Category: Emissions reductions/mitigation

Categories
Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Farming Japan Paris Agreement Right to a healthy environment Right to health Right to life Right to property Right to pursue happiness

Call4 et al. v. Japan

Summary:
On 18 December 2025 and 4 April 2026, two lawsuits were filed in Japan against the Japanese government’s inaction on climate change. The first suit was filed with the Tokyo District Court on behalf of 452 plaintiffs from all over Japan, including victims of heatstroke, individuals who work in primary industries such as agriculture and fisheries, and children. The second suit, again with the Tokyo District Court, was filed on behalf of 454 additional plaintiffs.

The (in total) 906 plaintiffs in these twin cases summarize their claims as follows:

First, they challenge the legality of the government’s emissions reductions targets, given their inconsistency with the 1.5-degree warming target set out by the Paris Agreement. They challenge the reduction targets set out in the most recent Japanese NDC and the country’s 7th Global Warming Countermeasures Plan, both dated February 2025. Under these instruments, the government’s current targets aim for a 39% emissions reduction by 2030, a 52% reduction by 2035, and a 67% reduction by 2040 compared to 2019 levels, which the plaintiffs argue is incompatible with IPCC science, the 1.5-degree target, and Japan’s obligations as a highly developed nation.

Second, the plaintiffs argue that the government’s failure to enact effective legislation to achieve the 1.5-degree target is unconstitutional. They submit that “currently in Japan, there are no laws that set greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2030 or 2035, nor are there any legally binding emission standards.” They argue that “[t]he right to live peacefully in a stable climate without fear of harm to one’s life, health, or property is a human right that should be guaranteed by the Constitution”, as well as invoking the constitutionally guaranteed right to live peacefully.

In doing so, the plaintiffs draw on IPCC reports and explicitly refer to climate litigation in domestic and international jurisdictions, including the ICJ’s climate advisory opinion.

More information:
More information on the case, as well as case documents, are available here.

The applicants’ submissions in both cases (in Japanese) are available for download below.

Filing in the first caseDownload
Filing in the second caseDownload

Suggested citation:
Tokyo District Court, Call4 et al. v. Japan, filings of 18 December 2025 and 4 April 2026 (pending).

Categories
2026 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to life Separation of powers United States of America

Kaarina Dunn et al. v. Public Service Comission of Wisconsin, et al.

Summary:
On 23 April 2026, a court in the US state of Wisconsin ruled in a youth climate case against the Wisconsin Public Service Commission and the Wisconsin State legislature. The case was filed by fifteen young people ranging in age from 8-17. The youth plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of statues governing the approval of fossil fuel-fired power plants because those statutes limit the ability of the first respondent, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, to consider air quality impacts of when issuing permits for such plants. In doing so, they had invoked their rights, under the Wisconsin state constitution, to liberty and to life, as well as the rights to a stable climate system and to access, enjoy and use navigable waters (both of which they considered inherent within the constitution). They also alleged a violation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.

According to the Plaintiffs, climate change has rendered them unable to enjoy Wisconsin’s natural resources, like its rivers and lakes, as well as prevented them from engaging in recreational activities, like swimming and skiing. Some are deprived of their Indigenous cultural traditions, while others have experienced asthma and contracted Lyme disease.

The judge tasked with resolving this case, Judge Julie Genovese, ruled that “[w]hile the court is sympathetic to the youths and admires their willingness to access the courts in their quest to protect the planet, I conclude that the case must be dismissed because environmental policy is a nonjusticiable political question”. The judge discussed Wisconsin’s political question doctrine, which “dictates that courts will not decide questions that require the court to determine what the best or wisest public policy would be”, and “also embodies a practical component, recognizing that matters of economic and social policy are not reasonably “susceptible to judicial management or resolution.””

The judge concluded that:

“by substituting this court’s judgment for the legislature, the court
would be showing a lack of respect for the legislative and executive branches. Plaintiffs do not like these policy decisions. (…) Because Plaintiffs think it is technologically and economically feasible for Wisconsin to be carbon free by 2050, they conclude that by invalidating the statutes and thus their limitations, the PSC will decide to stop approving fossil fuel-fired plants, and Plaintiffs’ carbon free goal will be achieved. While the court may agree with Plaintiffs’ policy preferences, it would show a blatant lack of respect for our elected officials and the agency defendants to substitute my judgment for theirs, and strike the limitations imposed by the legislature and executed by the PSC. Accordingly, because the court concludes that the legislature’s policy decisions represent a nonjusticiable political question, this case must be dismissed.”

Full text of the judgment:
The full text of the judgment is available for download below.

Decision Wisconsin 2026Download

Submission on behalf of the state:
The submission made on behalf of the state government can be downloaded below.

Filing Legislature’s attorney Ryan WalshDownload
Categories
2026 Children and young people Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Non-discrimination Right to health Right to life Standing/admissibility Sweden Uncategorized

Aurora v. Sweden (Aurora Case II)

Summary

On 6 February 2026, the youth-led association Aurora launched a climate lawsuit before the Nacka District Court against the government of Sweden alleging a violation of their rights to life, health and well-being as well as the prohibition of discrimination (based on age). The case is a follow-up to Anton Folley and Others v. Sweden (Aurora Case). That case was a class action suit brought by over 600 young individuals (supported by Aurora), which the Supreme Court of Sweden dismissed as inadmissible on the ground that the plaintiffs did not meet the high threshold for individual victim status articulated by the European Court of Human Rights in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen et al. v. Switzerland judgment.

