the applicants argued that the Norwegian courts did not assess the merits of the Convention claims in full and based on ECtHR case law.

Under Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination, they argued that there were disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, citing the factors of young age and the fact that two of the individual applicants were members of the indigenous Sami minority, whose traditions, land and resources are negatively impacted. Due to their age, the young applicants, they submitted, had no opportunity to participate in the relevant decision-making while at the same time having to shoulder a heavier burden concerning the long-term consequences of the acts and omissions in question.

Interim developments:
The 10 disputed licenses were returned and relinquished by the companies concerned given that no potentially profitable gas discoveries were made. On 11 March 2022 Norway re-licensed the area covered by one of the disputed licenses (no. 855) under the so-called APA system for mature areas. The original license had covered the drilling of two wells, one of which had discovered an oil column but was ultimately considered have limited economic potential. The new production license for the area, no. 1170, is valid until 11 March 2030. It allowed the discovery of two significant gas deposits adjacent to and geologically part of Wisting, the largest undeveloped oil discovery on the Norwegian continental shelf. The two wells were plugged and abandoned after evaluation, but their discovery remains valid and open to development.

In 2019, the Ministry awarded twelve new petroleum production licenses to eleven companies in the 24th licensing round. In 2021, the Ministry awarded four new petroleum production licenses in the 25th licensing round. In addition, the Government also granted licenses under the system of Awards in Predefined Areas (“APA”), which relate to the mature areas of the Norwegian continental shelf.

On 8 April 2022 the Government approved the recommendation of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of a report that states that “The Norwegian petroleum industry will be further developed” and “[t]he licensing system will remain unchanged. Permits will continue to be granted to explore for oil and gas in new areas.” This same report indicates that licensees must “assess the climate impacts of production and combustion emissions when considering all new plans for development and operation (PDOs), and highlight the assessments in decisions related to those plans”. The Ministry also indicated that it would follow up to the Norwegian Supreme Court’s judgment in this case by “conducting an assessment of the climate impacts of production and combustion emissions when considering all new development plans (PDOs). The scope of the assessment will be adapted to the scale of the resources in the individual development.”

Judgment of the ECtHR of 28 October 2025:
On 28 October 2025, the Second Section of the ECtHR issued its unanimous judgment in this case, examining the applicants’ claim that the 2016 decision granting 10 petroleum production licenses was contrary to Norway’s obligation to mitigate climate change, which was adversely affecting the lives, living conditions and health of the individual applicants and other persons whose interests were represented by the applicant organizations. The Court, in doing so, engaged in an extensive comparative exercise. It noted the 2024/2025 climate-related advisory opinions issued by the ITLOS, IACtHR and ICJ, summarizing their findings as well as noting environmental treaties (the Aarhus Convention and Espoo Convention) and the (R (Finch) v Surrey County Council judgment of the UK Supreme Court.

After these considerations, the Court turned to the scope of the case before it. It held that the scope of the case as defined by the domestic proceedings was narrow, given that it concerned “an allegedly faulty decision-making process in one specific round of licensing of petroleum exploration, which would precede petroleum production” (para. 282). Contrasting the case with the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Grand Chamber judgment, the Court held that Greenpeace Nordic “concerns the State’s procedural, rather than substantive, obligations, and is moreover limited to ten exploration licences”, while nevertheless raising “the issue of an alleged failure of the State to effectively protect individuals from the serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 282). The Court also decided to examine the case only under Article 8 ECHR, the right to respect for private and family life, and not to examine the complaint made under Article 2 ECHR, the right to life (paras. 283-284).

The Court then examined the victim status and locus standi of the applicants under Article 34 ECHR, applying the criteria developed in the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Grand Chamber judgment. On individual victim status, the Court applied the high-threshold, two-step KlimaSeniorinnen test that requires (a) a high intensity of exposure and (b) a pressing need to ensure individual protection of the applicants. For the NGOs, it applied the KlimaSeniorinnen representative standing test that requires associations to be (a) lawfully established in the jurisdiction, (b) dedicated to the defense of climate rights, and (c) genuinely qualified and representative. The Court combined the assessment of these two tests with the merits of its examination of Article 8 ECHR, and ultimately found that the individual applicants, including the youth and Indigenous applicants, had not satisfied the individual victim status test. However, it did find that the legal persons had standing to bring a representative application.

