Category: Non-discrimination

Categories
Access to a remedy Austria Children and young people Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights France Gender / women-led Italy Non-discrimination Norway Paris Agreement Portugal Private and family life Right to life Switzerland Turkey

De Conto and Uricchio v. Italy and 32 other States

Summary:
In 2021, two further cases in the style of the Duarte Agostinho application were brought before the European Court of Human Rights, this time by two young people from Italy. The cases were brought against 33 Council of Europe Member States, and refer to storms, forest fires and heat waves experienced by the applicants, as well as associated physical and psychological distress. The applicants, two women aged 18 and 20 at the time of filing, invoked Articles 2, 8, 13 and 14. They made arguments about the positive obligations to protect against environmental harm under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, discrimination against younger generations, and a lack of access to effective domestic remedies given the excessive burden of being required to bring domestic proceedings in 33 States.

The application forms in these cases have not been made publicly available, and the cases had not yet been communicated by the Court at the time of writing. It had been announced, however, that the cases have been adjourned pending the outcome of Grand Chamber proceedings in three other climate cases (see the following section). More information on the cases will be published as it becomes available.

Status of case:

Adjourned until the Grand Chamber has ruled in the climate change cases pending before it (see the ECtHR’s press release here).

Suggested citation:

ECtHR, De Conto v. Italy and 32 other States, application no. 14620/21, submitted on 3 March 2021.

ECtHR, Uricchio v. Italy and 32 other States, application no. 14615/21, submitted on 3 March 2021.

More information (via climatecasechart.com):

On the De Conto case.

On the Uricchio case.

Last updated:

15 March 2023.

Categories
2021 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Imminent risk Indigenous peoples' rights Non-discrimination Right to life Right to property Sea-level rise United States of America

Aji P. and Others v. the State of Washington

Summary:
This case was brought by 13 young people aged between 8 and 18 who sued the US State of Washington, its Governor, and various other state agencies, arguing that the state had “injured and continue[d] to injure them by creating, operating, and maintaining a fossil fuel-based energy and transportation system that [the State] knew would result in greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, dangerous climate change, and resulting widespread harm.” In doing so, they invoked their “fundamental and inalienable constitutional rights to life, liberty, property, equal protection, and a healthful and pleasant environment, which includes a stable climate system that sustains human life and liberty.” They also invoked the impacts on indigenous peoples’ rights. The plaintiffs requested the judiciary to “[o]rder [the state] to develop and submit to the Court . . . an enforceable state climate recovery plan”.

A number of amici filed briefs in the case. For example, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Quinault Indian Nation, and Suquamish Tribe argued that local tribes were already seeing impacts on their traditional lands and abutting marine waters. The Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW-US) noted the well-documented impacts of climate change on human and constitutional rights. The League of Women Voters of Washington argued that access to judicial action was particularly important for minors who did not enjoy access to the right to vote. And a group of environmental NGOs submitted that “the right to a healthful and pleasant environment underlies our continued ability to claim our explicitly-guaranteed rights to life and liberty.”

On 8 February 2021, the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington held that it “firmly believe[d] that the right to a stable environment should be fundamental.” It also recognized “the extreme harm that greenhouse gas emissions inflict on the environment and its future stability.” However, it held that “it would be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for the court to resolve the Youths’ claims.” It accordingly dismissed the claim.

On 6 October 2021, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington denied the petition for review in this case. González, C.J. (dissenting) noted that the plaintiffs “asked this court to recognize a fundamental right to a healthful and pleasant environment that may be inconsistent with our State’s maintenance of a fossil-fuel-based energy and transportation system that it knows will result in greenhouse gas emissions. These greenhouse gases hasten a rise in the earth’s temperature. This temperature change foreshadows the potential collapse of our environment. In its place is an unstable climate system, conceivably unable to sustain human life and continued enjoyment of ordered liberty under law. Today, we have an opportunity to consider whether these are the sorts of harms that are remediable under Washington’s law and constitution. We should have granted review to decide that question”.

Suggested citation:
Court of Appeals of the State of Washington (USA), Aji P. v. State, 16 Wash. App. 2d 177, 480 P.3d 438, 16 Wn. App. 2d 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

Last updated:
5 July 2022

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to life Right to property South Korea

Woodpecker et al. v. South Korea (‘Baby Climate Litigation’)

Summary:
In June 2022, a climate case was filed in South Korea by sixty-two babies and children under the age of 11, including a 20-week-old fetus nicknamed “Woodpecker”, who was born after the proceedings were launched. The claimants submitted that the State was violating the rights of future generations by failing to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. At the time of filing, this was the fourth climate case challenging the constitutionality of the Korean climate policy, as contained in the country’s 2021 Carbon Neutrality Act (2021). In this case, the claimants argue that the mitigation measures set out in this Act (envisioning a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 as compared with 2018 levels) violates their constitutional rights to life, equality, property, and to live in a healthy and pleasant environment. To do so, they extensively discuss IPCC reports and successful domestic climate litigation in other jurisdictions (particularly the Urgenda and Neubauer judgments).