Relying upon the criteria for ‘victim status’ and the standing of associations to litigate climate cases laid down in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, Aurora argues that this fresh case is admissible and that the district court may proceed to examining the substantive claims.

Claims:

The substantive claims in Aurora II are largely the same as the claims which were made in the Aurora case, with the new petition drawing upon more recent climate jurisprudence, including the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change to support its case. In the petition, Aurora identifies a lack of measures or intermediate emission reduction targets envisaged for the period after 2030, and problematizes Sweden’s emissions debt (i.e. the exceedance of its national fair share of the global carbon budget) as failures to exercise due diligence in the discharge of positive obligation to protect individuals who Aurora represents from serious threats to the enjoyment of their rights. The petition also invokes the findings of the IPCC to argue that children and youth, who Aurora represents (majority born between 1998 and 2026), are at a particular risk from climate change, in order to demonstrate the disparate impact of Sweden’s failure to effectively contribute towards climate mitigation. The petition requests the court to handle the case with urgency, to declare violations of Articles 2, 8 and 14 and an order the government to pay legal costs incurred by the plaintiffs.

Response from the State

In June 2026, the Swedish government responded to the case. It agreed that the Aurora case should be heard on its merits, but argued that Sweden action on climate change is already sufficient to protect human rights. This means that the case will now move to examination by the district court, which will determine whether Sweden’s overall climate efforts are sufficient to protect human rights from the effects of the climate crisis.

The State’s submissions (in Swedish) can be downloaded below.

Statens svaromålDownload

Links

  • For the petition (in Swedish) filed by Aurora, see here.
  • For the press release by Aurora announcing the case, see here.

Status

Pending

Suggested citation

Nacka District Court, Aurora v. Sweden, filed on 6 February 2026 (pending).

Last updated

2 July 2026.

Categories
2026 Blog Class action Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Margin of appreciation Private and family life The Netherlands

Bonaire Climate Case: Creative or Questionable Interpretation of International Climate Law?

Pranav Ganesan, PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich

The Greenpeace Netherlands v. State of the Netherlands (Bonaire) judgment of the Hague District Court has stolen the limelight as the new posterchild for strategic climate litigation. The plaintiff in this case, Greenpeace Netherlands, argued that the Dutch government failed in its duty to protect the residents of Bonaire, an island in the Caribbean which formally attained the status of a special municipality of the Netherlands in 2010. Although it is a special municipality (bijzondere gemeente), it is just as much a part of the Netherlands as any other province in the European Netherlands. The Dutch government owes obligations under international human rights law, including those arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), towards residents of the municipality. That international human rights law requires states to undertake climate mitigation measures and adaptation measures, as informed by international climate change law where relevant, has been affirmatively held in two advisory opinions from international courts and the European Court of Human Rights. And the proposition that the Dutch government’s duty of care towards its population essentially includes obligations under the ECHR was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in material respects, the Hague District Court’s reasoning was so heavily based on international law.[1] In terms of the scope of state conduct implicated in this case, it outdoes the Urgenda case,which only concerned contributions to the mitigation of climate change. The Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiff that the Dutch government had violated Article 8 ECHR as well as the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR), the former due to inadequate mitigation measures, inadequate implementation of those measures, delays in adopting an adaptation plan for Bonaire and late provision of procedural safeguards to the residents of Bonaire. In this blog, I provide a quick analysis of the District Court’s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement in the section on mitigation measures. Readers interested in learning about the adaptation component and how the court addressed discrimination claim are welcome to read this blogpost by Wewerinke-Singh.

There are areas in the judgment where the District Court’s assessment of the compatibility of the Dutch Climate law framework with international climate law is questionable. The first glaring issue is that the court made a finding of non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement based on the absence of ‘absolute emissions reduction targets’ in the Dutch Climate Act of 2019 (para 11.13.1). The problem identified by the court was that the targets were expressed as goals that the government would ‘strive to achieve.’ However, this does not mean that the targets are not absolute. The difference between absolute and relative emissions reductions targets being whether they are expressed as percentage reductions in comparison to the emissions during a fixed baseline year, as opposed to reductions from a business as usual scenario in case of relative targets (Winkler et al 2014, 636). The use of the expression ‘strive to achieve’ means that the nature of the obligation to achieve the target is one of conduct rather than result, reflecting the nature of the obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures in pursuance of NDCs communicated under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement (ICJ Advisory Opinion, paras 251-253). Another connected example is the court’s declaration that ‘UN standards’ require emission reduction targets to be expressed as percentage reductions to be achieved by the target date, in comparison to 2019 levels as opposed to the 1990 baseline (para 11.13.2). Moreover, strictly speaking, Article 12(8) of the UNFCCC does not require the EU to provide information about each member state’s national carbon budget like the court suggests (para 11.15.3). The court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions might be technically imprecise, but it is undoubtedly bold, being based on the need for exemplary efforts from a developed country like the Netherlands, and reflecting the appropriate sense of urgency in light of the results of the First Global Stocktake (para 11.9.4). Through its interpretive moves, the court effectively hardened ‘soft’ obligations (i.e. normative expectations) sourced from the Paris Agreement and COP decisions (on hard and soft obligations in the Paris Agreement, see Rajamani, 2016).