The Court’s reasoning in this regard first examined whether there was a “sufficiently close link” between the disputed 2016 licensing decision and the risk of climate-related impacts on ECHR rights. It held that:

294. “The Court observes that while exploration will not always, and certainly not automatically or unconditionally, be followed by extraction, in Norway, it is both a legal and a practical precondition for it. (…) [P]etroleum would not be extracted but for the opening of an area for extraction, and the granting of production licences. The fact that other events and permits are also necessary before extraction can take place does not break that chain of causation. When considering causation for the purposes of attributing responsibility for adverse effects arising from climate change, the Court has not required it to be shown that “but for” a failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred (…). The Court further observes that the link between petroleum exploration and its future production is inherent. (…) The Supreme Court itself observed that the SEA had to include all stages of the petroleum production, from exploration to development, extraction, transport, exploitation and termination (…). In these circumstances, it is clear that the petroleum project in question was of such a nature as to entail potential risks of extraction.”

The Court went on to find that the relinquishment of the 10 licenses “does not break the required causal nexus for the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention”, emphasizing the preventive function of the right of access to information and observing that “the Convention guarantees a right for affected individuals to be informed about the environmental effects of a planned activity” which means that “[t]he procedural nature of the right to information and the preventive function of that right make the applicability of the provisions in question independent of the later materialisation of the risk” (para. 295). The Court also noted that the previously licensed areas could be automatically re-licensed for exploration under the APA system, meaning that “even a relinquished licence maps out an opened area for future discoveries” (para. 296). The Court went on to hold that

297.  Having established the link between exploration licensing and extraction, the Court also notes that oil and gas extraction is the most important source of GHG emissions of Norway (…), and that the burning of fossil fuels, including oil and gas, is among the main causes of climate change (…).

This meant that there was a sufficiently close link between the disputed licensing procedure and serious adverse effects of climate change on the lives, health, well-being and quality of life of individuals (para. 299).

Examining this with regard to individual victim status, the Court held that “no grievances about the personal situation of the six individual applicants were examined in the disputed judicial review of the 23rd licensing round” (para. 301). Nevertheless, it noted that “the crux of these applicants’ complaint concerns the adverse effects of climate change which they, as young people, are suffering as a result of the respondent State’s allegedly inadequate action on climate change, particularly as a result of the authorisation of further petroleum production.” It considered these to be localized claims, focused on the specific situation prevailing in Norway and noting the climate impacts in that country, including ocean warming, rising air temperatures, seasonal effects and forest and fish stock degradation (para. 302). However, it found that the individual applicants (applicants nos. 2‑7) did not fulfil the criteria for victim status under Article 34 ECHR. Albeit noting the Indigenous rights implications of the case – the fact that that three of the six individual applicants identify as members of the Sámi people – it held that “[w]hile the Court fully appreciates that climate change poses a threat to the traditional Sámi way of life and culture (…), it cannot conclude that the hardships that the situation complained about may be causing the three applicants personally are of “high intensity”” (para. 303). Neither had arguments about the mental health impacts of climate change been adequately substantiated. However, the Court did note “the seriousness of conditions such as climate anxiety or climate grief” (para. 304), but found that it lacked evidence to examine this in light of ECHR rights. Likewise, it lacked medical evidence indicating “any particular morbidity or any other serious adverse effect on their health or well-being that had been created by climate change and would go beyond the effects which any young person living in Norway and having a degree of awareness about climate change might experience” (para. 305). On this basis, it rejected the individual victim status of the applicants.

On representative locus standi, the Court applied the three-step KlimaSeniorinnen test, finding that the two NGOs concerned, Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth, met all three criteria of that test. They enjoyed standing in the domestic courts and “act in the interest of the general public and of future generations – and, in the case of Young Friends of the Earth, also in the interest of its members – with the aim of ensuring effective climate protection”, meaning that they take “legal action to address the effects of climate change in the interests of its members and/or other persons affected by specific climate change impacts” (para. 309). As a result, the Court was satisfied that these two organizations represented “a collective means of defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State” (para. 310).