More specifically, the plaintiffs contested Article 3(1) of the 2022 Enforcement Decree of the 2021 domestic Carbon Neutrality Act, arguing that this provision was unconstitutional because it violated:

  • their right to life, pursuit of happiness and general freedom of action (Article 10 of the South Korean Constitution, ‘Guarantee of Human Dignity and Fundamental Rights’);
  • their right to equality (Article 11 of the Constitution);
  • their right to property (Article 23 of the Constitution);
  • thir right to live in a healthy and pleasant environment (Article 35 of the Constitution); and
  • the state’s obligation to prevent disasters and protect the people from the risk of environmental disasters (Article 34(6) and Article 35(2) of the Constitution).

According to the Guardian, this was the first climate case in which a foetus was listed as a claimant. Together, the four cases reportedly represent the first findings of their kind in Asia (i.e. the first time that a court has find that inadequate mitigation action violates fundamental rights).

Relevant developments:
On 12 June 2023, it was announced that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea had decided to submit an opinion to South Korea’s Constitutional Court to oppose the country’s Carbon Neutrality Act (2021), which it considered to be unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of future generations because it sets out a greenhouse gas emissions reductions target that was too low. The Act sets out a 40% emissions reductions target by 2030 as compared to 2018 levels. This, the Commission found, did not respect the constitutional principle of equality, because it passed the burden of greenhouse gas emissions on to future generations.

Consolidation with three other cases:
The South Korean Constitutional Court decided to consolidate its first four climate cases (Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea, Woodpecker et al. v. South Korea (Baby Climate Litigation) (the present case), Climate Crisis Emergency Action v. South Korea (a.k.a. Byung-In Kim et al. v. South Korea) and Min-A Park v. South Korea). Public hearings in the cases were held on 23 April 2024 and 21 May 2024.

These cases all alleged that the government’s inadequate greenhouse gas reduction targets violated citizens’ fundamental rights, particularly those of future generations. Together, the four cases comprised over 250 plaintiffs, including civil society, youth and children. The Constitutional Court issued a joint ruling in these cases on 29 August 2024.

Judgment of the constitutional court:
On 29 August 2024, the South Korean Constitutional Court found a violation of constitutional rights in this case and three related cases. In an unanimous ruling, hailed as “the first decision of its kind in Asia“, the court found that the government’s response to the climate crisis was inadequate and threatened constitutional rights, noting that the country lacked legally binding long-term emissions reductions targets for the post-2031 period, which violated the constitutional rights of future generations by shifting an excessive reductions burden to the future. The court gave government and legislature 18 months (until 28 February 2026) to introduce the relevant targets.

In particular, the Court ruled that Article 8(1) of the South Korean Carbon Neutrality Basic Act was unconstitutional. Previously, the government had pledged a 40% reduction of its GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 2018 levels, but had failed to set any targets since. The Constitutional Court held that this “does not have the minimum character necessary as a protective measure corresponding to the dangerous situation of the climate crisis”, citing the “principle of non-underprotection”, which means that the State must take appropriate measures to effectively protect the constitutional rights of its citizens.

Simultaneously, the Court held that the government’s target for 2030 did not infringe constitutional rights.

See also:
Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea.

Last updated:
29 August 2024.

Categories
2021 Access to a remedy Children and young people Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Non-discrimination Norway Private and family life Right to life

Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway

Summary:
This case was the fourth climate change case brought to the European Court of Human Rights. It was brought by six young Norwegian climate activists aged between 20 and 27, along with two organisations, who alleged that their members’ lives, health and well-being are being directly affected by the escalating climate crisis. The six individual applicants also alleged that, as young people, some of whom belong to an Indigenous community, they are being disproportionately affected by the climate crisis.

The application concerns the Norwegian State’s decision to license continuing exploration for oil and gas in new areas of the Arctic (Barents Sea), and its intention to bring new fossil fuels to market after 2035. The applicants argued that the best available science shows that the emissions from known reserves of fossil fuels will already exceed the carbon budget that remains given the 1.5°C temperature target set in the Paris Agreement.

Citing the seriousness and urgency of the climate crisis, the applicants alleged that the respondent State had failed to take the precautionary measures of prevention and protection required under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (the right to life and the right to respect for private and family life, respectively). They furthermore alleged a breach of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 ECHR. during the domestic court proceedings, as well as a violation of the right of access to an effective domestic remedy under Article 13 ECHR.

Domestic proceedings and the reasoning of the Norwegian Supreme Court:
This case is a follow-up from domestic proceedings that were concluded by a judgment in favor of the State issued by the Norwegian Supreme Court on 22 December 2020. In 2016, the two applicant organizations brought a case against the State’s decision to grant 10 licenses in the Barents Sea (in what is known as “the 23rd licensing round” on the Norwegian continental shelf). On 22 December 2020, the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled that this decision did not violate the right to a healthy environment under Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution. It also found no violation of the ECHR. While it did find that climate impacts should have been assessed, it held that this could be remedied at the development stage (after the licenses in question had been issued). The Supreme Court’s judgment followed rulings from Oslo City Court and the Borgarting Court of Appeal, both of which held that the disputed licensing decision was valid.

In its ruling, the Norwegian Supreme Court considered that there had been no violation of the ECHR in this case because that Convention only applies to “direct and immediate” environmental harms. Although the Supreme Court considered Articles 2 and 8 ECHR and referred to the pending Duarte Agostinho case in its oral ruling, it considered that the case-law as it stood at the time of decision had not been contravened.