A final noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the rather detailed response to how the notion of ‘equity’ in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Articles 2(1) and 4(1) of the Paris Agreement is to be applied in reviewing states’ mitigation commitments. Equity is an elusive concept, with debates on what an equitable distribution of the global emissions reduction burden entails having remained unsettled since the inception of international negotiations on the topic of climate mitigation (Oliver Herrera et al, 2025). The court provided the (un)acceptability of a ‘grandfathering approach’ as an example of one such debate (para 11.13.5). But it did not go so far as to hold that the grandfathering approach is legally impermissible because it is inequitable per se, or that an equal per capita emissions approach is the minimum standard under international law. Rather, it assessed the Netherlands’ policy negatively on account of its failure to justify why its current policy, which is based on the controversial grandfathering principle and falls short of the ambition required by the equal per capita emissions approach, is equitable in accordance with Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC and Article 4(1). It thus did not use equity to dictate the outcome of what exactly the Dutch government’s fair share of the global carbon emissions ought to be. At same time, it did not use the underlying controversy as a reason to entirely avoid reviewing the substance of the Dutch climate mitigation policy. This is underscored by its remedial findings, wherein the court declared that the Netherlands’ current mitigation commitments were inequitable, thereby leading to a breach of Article 8 (para 12.1), but dismissed Greenpeace’s request ordering the adoption of specific emissions reduction targets by the government, or at least a carbon budget reflecting the ‘equal per capita emissions approach’ (paras 8.1 (IV)-(VI), 11.55 and 11.58).

Overall, the Bonaire judgment shows how climate litigation can lead to precarious precedents. On the one hand, the way the Court engaged with the concept of equity provided an assessment of Dutch mitigation ambition which was notably pragmatic and might serve as inspiration for other courts when asked to answer the fair share question. On the other hand, the judgment risks signaling to states that legal texts—which negotiators toiled to craft in ‘constructively ambiguous’ terms—may be stretched by domestic courts to uncomfortable extents. Ultimately, the appellate court’s scrutiny of this case (should the Dutch government file an appeal) will reveal how this judgment will be remembered: whether it will be hailed for its boldness or criticized for its questionable interpretation of international treaties.

[1] André Nollkaemper commented: ‘Today’s judgment of the District Court of The Hague fully lives up to the reputation of Dutch courts as strongly international law-minded. […] The conclusion is firmly anchored in international law. With 29 references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, 64 references to the European Court’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, 64 to the UNFCCC, 62 to the Paris Agreement, and 12 to COP decisions, this surely ranks high on the list of climate change cases that are most shaped by international law.’

Categories
Access to a remedy Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Emissions reductions/mitigation Fair trial Fossil fuel extraction Human dignity Imminent risk Inter-American Human Rights System Non-discrimination Private and family life Public trust doctrine Right to a healthy environment Right to culture Right to health Right to life Right to property United States of America

Our Children’s Trust with 15 Juliana Plaintiffs v. The United States of America

Summary:
On 23 September 2025, the NGO Our Children’s Trust announced that it had filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging climate-related violations of human rights by the government of the United States of America on behalf of a group of youth. This petition follows the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on climate change, which was issued on 29 May 2025, as well as drawing on the climate advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The petitioners were formerly plaintiffs in the Juliana proceedings brought before US domestic courts on the basis of the public trust doctrine, among others.

Before the Inter-American Commission, the petitioners allege that the United States has known for decades that CO2 emissions cause climate change and that a transition away from fossil fuels is needed to protect human rights. They argue that, as the world’s largest emitter, the United States has played a leading role in causing climate change, and that its greenhouse gas emissions — and the resulting climate change — violate the human rights of children and youth, who are disproportionately impacted by its effects.

They claim before the Commission that the United States has failed to comply with its international obligations to guarantee the petitioners’ human rights, that it has a duty to prevent harm to the global climate system to guarantee those rights, that it brached its obligation to act with due diligence ot guarantee their rights and prevent harm to the climate system, that if violated its obligation to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions,a form of pollution, and that the United States’s deliberate emissions of greenhouse gasses violate the substantive rights of the petitioners as per the American Declaration, including the rights to life and health, the particular protections for children, equality and non-discrimination, the rights to home, property and private and family life, the right to culture, the right to dignity, and the right to a healthy climate.

They also invoke their procedural rights, namely the rights to access to justice and an effective remedy, alleging that the United States Department of Justice has deployed “extraordinary tactics” to silence the petitioners, and that the domestic courts failed to consider the merits of their claims.