Under Article 8 ECHR, the Court began its merits analysis by setting out the nature of the State’s positive obligation in the specific context of climate risk. It reiterated that Article 8 protects individuals against serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life, and that the Contracting State must ‘do its part’ to ensure effective protection against such risks through an adequate legal and administrative framework. The Court underlined that this obligation is not purely theoretical: States are required to organize their decision-making in a way that meaningfully addresses climate-related risks that may interfere with the enjoyment of Convention rights (para. 314).

At the same time, the Court accepted that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the specific measures they adopt to discharge their climate-related obligations under Article 8, including how they balance climate protection against other competing interests.

That margin of appreciation is nevertheless framed and limited by what could be described as three considerations of particular weight. First, in any such balancing, climate protection must be afforded ‘considerable weight,’ reflecting both the severity and the irreversibility of climate harm. Second, greenhouse gas emissions are cumulative and transboundary, meaning that the harmful effects of present-day decisions will manifest and intensify over time and are not confined to national borders. Third, despite longstanding scientific warnings, States collectively have not yet acted sufficiently to avoid dangerous climate change risk, and there remains only a ‘rapidly closing window of opportunity’ to secure a liveable future. In the Court’s view, those elements reinforce the urgency and seriousness of climate mitigation as a human rights concern (paras. 315-316).

The Court then specified how Article 8 operates in procedural terms. It recalled that, in environmental cases, its analysis often centers on whether the domestic decision-making process provided adequate procedural safeguards, rather than on substituting its own assessment for that of national authorities. In the climate context, this procedural obligation see itself in a requirement that States, before authorising an activity which could significantly contribute to climate change and thereby threaten the protected interests under Article 8, carry out an environmental impact assessment that is adequate, timely and comprehensive. The assessment must be conducted in good faith, rely on the best available science, and be sufficiently concrete and detailed to inform the authorities’ decision at a stage when all options (including refusing the project) are genuinely open (para. 318).

This assessment must, at a minimum, allow identification and, so far as possible, quantification of expected greenhouse gas emissions arising from the proposed activity; evaluate the compatibility of that activity with the State’s domestic and international climate obligations; and address not only direct operational emissions but also downstream emissions (scope 3) that would result from the eventual use of the extracted petroleum, including where that combustion would take place outside the State’s territory. The Court also stressed that meaningful public participation is an integral part of this procedural duty. Individuals and communities affected by the climate risks associated with a project must have access to relevant information and a genuine opportunity to express their views early enough in the process to influence the outcome (paras. 319–320). Crucially, the Court held that

319.  In the context of petroleum production projects, the environmental impact assessment must include, at a minimum, a quantification of the GHG emissions anticipated to be produced (including the combustion emissions both within the country and abroad; compare, mutatis mutandis, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, § 550). Moreover, at the level of the public authorities, there must be an assessment of whether the activity is compatible with their obligations under national and international law to take effective measures against the adverse effects of climate change. Lastly, informed public consultation must take place at a time when all options are still open and when pollution can realistically be prevented at source.

The Court situated these procedural requirements within broader developments in international law, noting the converging obligations articulated in recent advisory opinions by international courts and tribunals such as the 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinion; the 2025 EFTA Advisory Opinion; the 2024 Advisory Opinion of the ITLOS; and the IACtHR Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 (paras. 320–324).

Against that normative structure, the Court turned to the Norwegian system. It noted that petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf proceed in three administrative stages: first, the opening of an area for petroleum activities, following a strategic environmental assessment and parliamentary involvement; second, the granting of exploration licenses (the stage at issue in the present case); and third, the approval of a Plan for Development and Operation (PDO), which is required before any extraction can begin (para. 326).

The applicant organizations had argued that Norway failed to comply with Article 8 because, prior to awarding the exploration licenses in 2016, the authorities did not conduct a sufficiently comprehensive climate impact assessment. In particular, they submitted that there had been no assessment, at that stage, of the total climate effects of future extraction, including exported combustion emissions, no evaluation of the project’s compatibility with the remaining carbon budget aligned with the 1.5°C temperature goal, and an overall approach that prioritized economic projections over climate constraints. They also challenged the position taken by the Norwegian Supreme Court, namely that any deficiencies could simply be addressed later at the PDO stage, arguing that deferring climate assessment to the PDO stage was contrary to EEA and international law and, in practice, ineffective (paras. 328-329).