Regarding Article 2 ECHR, the Supreme Court held that this only applies to real and immediate risks of loss of life. The question before the Supreme Court, it argued, was the issue of a sufficient link between the domestic administrative decisions and the risk of a loss of life. It considered that it was not clear whether the decisions would in fact lead to emissions, and the threat concerned was in the future.

Regarding Article 8 ECHR, the Court held that this did not cover every harm to the environment, that an impact had to be “direct and immediate” also here, and that efforts by the Committee of Ministers to add a separate right to a healthy environment to the ECHR had failed. The Supreme Court also considered that the Dutch Urgenda judgment was not comparable to the case at hand, because that case concerned already-established climate targets, and not the possible invalidity of an administrative decision.

Given these considerations, the Norwegian Supreme Court held, by a majority of eleven to four, that the disputed licensing decision granting was valid. A minority of four judges dissented, arguing that – although they agreed with the majority’s conclusions on Article 112 of the Constitution and Articles 2 and 8 ECHR – the production licenses awarded in the 23rd licensing round were invalid because of procedural errors in the impact assessment. 

Submissions before the ECtHR in greater detail:
The applicants argued that there is a real and serious risk to their lives and well-being, and to their ability to enjoy their private life, family life and home. They submitted that the Norwegian State had failed to adopt the necessary and appropriate measures to address this risk, and that it had failed to describe and assess the total climate effects, including exported emissions, of continued and expanded extraction of oil and gas from the Arctic, thereby also violating the applicants’ rights.

The six individual applicants submitted that they have experienced climate anxiety, emotional distress and great worry about the
current and imminent risks of serious climate harms, and the impact on their lives, life choices, and the lives of future generations. They referred to mental health literature, which increasingly draws attention to such concerns, described in the application as “pre-traumatic stress.”

The applicants noted that, under current climate policies, the average temperature in Norway is expected to rise by more than 5.5 degrees Celsius by 2100. There had already been an increase in extreme rainfall events, flooding and landslides. Future impacts will include increased risk of drought and forest fire-inducing thunderstorms, changes to flood systems, sea level rise and ocean acidification.

The applicants noted that there is a significant difference between planned fossil fuel extraction and Norwegian climate goals. The applicants submitted that State representatives stated before the Norwegian Supreme Court that Norway will continue to produce and export petroleum as long as there are buyers. They noted that Norway is the 7th largest exporter of emissions in the world, and the 3rd largest per capita, behind Qatar and Kuwait. There is no system in place to declare, assess, calculate, or reduce exported emissions from fossil fuels extraction projects, nor the exported emissions from oil and gas extraction overall.

On victim status, the applicants alleged that the licensing of fossil fuels extraction is too complex for individuals and young people to challenge alone. The organizations in question are not only better suited to challenge such decisions, but they also claim to represent future generations.

The applicants alleged that Articles 2 and 8 ECHR had been violated because of the presence of a real, immediate and serious risk to these rights, of which the State had actual or putative knowledge and regarding which it failed to adopt reasonable and appropriate preventative measures. They invoked the principle of prevention, and argued that the State must adopt a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life. They argued that an unequal burden has been placed on younger generations, and those unborn. The applicants argued that the threats against their rights are ongoing since temperature increase cannot be reversed and the authorities must act immediately to prevent the harms in question.

Under Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy), the applicants argued that the Norwegian courts did not assess the merits of the Convention claims in full and based on ECtHR case law.

Under Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination, they argued that there were disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, citing the factors of young age and the fact that two of the individual applicants were members of the indigenous Sami minority, whose traditions, land and resources are negatively impacted. Due to their age, the young applicants, they submitted, had no opportunity to participate in the relevant decision-making while at the same time having to shoulder a heavier burden concerning the long-term consequences of the acts and omissions in question.

Interim developments:
The 10 disputed licenses were returned and relinquished by the companies concerned given that no potentially profitable gas discoveries were made. On 11 March 2022 Norway re-licensed the area covered by one of the disputed licenses (no. 855) under the so-called APA system for mature areas. The original license had covered the drilling of two wells, one of which had discovered an oil column but was ultimately considered have limited economic potential. The new production license for the area, no. 1170, is valid until 11 March 2030. It allowed the discovery of two significant gas deposits adjacent to and geologically part of Wisting, the largest undeveloped oil discovery on the Norwegian continental shelf. The two wells were plugged and abandoned after evaluation, but their discovery remains valid and open to development.

In 2019, the Ministry awarded twelve new petroleum production licenses to eleven companies in the 24th licensing round. In 2021, the Ministry awarded four new petroleum production licenses in the 25th licensing round. In addition, the Government also granted licenses under the system of Awards in Predefined Areas (“APA”), which relate to the mature areas of the Norwegian continental shelf.