In their request for relief, the petitioners inter alia request the Commission to:

  • order precautionary measures to prevent further irreparable harm;
  • join the admissibility and merits of the petition, in accordance with Article 37(4) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, given the serious and urgent nature of the case and the ongoing violations of Petitioners’ fundamental rights;
  • conduct an on-site country visit, including a visit with the Petitioners, and hold fact-finding hearings;
  • establish violations of Articles I (life), II (equality), V (private and family life), VI (family), VII (special protections for children), IX (inviolability of the home), XI (health), XIII (cultural life), XVIII (access to justice and effective remedies), XXIII (property), and XXIV (prompt and effective remedy) of the American Declaration and the rights to dignity (Preamble) and to a healthy climate; and
  • issue a country report with recommendations to the United States to remedy confirmed violations of international law, taking into account the clarifications of existing law set forth by the IACtHR and the ICJ in their in Advisory Opinions on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights and the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change.

Full text of the petition:

The full text of the petition can be found below.

_2025.09.23+Juliana-IACHR+PetitionDownload

Suggested citation:

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Our Children’s Trust with 15 Juliana Plaintiffs v. The United States of America, petition filed on 23 September 2025.

Categories
Business responsibility / corporate cases Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights New Zealand

Smith v. Fonterra

Summary:
This case was brought by Michael John Smith (Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Kahu), who is the climate change spokesperson for a Māori development platform known as the Iwi Chairs’ Forum, and who is also the applicant in the case of Smith v. Attorney-General. In the present case, he brought proceedings against seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand who are involved in agriculture and energy sectors (namely Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd , Genesis Energy Ltd, Dairy Holdings Ltd, New Zealand Steel Ltd, Z Energy Ltd, Channel Infrastructure NZ Ltd and BT Mining Ltd.). He claimed that the emissions caused by these corporate actors constituted a public nuisance, acts of negligence, and a breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change. The New Zealand courts have issued a series of decisions on this case.

On 6 March 2020, the High Court of New Zealand struck out the first two causes of action (public nuisance and acts of negligence), but allowed the third (reach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change) to proceed.

After, on 21 October 2021, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Smith’s appeal and upheld the cross appeal of the respondents, Mr Smith received leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on 31 March 2022. On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court unanimously allowed Mr Smith’s appeal, and reinstated his statement of claim, and referred the case back to the High Court to proceed to trial (for more detail on the Supreme Court’s judgment, see below). After a series of procedural decisions, a substantive hearing in the case by the High Court was scheduled for April 2027.

Current state of the proceedings:
On 7 February 2024, the Supreme Court of New Zealand reinstated the two dismissed tort causes of action and remanded the case to the lower court (the High Court). It held that the public rights pleaded laid an appropriate foundation for a nuisance claim. It also held that it was premature, at this stage of the proceeding, to conclude that the common law was insufficient to address the tortious aspects of climate change. Determining whether the actions of respondents, seven high-emitting companies in New Zealand, amount to a ‘substantial and unreasonable interference’ to public rights is a fact inquiry to be analyzed according to policy factors and human rights obligations.

On remand, the interlocutory applications raised noteworthy cost questions. The sixth defendant, BT Mining, sought an order for security for costs and Mr. Smith applied for protected cost orders (PCO). Here, the court has a wide latitude of discretion. It dismisses BT Mining’s request citing, among other considerations, access to justice concerns. Regarding Mr. Smith however, the court relies on the Edwards factors: (1) whether an issue of significant general or public importance is raised; (2) whether the applicant’s stance is seriously arguable; (3) whether the applicant is genuinely impecunious; (4) the position of the respondent, including “any unjust advantage likely to accrue to it absent the order”; and (5) any reasonable alternatives to making the order.

Reluctant to grant, the court emphasized the exceptional nature of a PCO in these proceedings. Mr. Smith, however, draws on Munkara v Santos NA Barossa Pty Ltd (No 4), an Australian Federal Court decision that ordered nonparty funders, the Environmental Defense Office, to pay costs to Santos, an oil company who defeated claimants’ petition for injunctive relief in the construction of a pipeline, to remind the court of the significant chilling effect of potential costs exposure on charitable funders. The court draws a distinction between a third-party funder and a ‘pure funder’ to reason that it would be highly unlikely for a costs award to be made against one that did not seek to benefit financially from the litigation nor seek to control its course. Unsatisfactory, but absent disclosure of third-party donor(s), the court declines Mr. Smith’s PCO application in its entirety. The decision, however, is without prejudice, leaving the door open to re-application with third-party funder identification.

Suggested citation:
Smith v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2024] NZSC 5, [2024] 1 NZLR 134.

Last updated:
19 September 2025.

Categories
Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Fossil fuel extraction Renewable energy Right to life Separation of powers United States of America

Lighthiser v. Trump

Summary:  
On 29 May 2025, a case was filed on behalf of 22 youth plaintiffs from five US states (Montana, Oregon, Hawai‘i, California, and Florida) before the US District Court in the District of Montana with the support of the NGO Our Children’s Trust and others. The plaintiffs in this case contested a series of climate-related executive orders issued by the Trump administration, arguing that these measures threaten their constitutional rights to life, health, and safety. This includes executive orders aimed at “unleashing” fossil fuels, anti-clean energy measures and those removing climate science-related information from federal websites.