The ECtHR accepted an important part of the applicants’ arguments at the factual level. It observed that the domestic procedures leading to the 2016 licensing decision were ‘not fully comprehensive,’ in that the strategic environmental assessment did not include all stages of the petroleum project, particularly the downstream combustion emissions. It noted that the Norwegian Supreme Court acknowledged this omission but considered that it could be remedied at the later PDO stage (para. 330).

However, the Court did not consider those gaps, taken alone, to amount to a breach of Article 8. Instead, it asked whether, looking at the process ‘as a whole,’ Norway had put in place procedural guarantees capable of ensuring that no petroleum extraction project would proceed without a sufficiently rigorous climate assessment and an opportunity for effective public challenge. The Court based its reasoning on three following elements.

First, it attached weight to the legal position, confirmed by the Norwegian Supreme Court, that the granting of an exploration license does not create any automatic entitlement to extract petroleum. Under Norwegian law, extraction cannot commence without approval of a PDO by the competent ministry. The authorities therefore retain both the power and, under Article 112 of the Constitution, the duty to refuse a PDO if climate or environmental considerations so require (para. 331).

Second, at the PDO stage, Norwegian law requires an environmental impact assessment and public consultation. This assessment must address the climate impacts of both production and combustion emissions and be reviewed by the authorities in light of Norway’s domestic and international climate commitments. The Court also noted the Government’s formal undertaking, following the domestic litigation, to ensure that all future PDOs include such assessments and that their results are explicitly reflected in the approval decisions. These commitments, in the Court’s view, confirmed that downstream emissions and compatibility with climate targets would be examined before any extraction could begin (paras. 332–334).

Third, the Court observed that affected individuals and organisations have access to environmental information and opportunities to participate in the PDO-stage decision-making, which is subject to administrative and judicial oversight before any extraction begins. Because the PDO stage precedes production, the Court considered that meaningful preventive control remains possible at that point (paras. 333–334).

The Court further observed that, under Norwegian law interpreted in light of EEA environmental requirements, impact assessments at the PDO stage must take account of cumulative and transboundary climate effects, including downstream or ‘exported’ emissions from the eventual combustion of petroleum. It considered that this mechanism, assessed together with the wider procedural safeguards of the Norwegian system, adequately addressed the applicants’ concern that such emissions had been overlooked at the earlier licensing stage. On that basis, the Court concluded that, although the environmental impact assessment at the licensing stage was incomplete, the Norwegian system, assessed in its entirety, still satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8. In light of this, the Court unanimously found that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (paras. 336-337).

Thus, the decisive point for the Court was that there are effective safeguards built into the approval process for actual extraction: extraction cannot begin without a PDO; the PDO must be preceded by a climate-focused assessment and public participation; the authorities are under a duty to refuse the PDO if climate considerations so require; and those decisions remain open to challenge. The Court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Norwegian authorities, no indication that the PDO stage is structurally incapable of correcting earlier deficiencies, and no indication that those safeguards are purely theoretical or illusory. It therefore held that Norway had remained within its margin of appreciation in structuring climate-related assessment across multiple stages, and that the deferral of a full climate assessment to the PDO stage, while not ideal from the applicants’ perspective, did not in itself breach Article 8 as long as the PDO stage functions in the manner described above.

Concerning the complaint under Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination), the Court considered that it was not necessary to examine whether this provision was applicable as concerned the individual applicants because this complaint was in any event inadmissible given the failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Citing its own subsidiarity and the exhaustion rule in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Court noted that “the individual applicants did not avail themselves of any domestic remedy in their own name” (para. 350). It held that “while the applicants complained before the Court that not invalidating the 2016 licensing decision constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of the individual applicants’ age and of ethnic status, no such complaint had been made, even in substance, in the course of the domestic judicial review proceedings, and, in particular, before the Supreme Court” (para. 351). As a result, the applicants had not afforded the domestic courts with the requisite opportunity to examine or remedy this complaint, and it was declared inadmissible.