On 8 April 2022 the Government approved the recommendation of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of a report that states that “The Norwegian petroleum industry will be further developed” and “[t]he licensing system will remain unchanged. Permits will continue to be granted to explore for oil and gas in new areas.” This same report indicates that licensees must “assess the climate impacts of production and combustion emissions when considering all new plans for development and operation (PDOs), and highlight the assessments in decisions related to those plans”. The Ministry also indicated that it would follow up to the Norwegian Supreme Court’s judgment in this case by “conducting an assessment of the climate impacts of production and combustion emissions when considering all new development plans (PDOs). The scope of the assessment will be adapted to the scale of the resources in the individual development.”

Judgment of the ECtHR of 28 October 2025:
On 28 October 2025, the Second Section of the ECtHR issued its unanimous judgment in this case, examining the applicants’ claim that the 2016 decision granting 10 petroleum production licenses was contrary to Norway’s obligation to mitigate climate change, which was adversely affecting the lives, living conditions and health of the individual applicants and other persons whose interests were represented by the applicant organizations. The Court, in doing so, engaged in an extensive comparative exercise. It noted the 2024/2025 climate-related advisory opinions issued by the ITLOS, IACtHR and ICJ, summarizing their findings as well as noting environmental treaties (the Aarhus Convention and Espoo Convention) and the (R (Finch) v Surrey County Council judgment of the UK Supreme Court.

After these considerations, the Court turned to the scope of the case before it. It held that the scope of the case as defined by the domestic proceedings was narrow, given that it concerned “an allegedly faulty decision-making process in one specific round of licensing of petroleum exploration, which would precede petroleum production” (para. 282). Contrasting the case with the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Grand Chamber judgment, the Court held that Greenpeace Nordic “concerns the State’s procedural, rather than substantive, obligations, and is moreover limited to ten exploration licences”, while nevertheless raising “the issue of an alleged failure of the State to effectively protect individuals from the serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life” (para. 282). The Court also decided to examine the case only under Article 8 ECHR, the right to respect for private and family life, and not to examine the complaint made under Article 2 ECHR, the right to life (paras. 283-284).

The Court then examined the victim status and locus standi of the applicants under Article 34 ECHR, applying the criteria developed in the 2024 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Grand Chamber judgment. On individual victim status, the Court applied the high-threshold, two-step KlimaSeniorinnen test that requires (a) a high intensity of exposure and (b) a pressing need to ensure individual protection of the applicants. For the NGOs, it applied the KlimaSeniorinnen representative standing test that requires associations to be (a) lawfully established in the jurisdiction, (b) dedicated to the defense of climate rights, and (c) genuinely qualified and representative. The Court combined the assessment of these two tests with the merits of its examination of Article 8 ECHR, and ultimately found that the individual applicants, including the youth and Indigenous applicants, had not satisfied the individual victim status test. However, it did find that the legal persons had standing to bring a representative application.

The Court’s reasoning in this regard first examined whether there was a “sufficiently close link” between the disputed 2016 licensing decision and the risk of climate-related impacts on ECHR rights. It held that:

294. “The Court observes that while exploration will not always, and certainly not automatically or unconditionally, be followed by extraction, in Norway, it is both a legal and a practical precondition for it. (…) [P]etroleum would not be extracted but for the opening of an area for extraction, and the granting of production licences. The fact that other events and permits are also necessary before extraction can take place does not break that chain of causation. When considering causation for the purposes of attributing responsibility for adverse effects arising from climate change, the Court has not required it to be shown that “but for” a failing or omission of the authorities the harm would not have occurred (…). The Court further observes that the link between petroleum exploration and its future production is inherent. (…) The Supreme Court itself observed that the SEA had to include all stages of the petroleum production, from exploration to development, extraction, transport, exploitation and termination (…). In these circumstances, it is clear that the petroleum project in question was of such a nature as to entail potential risks of extraction.”

The Court went on to find that the relinquishment of the 10 licenses “does not break the required causal nexus for the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention”, emphasizing the preventive function of the right of access to information and observing that “the Convention guarantees a right for affected individuals to be informed about the environmental effects of a planned activity” which means that “[t]he procedural nature of the right to information and the preventive function of that right make the applicability of the provisions in question independent of the later materialisation of the risk” (para. 295). The Court also noted that the previously licensed areas could be automatically re-licensed for exploration under the APA system, meaning that “even a relinquished licence maps out an opened area for future discoveries” (para. 296). The Court went on to hold that

297.  Having established the link between exploration licensing and extraction, the Court also notes that oil and gas extraction is the most important source of GHG emissions of Norway (…), and that the burning of fossil fuels, including oil and gas, is among the main causes of climate change (…).

This meant that there was a sufficiently close link between the disputed licensing procedure and serious adverse effects of climate change on the lives, health, well-being and quality of life of individuals (para. 299).