The case was brought against US President Donald Trump as well as various government agencies and offices including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the Interior (DOI), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the United States of America itself.  

Measures challenged:
The lawsuit challenged three specific executive orders, as well as measures to delete climate science information from government websites. The contested executive orders are the following:

  • Executive Order 14154: “Unleashing American Energy” (which prioritizes oil, gas, and coal over renewable energy).  
  • Executive Order 14156: “Declaring a National Energy Emergency” (which directs federal agencies to invoke emergency powers to fast-track fossil fuel production).
  • Executive Order 14261: “Reinvigorating America’s Beautiful Clean Coal Industry” (designating coal as a “mineral” under federal policy, thereby granting it priority status for extraction and development on public lands). 

Claims made:
The youth plaintiffs argued that the Trump administration’s executive orders violate their constitutional right to life (under the fifth amendment to the US Constitution) by increasing climate pollution. They also argue that the measures are an act of executive overreach, or in other words an ultra vires act going beyond presidential powers, and that augmenting fossil fuel production, suppressing climate science, and blocking clean energy solutions is a violation of the ‘state-created danger doctrine’, which triggers a governmental duty to protect against government-induced harm.

Dismissal of the case:
On 15 October 2025, the United States District Court for the State of Montana dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing, denying them leave to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs appealed this decision with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on 2 June 2026, affirming the decision of the district court to dismiss the case. The Ninth Circuit Court held that:

by effectively challenging hundreds of current and anticipated agency actions in one lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to circumvent the jurisdictional and procedural rules Congress has established for challenges to agency actions. Such a sweeping injunction against hundreds of agency actions in one lawsuit is unprecedented.

Suggested citation:
US District Court of Montana, Lighthiser et al. v. Trump, CV 25–54–BU–DLC, 15 October 2025.

US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Lighthiser et al. v. Trump, D.C. No. 2:25-cv-00054-DLC, 2 June 2026.

Last updated:
24 June 2026.

Categories
Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation European Convention on Human Rights Fair trial Farming Just transition litigation Paris Agreement Private and family life Right to development and work Right to health Right to life Right to property Separation of powers Standing/admissibility Switzerland Uncategorized Victim status Vulnerability

Uniterre et al. v. Swiss Department of the Environment (Swiss Farmers Case)

Summary:
On 5 March 2024, a group of nine individual Swiss farmers, along with 5 associations representing farming-related interests, submitted a request to the Swiss Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication (DETEC), demanding enhanced governmental action to protect them against the impacts of climate change. Noting increasing summer drought periods that particularly impact their human and constitutional rights and livelihoods, they alleged inadequacies in the existing Swiss climate policy response. In doing so, they submitted that:

As farmers and as associations defending the interests of farmers, the Petitioners and Petitioner Associations are particularly affected by climate change, which infringes their fundamental rights. It affects their harvests and jeopardizes the viability of their farms. Climate disruption has been encouraged by the Authority’s climate inaction. This serious negligence on the part of the Authority now justifies the filing of the present petition (translated from the original French).

Response by DETEC:
On 20 September 2024, DETEC rejected the petitioners’ request, finding that the alleged omissions did not impact the individual petitioners more intensely than other segments of the population, meaning that they lacked an interest worthy of protection, as well as standing. The same result was reached concerning the five petitioning associations (which are Uniterre, Kleinbauern-Vereinigung, Biogenève, Schweizer Bergheimat and Les jardins de cocagne).

The request to DETEC was made pursuant to Art. 25a of the Swiss Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), requesting that the government (and more specifically DETEC) should refrain from the alleged unlawful acts impacting the petitioners’ human and constitutional rights and livelihoods. Art. 25a APA provides that:

In other words, Art. 25a APA allows persons whose rights or obligations are impacted by ‘real acts’ of the federal authorities to seek a (subsequently legally contestable) ruling concerning the situation. This approach has been used by climate litigants to contest policy lacunae given that constitutionality review of existing federal legislation is not possible under Swiss Constitutional law. A similar request was the starting point of the landmark KlimaSeniorinnen case that was ultimately decided upon by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2024.

However, and much like the KlimaSeniorinnen association and its members, the present petitioners did not succeed with their request to DETEC. On 20 September 2024, DETEC rejected their request. Uniterre, one of the petitioning associations, argued that DETEC had thereby ignored the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, which established that there were access to justice issues for climate applicants in Switzerland by finding a violation of the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).

DETEC’s reasoning did note the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment. First, it argued that the ECtHR had not considered recent developments in Swiss climate policy, emphasizing that Switzerland had a “long history of climate policy” and had only “barely” missed its 2020 national emissions reductions target. DETEC also noted the domestic findings in the KlimaSeniorinnen case, where Swiss courts had left open the question of whether the applicant association in that case had standing. It did not, in doing so, mention the later ruling of the ECtHR, which found that the conduct of these domestic proceedings and particularly the domestic instances’ treatment of the association’s standing claim had violated fair trial rights. Instead, it relied only on the reasoning of the domestic instances in KlimaSeniorinnen to find that the plaintiffs in the present case did not have a sufficient interest to seek legal protection given that they had failed to demonstrate “how they are more affected by the material acts of which DETEC is accused than the rest of the agricultural world, or other economic sectors that may be impacted by global warming (forestry, fishing, etc.), or other groups of people (children, pregnant women, the elderly, etc.). Nor do the individual Claimants establish for each of them that a particular level and severity of damage is likely to be caused by climate change.” (translated from the original French). DETEC found that “what is at stake in the application is the protection of the community as a whole, and not just of individuals, so that it is akin to a form of actio popularis [meaning] that the individual applicants are pursuing public interests that cannot justify victim status.”