As concerned Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy), the Court held that the domestic courts “duly engaged” with the applicant organizations’ arguments and duly examined their claims, in line with the requirements of Article 13, and that their review powers were not limited in the sense of precluding them from examining the applicants’ complaints. The fact that the domestic courts ultimately held that the omission to conduct a prior assessment did not invalidate the licensing decision, as that could be rectified at the next PDO stage, and did not mean that their examination of the issues had been superficial (para. 363). The ECtHR also noted that the Norwegian Supreme Court devoted a separate section of its judgment to whether ECHR rights were engaged. The fact that the Supreme Court’s conclusion could be called into question in the light of the Court’s findings in this case did “not mean that the assessment was insufficient or that it was not diligently undertaken” (para. 354). The ECtHR itself noted that the approach taken in this case represented “a significant development in Convention case-law”, based on the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment. It ultimately declared the Article 13 complaint manifestly ill-founded in light of this reasoning.

Date filed:
15 June 2021

Date communicated:
6 January 2022 (press release).

Date of judgment:
28 October 2025

Adjudicating Body:
European Court of Human Rights

Status of case:
Decided by a Chamber formation of the ECtHR on 28 October 2025.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway, no. 34068/21, Judgment of 28 October 2025.

Case documents:
Link to the text of the application: click here.
The full text of the judgment is available below.

CASE OF GREENPEACE NORDIC AND OTHERS v. NORWAYDownload

Last updated:
28 October 2025

Categories
Access to a remedy Austria Disability and health-related inequality Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Fair trial Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life Victim status Vulnerability

Müllner v. Austria

Summary:
On 25 March 2021, an application was filed before the European Court of Human Rights concerning the impact of climate change (specifically, temperature increases) on an applicant suffering from temperature-sensitive multiple sclerosis and Uhthoff’s syndrome. The applicant alleged a violation of his rights under Article 8 ECHR by the failure by the Austrian government to set effective greenhouse gas emissions reduction measures.

The applicant alleged in particular that, at temperatures above 25 degrees Celsius, he is no longer able to walk, and that above 30 degrees Celsius, he loses complete control over his muscular movement. He alleged that, by failing to sufficiently reduce its emissions to meet the goals set out in the Paris Agreement, the respondent State had not only made it impossible to meet the 1,5 degree Celsius warming target set out therein, but had even actively taken measures to exacerbate the climate crisis, including through subsidies and incentives. The applicant also alleged that the domestic State’s legal system systemically impeded him from challenging the climate policies at stake, and the government’s inaction in this regard. This, he submitted, reflects a systemic deficit in the domestic legal system, making it impossible to challenge inaction by the State.

The applicant invoked the right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 ECHR, and subsidiarily the right to life in Article 2 ECHR, as well as the rights to access to a remedy and fair trial in Articles 13 and 6 ECHR.

The case was initially adjourned pending the outcome of Grand Chamber proceedings in three other climate cases, in which the Court issued its rulings on 9 April 2024 (KlimaSeniorinnen, Duarte Agostinho and Carême). On 1 July 2024, it was announced that the Court had communicated the case to the Austrian government. The Court also granted the case priority under Article 41 of the Rules of Court, meaning that it will receive expedited treatment.

Status of case:
The case was communicated to the Austrian government on 1 July 2024 as per the Court’s press release below.

In communicating the case, the Court asked the following questions of the parties:

1.  Is the application admissible? In particular:

a.  Has the applicant exhausted all effective domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in respect of each of his complaints lodged with the Court under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention (see Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, § 215, 9 April 2024, and Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], no. 21881/20, §§ 138-145, 27 November 2023)?

b.  Can the applicant claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, §§ 460-472, 478-488, 527-535, 9 April 2024)?

c.  Was Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head applicable to the proceedings in the present case (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, §§ 594-625)?

2.  To the extent that the complaints are admissible, has there been a violation of Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention? In particular:

a.  Has there been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life or home, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention?

Did the respondent State fail to comply with its positive obligations to effectively protect the applicant’s respect for his private and family life, including his home (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, §§ 538-574)?

b.  Did the applicant have access to a court for the determination of his civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, §§ 626-640)?