Examining this with regard to individual victim status, the Court held that “no grievances about the personal situation of the six individual applicants were examined in the disputed judicial review of the 23rd licensing round” (para. 301). Nevertheless, it noted that “the crux of these applicants’ complaint concerns the adverse effects of climate change which they, as young people, are suffering as a result of the respondent State’s allegedly inadequate action on climate change, particularly as a result of the authorisation of further petroleum production.” It considered these to be localized claims, focused on the specific situation prevailing in Norway and noting the climate impacts in that country, including ocean warming, rising air temperatures, seasonal effects and forest and fish stock degradation (para. 302). However, it found that the individual applicants (applicants nos. 2‑7) did not fulfil the criteria for victim status under Article 34 ECHR. Albeit noting the Indigenous rights implications of the case – the fact that that three of the six individual applicants identify as members of the Sámi people – it held that “[w]hile the Court fully appreciates that climate change poses a threat to the traditional Sámi way of life and culture (…), it cannot conclude that the hardships that the situation complained about may be causing the three applicants personally are of “high intensity”” (para. 303). Neither had arguments about the mental health impacts of climate change been adequately substantiated. However, the Court did note “the seriousness of conditions such as climate anxiety or climate grief” (para. 304), but found that it lacked evidence to examine this in light of ECHR rights. Likewise, it lacked medical evidence indicating “any particular morbidity or any other serious adverse effect on their health or well-being that had been created by climate change and would go beyond the effects which any young person living in Norway and having a degree of awareness about climate change might experience” (para. 305). On this basis, it rejected the individual victim status of the applicants.

On representative locus standi, the Court applied the three-step KlimaSeniorinnen test, finding that the two NGOs concerned, Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth, met all three criteria of that test. They enjoyed standing in the domestic courts and “act in the interest of the general public and of future generations – and, in the case of Young Friends of the Earth, also in the interest of its members – with the aim of ensuring effective climate protection”, meaning that they take “legal action to address the effects of climate change in the interests of its members and/or other persons affected by specific climate change impacts” (para. 309). As a result, the Court was satisfied that these two organizations represented “a collective means of defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change in the respondent State” (para. 310).

Under Article 8 ECHR, the Court began its merits analysis by setting out the nature of the State’s positive obligation in the specific context of climate risk. It reiterated that Article 8 protects individuals against serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life, and that the Contracting State must ‘do its part’ to ensure effective protection against such risks through an adequate legal and administrative framework. The Court underlined that this obligation is not purely theoretical: States are required to organize their decision-making in a way that meaningfully addresses climate-related risks that may interfere with the enjoyment of Convention rights (para. 314).

At the same time, the Court accepted that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the specific measures they adopt to discharge their climate-related obligations under Article 8, including how they balance climate protection against other competing interests.

That margin of appreciation is nevertheless framed and limited by what could be described as three considerations of particular weight. First, in any such balancing, climate protection must be afforded ‘considerable weight,’ reflecting both the severity and the irreversibility of climate harm. Second, greenhouse gas emissions are cumulative and transboundary, meaning that the harmful effects of present-day decisions will manifest and intensify over time and are not confined to national borders. Third, despite longstanding scientific warnings, States collectively have not yet acted sufficiently to avoid dangerous climate change risk, and there remains only a ‘rapidly closing window of opportunity’ to secure a liveable future. In the Court’s view, those elements reinforce the urgency and seriousness of climate mitigation as a human rights concern (paras. 315-316).

The Court then specified how Article 8 operates in procedural terms. It recalled that, in environmental cases, its analysis often centers on whether the domestic decision-making process provided adequate procedural safeguards, rather than on substituting its own assessment for that of national authorities. In the climate context, this procedural obligation see itself in a requirement that States, before authorising an activity which could significantly contribute to climate change and thereby threaten the protected interests under Article 8, carry out an environmental impact assessment that is adequate, timely and comprehensive. The assessment must be conducted in good faith, rely on the best available science, and be sufficiently concrete and detailed to inform the authorities’ decision at a stage when all options (including refusing the project) are genuinely open (para. 318).

This assessment must, at a minimum, allow identification and, so far as possible, quantification of expected greenhouse gas emissions arising from the proposed activity; evaluate the compatibility of that activity with the State’s domestic and international climate obligations; and address not only direct operational emissions but also downstream emissions (scope 3) that would result from the eventual use of the extracted petroleum, including where that combustion would take place outside the State’s territory. The Court also stressed that meaningful public participation is an integral part of this procedural duty. Individuals and communities affected by the climate risks associated with a project must have access to relevant information and a genuine opportunity to express their views early enough in the process to influence the outcome (paras. 319–320). Crucially, the Court held that

319.  In the context of petroleum production projects, the environmental impact assessment must include, at a minimum, a quantification of the GHG emissions anticipated to be produced (including the combustion emissions both within the country and abroad; compare, mutatis mutandis, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, § 550). Moreover, at the level of the public authorities, there must be an assessment of whether the activity is compatible with their obligations under national and international law to take effective measures against the adverse effects of climate change. Lastly, informed public consultation must take place at a time when all options are still open and when pollution can realistically be prevented at source.

The Court situated these procedural requirements within broader developments in international law, noting the converging obligations articulated in recent advisory opinions by international courts and tribunals such as the 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinion; the 2025 EFTA Advisory Opinion; the 2024 Advisory Opinion of the ITLOS; and the IACtHR Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 (paras. 320–324).

Against that normative structure, the Court turned to the Norwegian system. It noted that petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf proceed in three administrative stages: first, the opening of an area for petroleum activities, following a strategic environmental assessment and parliamentary involvement; second, the granting of exploration licenses (the stage at issue in the present case); and third, the approval of a Plan for Development and Operation (PDO), which is required before any extraction can begin (para. 326).