Concerning the standing of associations, DETEC noted that the Swiss federal executive had “rejected the extension of associations’ right of appeal to include climate issues, as set out by the European Court of Human Rights [in KlimaSeniorinnen]”. It also noted that the associations did not pursue the specific goal of defending the fundamental rights of their members or other affected individuals in Switzerland, and that alleging that they did do so would be impossible because the associations in question “were all created before the global awareness of the threat of anthropogenic global warming, and therefore before the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992.”

Overall, DETEC found that while it could not rule out “that the State’s material acts (actions or omissions) in the field of climate change are in principle capable of producing sufficient effects on the Petitioners to affect the right to protection of private and family life, the right to protection of the home guaranteed by art. 13 para. 1 Cst. as well as the guarantee of property (art. 26 Cst.) and economic freedom (art. 27 Cst.) [and] that Switzerland can, in a global context, have an influence on global warming, the fact remains that it is too small to have a decisive influence in this area, in the sense that there is no direct causal link between the actions or omissions of Switzerland and the effects of global warming, the latter being marked above all by the major industrial powers” (translated from the original French). This meant that “Switzerland’s material actions, while morally and politically relevant, have only a marginal effect on global climate change”.

Case before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal:
On 23 October 2024, the plaintiffs challenged the DETEC decision before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal. They invoked four main grounds for appeal, namely that:

  • By ignoring the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen ruling, the decision violates federal law, the principle of the separation of powers and the binding force of judgments of the ECtHR (art. 46 ECHR). In particular, the applicants argue that the federal executive has undermined judicial oversight “by arrogating to itself the right to emancipate itself from judicial control”.
  • DETEC’s actions and omissions are contrary to law, as is clear from the KlimaSeniorinnen ruling.
  • The (individual) appellants have standing to bring an action, contesting DETEC’s arguments about the limited impact of Swiss emissions on a global scale and arguing that there is no right to “l’égalité dans l’illégalité”. They emphasized the economic losses and health impacts facing the appellants, with impacts on several fundamental rights, and argued that the refusal to recognize the affectedness of the applicants represented a denial of access to justice and a violation of the right to a fair trial as enshrined in domestic law and Article 6 ECHR.
  • The appellant associations have standing as parties, and DETEC’s refusal to follow the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (KlimaSeniorinnen) in this regard had violated fair trial and access to justice entitlements enshrined, among others, in Art. 6 ECHR. The ECtHR had not required associations’ statutes to explicitly mention fundamental rights protection. Furthermore, the statutes and aims of the five associations all related to protecting smallholder, sustainable and/or biological farming, with one association (Uniterre) explicitly pursuing the protection of the human rights of peasants and other rural workers as recognized in the 2018 UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants (UNDROP).

The plaintiffs sought orders to the effect that:

  • An expert study should be commissioned concerning the contribution of climate change to worsening drought in Switzerland and reducing agricultural productivity;
  • The government should be ordered to take every measure needed to avoid negative climate impacts and contribution to chronic drought on Swiss territory, abstain from actions causing corresponding impacts, and take every measure capable of reducing or eliminating the impacts of climate change, chronic drought, and the rights violations complained of.
  • A violation of the right to life (Art. 10 of the Swiss Constitution/Art. 2 ECHR), the right to private life (Art. 13 of the Swiss Constitution/Art. 8 ECHR), the right to property (Art. 26 of the Swiss Constitution, Switzerland not having ratified the first additional protocol to the ECHR that enshrines this right), and the right to economic liberty (Art. 27 of the Swiss Constitution) had taken place.
  • A violation of the climate objectives and environmental protection requirements enshrined in domestic legislation had taken place, insufficient measures had been taken to ensure respect for the Paris Agreement, and overall the sum of the action taken with a direct or indirect impact on the climate had been insufficient.

Status of the case:
Pending before the Swiss Federal Administrative Tribunal.

Case documents:
The full text of the initial request as submitted to the Swiss Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication (DETEC) is available below, as made available by Advocat.e.s pour le Climat (in French).

2024-03-05-Plainte-25a-PA-AvoC-caviardeeDownload

The DETEC decision is available below.

2024-09-24-DETEC-a-ANL-Decision-concernant-la-requete-du-5-mars-2024_caviardeeDownload

The full text of the appeal to the Federal Administrative Tribunal is available below.

2024-10-24-Recours-au-TAF_caviarde (1)Download

Further reading:

  • More information on the case is available via SwissInfo.
  • See also the comment by Charlotte E. Blattner, Robert Finger & Karin Ingold in Nature.