Did the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied Articles 139 and 140 of the Federal Constitution involve excessive formalism (see Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 80-86, 96-99, 5 April 2018, and Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, nos. 55997/14 and 3 others, §§ 111-117, 31 March 2020)?

c.  Did the applicant have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his Convention complaints, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Müllner v. Austria, application no. 18859/21, filed on 25 March 2021, communicated on 1 July 2024.

Links:
For the last-instance domestic judgment in this case, see here: https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_Beschluss_G_144_2020_vom_30._September_2020.pdf

For the full text of the application to the Court, see here: https://www.michaelakroemer.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/rechtsanwaeltin-michaela-kroemer-klimaklage-petition.pdf

For more information on the case from Fridays for Future Austria, see here.

For a statement from the applicant’s lawyer, Michaela Kroemer, see here.

Last updated:
1 July 2024.

Categories
2020 Climate activists and human rights defenders Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Extraterritorial obligations Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life The Netherlands

Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (KLM)

Summary:

During the Covid-19 pandemic, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines struggled with serious financial difficulties. To support the airline during the crisis, the Dutch government granted KLM a bailout package totalling 3.4 billion Euros. Along with the support package, a number of conditions were imposed on KLM. These included a set of sustainability requirements and a requirement to reduce CO2 emissions. As a result, Greenpeace Netherlands sued the Dutch government before the District Court of the Hague on 7 October 2020. Greenpeace claimed that the conditions imposed were not sufficient to achieve the climate goals of the Paris Agreement and that the state should either have imposed a cap on CO2 emissions on the airline or should not have granted the bailout package at all. In Greenpeace’s view, the state has thus breached its duty of care to prevent dangerous climate change, following the ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court in the Urgenda Foundation case, thereby allegedly violating of Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

In its ruling of 9 December 2020, the court ruled against Greenpeace, reasoning that neither the Paris Agreement nor other international climate agreements oblige the Dutch government to reduce CO2 emissions from international aviation. According to the court, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 stipulates that cooperation with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is required for CO2 reduction in international aviation. The Paris Agreement therefore only contains the obligation to reduce domestic emissions, but not emissions from international air traffic. Furthermore, the court found that the conditions requested by Greenpeace go beyond the ICAO’s resolution on CO2 emissions and that the conditions imposed by the Dutch government are in accordance with all international obligations in this regard. The court concluded that there was no obligation of the State of the Netherlands which was violated by granting KLM the bailout package with its conditions.

Date of decision:

9 December 2020

Suggested case citation:

District Court of The Hague, Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands, Judgment of 9 December 2020, C/09/600364 / KG ZA 20-933, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:12440.

Case ducuments:

District-Court-Judgment-in-DutchDownload
Plaintiffs-advocacy-note-in-DutchDownload
Notice-of-possible-legal-procedure-in-DutchDownload

Date last updated:

11 January 2023

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights France Paris Agreement Sea-level rise Uncategorized

Commune de Grande-Synthe v. France

Summary:
This case was brought to the French Conseil d’Etat by the municipality of Grande-Synthe, which is a low-lying coastal community, against the French government. The plaintiffs alleged that the government had taken insufficient action to combat climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and invoked the European Convention on Human Rights, the Paris Agreement, and domestic environmental regulations.

Admissibility:
The case was declared admissible on 19 November 2020 by the Conseil d’Etat. The Government was given three months to justify its current approach to climate measures. The Conseil d’Etat indicated that the Paris Agreement, and France’s 40% reduction target by 2030 as opposed to 1990 emissions levels, would be used to interpret the State’s obligations.

Merits:
Pending

Remedies:
Pending

Separate opinions:
Pending

Implementation measures taken:
On 1 July 2021, it was announced that, in light of this case, the French Conseil d’État would require the Government to take measures before 31 March 2022 in order to reach the target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions totalling 40% by the year 2030.

To achieve the reduction targets set out in the Paris Agreement, meaning a -40% reduction in emissions as compared to 1990 levels, the Government had previously adopted a reductions plan covering four time periods (2015-2018, 2019-2023, 2024-2028 and 2029-2033), each with its own reduction targets. The Conseil d’État observed in its decision of 1 July 2021 that the level of emissions measured in 2019 had respected the annual target set for the period of 2019-2023. However, the 0.9% decrease in emissions observed was too low when compared to the reduction objectives for the previous period (2015-2018), which were 1.9% per year, and compared to the objectives for the following period (2024-2028), which are 3% per year. Provisional data for 2020 might show a significant drop in emissions, but this must be to some extent due to pandemic-related restrictions and must therefore be regarded as “transitory”. It did not, by itself, guarantee that the reductions needed to achieve the 2030 target were being made. The Conseil d’État found that additional efforts were needed in the short term to achieve the target of 12% emissions reductions between 2024 and 2028.