The applicant organizations had argued that Norway failed to comply with Article 8 because, prior to awarding the exploration licenses in 2016, the authorities did not conduct a sufficiently comprehensive climate impact assessment. In particular, they submitted that there had been no assessment, at that stage, of the total climate effects of future extraction, including exported combustion emissions, no evaluation of the project’s compatibility with the remaining carbon budget aligned with the 1.5°C temperature goal, and an overall approach that prioritized economic projections over climate constraints. They also challenged the position taken by the Norwegian Supreme Court, namely that any deficiencies could simply be addressed later at the PDO stage, arguing that deferring climate assessment to the PDO stage was contrary to EEA and international law and, in practice, ineffective (paras. 328-329).

The ECtHR accepted an important part of the applicants’ arguments at the factual level. It observed that the domestic procedures leading to the 2016 licensing decision were ‘not fully comprehensive,’ in that the strategic environmental assessment did not include all stages of the petroleum project, particularly the downstream combustion emissions. It noted that the Norwegian Supreme Court acknowledged this omission but considered that it could be remedied at the later PDO stage (para. 330).

However, the Court did not consider those gaps, taken alone, to amount to a breach of Article 8. Instead, it asked whether, looking at the process ‘as a whole,’ Norway had put in place procedural guarantees capable of ensuring that no petroleum extraction project would proceed without a sufficiently rigorous climate assessment and an opportunity for effective public challenge. The Court based its reasoning on three following elements.

First, it attached weight to the legal position, confirmed by the Norwegian Supreme Court, that the granting of an exploration license does not create any automatic entitlement to extract petroleum. Under Norwegian law, extraction cannot commence without approval of a PDO by the competent ministry. The authorities therefore retain both the power and, under Article 112 of the Constitution, the duty to refuse a PDO if climate or environmental considerations so require (para. 331).

Second, at the PDO stage, Norwegian law requires an environmental impact assessment and public consultation. This assessment must address the climate impacts of both production and combustion emissions and be reviewed by the authorities in light of Norway’s domestic and international climate commitments. The Court also noted the Government’s formal undertaking, following the domestic litigation, to ensure that all future PDOs include such assessments and that their results are explicitly reflected in the approval decisions. These commitments, in the Court’s view, confirmed that downstream emissions and compatibility with climate targets would be examined before any extraction could begin (paras. 332–334).

Third, the Court observed that affected individuals and organisations have access to environmental information and opportunities to participate in the PDO-stage decision-making, which is subject to administrative and judicial oversight before any extraction begins. Because the PDO stage precedes production, the Court considered that meaningful preventive control remains possible at that point (paras. 333–334).

The Court further observed that, under Norwegian law interpreted in light of EEA environmental requirements, impact assessments at the PDO stage must take account of cumulative and transboundary climate effects, including downstream or ‘exported’ emissions from the eventual combustion of petroleum. It considered that this mechanism, assessed together with the wider procedural safeguards of the Norwegian system, adequately addressed the applicants’ concern that such emissions had been overlooked at the earlier licensing stage. On that basis, the Court concluded that, although the environmental impact assessment at the licensing stage was incomplete, the Norwegian system, assessed in its entirety, still satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8. In light of this, the Court unanimously found that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (paras. 336-337).

Thus, the decisive point for the Court was that there are effective safeguards built into the approval process for actual extraction: extraction cannot begin without a PDO; the PDO must be preceded by a climate-focused assessment and public participation; the authorities are under a duty to refuse the PDO if climate considerations so require; and those decisions remain open to challenge. The Court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Norwegian authorities, no indication that the PDO stage is structurally incapable of correcting earlier deficiencies, and no indication that those safeguards are purely theoretical or illusory. It therefore held that Norway had remained within its margin of appreciation in structuring climate-related assessment across multiple stages, and that the deferral of a full climate assessment to the PDO stage, while not ideal from the applicants’ perspective, did not in itself breach Article 8 as long as the PDO stage functions in the manner described above.

Concerning the complaint under Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination), the Court considered that it was not necessary to examine whether this provision was applicable as concerned the individual applicants because this complaint was in any event inadmissible given the failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Citing its own subsidiarity and the exhaustion rule in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Court noted that “the individual applicants did not avail themselves of any domestic remedy in their own name” (para. 350). It held that “while the applicants complained before the Court that not invalidating the 2016 licensing decision constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of the individual applicants’ age and of ethnic status, no such complaint had been made, even in substance, in the course of the domestic judicial review proceedings, and, in particular, before the Supreme Court” (para. 351). As a result, the applicants had not afforded the domestic courts with the requisite opportunity to examine or remedy this complaint, and it was declared inadmissible.

As concerned Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy), the Court held that the domestic courts “duly engaged” with the applicant organizations’ arguments and duly examined their claims, in line with the requirements of Article 13, and that their review powers were not limited in the sense of precluding them from examining the applicants’ complaints. The fact that the domestic courts ultimately held that the omission to conduct a prior assessment did not invalidate the licensing decision, as that could be rectified at the next PDO stage, and did not mean that their examination of the issues had been superficial (para. 363). The ECtHR also noted that the Norwegian Supreme Court devoted a separate section of its judgment to whether ECHR rights were engaged. The fact that the Supreme Court’s conclusion could be called into question in the light of the Court’s findings in this case did “not mean that the assessment was insufficient or that it was not diligently undertaken” (para. 354). The ECtHR itself noted that the approach taken in this case represented “a significant development in Convention case-law”, based on the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment. It ultimately declared the Article 13 complaint manifestly ill-founded in light of this reasoning.