Suggested citation:
Swiss Federal Administrative Court, Uniterre et al. v. Swiss Department of the Environment (Swiss Farmers Case), case filed 23 October 2024 (pending).

Last updated:
2 June 2025.

Categories
Adaptation African Court on Human & Peoples' Rights Business responsibility / corporate cases Children and young people Children's rights/best interests Climate activists and human rights defenders Climate-induced displacement Deforestation Disability and health-related inequality Elderly Emissions reductions/mitigation Environmental racism Evidence Extreme poverty Farming Gender / women-led Human dignity Indigenous peoples rights Indigenous peoples' rights Loss & damage Minority rights Non-discrimination Paris Agreement Participation rights Private and family life Prohibition of torture Renewable energy Right to a healthy environment Right to assembly and association Right to development and work Right to education Right to freedom of expression Right to health Right to housing Right to life Right to property Right to subsistence/food Rights of nature Sea-level rise Self-determination Standing/admissibility Victim status Vulnerability

African Court on Human and People’s Rights Climate Advisory Opinion

Summary:
On 2 May 2025, a request for an advisory opinion on climate change was submitted to the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The request was submitted by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), in collaboration with the African Climate Platform, and other African Civil society Organizations including the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, Natural Justice and resilient40, and seeks clarification of States’ obligations in the context of climate change.

Submitted under article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights and Rule 82(1) of the Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, the request submits that “[a]cross the continent, Africans are suffering the consequences of climate change, whether from rising temperatures, unrelenting droughts, catastrophic floods, vanishing biodiversity, or threats to livelihoods. Climate change in Africa has had prior, current and will have future consequences that impact the enjoyment of numerous rights.”

The request sets out impacts, disaggregating them region-by-region and in terms of the groups of people most affected by climate change (mentioning women and girls, children, the elderly, Indigenous peoples, and environmental human rights defenders in particular).

The request then goes on to discuss several issues of law, beginning with issues of admissibility and jurisdiction and then relying on a wide range of rights and instruments, namely:

  • a) the Constitutive Act of the African Union
  • b) the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), especially articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 60 and 61
  • c) African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)
  • d) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)
  • e) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
  • f) The Revised African Convention on Conservation of Nature
  • g) Any other Relevant Instrument.

In doing so, PALU invites the Court to consider international climate change law, including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as well as the UN Conventions on Combatting Desertification and on Biological Diversity.

Rights invoked in more detail:
PALU submits that “a rights-based climate approach is needed to address the challenges posed by climate change” and that the human rights framework “provides a robust legal framework upon which the Court may rely to define States’ responsibilities and duties in the context of climate change […] because the Charter clearly provides for collective rights and the explicit protection of the right to a healthy environment.” PALU accordingly invites the Court to consider the following provisions of the Banjul Charter:

  • Articles 2 and 3 (equality and non-discrimination)
  • Article 4 (right to life and inviolability of the human person)
  • Article 5 (right to respect for dignity and prohibition of all forms of exploitation and degradation, including slavery and torture)
  • Article 8 (freedom of conscience and religion)
  • Article 9 (freedom of information and opinion)
  • Article 10 (freedom of association)
  • Article 11 (freedom of assembly)
  • Article 12 (freedom of movement, residence and asylum; prohibition of mass expulsion)
  • Article 14 (right to property)
  • Article 16 (right to health)
  • Article 17 (right to education)
  • Article 18 (protection of the family, prohibition of age and gender discrimination)
  • Article 19 (equality of peoples, prohibition of domination)
  • Article 20 (right of peoples to existence and self-determination)
  • Article 21 (right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources)
  • Article 22 (right of peoples to their economic, social and cultural development)
  • Article 23 (right of peoples to national and international peace and security)
  • Article 24 (right of all peoples to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development)
  • The request also discusses the implied rights to food and shelter.

Issues for determination:
PALU submits the following issues for determination by the Court (paraphrased):

(a) Whether the Court can be seized with the question of obligations concerning climate change under the Banjul Charter and other relevant instruments?

(b) Whether the Court can interpret and lay down applicable custom and treaty law regarding States’ obligations and duties in the context of climate change?

If these questions are resolved in the affirmative, the Court is invited to further determine:

(a) What, if any, are States’ human and peoples’ rights obligations to protect and safeguard the rights of individuals and peoples of the past (ancestral rights), and present and future generations?

(b) Whether States have positive obligations to protect vulnerable populations including environmental human rights defenders, indigenous communities, women, children, youth, future generations, the current generation, past generations, the elderly and people with disabilities from the impact of climate change in line with the relevant treaties?

(c) What human rights obligations do States have to facilitate a just, transparent, equitable and accountable transition in the context of climate change in Africa?

(d) What are the obligations of African States in implementing adaptation, resilience and mitigation measures in response to climate change?

(e) What, if any, are applicable human rights obligations of States to compensate for loss, damage and reparations?

(f) What responsibilities, if any, do African States have in relation to third parties, including international monopolies, multinational corporations and non-state actors operating on the continent, to ensure that international and regional treaties and laws on climate change are respected, protected, promoted and implemented?