Date:
Pending

Type of Forum:
Domestic

Status of case:
Pending

Suggested case citation:
Decision on the Admissibility: French Conseil d’Etat, Commune de Grande-Synthe and Others v. France, case no. 427301, Admissibility, 19 November 2020.

Links:
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/non-us-case/commune-de-grande-synthe-v-france/

Categories
2020 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Ireland Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life

Friends of the Irish Environment v. Government of Ireland

Summary:
In this case, brought before the Irish Supreme Court by the environmental activist group Friends of the Irish Environment, the Supreme Court quashed the Irish National Mitigation Plan of 2017 on the grounds that it was incompatible with the Irish Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 (the 2015 Climate Act). The Supreme Court ordered the creation of a new, Climate Act-compliant plan.

Facts:
The case was premised on evidence that Ireland was set to miss its 2030 mitigation targets by a substantial degree.

Domestic instances:
The applicant’s claim was unsuccessful before the High Court. After the High Court proceedings were concluded, the Irish Supreme Court agreed to hear the case directly, without first seizing the Court of Appeal with the case. In doing so, the Supreme Court noted the “general public and legal importance” of the case, and the fact that the seriousness of climate change, the climate science, and the emissions at stake were not contested.

Merits:
In a unanimous seven-judge judgment, delivered by Chief Justice Clarke on 31 July 2020, the Supreme Court found that the Mitigation Plan did not reach the level of detail required under the 2015 Climate Act and was ultra vires that Act.

However, the judges did not allow the applicants’ rights-based arguments. Because Friends of the Irish Environment was a corporate entity, it did not enjoy the right to life or bodily integrity under the ECHR and the Irish Constitution, and lacked standing to bring these claims. Chief Justice Clarke CJ accepted that constitutional rights could be engaged in environmental cases, but held that the Irish Constitution does not contain a right to a healthy environment.

Date of judgment:
31 July 2020

Suggested citation:
Supreme Court of Ireland, Friends of the Irish Environment v. The Government of Ireland and Others, Judgment of 31 July 2020, [2020] IESC 49.

Further reading:
Orla Kelleher, ‘The Supreme Court of Ireland’s decision in Friends of the Irish Environment v Government of Ireland (“Climate Case Ireland”)’ in EJIL Talk!, 9 September 2020.

The full text of the judgment is available here.

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to life The Netherlands

Urgenda Foundation v. the Netherlands

Summary:
This case, brought in 2013 by the Urgenda foundation and hundreds of Dutch citizens against the Netherlands, has become the leading climate and human rights judgment, and served as inspiration for similar litigation around the world. The final judgment in this case was issued in 2019, and in this case the domestic courts not only found that the Dutch climate policy had violated Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the rights to life and respect for private and family life, respectively), but also issued an injunction requiring greenhouse gas emissions reductions.

Remedies ordered:
District Court of The Hague had previously ruled that the government was obligated to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020 in comparison to 1990 levels. The District Court’s decision was appealed by the State. The Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision on 9 October 2018. After the State’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme court ruled in favour of Urgenda and held that the government has a legal duty to prevent dangerous climate change.

Date of final domestic judgment:
20 December 2019

More on this case:
For the final judgment in Dutch, click here.

For the summary provided by the Supreme Court (English), click here.

Recommended reading:
Ingrid Leijten, ‘Human Rights v. Insufficient Climate Action: The Urgenda Case’ 37(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2019)

Benoit Mayer, ‘The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation: Ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (9 October 2018)’ 8(1) Transnational Environmental Law (2019), 167-192.

Maiko Meguro, ‘State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation’ 114(4) American Journal of International Law (2020), 729-735.

Suggested citation:
Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), Urgenda Foundation v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 20 December 2019, No. 19/00135, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2006.