Date filed:
15 June 2021

Date communicated:
6 January 2022 (press release).

Date of judgment:
28 October 2025

Adjudicating Body:
European Court of Human Rights

Status of case:
Decided by a Chamber formation of the ECtHR on 28 October 2025.

Suggested case citation:
ECtHR, Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway, no. 34068/21, Judgment of 28 October 2025.

Case documents:
Link to the text of the application: click here.
The full text of the judgment is available below.

CASE OF GREENPEACE NORDIC AND OTHERS v. NORWAYDownload

Last updated:
28 October 2025

Categories
2021 Access to a remedy Children and young people EU/European Court of Justice Non-discrimination Private and family life Right to life Victim status

Armando Carvalho and Others v. Parliament 

Summary:
This case, also known as ‘The People’s Climate Case’, was brought by families from different Member States of the European Union. The families, who are active in the agricultural or tourism sectors, brought the case to the General Court of the European Union together with a Swedish association representing young indigenous people. They claimed that the measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that had been laid down by a legislative package from 2018 were not far-reaching enough. They demanded stricter measures: the aim should be to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 – 60% by 2030, when compared to 1990 levels. In doing so, the applicants argued that an insufficient reduction in greenhouse gas emissions infringed their fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, namely the right to life (Article 2), the right to the integrity of the person (Article 3), the rights of the child (Article 24), the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation (Article 15), the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16), the right to property (Article 17) and the right to equal treatment (Articles 20 and 21).

The General Court declared the action inadmissible because the claimants had no locus standi. The claimants appealed to the Court of Justice. They claimed that the Court should set aside the order under appeal, declare the actions at first instance admissible, and refer the case back to the General Court. The Court of Justice dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the claim that an act of the EU infringes fundamental rights is not sufficient to establish admissibility of an action brought by an individual.

Deciding body:
European Court of Justice (European Union)

Date of resolution:
25 March 2021

Admissibility:
The General Court declared the action inadmissible because the claimants did not satisfy any of the locus standi criteria under its strict ‘Plaumann’ test. The Court held that the claimants were not individually concerned, because they were not the addressees of the acts at issue. The Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, and emphasized that the mere fact of alleging that a legal act of the Union infringes fundamental rights does not mean that an individual’s action is admissible; otherwise the meaning of the admissibility requirements laid down in the TFEU would be meaningless. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the European Union courts cannot, without exceeding their powers, deviate from the express provisions of the TFEU, this also applies to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Full text
The full text of the decision is available here.

Further developments:
EU Regulation 1367/2006/EU, the ‘Aarhus Regulation’, was amended on 6 October 2021. This decision expanded NGO’s abilities to challenge administrative acts contravening environmental law. For an analysis of ensuing developments by Juliette Delarue, see here.

Additional reading:
On the 2019 decision on the case by the General Court, see Gerd Winter, ‘Armando Carvalho and Others v. EU: Invoking Human Rights and the Paris Agreement for Better Climate Protection Legislation’ 9(1) Transnational Environmental Law (2020), 137-164, available here.

Suggested case citation:
ECJ, Armando Carvalho and Others v. The European Parliament and the Council, no. C-565/19 P, Judgment of 25 March 2021.

Last updated:
26 August 2023


Categories
2020 Canada Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Non-discrimination Public trust doctrine Right to life Standing/admissibility

Cecilia La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen

Facts of the case:

Plaintiffs comprising of 15 children and youths from various parts of Canada sued the Government and Attorney General of Canada alleging violations of the right to life and right to equality under Sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the constitutional and common law duty to protect the integrity of common natural resources in public trust. According to the plaintiffs, the impugned conduct of the respondents consisted in: continuing to cause, contribute to and allow a level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions incompatible with a Stable Climate System (defined as a climate capable of sustaining human life and liberties); adopting GHG emission targets that are inconsistent with the best available science about what is necessary to avoid dangerous climate change and restore a Stable Climate System; failing to meet the Defendants’ own GHG emission targets; and actively participating in and supporting the development, expansion and operation of industries and activities involving fossil fuels that emit a level of GHGs incompatible with a Stable Climate System.

The defendants, while accepting the plaintiffs’ concerns about the seriousness of climate change and its potential impacts, filed a motion to strike their claim alleging that their claim is not justiciable.

Date of decision:

27 October 2020

Admissibility:

On 27 October 2020 the Federal Court in Ottawa granted the defendants’ motion. The Court answered the question of justiciability of the claims of Charter violations for the reason that the impugned conduct is of undue breadth and diffuse nature, and that the remedies sought by the plaintiffs were inappropriate. The Court also found that it had no constitutional obligation to intervene on the matter as there is room for disagreement between reasonable people on how climate change should be addressed. On the issue of justiciability of the public trust doctrine invoked by the plaintiffs, the Court found that the question of existence of the doctrine is a legal question which courts can resolve. However, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ claim did not disclose a reasonable prospect of success for the purposes of its admissibility.