(g) What, if any, is the nature of the obligations on African States to cooperate with other states especially historical emitters to limit global warming to below the 1.5°C threshold, to avert an existential climate crisis for present and future generations on the continent?

Further reading:
For more information on the advisory opinion request, see this post by Yusra Suedi.

Suggested citation:
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Request for an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in addressing the climate crisis, filed 2 May 2025 (pending).

Last updated:
23 May 2025

Categories
2025 Domestic court Emissions reductions/mitigation Ireland Just transition litigation Private and family life Renewable energy Victim status

Coolglass Wind Farm Limited v. An Bord Pleanála

Summary:
In a January 2025 judgment, the Irish High Court of Planning and Environment ruled in favor of an appeal challenging the refusal of planning permission for a wind farm development. In doing so, it applied EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as interpreted in the 2024 KlimaSeniorinnen judgment by the European Court of Human Rights, to find that the relevant planning authority needed to have regard to Ireland’s renewable energy targets.

Facts of the case:
In a judgment delivered on 10 January 2025, the Irish High Court of Planning and Environment ruled on the refusal of planning permission for a wind farm development. The case raised an issue of statutory interpretation relating to the Irish Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015, as amended in 2021. Planning permission for the wind farm project sought by Coolglass Wind Farm Limited was refused by the responsible board (An Bord Pleanála, Ireland’s national independent planning body that decides appeals on planning decisions made by local authorities) because it was contrary to planning regulation and rules on sustainable development of the area. Coolglass appealed, arguing that the Board was failing to approve adequate planning applications to meet Ireland’s 2030 renewable energy targets in the Climate Action Plan 2024, and was thereby failing to comply with its obligations under section 15 of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015. Coolglass also argued that the board’s decision was incompatible with the ECHR and with Regulation (EU) 2022/2577 of 22 December 2022 laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.

Findings:
The Court, in a ruling by Humphreys J., upheld the appeal by Coolglass. It held that the board had failed to exercise its powers in a manner that complied (as far as practicable) with Ireland’s climate objectives and policies, and that this failure also constituted a breach of duty under the European Convention on Human Rights, read in light of the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, as well as a breach of EU law obligations.

On the human rights aspect of the case, the Court ruled that:

109. I agree with the applicant that one must conclude that art. 8 of the ECHR imposes a positive obligation on the State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework with respect to climate change designed to provide effective protection of human health and life, and a further positive obligation to apply that framework effectively in practice, and in a timely manner.
110. Ireland has a framework of course but (as discussed above under the heading of EU law conformity) it is clear that it is not being complied with. The latter failure, on the logic of Klimaseniorinnen, involves a breach of art. 8 of the ECHR.
111. The application of the framework in practice is crucial. As we know from the termination of pregnancy context (Case of A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, ECHR 2010 (https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-102332)), the Strasbourg court takes a dim view of a situation where there are laws on the books but a failure to put in place practical arrangements to implement them.
112. The problem for the opposing parties here is firstly that an interpretation of s. 15(1) that allows the climate goals in legislation to fall by the wayside due to a failure by the board to exercise discretionary powers to override development plans is an interpretation that fails to conform with ECHR obligations contrary to s. 2 of the 2003 Act.
113. Secondly, the failure by the board to use its discretionary powers in that manner constitutes a failure to act consistently with ECHR obligations contrary to s. 3 of the 2003 Act.
114. The board rather weakly raises the defence that a body corporate doesn’t have locus standi to argue for the right to a private life in a climate-relevant sense under art. 8 of the ECHR. But that isn’t the point of course. Whether an individual applicant has standing in a hypothetical case or not doesn’t affect the interpretation of a statutory provision. The point being made is that the court should interpret the 2015 Act as amended in an ECHR-compatible manner. Such an interpretation supports the applicant’s proposition that s. 15(1) should be read as meaning what it says.
115. Thus the requirement to read legislation in an ECHR-compliant manner supports an interpretation of s. 15 that goes beyond the board’s have-regard-to interpretation and the State’s meaningful engagement interpretation. It reinforces the applicant’s case that the interpretation should ensure that ECHR obligations are complied with in practice, including compliance in practice with stated goals in relation to renewable energy infrastructure.

Overall, the Court ruled that:

116. Sometimes (although not as often as some people think) the language, context and purpose of a provision, or the requirements of EU law conformity or ECHR conformity, pull in different directions. This is not such a case.
117. On the contrary, all vectors of interpretation point strongly in the same direction – the need for an imperative reading of s. 15(1) in line with what it says, namely that the board and any other relevant body is required to act in conformity with the climate plans and objectives set out in the subsection unless it is impracticable to do so.
118. I therefore reject the watered-down interpretations of s. 15(1) offered by the opposing parties here and accept the applicant’s interpretation.

The Court granted Coolglass’s appeal and ordered that its planning application be remitted to An Bord Pleanála for renewed consideration. An appeal against the decision to quash the refusal was refused by the Irish Supreme Court on 4 February 2026.

Suggested citation:
Irish High Court of Planning and Environment, Coolglass Wind Farm Limited v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 1, H.JR.2024.0001244, 10 January 2025.

Last updated:
24 June 2026.