Merits:

NA

Status of the case:

The plaintiffs have appealed against the Federal Court’s order before the Federal Court of Appeal.

Suggested case citation:

Federal Court of Ottawa, Cecilia La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen, T-1750-19, judgment of 27 October 2020, 2020 FC 1008

Case documents:

For the complaint filed by the plaintiffs on 25 October 2019, click here.

For the Government’s statement of defence notified on 7 February 2020, click here.

For the plaintiff’s reply to the Government’s motion to strike, filed on 31 August 2020, click here.

For the Federal Court of Ottawa’s order dated 27 October 2020, click here.

For the Memorandum of Appeal filed by the plaintiffs on 5 March 2021, click here.

Further reading:

Camille Cameron, Riley Weyman, ‘Recent Youth-Led and Rights-Based Climate Change Litigation in Canada: Reconciling Justiciability, Charter Claims and Procedural Choices,’ 34(1) Journal of Environmental Law (2021), Pages 195–207. Available here.

Categories
2020 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Mexico Non-discrimination Right to a healthy environment Right to health

Greenpeace Mexico v. Ministry of Energy and Others

Summary:
This indirect amparo suit was brought by Greenpeace Mexico against the Mexican government, contesting the Mexican Sectoral Energy Plan for 2020-2024. Greenpeace argued that this policy promotes the use of fossil fuels over sustainable energy sources, thereby violating fundamental rights. The case invokes the pro persona principle and the human and constitutional rights to equality, a healthy environment, the protection of health, and access to renewable energy, as well as the legality principle. It also invokes the principle of progressive interpretation of human rights and the concept of positive and negative obligations.

In 2020, a Mexico City District Court ordered the suspension of the policy in an injunction.

Procedural steps:
The Third District Administrative Court for Mexico City declined to hear the case on grounds of lack of specialization in the matter. On 8 September 2020, the Mexico City District Court accepted to hear the case.

On 21 September 2020, the Mexico City District Court issued an injunction suspending the Sectoral Energy Plan (2020-2024). The court noted the imminence and irreparability of the harms at stake, finding that the it was an ‘indisputable fact’ that the limitation of the production and use of renewable energies encourages the operation of conventional electricity generation technologies using fossil fuels and thereby causing greater emissions, which affects human healthy and the environment. Because of this, the degree of imminence and irreparability of the risk at stake did not require specific proof, because it had been established through logical reasoning (p. 29).

Date of filing:
20 August 2020

Suggested citation:
Mexico City District Court, Greenpeace Mexico v. Ministry of Energy and Others, injunction no. 372/2020, 21 September 2020.

More information:
The full text of the injunction is provided on climatecasechart.com.

Categories
2019 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Gender / women-led Non-discrimination Pakistan Paris Agreement Private and family life Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to life Uncategorized Vulnerability

Maria Khan et al. v. Federation of Pakistan et al.

Summary
Five people identifying themselves as women filed a writ petition, under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, against the Federation of Pakistan, the Ministry of Climate Change, the Ministry of Energy, the Alternative Energy Development Board, and the Central Power Purchasing Agency. The petitioners alleged a violation of their fundamental rights, recognized by Articles 4 (inalienable rights), 9 (right to life), 14 (right to privacy) and 25 (equality of citizens, notably regardless of sex) of the Constitution of Pakistan, as the respondents infringed their right to a clean and healthy environment and a climate capable of sustaining human life (as recognized in the Leghari v. Pakistan case) by failing to take climate change mitigation measures, and specifically measures to develop renewable energy resources and transition to a low-carbon economy.

The petitioners highlighted that Pakistan had ratified the Paris Agreement and submitted its INDC, committing to a reduction of 20% of its 2030 projected GHG emissions, but then failed to engage in any renewable energy power project. This was seen to represent an abdication of the respondents’ responsibilities under the Public Trust Doctrine (namely their duty to act as trustees of the natural resources of the country), and a violation of the jurisprudence of the seized Court on environmental and climate justice.

Notably, the petitioners claimed that being women and mothers, they are particularly endangered by global warming and disadvantaged in the context of the climate crisis, as documented in scientific research and international reports. Therefore, the respondents have allegedly violated Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan in that climate change disproportionately affects the rights of the petitioners and more broadly of all Pakistani women.

The remedies demanded by the petitioners are: the declaration of the violation of the above-mentioned fundamental rights and of the breach of Pakistan’s commitments under the Paris Agreement; the declaration of a positive duty on the respondents to encourage and support the development of renewable energy projects to reduce GHG emissions and mitigate climate change impacts; the order to implement and enforce the Paris Agreement to the fullest extent possible and to create and implement an integrated policy towards climate resilient development.

Date of filing:
14 February 2019, Misc. Writ 8960/19

Date of last hearing:
21 January 2021

Jurisdiction:
High Court of Lahore, Pakistan

Documents:

  • Petition (in English, via Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Global Climate Litigation Database)
  • Order (in English, via Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Global Climate Litigation Database)

More information:
Independently of the above-summarized judicial proceeding, on 21 July 2022, the Government of Pakistan adopted the “Climate Change Gender Action Plan of the Government and People of Pakistan” (you can read it here).

Last Updated:
18 May 2023